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CORRESPONDENCE

OF THE

RIGHT HON.

WILLIAM WICKHAM

VOL. I.

The Right Honourable

WILLIAM WICKHAM.

From the original picture painted at Vienna 1801

THE

CORRESPONDENCE

OF THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM WICKHAM

FROM THE YEAR 1794

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ac

EDITED, WITH NOTES, BY

HIS GRANDSON, WILLIAM WICKHAM, M.A.

TWO VOLUMES

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TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

CHARLES VISCOUNT EVERSLEY

&c. &c. &c.

THIS CORRESPONDENCE OF HIS OWN AND HIS FATHER'S FRIEND

Is Dedicated

WITH VERY GREAT RESPECT AND AFFECTION

BY

THE EDITOR

MAY 1870

PREFACE.

No apology, I think, will be needed for giving this selection to the public. My grandfather held important appointments during some of the most critical and eventful years of our history; he was in the confidence of, and on the most intimate terms with, many of the leading personages of the day both English and foreign; he was acquainted with most of the political secrets of his time, and it so happened that whatever appointment he held was made by circumstances of peculiar importance for the time being; and there can be no doubt that if Lord Grenville had remained in power, my grandfather would have been appointed to posts of greater lustre, though they could hardly have been of greater weight or confidence; but he preferred fidelity to his chief and political consistency to place, and was content to retire from public life at an age when, in these days, many are only beginning to enter it.

There are happily still amongst us not a few who knew my grandfather after his retirement, and cherish the memory of those qualities which adorned his private life; but those who served with him and knew him in his public career, who were witnesses to and felt the force of his public character, have all passed away. One

of them, who survived him, wrote thus on the subject of his retirement:

'Those who have best known Mr. Wickham may regret that, on the retirement of his noble friend Lord Grenville from public life, he should have deemed it a point of dutiful gratitude to do the same; the more so as Lord Grenville, who well knew and appreciated his abilities, his devoted attachment to the service of his country, and his qualifications still effectually to promote the public good, desired him to consider himself perfectly at liberty to join the Administration which was then formed. Had Mr. Wickham continued in public life until the time when the Continental Powers, weary of French oppression, began to call forth their best energies to shake it off, he no doubt would have borne a conspicuous and distinguished share among those diplomatists whose good fortune it was to see the close of the year 1814. Instead of which he adopted a life of country retirement, where he, with the resources of mind he possessed to cheer and adorn any private station, found that quiet kind of domestic happiness he had so long been a stranger to. The dignified suavity of manners he displayed toward persons of his rank and station; the persevering spirit of research and industry which made him never give up a point which it was expedient to elucidate; the peculiar manner, free from any kind of familiarity, but rather founded upon a firm expectation and reliance upon what those he employed were by him expected to do—the confidence he inspired among them by the honest and sincere devotedness to what he deemed his duty, together with the respect he impressed, both by his unflinching integrity of purpose and in his exemplary private relation

of husband, father, and friend, make up a character of which those who have known and loved him will long deplore the loss.'

It may not be out of place here to mention a saying of my grandfather's that illustrates in an interesting manner both his singular insight into character and the goodness of his heart. He was accustomed to say, that among all the persons whom he had promoted and assisted in life (and they were many), he never met with an instance of ingratitude.

He was in the habit of preserving the greater part of his official papers, though he destroyed ordinary or family letters, and I have not come upon a single letter addressed to him before August 1794. These official papers were carefully kept during the last fifteen years of his life when he had no settled home. From the care with which he preserved his papers, and still more from the manner in which he spoke of them to friends, I entertain no doubt that he contemplated the publication of a part of them (though in what form I have no means of knowing), when the proper time should arrive. It was manifest that that time could not be during his life. At his death, in 1840, my father, who was then chairman of the united boards of Stamps and Taxes, had not leisure, and after his retirement from office had neither health nor inclination, for the work; but he often spoke to me of the importance of these documents. My father died in October 1864, and they then came into my possession. Their perusal was a work of time, and the selection one of no little difficulty. My chief object has been to make public such documents as throw light upon the history of the time, and I have also selected such letters, both to

and from my grandfather, as best illustrate his character, serve as a key to his career, and show the esteem in which he was held by so many of the first amongst his contemporaries, some of whose private letters, which seemed to me the most characteristic of their writers, I have inserted.

I may add that out of the collection of papers left by my grandfather (which filled three large chests) there is not one document which, as far as it affects his character, ability, and patriotism, I should not be glad to make public.

The documents have been printed as nearly as possible as they were penned by the writers. I have carefully preserved the original orthography, and the punctuation has been altered only so far as was necessary to avoid obscurity.

WILLIAM WICKHAM.

BINSTED-WYCK: *April* 1870.

DIRECTIONS TO THE BINDER.

Portrait of the Right Hon. William Wickham . . . . . *frontispiece*

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ERRATA.

Pp. 107, 133, 314, *for* Crawfurd *read* Craufurd.
Page 294, *for* Degelman *read* Degelmann.
Page 366, *for* 1696 *read* 1796.
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PEDIGREE OF THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM WICKHAM.

The Pedigree will be found in the Books of the College of Arms, Norfolk ×, *and 18th D*, 14, *p.* 266.

JOHN * WICKHAM = Barbara, daughter of William Parker,† of the ancient family of Wickham of Swacliffe, co: Oxon. Rented the manor house of Honylands, co: Middlesex, of the Crown temp. Henry VIII. of Norton Lees, co: Derby.

WILLIAM * WICKHAM, D.D., = Anthonina, daughter of William Barlow, D.D.,‡ Fellow of Eton and King's College, Prebendary of Windsor, Dean of Lincoln, Bishop of Lincoln, Bishop of Winchester, Prelate of the most noble Order of the Garter. Died 1595. Bishop of Chichester. Died 1608.

HENRY * WICKHAM, D.D., = *Annabella*,§ *daughter of Sir Henry Cholmeley*, Archdeacon of York and Prebendary of that cathedral, Rector of Bolton Percy and Bedale, co: York, and Chaplain to King Charles I. Died 1641. of Thornton, co: York, died 1625; and, secondly, Elizabeth, daughter of John Brown, of Fidlers, co: Essex.

TOBIAS * WICKHAM, D.D., = Elizabeth, daughter of William Wye. Dean and Prebendary of the Cathedral Church of York, and Rector of Bolton Percy. Died 1697, aged 76. Died 1697.

HENRY WICKHAM = Margaret Archer of Barbadoes. Died 1751; Died November 1735, aged 70; buried in York Minster. buried in York Minster.

Anne, daughter of William Calverley. Died 1736, aged 27. = HENRY WICKHAM, D.D., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, Rector of Guiseley, co: York; Chaplain to Princess of Wales. Died 1772, aged 73; buried in Abbey Church, Bath. = Anne Gibson. Died 1744. Elizabeth. Died unmarried at York. Annabella‖ = James Scott, Clerk. *Issue*

HENRY WICKHAM = Elizabeth, daughter and heir of William Lamplugh, of Cottingley, co: York; born September 7, 1731; died October 9, 1804. of Cottingley, Clerk, Vicar of Dewsbury; by Elizabeth, daughter and heir of Thomas Dobson, of Cottingley. Died April 23, 1815.

Mary = Jeremiah Dixon, of Gledhow, co: York. *Issue*

WILLIAM WICKHAM = *Eleonore Madeleine*, daughter of M. Louis Bertrand, by Isabelle Sara Mallet; born, 1763; died, 1836.

Sarah Elizabeth, daughter of Richard Hird. = Lamplugh¶ = Hannah Frances, daughter of Rev. L. S. Lascelles. *Issue* *Issue*

Anne, born 1764, died unmarried at York, 1857.

Harriet, died unmarried.

Annabella, died unmarried, 1800.

HENRY LOUIS WICKHAM, born May 19, 1789; died, 1864. = Lucy, youngest daughter of William Markham, of Becca Hall, co: York.

Elizabeth, died in infancy.

Henry, died in infancy.

WILLIAM WICKHAM = Sophia Emma, youngest daughter of H. F. Shaw Lefevre.

Leonora Emma = Herbert Crompton Herries, eldest son of Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. L. Herries.

Henry Lamplugh Wickham.

Lucy.

Issue

* Each of these persons had other children, but their issue male (except as shown in this pedigree) has become extinct.

† This is the same family as the Parker, Earls of Macclesfield.

‡ Dr. Barlow lived in exile during the Marian persecution; he had five daughters, who all married bishops or archbishops.

§ This lady was, through her grandmother, descended from the Cliffords, Earls of Cumberland.

‖ Mrs. Scott was mother of James Scott, D.D., well-known as Anti-Sejanus.

¶ The late Henry Wickham Wickham, M.P. for Bradford, and Chairman of the West Riding Quarter Sessions, born 1800 and died 1867, was his son.

CORRESPONDENCE

OF THE

RIGHT HON. WILLIAM WICKHAM.

EARLY LIFE.

1761–1794.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, born October 1761, at Cottingley, in the parish of Bingley, in the West Riding of Yorkshire, was the eldest son of Henry Wickham, Esq., of Cottingley, Lieutenant-Colonel in the 1st Regiment of Foot Guards, and a Justice of the Peace for the West Riding. The following curious account of Colonel Wickham's early career, is given by his son :—

'My father was tall and well made, a very manly beauty,* though fair. He looked so like a youth of full growth even at the early age of fifteen, that having escaped from school at Heath in the year 1745, when General Wade's army was encamped on Bramham Moor, he was enlisted, as a young man of eighteen, in one of the infantry regiments, the name of which I have forgotten. His discharge was easily procured, but not until he had marched some time with the corps. His passion for a

* Note by Mr. Wickham. 'The first time I went to Court the King told Lord Rosslyn, near whom I was standing, that my father was the handsomest man in his three regiments of guards.'

military life, and his aversion to Greek and Latin, being alike insurmountable, my grandfather, in the hope of weaning him from the former, and substituting German and French for the latter, sent him in good company to Leipsich, where he remained a year, during which time he acquired a thorough practical knowledge of German. When at Leipsich he lived very much with Mr. Stanhope, Lord Chesterfield's natural son, and with Mr. Eliot, father to Lord St. Germans. He removed from thence to Neuchâtel, where he was placed *en pension* with a clergyman of the name of Lardy, for the sake of learning French. But his passion for the army increasing, with my grandfather's aversion to it, at last, in utter despair of obtaining his object by fair means, he left Neuchâtel in company with two Bern Officers in the service of Piedmont and entered as a volunteer in the regiment to which they belonged, where he remained nearly two years performing all the duties of a common soldier,* but messing with the officers. I have often heard him say, that if he could have obtained a commission in that regiment, he would never have quitted it; but this could not be. It was the regiment of the Canton of Berne, and by their capitulation with the King of Sardinia, none but subjects of that canton could hold commissions in it. In the hope however of conquering that difficulty, he concealed his situation from my grandfather, and would probably have continued to do so some time longer, had he not been discovered standing sentinel at the gates of Alexandria by Sir Charles Turner and Sir Thomas Gascoign, then young men of about his own age, or I believe a few years older. Whilst their passports were examined at the gate, my father, who had been at school with Sir Charles, and knew him perfectly, could not resist the temptation of saluting him by way of a joke. This was a very unmilitary proceeding, and noticed as such; but my father excused himself by the military appearance of the servants. Sir Charles immediately

* Colonel Wickham fought in the bloody battle of Exilles.

recognised him, and very kindly remained a whole day at Alexandria for the sole purpose of engaging him to write to his friends.'*

'In this laudable object he finally, though not without much difficulty, succeeded. My grandfather, finding all further resistance vain, purchased a commission in the First Regiment of Guards for my father, and he remained in that corps (where he acquired the rank of Lieut-Colonel) until my grandfather's death, when he sold out of the regiment, and my grandfather Lamplugh giving up Cottingley to him, he became an active justice of peace, and a resident country-gentleman.'†

Colonel Wickham sent his son to Harrow and to Christ Church, Oxford, where he obtained a studentship.

Of his school days I have been able to discover nothing. It is an extraordinary thing that, except the very imperfect lists published by the late Dean of Peterborough, there is no extant admission book or other record of the boys at Harrow School known before 1829.

Amongst other college intimacies, Mr. Wickham formed lifelong friendships with Mr. Charles Abbot, afterwards Lord Colchester, and Mr. William Wyndham Grenville, afterwards Lord Grenville. His friendship with that great statesman was destined to exercise a powerful influence on his future career. Mr. Wickham graduated B.A. in 1782, and then, according to a common practice of the time for young men to complete their education abroad, proceeded to Geneva, where he studied civil law under

* Note by Mr. Wickham. 'I learnt these details and many more not only from my father, but from Sir C. Turner, whom I once met at Stilton when I was going up to school with Sir J. Gooderich. We all supped together, and the evening was fully employed in listening to Sir Charles' stories of the Alexandrian adventure. I often met him afterwards at the Assizes, where he seldom failed to talk on the same subject.'

† Extract from a letter to his daughter-in-law, Mrs. Henry Wickham, dated Celigny, July 12, 1830.

Amadée Perdriau, a professor of distinction in the university of that republic.

Mr. Wickham took the degree of M.A. in February 1786, and in Michaelmas term of the same year was called to the bar at Lincoln's Inn.

On August 10, 1788, Mr. Wickham was married at the Cathedral of Geneva, to Mademoiselle Eleonore Madeleine Bertrand,* eldest daughter of Monsieur Louis Bertrand, Professor of Mathematics in the University of Geneva. Mr. Wickham had for some years been attached to Mademoiselle Bertrand; their married life, which lasted near forty-eight years, was one of uninterrupted unity. Mrs. Wickham accompanied her husband in his foreign missions, she shared his fatigues, and braved many dangers with him. To a good understanding and much personal beauty she united a disposition so affectionate and gentle, and such a charm of manner, as speedily, though a foreigner, to win the affections of her husband's family, and of his friends; all indeed who knew her loved and respected her.

In 1798 their only child, Henry Louis, was born at Cottingley; and the following year Mr. Wickham was appointed a commissioner in bankruptcy, an office he held for four years, until he was called to more important occupations.

In a letter written to his son from Ouchy, in Switzerland, on the subject of a return required by the Government with respect to pensions granted for diplomatic services, and dated March 27, 1831, Mr. Wickham thus enumerates his own services:—

* 'The Bertrands were a respectable family of the Reformed faith at Montpellier. Antoine Bertrand, driven from his country by the religious persecutions which then desolated the south of France, took refuge at Geneva very early in the last century; his son Antoine married Mademoiselle Madeleine Lafont, and was father of Professor Louis Bertrand; besides whom he had five sons and four daughters, married into distinguished families of Geneva. The male line of the Bertrands became extinct at the death of Horace Bertrand, Mrs. Wickham's first cousin, in 184—.'

'The last return of pensions called for, *with the dates of services*, set me down as having served ten years. This would be saying too little if applied to the whole of my public services, too much if confined to diplomatic services only, publicly acknowledged as such.

'I was secretly employed by Lord Grenville, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,* in a Foreign Correspondance so early as (I think) August, 1793. This correspondance continued till I was appointed Superintendent of Aliens, in the summer of 1794, and I have reason to know that there is no trace of that correspondance in the office nor was it known, though of considerable importance, to anyone but the late Lord Rosslyn then Lord Chancellor, through whose hands it passed to avoid observation by any of the Messengers, &c. of the Foreign Office. This correspondance was continued during the short time that I acted as Superintendent of Aliens to which place I was appointed *(inter alia)* with the express view of enabling me to extend and enlarge my foreign communications and correspondance, for which that office furnished singular facilities and advantages that could have been obtained in no other way. I believe you know that I was promised the Under-Secretaryship of State at that time, with the Alien Department under my direction, in case Mr. Broderick, then Under-Secretary and very ill, should not survive. In the month of October however of that same year a circumstance occurred that made it desirable or rather necessary, that some person of confidence should be sent over on a special mission to Switzerland where Lord Rt. Fitz-Gerald† was at that time Minister Plenipotentiary. The nature and object of this mission was considered so secret and confidential that I never appeared at the Foreign Office at all, and my instructions drawn up in Lord Grenville's

* Lord Grenville was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1791 to 1801.

† Lord Robert Stephen Fitz-Gerald, fifth son of the first Duke of Leinster, b. 1765, d. 1833.

handwriting, were copied by me at my own house and I think never signed, but of that I am not sure. You will find them among my papers, where, however they had better remain, as they would commit two persons now and for a long time past distinguished Legislators in the French Chambers whose sleep I daresay is sometimes disturbed by the fear of my betraying them.* A despatch sent home by me by a servant of Lord R. Fitz-Gerald's, whom I had borrowed for that occasion gave the first intimation at the Foreign Office (about Christmas, 1794), that I had been employed on a diplomatick mission. I need not say that this circumstance was the cause of much jealousy, the effects of which I could not but occasionally feel. Lord R. Fitz-Gerald's servant brought back a leave of absence to the Minister with directions to leave me Chargé d'Affaires during such absence. This is probably the first trace that will be found of my having been employed on diplomatick service though I had been so employed secretly for more than a year and a half. It was I think in June or July 1795 when Lord R. was appointed to the Court of Copenhagen that I was named Minister Plenipotentiary to the Swiss Cantons and the Grisons, having in the meantime had a separate mission to the armies and the conduct of a secret correspondance, of which I doubt whether there is any trace in the Foreign Office; it related to the Royalists in the west, to which country I sent off, so that they all arrived safe, Bourmont,† Sapinaud, Philippeau and seven or eight more who all became more or less distinguished commanders in the Vendée; they were all selected by me from the *cavaliers nobles*, after the strictest enquiry into their respective

* The lapse of thirty-eight years since this letter was written entirely removes the reasons for Mr. Wickham's delicacy: the two persons in question have been long since dead.

† The fact of Bourmont being employed by Mr. Wickham is mentioned by De Puisaye. See a note to *Guerres des Vendéens et des Chouans contre la république Française*, in Berville and Barriere's series, vol. lviii. ch. xxxiv. p. 99.

characters and conduct and several weeks of residence at the head-quarters of the army of Condé. The unbounded confidence reposed in me by Lord Grenville on this, as well as every other occasion enabled me to perform much essential service of this kind without the fear of committing anyone, as it was never expected from me that any names should be mentioned. It is indeed owing to this confidence that the secret respecting the persons of importance who had committed themselves to support General Pichegru is, at this moment, I believe, locked up in my own breast.

'In January 1798, I returned home and was soon after appointed Under-Secretary of State, which place had been kept open for me from the time that I was first appointed Minister Plenipotentiary in Switzerland, the Duke of Portland * having appointed his son-in-law Mr. Greville as *locum tenens* during my absence. In June 1799, I was again sent out with an appointment as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Swiss Cantons, keeping my office of Under-Secretary, with a mission also of great importance to the armies, and subsequently with powers and instructions to make subsidiary treaties and to concert measures against the common enemy under (I believe) one of the largest commissions ever given. I continued to act under this commission until March 1802, when I was appointed Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant † of Ireland in which office I remained until February 1804 when I resigned it contrary to the particular desire of both the Lord-Lieutenant and the Prime Minister for reasons which to me were unanswerable. In the meantime I had been named successively to the missions of Berlin and Vienna both of which courts in succession objected to me, as personally obnoxious to the French Government,

* William Henry, third Duke of Portland, K.G., Prime Minister in 1783, and again from 1807 to 1809. Secretary of State for the Home Department from 1794 to 1801.

† Philip, third Earl of Hardwicke, K.G.

with which they were both of them desirous of keeping well if possible. As this state of things however was not likely to endure for ever, and as this honourable testimony had been given to me by the Government I desired to retire from the public service for a time as a Foreign Minister out of employment, on whatever pension they might think right to give me including Mrs. Wickham's. This was fixed not by me but by Lord Liverpool and Lord Sidmouth, at 1800*l.* a year, but as the portion assigned to Mrs. Wickham was paid from the civil list a fractional sum was added to cover the land tax which Foreign Ministers' pensions do not pay. I have here stated ten and a half years of public service, to which must be added twelve or thirteen months when at Lord Grenville's particular request I took my seat at his Board of Treasury—making in the whole eleven years. These are all my claims from length of service—of the actual service rendered by me during that time I have spoken to you enough on another occasion. When Lord Grenville went out of office in the spring of 1801 it was his intention to have sent me Ambassador to St. Petersburg in which case his nephew, Henry Williams would have gone with me.'

FIRST MISSION TO SWITZERLAND.

1794–1797.

Lord Grenville's Instructions to Mr. Wickham.

MR. WICKHAM will endeavour to learn from Messrs. Mounier* and Mallet Du Pan† the names of the Persons from whom the overtures now made have proceeded, and also the origin of the proposal, whether it came first from Paris to these Gentlemen, or whether it originated with them.

This point being ascertained, if it should appear that the overture merits attention and really proceeds from Persons of weight at Paris he may enter with Mr. Mounier and Mr. Mallet Du Pan into the discussion of the different points of Mr. Mounier's memoire requiring of them the strictest secresy, Mr. Wickham is acquainted with the reasons which seem to make such an Injunction particularly necessary.

He will take as the ground of his discussion the paper called 'Notes sur le memoire remis a Lord Robert Fitz-Gerald' which Mr. W. may deliver to Messrs. Mounier and Mallet Du Pan in order to be shown to the Persons treated with, supposing the business should appear to rest on such grounds as make it fit to be proceeded in.

* Jean Joseph Mounier, b. 1758, one of the most distinguished members of the States General, Préfet and Councillor of State under Napoleon, d. 1806, author of several works.

† Mallet du Pan, a native of Geneva, b. 1749, greatly distinguished as an able political writer, d. in England 1800, where his family settled. Sir Louis Mallet, C.B. is his grandson.

With respect to the Amnisty, the word 'Assassin' is understood to include the authors and principal actors of the massacres at Paris, Lyons, Avignon and other places— and the words which extend the exception to the case of those who have in any marked and ostensible manner, besides that of voting in the Convention, taken part in the murthers of the King or Queen or Madame Elizabeth, are meant to apply to such cases as those of Santerre, who commanded the Guards at the King's execution, of the then executive council who gave the orders for the execution, and of their Secretary who read the sentence to the King and generally to such persons respectively in power at the time as were the real promoters of that and the two other murthers.

But even with respect to all these the general words at the end of the Paragraph are meant to hold out pardon even for these offences to any man without exception who may now render distinguished service.

On the second point it is necessary to observe that the words in the memoire are so general as to make such an agreement as is there proposed inadmissible without further explanation.

The engagement there stated is indefinite as to time, and does not specify in what situation the armies of the Convention are to be placed during the period of this suspense.

In the case of places besieged the allies could not suspend the measures for their relief in the uncertain hope of a Revolution at Paris.

If while the Party with whom we treat are taking their measures at Paris, the armies on the Frontiers are not favourably disposed to them it cannot be expected that we should engage for any suspension of arms on one side which would not be observed on the other.

But if that party has influence enough either through the channel of the Generals of their armies or by means of orders to be given by the Committees of Government

at Paris, to withdraw the Troops into Winter Quarters within their own country, or even within the Austrian Netherlands, holding only such Towns as they may actually have reduced on the Dutch Frontier, in that case an understanding might with more facility be established which should lead either to a virtual or to an avowed suspension of arms in that quarter, and Mr. W. may express his knowledge of the disposition of this Government to consent to any such arrangement supposing the concurrence of Austria can be obtained as seems most likely.

Mr. W. will be very careful to confine his discussions on this point to the armies in Flanders, Holland and on the Rhine and to say nothing that may apply to any Royalists acting in concert or in conjunction with us in the interior of France.

With respect to such a suspension on the side of Spain, it is evident that this cannot be engaged for by this country which has no Troops there, and the same observation applies to the King of Sardinia.

If therefore such a suspension in those quarters is judged necessary for the success of the Plan, application must be made to those powers. But in case of any understanding with this country relative to such a suspension it must be stipulated that the same should be offered to Spain and Sardinia, supposing those Powers willing to accede to it.

With respect to the third point Mr. W. knows that M. Mounier the principal agent in this business is still strongly tinctured with all the prejudices of that party with whom he acted in the commencement of the Revolution.

It may therefore justly be suspected that even without designing it, he may give to any negotiation passing through his hands a turn favourable to those principles and Mr. W. is therefore to observe a particular degree of caution upon all points connected with this subject.

In the discussions on this third head the leading ideas which Mr. W. is to keep in view are

1st. That the King has never desired to interfere for the purpose of giving to France any particular form of Government further than became necessary for his own security and that of the rest of Europe, but having been attacked by the convention and seeing in the principles which all the Republican Parties in France have uniformly professed, the certain ruin of all civil society in Europe if these Principles should be suffered ultimately to establish themselves in so powerful a country as France, he is naturally led to seek as the means of Peace some legitimate principle of Government in that country, which can as it appears only be looked to from the restoration of a monarchy in the person of the undoubted Heir of that Throne.

The Constitution of 1789–90 has allways been considered as vicious and destructive, containing in itself the seeds of its own ruin, and having led by a natural progression to all that has since happened. No approbation can therefore ever be expressed from hence of any Government founded on that Basis.

But if on that ground, or on any other, a just security can be held out to Foreign Nations against the attempts to destroy their Governments, they could have no reason to desire the overthrow of that of France though such as they might think ill calculated to promote the happiness of that country.

These principles led to the acceptance of the surrender of Toulon on the terms then held out, and they are stated in more detail in the King's Declaration of October last.

2. It should however be observed that even to hold out such security as is above mentioned there must be a prospect of permanence in the form of the Government to be established.

If by the restoration of Royalty nothing more is meant

than the proclaiming the young King, keeping him still in a virtual Prison and putting the exercise of his authority into the hands of the convention or its Committees, such a system would differ from the present in name only and all the causes which produce the present instability of power in that country would continue to operate with the same force.

The restoration of monarchy if really intended must necessarily imply the recall of the Princes and the vesting the powers meant to be left to the King in the hands of some person intended to maintain and support them. No personal objection can justly be made to Monsieur and any other plan is full of insurmountable difficulties.

What is so much dwelt on in the paper of Mallet Dupan as to the disposition of the Princes towards systems of revenge and proscription does not appear to rest on any proof.

They have evidently an interest directly contrary to such a line of conduct, and they could not be blind to it, but have in fact uniformly given to this government the most express assurances of their entertaining views of conciliation and moderation conformable to the representations which have been made from hence.

Sufficient securities might however easily be provided against the exercise of any such disposition if it could be supposed to exist. But no permanent tranquillity for France can be procured by a system which should exclude the Royal Family of that country from their just share in the exercise of the Royal authority during the minority of the King.

In one of the papers which Mr. W. has seen an idea is held out as by way of menace of calling to the Throne the son of the late Duke of Orleans.*

If this is any thing more than an idle menace, it seems to require no other comment than that such a measure

* Afterwards King Louis Philippe.

could only lead to perpetuate in France the horrors of Civil War. But it is difficult to believe that this idea can have been seriously entertained, or that any number of people could be found to act in support of it.

4. On the subject of Religion and public worship it is conceived that whatever party really wishes to restore public Peace in France must see that the Bulk of the People there can never be brought back to the Habits of Industry and Subordination but by the aid of Religion, and that is therefore an indispensable part of any plan for the re-establishment of a quiet and well-ordered Government there.

The words used in this respect in the 'Notes sur le Mémoire' do not decide the question as to the mode of supporting the Ecclesiastical Establishment, or the amount of the expense to be allotted for that purpose. But every reasoning man must see the necessity both of a decent maintenance for the Ministers of the established Religion, and also of giving to that profession such encouragement by the prospect of more considerable rewards, as may induce men of rank and liberal education to engage in it.

5. The repeal of all Laws of banishment, Proscription and confiscation is too obviously necessary to require any argument, and it seems to be taken for granted in all that is thrown out on the subject.

6. The future arrangement with respect to Assignats, and to that part of the property of the crown, the church and the emigrants, which has been sold, is a point too difficult to make it possible that the British Government should hope now to propose any satisfactory expedient with respect to it, and the most advantageous measure that could be adopted on that subject by any party wishing the reestablishment of order, would be to reserve the details of that point for future decision under more favourable circumstances, settling only such general outlines as may be necessary in order to remove the alarm

which the idea of a counter-revolution might give in France for the safety of all property of whatever kind now possessed there, and this government would readily make itself the channel of conveyance of any propositions or plans on that subject to which the consent of the Princes and the great body of Emigrants might be necessary.

The present object is first to ascertain the existence of such a disposition as is represented to exist among leading persons at Paris for producing the restoration of monarchy by the means of the interior parties in France, and with no other stipulation on the part of Foreign nations than that of a suspension of arms and a readiness to recommend systems of moderation and prudence, abstaining themselves from taking any direct part in the details consequent upon such an event.

If such a disposition should be found to exist, the next main point is to endeavour to direct it to such mode of accomplishing that object as may be most likely to insure its permanence, giving for that purpose the necessary assurances of a disposition on the part of the British Government to facilitate its attainment by such means as are pointed at in the paper transmitted to us, and particularly undertaking for the King's consent and influence to promise a suspension of arms on the part of the Allies in the Low Countries and on the Rhine during the attempt, if such a suspension can be made reciprocal.

Mr. Wickham accordingly proceeded to Berne, where he had several interviews with Messrs. Mounier, Mallet du Pan, and Dumas. Their plans, which at first seemed plausible, when thoroughly enquired into and sifted by Mr. Wickham, proved to rest on so slight a basis, that he not only refused to make any pecuniary advances to them, but informed them that the whole had taken a turn so very different from what he had expected, that they must excuse him if he proceeded no further in the

business. Mr. Wickham gave a full account of this transaction in a despatch to Lord Grenville, dated November 15, 1794.*

Monsieur Malouet† to Mr. Wickham.

(Received October 11, 1794.)

Voici la première lettre de Mallet du Pan sur les propositions de paix, et ensuite la dernière que j'ay reçue de Mounnier.

Ce n'est pas pour *ne pas importuner* que je ne l'ai pas communiquée, mais pour ne pas paroître courir après des témoignages de confiance qui ne viennent pas me chercher. Ce que j'ai dit au duc d'Harcourt, non sur cette espèce de négotiation mais sur les dispositions de l'intérieur, avoit pour objet, ainsi que mes autres conversations avec lui, de le conduire, et par lui les entours de nos princes, à des vües plus raisonnables sur leur position et sur ce qu'ils auroient à faire pour l'améliorer.

Si les propositions et les moyens de conciliation ont quelque consistance, il peut être utile aujourd'hui que les lettres de Mallet Dupan soient connues du ministre, et d'après ce que m'a dit M. Whicam je les lui confie volontiers. J'ai l'honneur de lui souhaiter le bonjour.

M.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

(No. 1.) Downing Street, Dec. 9, 1794.

Sir,—The King having been pleased, in compliance with Lord Robert Fitz Gerald's Request, to grant him Leave

* An account of this transaction will be found in *Mémoires et Correspondance de Mallet du Pan* (Paris, 1851), vol. ii. ch. iv. The editor, M. Sayous, is in error in stating that Mr. Wickham was educated at Eton, and also that Lord Robert Fitz-Gerald was offended at the negotiation being entrusted to Mr. Wickham. On the contrary, they were on terms of perfect cordiality, as appears both from the despatch mentioned above, and from Lord Robert's letters to Mr. Wickham.

† Pierre Victor, Baron Malouet, b. 1740. One of the most enlightened members of the States-General. Took refuge in England in 1792; d. 1814. His Memoirs were published by his grandson in 1868.

of Absence from his Post, I am to signify to you His Majesty's Pleasure that you take charge of His Majesty's Affairs in that mission till His Lordship's return, for which Purpose I have directed Him to leave in your Hands the official Papers and Cyphers in his Possession.

I am, with great Truth and Regard, Sir, your most obedient humble Servant,

GRENVILLE.

W. WICKHAM, Esq.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

(Private.) Dover Street, Dec. 9, 1794.

Dear Sir,—I cannot let this Messenger go without adding to my public despatch a few words to express to you how completely all the King's Servants have been satisfied with the manner in which you have executed the very delicate transaction with which you were entrusted. I hope it will be no inconvenience to you to remain a few months where you are, as your presence may on various occasions be of the greatest use. We receive little intelligence from France, on which much reliance can be placed, respecting the general disposition of the Country, or the events in the inland and southern Provinces, except what comes thro' Swisserland. It would therefore be extremely material that you should exert yourself to the utmost to procure constant and detailed information from thence: and it will generally be as early as any other that we shall receive (at least of a nature to be depended on) respecting the general situation of the Country. It is hardly necessary to add that expense for that purpose will be considered as very well employed.

It will be necessary now to be more than ever upon your guard respecting Mounier and Mallet du Pan, and yet with attention, a communication with them may be rendered useful, and I know I can trust to your making it so without incurring the danger of suffering them to make use of that intercourse for their purposes.

From what passed before you left London I had no hesitation in proposing to the King that you should remain as Chargé d'Affaires for the present, but as this is considered merely as a temporary arrangement it will not interfere with your situation here, and I beg to repeat that I shall be very sorry if it puts you to any inconvenience.

Believe me Ever, my Dear Sir, very truly and faithfully y^{rs},

GRENVILLE.

W. WICKHAM, Esq.

1795.

Mr. Wickham was now Chargé d'Affaires at Berne, and about the middle of 1795 was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to the Swiss cantons; but the conduct of the ordinary diplomatic relations with the cantons was the least of his duties. The particular objects of his residence in a diplomatic capacity in Switzerland will be gathered from the various despatches and letters which follow.

It was necessary for carrying into effect the instructions from time to time received from Lord Grenville, that Mr. Wickham should maintain a very extensive correspondence, not only with many of the English ambassadors and ministers on the Continent, and the Ministers of other courts to Switzerland, but also with the Prince de Condé, the royal family of France, the Comte de Preçy, Mallet du Pan, and others, especially with a great number of agents in every part of France, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the state of parties, the inclinations of their leaders, and the probability of a reaction in that country. Many of the memoirs and publications relating to that period testify to the remarkable skill with which this correspondence was organised, and to the accuracy of the information obtained by Mr. Wickham. Mongaillard, though most hostile to Mr. Wickham, says in his 'Mémoires concernant la trahison de Pichegru. Paris, an XII' (p. 99), that it is difficult to form an idea of the order and regularity with which the correspondence with the interior of France was carried on, and M.

Sayous, the editor of the 'Mémoires et Correspondance de Mallet du Pan,' in a note to vol. ii. ch. 13, p. 336, gives a most interesting account of this correspondence. This note, moreover, bears the highest testimony to the ability of Mr. Wickham, the importance of his mission, and the very great services he rendered his country by counteracting the hostile schemes of the French Convention and Directory, against which he was enabled to warn the Government at home by means of the early and accurate information received from his agents.

This correspondence was in great part managed by M. Dandré* and M. Imbert Colomés,† two men of very high character. Also by Fauche Borel,‡ and others who were agents of King Louis XVIII.

I have not thought it desirable to print any of this correspondence, as Mr. Wickham has given the substance of as much of it as he considered of importance in his despatches to Lord Grenville.

In the year 1795 began those remarkable negotiations

* Antoine Balthazar Joseph Dandré, b. 1759. A distinguished member of the States-General. He was at first favourable to the changes of the Revolution, but left France in 1792, and, together with Talleyrand, took refuge in England. He was confidentially employed by Louis XVIII. in his communications with the interior of France. After the Restoration, Intendant of the Royal Domains and Director of Police; d. 1825 or 1827.

† Jacques Imbert Colomés, b. 1725. A distinguished magistrate of Lyons, from which town he was driven in 1799. A strong Royalist, and member of the Council of Five Hundred. Sentenced to transportation after the 18th Fructidor, he escaped to England, and died at Bath in 1809.

‡ Louis Fauche Borel, b. 1762. This singular person was a bookseller of Neuchâtel, and, actuated by a romantic attachment to the French Monarchy and by no selfish motive, devoted his life to the restoration of Louis XVIII.; from 1793 to 1814 he toiled incessantly for this object. Till his restoration Louis XVIII. treated him with great confidence and affection, but once restored to the throne, Fauche was forgotten, and at last worn out by ingratitude and calumny, killed himself by throwing himself out of a window at Neuchâtel in 1829. He received a pension from the English Government for many years, and latterly a small one from the Comte D'Artois. He published his memoirs in two vols. in 1829, besides other writings.

with General Pichegru, which seemed likely entirely to alter the state of affairs in Europe, and of which the first account was given in the unreliable work of Mongaillard.

Fauche Borel, who took an active part in them, relates what he knew in his memoirs. A certain degree of mystery, however, seems still to hang over these transactions, and I have introduced into this selection everything that I found which threw any light upon them, or bore upon the character of that great General, whose career was so singularly romantic and unfortunate, and whose reputation still suffers at the hands of his countrymen.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

(Private.) Dover Street: Feb. 20, 1795.

Dear Sir,—I have the pleasure of being able to assure you that your dispatches have given much satisfaction, and that I look forward with much expectation to your continuance in your present situation, which circumstances seem likely to render one of the most important and active in the whole foreign department.

I think I should not do right by you if I did not mention to you one or two points which are in themselves mere trifles, but which are however from particular circumstances worth your attention. You must not be surprised when I tell you that the first of these is your handwriting, which is much too small and crowded for an official correspondence; and it is the more desirable that you should endeavour to correct this, as it makes the perusal of your letters laborious, but particularly so in *a quarter* where I should wish on every account that they should be read, as I am sure they will not fail to convey the most favourable impression of your zeal and talents.

Your letters should be numbered in succession, each letter having a different number, and not as you now do, by giving the same number to those of the same date.

Our only certain and constant communication with France, even for newspapers &c., has hitherto been thro' Swiss[d]; whenever therefore you send a Messenger from thence, it would be useful to send by him six or eight of the latest papers; and indeed it would always be useful that you should, even by the post, send any that you think material, as we receive none regularly here but the 'Moniteurs.'

It would much tend to the perspicuity of your correspondence that you should divide it into separate letters, according to the objects of which you write, *e.g.* one letter respecting the various intelligence you may have to send as to the interior of France; one respecting points more immediately connected with the affairs of Swisserland, and so of the rest.

I return you enclosed a letter from B. I am not quite sure whether this is the letter you mention in one of your dispatches as being inclosed in your's of the 14th. I have no letter from you of that date.

I have mentioned to King that I see no objection whatever to Mrs. Wickham's joining you, except the difficulties and fatigue of such a journey, which I am sorry to say are encreased, instead of being diminished, since you left us. I hope that what respects your allowances is settled to your satisfaction in the dispatch on that subject which you will receive with this letter. But it would have been the height of absurdity to employ you on such a mission as that in which you are engaged, if I had not confidence enough in you to beg as I now do, that if you find the allowance insufficient to enable you to do justice to the objects of your mission, you will tell me so without reserve. We have not sent you there to ruin you, nor to starve the service by an ill-judged parsimony.

The post of Swisserland is likely to be so important during the whole of the next campaign, and at the time of any negotiations for Peace that may follow it, that I much hope it will not be inconvenient to you to prolong

your stay there during that period. After that, your further stay will of course depend upon your own choice, unless any new event should arise to make a change in that respect.

I have put nothing into my dispatch about the suggestion of paying such services as Mallet might render, especially under the circumstances of the secret correspondence which you mention. There would be no difficulty in your making any proper temporary arrangement of that sort with him, and it will come strictly under the general head of your secret service expenditure. I should be curious to know with *whom* he corresponds at Vienna. The Emperor is not of a character to make it probable that the intercourse is *personally* with him.

Since I wrote the above I recollect that King is not yet well enough to go out, and I have desired Mr. Goddard to call upon Mrs. Wickham to deliver her the same Message, and to offer any facilities that it may be in my power to furnish to lessen the inconvenience of her journey.

Ever yours most truly,
GRENVILLE.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

Downing Street: February 24th, 1795.
(No. 2.) (Received March 16.)

Sir,—By the Communications which have been received from the Court of Vienna, it appears that a Plan has been formed there for an Attack early in the ensuing Campaign, on the side of Franche Comté; and it is also mentioned that it is the Emperor's Intention to avail Himself of the Force now under the Prince of Condé,* as a Foundation for collecting the Royalists in that Part of

* Louis Joseph Prince de Condé, b. 1736. This gallant and high-minded prince was a distinguished soldier before the revolution; he left France in 1790, and commanded the army of emigrants till its dissolution in 1801; d. 1818.

France, which is supposed to be particularly well disposed to shake off the Yoke of their present Rulers.

In the Execution of this Plan, there will occur a great Variety of Details, in which Your Assistance, as His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Switzerland, may be of material Service; but particularly in procuring and collecting Information of every kind, and in following up the Cause and Progress of the Business.

You will maintain a perfect Concert with the Imperial Minister, in all Matters tending to promote the Success of this Object, so interesting to the common Cause; but You will particularly urge, how important it is to the Success of the Plan on which this Court is about to act, that every Means should be taken to conciliate the Royalist Party in those Provinces, where the Attempt is to be made, and to derive from the Rank, Situation, and Character, of the Prince of Condé, all that Assistance which they would naturally afford.

If the proposed Enterprize should be attended with Success in its Commencement, it is by no means impossible that Overtures may be made to you on the Part of some of the Convention, or other leading Persons in France, with Offers of Co-operation for the Restoration of Monarchy. Such Propositions are in general to be encouraged by You, to the Extent of such Amnesty or Pardon as was pointed out in your original Instructions, and also by general Assurances of such Reward, as the Services rendered, may be found to merit; but you must be very careful not to enter into any Engagements on His Majesty's Part, respecting any particular Modification or Form of Monarchical Government, which it may be the Object of such Persons to establish; though, on the other Hand, you are not to give it to be understood that such Modifications or Forms, whatever they may be, are rejected by His Majesty. On this Head, the safest Line for You to follow, till you can receive precise Instructions adapted to the Case, is the general Intimation conveyed

in your original Instructions, that the King has never desired to interfere with respect to the particular Form of Government in France, further than it may be necessary for the Security of this Country, and of the rest of Europe, and that His Majesty desires only to see such a Government established there, as may lead to the permanent Establishment of general Tranquillity.

On the general Subject of Communication with any of the Persons employed by the present Rulers of France, I think it proper to mention to you (though my perfect Confidence in your Discretion and Prudence might perhaps have made it unnecessary) that you must be particularly careful not to enable them to give the Appearance of our being engaged in Negotiations of Peace, which is an Impression they would certainly be very anxious to give, in order to create Jealousy among the Allies. Besides this general Difficulty, you are aware that the Conduct and Character of Monsieur Barthelemy, are such, as to make it more desirable that such Communications should be made through any other Channel than his.

I am with great Truth and Regard, Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant,

GRENVILLE.

WILL^M WICKHAM, Esq.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

Downing Street: Febry. 24, 1795.
(No. 3.) (Received March 16.)

Sir,—I am to inform you that the Chevalier d'Artez having been recommended to this Government as a proper Person to assist in opening Communications with such of the Inhabitants of Franche Comté or the neighbouring Provinces as may be disposed in any manner to co-operate with the Efforts which The Court of Vienna proposes to make in that Quarter during the next Campaign, I have given him a general Letter of Recommendation to you introducing him to you as an Officer in one

of the Emigré Corps now raising by His Majesty. He is unapprized of the Intention of the Austrians to act in Force in that quarter, as I have judged that such Communication was unfit to be made till the Period fixed for this Operation was nearer at hand, and you will take Care not to acquaint him with this Idea till it shall appear that the Thing is in sufficient Forwardness to prevent any Danger from its being known in France.

The Object in the Interval must be to endeavour to dispose the Inhabitants of the Jura and of Franche Comté so as that they may be willing to come forward in Case the Idea abovementioned should actually be carried into Effect, and that they should see a considerable Austrian Force in Readiness to support them. For this Purpose it may be necessary to make some Advances of Money, particularly for the Purchase of Arms, and for other similar Objects. M. D'Artez is to address himself to You on that Subject, and His Majesty is pleased to authorize you to make any such Advance in the Way of Secret Service Money as you are satisfied is likely to be usefully applied to these Objects, or to that of gaining over any Part of the Enemy's Army, or the Commandants or Officers of any of His Camps, Garrisons or Posts; or generally to promote the Success of the Enterprize which is in view.

It is I am persuaded unnecessary for me to point out to You the great Degree of Caution which must be observed with respect to this whole Business so as to prevent any premature Disclosure of the Ideas in Contemplation or any sudden Explosion by which a Number of Individuals would be exposed without any advantage to the Common Cause.

You will in general treat Monsieur D'Artez with such a Degree of Confidence on these Points as from the Account given me of his Character I trust he will be found to deserve; but You are by no means to suffer him to interfere in the general Business of your Mission, or to

take upon himself any public Appearance of being in any Manner employed by this Government on any political Business. If by the Means of any Correspondence with Paris or other Parts of France he should be enabled to open any Channels of Communication with the Persons now in Power you are to be guided by the Instructions contained in my other Dispatch of this Date, keeping always in view in any Communication which you may have with Monsieur D'Artez on these Points, his Situation as a Person closely connected with the French Princes, and whose Bias must therefore lay entirely on that Side, with respect to all the important and difficult Questions that may come forward in the Course of Events in France.

I have particularly cautioned him not to let his Conduct give any just Ground of Complaint against him from the French Party in Switzerland by which this Country may be at all committed; and if you observe anything of that kind in his Conduct you will apprize him of it with reserve; as it is felt to be of great Importance to the Line which We may have to follow hereafter in Switzerland that the Governments of the Cantons should not have been unnecessarily brought into Difficulties by Our Officers and Agents.

I am with great Truth and Regard Sir, your most obedient humble Servant,

GRENVILLE.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

Downing Street: March 9, 1795.

(No. 5.) (Received March 29.)

Sir,—I inclose the Copy of a Letter from the Prince of Condé to the Duke de Harcourt,* stating the Particulars of his present Situation and the Danger of His Army being either wholly or in part dissolved, from the pecuniary

* François Henri, fifth Duc d'Harcourt, b. 1726; d. 1802.

Difficulties in which He now finds Himself. The State of the Business relative to the Prince de Condé and His Army is shortly this. His Majesty being desirous of collecting a Force, to be composed of such Frenchmen as might be willing to bear Arms against the Convention, had, amongst other Measures for this Purpose, directed Proposals to be made to the Prince of Condé to pass with His Army into British Pay, after the Expiration of the last Campaign; and a small pecuniary Advance was at the same time made to the Prince by His Majesty, in consequence of a Representation which the King had received of the personal Difficulties under which the Prince laboured in this respect. The Answer which was received from the Prince of Condé stated the Impossibility of His complying with the King's Proposal, consistently with His Engagements to the Emperor, unless the Consent of that Sovereign could be obtained. His Majesty had, in the meantime, made repeated Application, for this Purpose, at Vienna, but had always found there a Disinclination to comply with this Proposal.

When Sir Morton Eden* returned to that Court, he was instructed to press this Subject and to bring it to a definite Point. He was told, in Answer to his Representations upon it, that the intended Plan of Operations, on the Side of Franche Comté, made the Emperor particularly solicitous to retain under His Direction the Army of Condé, in its present Situation, where it might be very advantageously employed in facilitating those Operations. The Force of this reasoning being admitted by His Majesty, I received the King's Commands to instruct Sir Morton Eden to acquiesce in it, but to urge, in the strongest Manner, the absolute Necessity of the Emperor's taking, without a Moment's Delay, the necessary Measures for providing for the numerous Wants of that Army, and for

* Sir Morton Eden, a distinguished diplomatist, youngest son of Sir Robert Eden, Bart., and brother of the first Lord Auckland, b. 1752; created Lord Henley 1799; d. 1830.

enabling the Prince of Condé not only to maintain it, on its present Footing, but even to avail himself of the Opportunity, which Circumstances appear now to afford, of augmenting it in a very considerable Degree: And for this Purpose, Sir Morton Eden was particularly directed to insist that, in order to save the Time which must be lost in continued References to and from Vienna, some Person of Confidence should be sent to that Army, sufficiently authorized and instructed to enable Him to agree to the Prince of Condé's Plans, if they appeared reasonable and practicable, and to concur in their immediate Execution.

The long Interruption of our Communication with the Continent has prevented my hitherto receiving any Answer to that Letter, which was, I fear, very much delayed before it reached Vienna; and in the Interval, the Distress of the Prince of Condé appears to have increased to such a Degree, as affords Room for Apprehension lest the whole of his Army should be broken up, which would be a Loss almost irreparable under the present Circumstances. To avoid such a Mischief, His Majesty would willingly consent to make an Advance to the Prince of Condé, to the Amount of Ten, Twenty or even Thirty Thousand Pounds. But the King is apprehensive that any Step of this Nature might lead the Court of Vienna gradually to throw upon Him the whole Expence of this Army, while they would retain the Direction of it; and it is for this Reason necessary to act with Caution, in this respect.

What you are therefore to do is this: You will endeadour either, by going yourself, if possible, to the Prince of Condé, or if any very pressing Consideration of public Service should prevent this, then by sending some Person, on whom You can entirely rely, to learn whether any Steps have been taken by the Court of Vienna to relieve His Distresses; and whether any Person has been sent to concert with Him the Measures necessary for re-establishing,

completing and augmenting His Army. If you find that the temporary Distress has been removed, You are ouly to offer to assist Him, by Your Influence with any Austrian Commissary, or General, who may be commissioned to treat with him; and also by writing to Sir Morton Eden to second, at Vienna, any Representations or Proposals, which he may make for the above Purposes. If, on the contrary, You should find that His pecuniary Distress still continues, and is such as really to threaten the Dissolution or Diminution of His Army, You will make him such secret Advances, not exceeding in the whole the Sum already mentioned, as you shall find to be necessary for the temporary Purposes which I have pointed out. But You will endeavour to do this in such a Manner as may be least likely to be known; and You will recommend it to His Serene Highness to conceal the Source of this Supply.

This Journey will afford you the Occasion of conversing fully and confidentially with the Prince of Condé, respecting the whole Situation of Affairs in that Quarter, and particularly as to His Expectations of effectual Support from the Emperor; and also to learn the real Nature and Amount of His present Army, and the Degree of Probability of His being able to augment it, supposing the pecuniary Means were furnished to Him for that Purpose. I shall be anxious to receive from you as much Information as you can procure on these Points, and on all others connected with the Subject of this Dispatch.

I am with great Truth and Regard, Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant,

GRENVILLE.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

*Mr. Wickham to (probably) Mr. Trevor.**

(Draft.) [Early in 1795.]

I have certain intelligence that the Sardinian Minister

* The Honourable John Trevor, son of the fourth Baron and first Viscount Hampden, afterwards third Viscount. Died SP. in 1824,

at Bern, some weeks since, sent a mémoire to Mr. Barthelemy* on the subject of the restitution of Savoy. He received no answer. I intreat that you will never appear to have known this, as the source by which I obtain my information would certainly be discovered. I hope to have a copy of it in a few days.

A Person sent by the Resident from Geneva to converse with the Sardinian Minister, is again here with new propositions. They have been transmitted to Turin, and the bearer has been told that no answer has yet been received from thence. He is still here. The Sardinian Minister, on my pressing him, told me this himself. It appears to me that with the best intentions to continue the alliance the Court of Turin wish to keep the door open for a reconciliation. Many things lead me to suspect that the Austrians are more occupied by the affairs of Germany than by those of France. I have also reason to believe that offers either have been made or are about to be made to the Court of Vienna. Mr. Barthelemy's Secretary told a person of confidence, that the Court of Vienna would hear of nothing yet, but when it had received the 6 millions the thing would be less difficult. It is of the utmost importance that I should be assured in time whether that court means to continue the war on this side in good earnest or not.

Lord Robert Fitz-Gerald to Mr. Wickham.

Kuxhaven, at the Mouth of the River Elbe:
Friday Morning, 19th March, 1795.

My Dear Wickham,—I take the opportunity of a Messenger just arrived from England with dispatches to you to give you an account of your friends, and of our safe

when his titles became extinct. At this time British Minister at Turin.

* François Barthelemy, b. 1747; d. 1830; at this time French Minister in Switzerland: after the 18th Fructidor, he was transported with Pichegru and others to Sinnamary, from whence he made his escape, and returning to France in 1800, occupied a position of high consideration both under Bonaparte and Louis XVIII.

arrival here. As far as Hanover we met with no difficulties, although the march of the Prussian troops to Westphalia obstructed our Road in some degree between Frankfurt and Casselle, and obliged us often to put up with very bad lodgings. At Hanover We found the Princess of Brunswick waiting with great impatience for the arrival of the Squadron, and Lord Malmsbury, in whose charge she is, perfectly disposed to do everything that was kind and obliging by us respecting our passage with her to England. This matter has been arranged to our utmost satisfaction, and we have been fortunate enough through his means and in consideration of my publick Character to obtain Leave of Commodore Payne who commands the squadron, to sail in one of the Frigates which compose the Convoy, in addition to the pleasure of being on board a Ship which is commanded by an old acquaintance and friend of Lady R.'s Family, Captn. Legge of the Latona.

From Hanover here we suffered in various Ways; from bad Roads vile Inns and miserable eating, in short we experienced all the Disadvantages of travelling through a desert for the space of five Days, although we are now arrived safe and well at the End of our fatigues, and having poked ourselves into a small Lodging in a place where there are no Inns that a Woman can stay in, We wait with great Impatience for the arrival of Lord Malmsbury and the Princess to embark for England. By their unaccountable Delay in coming, several fair opportunities for sailing have been lost, and Commodore Payne seems to be in daily alarm for the safety of his Ships which have miserable bad anchorage here, and are exposed to all the bad Effects of a most inclement and stormy Season, and are beat about by the Ice which still floats down the River in huge masses in a most frightful manner. I found Hamburgh to be entirely out of my Way and I therefore avoided it, but Desjean set out yesterday for that place with his Carriages in hopes of finding passengers, although I fear there is little prospect of that,

and none at present of Mrs. Wickham's coming, as you will I suppose have learnt from your servant who, though we did not see him as he returned to Berne, had the good sense to Leave the Letters he had for us with Lord Malmsbury at Hanover. I have no news of any kind to send you that I can warrant as good, though I have this morning seen an officer of my acquaintance from the British Quarters at Osnaburgh. The French are on one side of the Ems and the British on the other, but as the latter are not in force to resist them long it is supposed that they will retreat, and that the defence of these provinces and the Electorate will be left to the Prussians and Hanoverians, while the shattered remains of our unfortunate Troops will be formed into complete Regts. and embarked for the West Indies, for which Destination several Transports are now making into this Port in order to convey them. The Messengers from England bring us Word that the Vendée is stronger than Ever and that nothing is wanted there but arms and ammunition; and a lame acc^{t}. arrived with Col^{l}. Stuard from Corsica, gives us to understand, but scarcely to expect, that Admiral Hotham has taken six ships of the Line in the Mediterranean from the French. The Messenger who brings you this has desired me to inform you that he has had a very bad passage, and that he was not only 5 days at Sea, but was detained likewise a considerable Time at Yarmouth before he could embark. This place is full of Messengers and People from all Nations waiting for their passage to England, but detained by the badness of the Weather, and the fears of the Captns. of the Packets of falling in with the Ice and losing their Lives with their vessels. I can almost from the appearance of the Sea conceive myself at Greenland, and from the severity of the Weather believe myself on the Top of the St. Gothard.

Remember me to Nutcombe and my friends at Berne and believe me most truely yours

ROBT. STEPH. FITZGERALD.

P.S.—Lady Robert desires her best Compts. and to inform you that she and both her Children are perfectly well. I hope you rec^{d} my Letter from Frankfurt.

Baron de Degelmann (Austrian Minister at Basle) to Mr. Wickham.

Monsieur!—Le général Pichegrû s'est trouvé à Huningue—il y a quelques jours; un Courrier lui étant arrivé —il en est parti avant hier et a pris la route de Strasbourg; il doit avoir dit—qu'il regardoit comme très difficile—d'établir une armée dans la Haute Alsace—qui manque absolument de vivres. Il est arrivée dans cette province la première Colonne de l'armée du Blocus de Luxembourg—1500 hommes ont restés à Selestatt—et 4000 —étant venus dimanche dernier à Colmar—ont été de suite cantonnés dans les villages voisins.

J'ai l'honneur d'étre avec une Considération très distinguée

Monsieur! Votre très humble et très obéissant Serviteur

LE B^{ON}. DE DEGELMANN.

Bâle le 28 avril 1795.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

Downing Street: May 5th, 1795.

(No. 9.) (Received 20th.)

Sir,—Your Dispatches to No. 17 inclusive have been received and laid before the King, and I have the greatest pleasure in being able to inform you of the entire satisfaction which His Majesty has been graciously pleased to express in the continued proofs which those dispatches have afforded of your diligence and zeal in His Majesty's service and of the ability with which you discharge the important commission which you have undertaken. I am now to convey to you such Instructions as appear necessary to be given on the different points to which they relate: which I shall do in the order of your dispatches.

With respect to the most important of all those points, the interior situation of France, nothing can be more interesting than the information which you have transmitted in your different dispatches. The measures taken by you with Monsieur Preçy* as mentioned in No. 9 were highly proper and will I trust produce the best effects. The terms settled with the person mentioned in the inclosure No. 5 to that Letter are also entirely approved, as far as they are of a pecuniary nature; and I trust I shall be able to inform you, that the other points are also satisfactorily arranged.

With respect to what is mentioned in your No. 10, on the subject of Monsieur Borel, you may safely assert that neither he nor Monsieur de Foveray have ever been employed for any such purpose as you mention, and it may be useful to contradict these reports as they sometimes tend to weaken the Confidence of our Allies. Although the report No. 6, does not seem to be the production of a man who could be capable of managing any serious overtures of Peace between Austria and France it may be useful to know whether he is sent back or not.

I wait with much anxiety for the account of the result of the Steps which you have taken on the subject of the Prince of Condé in execution of the Instructions which I transmitted to you for that purpose. The question of the recognition of the Authority of the French Princes in the qualities of Regent and Lieutenant

* Louis François Perrein, Comte de Préçy, one of the purest and most heroic characters of his age; b. 1742. He served in the Guard of Louis XVI., who as he left the Tuileries for the last time on the fatal June 20, 1792, seeing de Préçy among the Swiss, exclaimed: 'Ah! fidèle Préçy;' words which Louis XVIII. afterwards authorised the family of de Préçy to add to their armorial bearings. De Préçy conducted the defence of Lyons, and headed the terrible retreat from that town in 1793. At the Restoration he was made Lieutenant-General, and given the command of the National Guard of Lyons. He died poor in 1820; almost all his valuable papers were lost when he was arrested at Bareuth in 1800.

General, is attended with great difficulty with respect to the time to be chosen for such a measure, especially as being to be concerted with the Court of Vienna. The premature adoption of such a resolution might in its effects both here and in France be of the highest detriment to the common Cause; while on the other hand His Majesty's Ministers are not insensible of the advantage which might be derived from it at a proper moment and under favorable circumstances. All that can now be said to you upon this point is, that you are to regulate your language as may best prepare the way for this measure, without as yet, in any manner committing this Government respecting it.

I observe from one of your subsequent Letters that Monsieur d'Artez is arrived in Switzerland, his presence will I imagine in a considerable degree answer the object which you appear to have in view in wishing for the appearance of a person enjoying the Confidence of the Princes. The personal communication you have opened with the Prince of Condé will best answer that object as far as he is concerned. Monsieur de Monciel is also now in Switzerland. It is hardly necessary for me to remind you how much caution is to be observed with respect to him and his Connections as I have reason to know that you are sufficiently aware of this.

There could be no objection to what you mention respecting your transferring your residence to Basle or any other point in Switzerland where you may judge your presence most useful, according to such events as may arise.

With respect to the general plan of operations we have lately had reason to fear that the probability of the Prussian Peace, (which has since taken place) added to some other circumstances have induced the Court of Vienna to relinquish either wholly or in great part its views towards Franche Comté and to look to operations in another Quarter. But till this point shall be more

distinctly ascertained it will be proper for you to continue to act as you have hitherto done with a view to operations on that side; but you will not fail to observe how very necessary this uncertainty makes it for you to use the utmost Caution not to commit the Royalists on that side to any exertions which the want of Austrian support might render fatal to them.

I fear that in all events nothing could be done on the side of Lyons and Savoy as mentioned in your No. 12, except in the event of such a sudden turn of affairs in France as cannot be reckoned upon in the formation of any plans, though it would undoubtedly be highly useful that the Allies should if possible be in a situation to profit of such a circumstance if it should occur. Considering however the present state of Italy I fear a defensive War in that Quarter is as much as can be looked to with any degree of Confidence. You will see that what I have already mentioned affords an answer to the most material of your Questions on this point in your No. 12. I have hitherto delayed answering that Letter in the hopes that every day might bring me more decisive Information respecting the Austrian plans, the apparent change in which at this late period of the year has greatly disconcerted all the views which had been formed here. But I am unwilling to keep you any longer without such Instructions as we can give upon this point, though they must in the present moment be confined to the saying that if in the event of a successful impression made by the Austrians in any quarter, Lyons should appear disposed and able to maintain itself, you may advance Money and provisions to any extent which your own discretion shall point out to you as conducive to the object in view. The only check in this respect arises from the fear of failure and the mischief of sacrificing friends without advantage to the common Cause, and not from the apprehension of any expence to be incurred, provided the object in question was likely to be answered by it.

I fear the Court of Vienna has as yet taken no effectual step on the subject of the Prince of Condé, notwithstanding the repeated and pressing applications which His Majesty's Minister at Vienna has been directed to make. Your choice of Monsieur de la Tour appears to have been very proper and your letter to the Prince of Condé is equally so, as well as your Instructions to that Gentleman: I wait with much impatience for the result.

With respect to the particular points mentioned in your No. 16, it is very difficult under the rapid changes which every week produces in the interior of France to give you such Instructions as will not be liable to be varied by the state of affairs at the moment when you are called upon to act in consequence of them.

It seems probable that the idea of primary assemblies though apparently abandoned for the present, will soon be again resorted to, and in that event the greatest advantages might be derived from any turn in the public opinions which should direct the Elections in favour of the Royalists. Your observation that this measure could produce no useful effect if confined to the eastern frontier of France is unquestionably just, but it is likely that such a spirit if manifested in any one part might rapidly spread over the whole. The two other measures mentioned by you might be still more useful if there were a certainty of force to support them, either from the Austrians or from the Prince of Condé aided by the Royalists of the frontier provinces. But I fear it would be too sanguine to reckon with confidence on such support.

The order to which you allude as given to Messrs. Zerleeder, arose only from a change in the mode of remittance which had been in Contemplation, and by no means from any opinion that an advance to the Prince of Condé would not be necessary, as on the contrary all our accounts agree in stating that nothing effectual has been done for Him at Vienna, and that his Army is in the

utmost distress—I trust therefore that you will have arranged this business in the manner which had been pointed out to you. I am, with great Truth and Regard, Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant,

GRENVILLE.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

Dover Street: May 5, 1795.
(Received 20th.)

My dear Sir,—I am too much pressed for time to-day to be able to write more than a few lines to you, though I had wished to do so more at large. I send to you, agreeably to your desire, one of the young men belonging to the office. His name is Flint,* and he has the character of much diligence and attention. I hope he will a little relieve your labour. Do not put yourself under any difficulties about your allowance, but tell me fairly if you find it inadequate. It is not reasonable that you should be put to any inconvenience in that respect.

I desired Mr. Goddard, as soon as I received your private letter, to explain to you about the Secret Service money. I earnestly hope that the mistake will not have produced any delay in the Prince of Condé's business.

I must now say a word about the letter which you will receive from the Duke of Portland on the subject of the Under-Secretaryship of State in His department. I feel that I can do no more than leave the point entirely to your decision in all its bearings, present and future. I have felt so much satisfaction since you have been engaged in the busy scene which now occupies your attention, that it would be with the greatest mortification that I should see you under the necessity of quitting it at this interesting crisis. Your knowledge of the country, and much more than that, the manner in which you have

* Charles William Flint, b. 1777; d. 1834. He afterwards held the office of Resident Secretary of the Irish Office in London, and was knighted in 1812.

acquitted yourself of what you have had to do there, would leave me little hope of replacing you in any satisfactory manner. The Duke of Portland is indeed so well convinced of this that I believe he does not press for your immediate return. As for the rest, it is of course not very easy either for you or me to conjecture when the circumstances which have changed the post of Swisserland from being nearly a sinecure to be one of the most important in the foreign line, may cease. When that happens, if you should like to continue in that line, and it should still fall to my share to have the direction of it, there are few persons in whose assistance I should have more pleasure and confidence than in your's. If on the other hand you should prefer employment in England to the being engaged in such foreign Missions as may offer themselves, I shall have no little pleasure in seeing you in a situation of as much trust and confidence as the Duke of Portland proposes to you.

I ought to mention that before I determined on proposing to you the undertaking in which you are now engaged, I had had it in contemplation to ask if you were disposed to go to America, where circumstances make it necessary for me to send a new Minister. No appointment has yet been made, and if such a destination would be at all agreeable to you it could easily be kept open till your present Mission should cease.

I throw all these things out for your consideration. You will decide upon them as you judge best on the whole. In every situation, believe me always

Most sincerely and faithfully Yours,

GRENVILLE.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

Downing Street: May 12th, 1795.

(No. 12.) (Received 26th.)

Sir,—Your Dispatches Nos. 19, 20, & 21 were received here the 6th Inst. and have been laid before His Majesty.

There seems to be so little reason to expect that any real Assistance will at last be afforded by the Court of Vienna to the Prince of Condé, that His Majesty has taken the Resolution of making to His Serene Highness such Advances as may be necessary in order to enable Him to avail Himself of such Openings as the present Circumstances seem so likely to afford during the Course of the present Campaign. In this View I have by the Messenger who will deliver this Letter to You taken Measures for advancing to His Serene Highness the Sum of ten Thousand Pounds to supply the immediate and pressing Wants of His Army, and I have acquainted Him by a Letter which I have written to Him that it is His Majesty's Intention to send to His Head Quarters a Confidential Officer charged with a Commission to discuss with him all the various Plans which may present themselves, and to furnish Him on His Majesty's Part with such Supplies as may be necessary for carrying them into Effect. I have also informed His Serene Highness, that His Majesty has apprized the Court of Vienna of this Intention. When such Officer is sent I will not fail to apprize You of it in order that You may keep up the necessary Communication with him. In the mean Time I think it right to mention to You, that You are not, except in the case of some sudden and unforeseen Emergency, to make any further Advance to the Prince de Condé in execution of your former Instructions, though it will be by no means a Circumstance to be regretted if You should in the Interval between the Date of your Letter and the Receipt of this h ve made some such Advance in addition to the Sum of 3,000 there mentioned by You.

It is necessary that I should observe to You in this Place that the Receipt for that Sum which You mention to have inclosed in that Letter was not contain'd in the Packet of Your Dispatches and has not yet reached me.

The Mass of Intelligence respecting France contained

in the Inclosures to Your Dispatches Nos. 20 & 21, though interesting in the highest Degree, does not require any particular Answer. It is infinitely to be regretted that while the Circumstances with respect to France itself are so favorable for the Success of the great Contest in which we are engaged, the Weakness of Our Allies should lead them to abandon the Cause precisely at the Moment when its prospects are the best. No final Answer has yet been received from Austria respecting the Loan which it was in Contemplation to raise here for that Power under the Guaranty of Parliament. But even if the Determination should be taken at Vienna to continue the War, I fear it is very doubtful whether any effectual Offensive Operation can be undertaken by that Power against France in the present State of Europe, and whether the utmost which is to be hoped for is not the obtaining from the Austrian Force such Demonstrations as may best support a vigorous Effort on the Part of the Prince of Condé aided by the Royalists in the interior. I shall write to You again as soon as we know any thing with certainty in this respect, but in the mean Time You will do well to be prepared to transmit to me an Opinion how far any such single and unsupported Attempt can be made with any reasonable Prospect of Success, and what Measures may be most likely to facilitate its Execution.

I am with great Truth and Regard Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant,

GRENVILLE.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.

(No. 36.) May 12, 1795.

Mr. Bayard left Lyons the day after the massacres and brings me a very full and curious account of every thing that he observed during his stay.

I kept him concealed in my house till he was recovered from his fatigue, and till I had obtained every possible

information from him and given him all the necessary instructions for his future conduct. I have sent him off again to Lyons this afternoon.

Some loose notes that he put together are contained in the paper marked No. 1. He has however given me much information upon many different points.

Upon the whole it appears from his account, that the Town of Lyons considers itself as committed by this late affair, the orders of the Representative of the People having been openly disobeyed.

That the young men are determined to defend themselves, that however they have not the least apprehension for the consequences.

If they should be attacked before they have the time to prepare themselves they are determined not to remain in the Town but to retire into the neighbouring country where they say they are now certain of being supported by the Inhabitants.

That they say very openly that the Convention dare not attack them.

That they only want a chief; and that the consciousness of this defect is one of the secret, but principal causes of their constant demand for Mr. de Preçy.

That the young men allmost without exception wish for the return of Royalty—Mr. Bayard was himself present at the beginning of the affair of 1793. He says that there is not the smallest resemblance between the opinion of the people as it was then and as it is now.

That at the beginning of the Troubles in 1793 there were scarce a hundred real Royalists in the place, and that it was only the extreme ability and good conduct of Mr. de Preçy that by *degrees* brought about a change in their way of thinking—whereas *now* the decided and *pronounced* opinion of the very great majority is in favour of Monarchy.

That on the other hand the old men, merchants and shop-keepers with some few exceptions are full of doubts

and fears. That nothing can be done because they have neither a leader nor a fixed Government of any kind.

That however the young men seem determined to force the old ones by committing some act or acts that will inculpate the whole Town.

And that a project is allready talked of for creating a something in the nature of their antient Municipality.

That Mr. de Preçy has only to signify that he wishes this or any thing else to be done, and both *old* and young are ready to undertake it immediately.

That it is not possible to conceive the enthusiasm that exists among all ranks of people upon the subject. That its effects extend to the Persons who were known to have been particularly connected with him (*sic*).

That Bayard himself had been sought after in every company because he was known to have seen Mr. de Preçy in Switzerland, and to have received a letter from him since.

That he was obliged to read his letter in every company, in the coffee house and even in the street—and that he absented himself from the Theatre the night before he left Lyons because several persons had determined to make him go upon the stage and read Mr. de Preçy's letter publickly.

That the young men have one and all the most thorough contempt for the Convention.

That they declare thev are ready to set out for Paris immediately if Mr. de Preçy should think such a measure necessary; and they are satisfied they should meet with no opposition on the road; on the contrary that they should be joined by the Inhabitants.

That they have refused to obey the Requisition, and that there is no attempt to force them; that if there were they are resolved to resist.

This young man has been particularly usefull during his short stay in removing the Prejudices that existed respecting the unfortunate affair of Toulon. He told me

that he had not much difficulty in convincing many of his friends when he informed them he had reason to believe that Mr. de Preçy was satisfyd about it.

Among many other points some of which it would not now be proper to commit to paper I have particularly instructed him to check the ardour of the young men for the moment—

To advise them above all things, not to attempt to provoke the Convention any further.

If there should be any appearance of force being used that they should endeavour to gain time, and not to be afraid of making even a temporary submission if necessity should require it, provided that is that they should not be required to disarm—for which conduct La Vendée had just set them a fair example.

That at the same time it would be wise to insinuate privately at Paris, that they would not attempt to molest the Convention, but that they would certainly defend themselves if attacked, and call in the assistance of the Piedmontese who they knew were ready to come in to their relief.

That they should endeavour by every means in their power from this very moment to interest the Inhabitants of the open country in their favour.

That if Troops were actually sent against them, they should treat with them immediately and during the treaty endeavour by every means in their power to bring them over; which would not be a difficult matter as there are a considerable number of volunteers, returned from the army without leave now in the place, who feel themselves happy and comfortable there and are determined not to go back again.

That he should endeavour to flatter and excite their passions by every possible means, particularly by the example of La Vendée with all its consequences—pointing out to them the advantages they had over that little province, particularly in the neighbourhood of their

Princes who were ready to throw themselves into the place with Mr. de Preçy at a moment's warning—That their town would be considered for ever as the real restorer of the antient monarchy, &c. &c. &c.

I shewed him the Letter I had received from the Prince of Condé on the subject of the augmentation of his army.

I authorized him to say that Mr. de Preçy should come to them whenever the wiser heads of the place and not the young ones only should think proper to demand him.

I authorized him also to give full assurance as to the intention of the Princes and their full resolution of encouraging no acts of personal vengeance.

I assured him also that I had every reason to believe and begged that he would particularly inculcate the idea, that they would make no difficulty of granting a general amnisty excepting for Assassins and Regicides.

I did not scruple to use this latter expression, not only on account of its being used in my original Instructions, but because it appears to me very clear in the present situation of things that the great point to be obtained is to separate the Convention entirely from the rest of the People, and to make if possible but two parties in France, viz. the Convention and the Nation.

I most particularly desired him to do his utmost to prevent any repetition of any scenes of the kind of those which had lately happened, and assured him that no encouragement or countenance whatever would be given to such measures which could not fail at length to bring a general execration upon the whole French Nation.

These and many other points he has undertaken to execute with the greatest zeal, and from the talents he has allready shewn, and the very high opinion that Mr. de Preçy entertains of him I have but little doubt of his succeeding in the most important parts of his mission.

I make haste to communicate to your Lordship this intelligence, and I earnestly request that you will have

the goodness to convey to me as early as possible his Majesty's commands for the direction of my conduct.

It is very fortunate that this case has been in some measure foreseen and submitted to your Lordship in my Letter No. 12 to which I am in hourly expectation of receiving an answer.

I have considered it so fully in that letter that it will be difficult for me to add any thing to what I have there said. I shall only observe that every argument I there used in favour of making Lyons the principal point of all our operations, has gained additional force since that time.

And I venture to press your Lordship once again upon that point as it appears to me now to be by far the most important of all.

It is still impossible to give anything like a general plan, or make any table of the expence that would be necessary, because each day makes so total a change in the situation of things as to render all calculation useless and impracticable.

I don't hesitate to say under the authority I at present have, that I should certainly advance a very large sum, in case that town were attacked and threatened and determined to defend itself.

But I wish for something more—my own idea in one word is to make Lyons the great point to which all others should be considered as secondary—and above all to make it *for the moment* a capital and the seat of Government. To which there seems to me now to be nothing wanting but the proper funds necessary for the beginning of such an enterprize, which at the same time that it is the most important appears to me also to be by far the easiest that can be attempted, and in the end I do not hesitate to say the most economical.

In truth the business is nearly half done allready. The singular relation that exists between that town and Mr.

de Preçy—the avowed attachment of that Gentleman to the cause of Royalty which is perfectly well known at Lyons—the respect and attention that the French Princes have paid him since his escape are *Means* that exist nowhere else and are really invaluable.

Were the thing taken up as a great and decisive measure in the way I have supposed here and in my No. 12, there seems to me to be scarce a passion or affection of the human mind that may not be powerfully employed in its service.

Another consideration which I venture to submit to his Majesty's Ministers is this. Your Lordship having informed me that his Majesty was desirous of collecting a force to be composed of such Frenchmen as might be willing to bear arms against the Convention, it seems to me that that intention could be in no way better fulfilled than by the project in question.

For the money employed to create one Regiment *without* four or five might at least be formed *within* because the greater part would be Volunteers, and because the Inhabitants would necessarily be obliged to contribute to their support and *by degrees* the whole expense might be thrown upon them. I say *by degrees*, but if the first funds were advanced, I should hope that it might be done allmost immediately. A little good management might easily bring about that point.

Upon this part of the subject I mean distinctly to say that the raising and disposal of that force, and the sums necessary for that purpose should be entirely in their own hands, or rather in those of Mr. de Preçy.

I am aware of an objection to this plan viz. that the *influence* acquired by the creating the different corps in his Majesty's service would thereby be lost. But as I am allways disposed to consider the thing in the great point of view, I cannot help believing that this measure would have a direct contrary effect.

I believe that it would reestablish confidence without which nothing can be done—and that it would effectually contribute to remove or allay all Jealousy, and be a decisive answer to all the mistaken and unjust reproaches and complaints that have been made on the subject of Toulon.

I believe also that it would give the Lyonnese an opinion of their own strength and importance which might be turned to great advantage, and that it would make them believe themselves about to be the real and only authors of the counter-Revolution, an idea which above all others it appears necessary to inculcate.

I wish if possible to save the expence of creating a corps on the side of Piedmont with all its necessary attendants of Artillery, Commissaries, Camp equipage &c. &c. and at the same time I fairly own that I do not wish to see Mr. de Preçy at the head of a corps any where but in Lyons, where I think he ought to be as independent as possible.

As to introducing him there, I am disposed to believe that it might be done without difficulty provided he himself were prudent and secret.

A younger Prince of the House of Bourbon might if necessary be introduced with him. Mr. Bayard seemed strongly to advise that measure.

(No. 13.) *Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.*

(Most Secret.) Downing Street, May 22nd, 1795.
(Received 13th June.)

Sir,—Your Dispatches to No. 27. inclusive have been received and laid before the King.

In consequence of your Reports respecting the Situation of the Prince of Condé, immediate Measures were taken for advancing to His Serene Highness Ten Thousand Pounds in addition to the Sum which had been furnished to him by you.

His Majesty has since been pleased to direct that

Colonel Craufurd * should proceed to His Serene Highness's Head Quarters, with Power to advance Money to him to the Extent of One Hundred and Forty Thousand Pounds, in Proportion as that Sum, or any Part of it, can be usefully employed in the great Objects of compleating or augmenting the Prince of Condé's Army. This Dispatch will be forwarded to you by Col. Craufurd, after he shall have seen and conversed with Marshal Clerfaye and the Prince of Condé. You will therefore learn from him what Hopes are entertained by those Officers, respecting the Possibility of availing themselves of the present Dispositions in Franche-Comté and the other frontier Provinces in France. I shall therefore content myself with stating to you, on this Subject, that by the Dispatches from Vienna, which accompanied the Convention signed there, for the Guaranty of the Austrian Loan, it appears that the Views of the Austrians are still directed towards Franche-Comté, and a positive Assurance has even been given to Sir Morton Eden, that, at a future Period of the Campaign, the Prince of Condé shall be pushed forward into that Province, with an Austrian Force to support him, and with full Liberty to act as Circumstances may require. I have particularly recommended it to Col. Craufurd to maintain a constant Correspondence with you on everything which relates to this interesting Subject, and he will forward to you a Cypher for that Purpose.

As Col^{l}. Craufurd is furnished with a Credit at Frankfort to the Amount above mentioned, and as it is not probable that he can at once be called upon for the whole Amount of that Sum I have desired that he will upon your Requisition advance to you any Sum not exceeding thirty thousand Pounds; so that if the Case

* Colonel Charles Craufurd, afterwards Lieut.-General and G.C.B., brother of Sir James Craufurd, Bart., and Major-General Robert Craufurd. Married the widow of the third Duke of Newcastle.

alluded to in Your Dispatch No. 27. should arise, You will be at no Loss for the Money. You are in such Case to forward to me a Receipt for the Amount of the Sum so drawn for by You, in the same Form with the other Receipts for secret Service Money. His Majesty's Ministers feel no Hesitation in continuing to You that confidence which Your Conduct has so well deserved. But before any Application can be made from hence to Monsieur for Your being furnished with Powers from the latter it will be absolutely necessary to make to him some Communication of the Nature and Extent of the Powers demanded of Him, and the Object with which they are asked.

I am, with great Truth and Regard, Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant,

GRENVILLE.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

(No. 37.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Mulheim: 25th May, 1795.

My Lord,—In answer to the Article in your Lordship's dispatch No. 9 concerning Monsr. de Monciel, I have the honor to inform you that that Gentleman passed through Berne whilst I was at Lausanne. Unfortunately we missed each other on the road.

I was soon after waited upon by Monsieur de la Champagne, a gentleman of the first landed property, best family and greatest personal respectability in Franche Comté. He was also one of the earliest emigrants and is still most entirely attached to the cause as well as the person of the Prince of Condé. He told me that Monsieur de Monciel had brought him a letter from the Comte du Moustier, from which it might be conjectured that he was come here with some Proposals tending to form an union between all the leading Proprietors and Persons of

* Mulheim, a small town in Baden, situated between Fribourg and Basle.

respectability of every description in Franche Comté. That for himself he felt the necessity of such a measure and should be happy to take M. de Monciel by the hand, because he believed him to be a perfectly honest man, Provided the ultimate object of such an union were the reestablishment of Royalty in the present family, of Religion and the Catholic Worship, the acknowledgement of Monsieur for Regent, and the restitution of the confiscated property. But that he was sorry to say that he had received several Letters from the army of the Prince of Condé, desiring that he would do his utmost to have Mons. de Monciel driven out of the Country, and declaring that it would be impossible for them ever to come to any terms of accommodation with him—He said however that he did not doubt if the Prince of Condé would lend his assistance that he should be able to bring all those persons to reason, and he desired me to procure him an interview with M. de Monciel which I promised to do immediately.

In consequence of this conversation I wrote on the following day to M. de Monciel to desire that he would call upon me here as soon as he should find it convenient to leave Lausanne. He complyd with my request immediately, and I had in the course of last week a very long conversation with him upon the subject.

I soon found that he was thoroughly acquainted with the whole of what had passed here in the months of October and November last, but that the answer of his Majesty's Ministers to the Propositions sent from hence had not been fairly represented to him.

I thought it therefore expedient on every account, but particularly because he allready knew so much, to state to him fairly and distinctly *the substance* of that answer, and to make him fully acquainted with the conduct of the persons in whom he had formerly placed so much confidence.

As to the persons alluded to, he said that he himself

had had reason to change his opinion of them—With respect however to Theodore Lameth he said, that he had learnt since he came into the Country, that his correspondence in Franche Comté was considerable and that there were many persons there, strongly attached to him and his Brothers—that it would therefore be very unwise to reject his Services—I observed to him upon this, that I was not quite satisfied either of the truth of the fact or the consequences he drew from it.

Without meaning to differ from him altogether I had reason to believe Mr. Lameth's *own reports* upon that subject were greatly exaggerated—he answered that he thought so too himself, but that he had reason to know that they were not altogether without foundation, and indeed we both agreed that in his present situation he was capable of doing much mischief.

As to the dispositions of the Court of London he said they were to the last degree fair and honorable, and that no good Frenchman could refuse to act under them, and in support of them for his own part he was ready to offer his services immediately, if he knew how they could be employed and was sure that they would not be rejected.

After much general Conversation upon that part of the subject I asked him, if he himself and other leading persons of the party with which he had acted were disposed to make their submission in due form to their own Princes—in using the word *submission* I told him that I meant to use it in its true sense and in the full extent of the term, and that there must be no idea of treating upon an equality, but a fair acknowledgement of their wrongs made with all the expressions of Decency and Respect that would have become them in other times. To this he answered that before he would engage for any thing of the kind he must be assured that they and their offers would not be rejected with contempt.

I agreed that *there* was the real difficulty, for that it was scarcely possible. nor indeed could any person who

called himself a good Frenchman think it *right* that the Princes should enter into any formal stipulation with them, but that having already received assurances of a disposition on their part to act in every case that regarded their unhappy Country with all that temper and moderation which the circumstances of the moment seem particularly to require—I would go a step farther and would endeavour to sound them on this particular case, and that he might rely upon me that I would neither deceive him or his friends, or be the means of leading them into any false measure of which they might afterwards have occasion to repent. At the same time I would not undertake to make any specific offer, but would confine myself entirely to learning their general opinion and disposition on the subject, and that I would not even go so far unless I was previously assured that he and his friends were disposed to adopt the measure I had suggested to him in its full extent—he said he could answer only for himself and I did not press him any more, because in truth I did not wish the thing to go any farther at this moment.

He then talked to me very particularly and earnestly on the subject of M. de la Fayette and his fellow Prisoners. I need not mention the Arguments he used, they are so obvious and have been so often repeated. I told him that if the Princes as I had every reason to believe were disposed to grant a general Amnesty with the sole exception of Regicides and Assassins, I thought he and his friends both within and without might be perfectly easy on that head, as far as their Persons and property were concerned, that when they had made their submission in the manner above spoken of, it would then be the time to talk or treat upon that subject, and that perhaps after all the Clemency and moderation of their Princes might be one of the most effectual means they could have recourse to—he seemed to me to be by no means averse to such an idea, and indeed I must do him

the Justice to say that I found in him a degree of openness, moderation and fairness of reasoning that I have never met with in any other of his party—here the Conversation ended and nothing at all was agreed upon excepting that he should see M. de la Champagne, which he did the next day, and immediately after wrote me the Letter of which I send Your Lordship a Copy inclosed.

You will perceive from the first part of it that he is to the full as averse from entering too much into particulars as I can be, and that he takes as much care to avoid it.

I have stated this Conversation so much at length for reasons which I shall have the honour of laying before your Lordship by the next occasion; at present it will not be possible, consistent with my other occupations, to enter into them.

(No. 40.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Mulheim: May 25th, 1795.

My Lord,—M. de Hardenberg left Basle very suddenly on Wednesday last for Berlin. His Secretary set out for Paris at the same time.

This of course gives rise to many conjectures, some of which you will find in the inclosed papers.

The Baron de Degelmann told me that it was said among the other ministers that the King of Prussia had recalled him, because some very unpleasant reports had reached Berlin respecting the manner in which he forgot his own dignity and that of his master, in suffering the familiarity of the Persons attached to the French Mission. Whether anything of the same kind had taken place before I cannot pretend to say but it appears certain that he was most grossly insulted at the dinner at Huninguen. Merlin de Thionville, if the French Secretaries are to be believed, made some open and indecent allusions to the King of Prussia's conduct of the most unpleasant nature.

The Chevalier d'Yriarte is certainly there by order from his court, though he has no public mission.

Mr. Trevor to Mr. Wickham.

(Most Secret.) Turin: Tuesday, May 26, 1795.

Sir,—After acknowledging with all the gratitude and esteem which they deserve, the candour and ability which distinguish every part of your late Dispatches, I proceed to give you every intelligence in my power, and to trouble you with such observations as occur to me upon the important subject of our Correspondence; though indeed after sending you the enclosed Letters from Sir Morton Eden and M. de Preçy it is perhaps superfluous to trouble you with anything more.

I have great satisfaction in seeing that there was not the smallest foundation for the alarms alluded to in my last, and I trust that your prudence which is equal to your activity, and the wise and forcible injunctions of M. de Preçy, will keep everything *en mesure* till the favourable progress of opinions and events have brought matters to a proper degree of maturity.

I think it necessary to recall to your attention that even in the most successful Event of M. Devins's operations on the Coast, no effectual resistance from without can be looked for, till the end of July; and it would even then become a great military question (of which I cannot pretend to judge) whether it would be most expedient to make a double Attack, one, in your sense, through Savoy, and another in the Southern Provinces—or to act only on the defensive in the former, and push on towards Toulon with an imposing and undivided Force, the operations of which, would be assisted by the superiority of His Majesty's Fleet. I should rather suspect that the latter Plan would be preferred by M. Devins, when I last talked to him upon this subject he considered the attack by Savoy merely as a Diversion, and seemed to think that ten

or 12,000 Men were all that could be spared for such a purpose, and that England would do well to furnish M. de Preçy with the means of raising a Corps, which might be employed on such an Expedition.

I have now written more fully to this General in consequence of your late Intelligence and of my answers from Vienna, and will not fail to communicate his answer.

I am in hopes of seeing him begin his operations in a few days; the moment he does so, the Enemy appears to me to have no adequate means of resistance.

I heartily wish to see him decorated with the *Bâton de Marechal* as soon as possible.

But however successful M. Devins's Operations may be, however favorable the dispositions of Lyons and its Neighbourhood may be found, I confess to you that I can entertain no hopes of any great, effectual, and (with respect to us) national Advantage, as long as they are confined within the limits of a particular Province, and founded only on particular, local, or even personal Circumstances—to indulge this hope I must see the Majority of the Nation, and of the great Towns which compose it, actuated by the same Principles, and be convinced that they are ready to follow the same example—Foreign Exertion in my opinion can do but little towards effecting a Counter-Revolution in France: when its principle is become general *in France*, and has acquired a very considerable degree of maturity, *then* I think the Co-operation, assistance and protection of foreign Force may facilitate and determine its success—but if it appears at an earlier Period, I am afraid it will do more harm than good.

The natural tendency of present opinions and things in France is certainly towards *a Monarchy*, but whether it be equally so towards the reestablishment of the antient one, is more than I can say: I am sorry to say that even amongst Royalists there is a decided Aversion to His Royal Highness *Monsieur*,* and yet if things are to take

* Afterwards King Louis XVIII.

a legitimate Course, we must not forget that *Monsieur* is *de jure* Regent of France: the Court of Vienna (as you will see by Sir Morton's Letter) has no confidence in the French Princes, and you may be assured that that Cabinet is much more anxious about the establishment of ANY form of Government in France with which it could make a reasonable Peace, than (as perhaps it ought to be) for the restoration of the antient and legitimate Monarchy; M. de Preçy is not ignorant of the unpopularity of *Monsieur*, and though he can hardly avoid a correspondence with him and demonstrating a respectful deference towards this unfortunate Prince, he must not hamper himself by any positive engagements in that quarter: I have prevented his going to Verona and have sometimes told him 'qu'il faudroit peutêtre travailler *pour* Monsieur plutôt *qu'avec* lui.'

Mr. Preçy will send you herewith the two Letters you require.

He will also tell you the reasons why he thinks he should not appear in France till things are much riper. I have just read Palzin's Journal de Lyon, which confirms that opinion; I should be glad to know what Judgment I am to form of that Paper, he says nothing of the repeated Cry of 'Vive Preçy,' during the late events; according to your accounts I conceive that Cry to be analogous to 'Vive le Roi.'

When the torrent of popular Opinion has acquired an impetuous Force, then I think M. Preçy should appear to direct its course and organize its effect.

I perfectly approve your Idea of giving all the effect possible to the dispositions of the Lyonnois, if they are properly backed by the general sentiments of the Nation; and the Idea of constituting that City the Capital of the reestablished Monarchy may be highly useful, provided it does not create jealousies at Paris or elsewhere which may impede the Progress of measures, which in order to be successful, must be as general as possible.

If any Counter-revolutionary measures can be adopted by Great Britain with utility and success, such as you have chalked out are indisputably the most promising, and I think you would do well if you could engage His Majesty's Ministers to concentrate all the Corps of Emigrés imperfect as they are, with the Army of the Prince de Condé, and reducing as much as possible the expences on that head, leave so much more at your disposal if the great measures you are aiming at, are brought to bear.

The more I see of M. Preçy, the more I am convinced how much confidence may be placed in his integrity, modesty and military Talents: he sees no occasion for his having a *Corps* unless a new System of Terror was to take place, and occasion a fresh Emigration of the young People, whom he *then* thinks he could collect together, and form into a very useful *Corps*; but this becomes a more partial military measure, and how far the Expence of its execution ought peculiarly to belong to *us* would I conceive depend upon the degree of Encouragement and promises of support which you may think it expedient to hold out.

I have the Honour to remain, with very sincere Esteem, Sir, Your most obedient and humble Servant,

JOHN TREVOR.

W. WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

Comte de Précy to Mr. Wickham.

turin le 26 mai 1795.

Monsieur,—Votre Corespondance avec Mr de trevor, est la seule Cause qui m'a fait différer de vous témoigner ma vive reconnoissance, pour tous vos procédés honnêtes vis-à-vis de moi, et pour tous ce que vous avai fait et vous proposais de faire, pour sauver ma patrie, les lionnois. surtout, et je puis sans méprise ajouter l'urope, qui ne peux que par des efforts généreux obtenir une paix solide.

Mr de trevor a bien voulu me communiquer votre dépêche.

d'après vos mesures, Monsieur, je fonde de grandes espérances, surtout apuyés par de bonnes armées. Mr de trevor, vous fera à ce sujet des réflexions auxquelles je n'ai rien à ajouter.

l'idée de faire de lyon la Capitalle du royame, quoique parfaitement vûe, ne peut s'émettre dans le moment, il atirerai à lyon de nombreux ennemis : la ville de paris et les provinces du nord. Sa politique du moment doit être de se faire des partisants, et de faire imiter ses actions. Cette ville est forcément à nous, le stimulant n'est point nécessaire. l'essensiele est de s'occuper des objets nécessaire à un rasemblement, comme armes et bléd, maintenir l'esprit régnant, les faire dissimuller, et tout calculer pour profiter de quelques grands succès des armées, surtout si ce succès étoit dû à celle de Mr de vins.

je ferai, Monsieur, dans tous les cas, mon bonheur et mon devoir de tout sacrifier pour répondre à la confiance bien flateuse des lionnois. je crois que ma présence est inutile, et serai très nuisible et même très dangereuse, je crois au contraire leurs êtres utile ici : Sa majesté Sardes en m'honorant d'un grade dans son armée, a pensé que je pourai le servir dans toutes entreprises sur les departemens environants la ville de lyon. j'espere obtenir le comendement d'une force quelconque. alors, Monsieur, je pourai être utile, surtout étant soutenu par une armée, ayant avec moi tous ce qui est nécessaire à organiser tout rassemblement, agissant de concert avec Mr de trevor, je marcherai avec sécurité, et intention de me livrer à toutes entreprises.

je reçois une lettre de Mr de la roullière, en date du 23 avril. vous voyez Monsieur que d'après cette date je ne puis avoir qu'une corespondance assez inutile, et où je doit me borner à exprimer mes sentiments pour les personnes et mon entier dévouement pour leur bonne cause. en voici deux dont vous ferai l'usage que vous croirai

convenable, vous pouvez les adresser à Mrs la roulière, bayard, ou tout autre dont vous auriez la connoissance.

j'ai demandé à Mr le régent de france une lettre, que je pourai montrer aux lionnois. je vous en adresserai une copie, dont vous feriez l'usage convenable. en tout, Monsieur, j'agirai de concert avec confiance et d'accord, avec vous et Mr de trevor dont je ne puis trop me louer, et admirer les qualités.

dans le cas où vous adresseriez un courier en angleterre, et que vous puissiez me procurer du cuire anglais pour une paire de botes vous m'obligeriez.

je suis, Monsieur, avec les sentiments les plus distingués,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur

PRECY.

Enclosures in the Comte de Precy's Letter.

Copie extraite sur l'original de la lettre datée de Vérone le 18 mars et écrite par MONSIEUR, Régent de France, à Monsieur de Précy.

J'AI eu un véritable plaisir, Monsieur, à recevoir de vos nouvelles par vous-même. La certitude de la conservation d'un brave et fidel Serviteur du Roi comme Vous, est la chose qui pourait me consoler le mieux des malheurs que tout votre courage et vos talens n'ont pû que retarder. J'attends avec impatience les détails que vous m'annoncez sur le plan dont vous me présentez l'esquisse: l'estime que j'avais pour vous avant le siége de Lyon, et que votre conduite en cette occasion a fort augmentée, m'en donne une idée avantageuse, mais je ne puis asseoir en jugement avant de connaître toutes les parties du plan, ainsi que les moïens, et les probabilités d'exécution. Je serai fort aise d'avoir votre relation militaire. Tout ce qui tendra à me faire connaître de mieux en mieux avec quel zèle et quelle fidélité dignes d'un meilleur succès, le Roi a été servi, sera toujours bien intéressant pour moi. Je vous adresse ma lettre à Turin, jugeant par la votre que vous devez vous y être déjà rendu.

Quelque parti que je prenne, Monsieur, à l'égard de votre plan, je ne négligerai sûrement aucun moïen de vous emploïer pour le service de la cause que nous deffendons. Recevez-en l'assurance,

ainsi que celle de ma parfaite estime, et de tous mes sentimens pour vous.

Signé, Louis Stanislas Xavier.

Vérone le 26. avril.

J'apprends avec grand plaisir, Monsieur, ce que le Roi mon Beau-père a fait pour vous, j'y reconnais ses généreux sentimens, et jusqu'à ce que je puisse vous emploïer moi-même plus activement pour le service de notre Roi je ne pourais vous assigner une place plus convenable, mais j'espère que le tems n'est pas bien éloigné où le Roi de Sardaigne approuvera que je retire de ses mains un dépôt aussi intéressant que vous.

Soiez persuadé en attendant, Monsieur, de la vérité de mes sentimens pour vous.

Signé, Louis Stanislas Xavier.

The Prince de Condé to Mr. Wickham.

à Mülheim ce 30 May 1795.
(Received June 3rd.)

Le Gentilhomme qui vous remettra ma lettre, Monsieur, est M. Pontier, franc Comtois, homme très-bien intentionné, et qui a des moyens, pour opérer dans son pays, le changement que nous y désirons tous ; il est venu me communiquer tout ce qu'il sait et tout ce qu'il peut ; pour vous marquer, Monsieur, toute la confiance que j'ai dans la pureté de vos intentions, j'ai cru ne pouvoir pas mieux faire, que de vous envoyer ce Gentilhomme, dont je crois qu'il est possible de tirer le meilleur parti, mais il pense qu'il n'y a pas un moment à perdre, parce qu'une fois la moisson venue, le mécontentement, le désespoir même de la franche Comté, pourroient bien se refroidir ; je lui ai conseillé de lier cette insurrection avec celle de Lyon, et je crois que ce sera aussi votre avis ; je ne vous cache pas, que j'ai beaucoup plus de confiance en M. Pontier, qu'en M. de faverney ; ce dernier s'est mal conduit au commencement de la révolution, personne ne l'a oublié, tout le monde le croit Constitutionnel, et l'on le croit même lié avec les personnes de ce parti qui sont en Suisse, chez qui l'on assure qu'il a été rendre compte depuis peu de

tems, d'un voyage qu'il a fait dans la Province dont je viens de parler ; j'espère que vous voudrez bien garder cela pour vous seul, et que vous me pardonnerez de vous dire quelques fois ce que je pense, sur certains françois, qui chercheront à capter votre bienveillance, et dont, étant étranger, vous ne pouvez pas connaitre, comme moi, les allures ; je pense donc, que si vous agréez le projet de M. Pontier, il seroit nécessaire que M. de faverney n'en eût pas connoissance ; au reste je suis bien sur que vous sentirez combien il seroit dangereux, de faire agir pour la même chose, deux personnes dont le système est différent ; celui de M. Pontier, m'a paru pur, comme le mien, et si vous voulez bien vous ouvrir à lui, sur les bases, que vous m'avez dit que vous désiriez, je ne doute pas qu'il ne vous parle avec toute la confiance, que vous savez si bien inspirer.

Je crois devoir vous envoyer l'extrait d'une lettre que m'écrit le Duc d'Harcourt, le 15 de ce mois, et dont la phrase que j'ai sousligné m'étonne beaucoup, n'ayant aucune notion de ce changement ; au reste, ce n'est pas la 1re fois qu'on me l'a mandé de Londres, et cela ne s'est point vérifié.

On nous dit toujours que Pichegru (*que j'espère que vous n'oubliez pas*) a annoncé à son armée, qu'il alloit passer le Rhin ; jusqu'à présent, nous ne voyons rien qui s'y prépare.

Votre Courier d'angleterre a répassé hier pour vous aller rejoindre ; j'attendrai toujours de vos nouvelles, pour vous renvoyer la Chevalerie ; je n'ai rien reçu de Vienne ; je me flatte que vous rendez justice, Monsieur, à tous les sentiments de véritable estime, et de considération particulière que j'ai pour vous.

LOUIS JOSEPH DE BOURBON.

(No. 42.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Bern : May 31st, 1795.

My Lord,—I have the honour to inform Your Lordship

that I have received, and in compliance with Lord Robert Fitzgerald's general directions, have opened a Letter addressed to his Lordship from the Magistrates of Lauffenbourg, in which they state that the Body of the late Viscount Montagu * had been found in the Rhine very near the place where the melancholy accident happened that was the occasion of his Death, that as his remains were not in a situation to be embalmed, they had caused them to be decently interred in the Churchyard of that place. I have not failed to return them all suitable thanks and acknowledgements for the attention they have shewn on this occasion, in paying the last honours to a Subject of His Majesty and a Peer of Great Britain. I have at the same time written to the Baron de Degelmann to request that he would give the necessary orders that a permission may be obtained for the remains to be removed to Bruck the nearest Protestant Town, in case the thing should be possible, and have applied to the Government here to give directions to the Magistrates of that place that they may be interred there with the proper ceremonies. I have also taken care to communicate all these Circumstances to His Lordship's Representatives.

I have the honour to be with the highest Respect, My Lord, Your Lordship's most obedient and most devoted, humble Servant.

(No. 43.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Bern: 31 May, 1795.

My Lord,—I have been honoured by your Lordship's dispatch of the Inst. with the extract of the Letter from the Baron de Roll to Mr. Windham enclosed.

* George Samuel Browne, eighth Viscount Montague, b. 1769; an account of the manner of his death will be found in 'The dormant and extinct Baronage of England,' T. C. Banks, 1809. At the same time that he was drowned his magnificent house of Cowdray, in Sussex, now the property of the Earl of Egmont, was burned down.

I shall pay full obedience to your Lordship's commands and will do any thing in my power to assist and hasten the completing of the Regiment, which I am happy to say is now in such a state of forwardness as to set at defiance all the efforts of Mr. Barthelemy as well as those of his friends and agents—The apprehensions of the Baron de Roll were indeed not without foundation. Your Lordship will have been able to form some Judgement of the importance attached by the French Mission to the defeating this measure, and of the pains they have taken to accomplish their purpose by the different letters and notes of Mr. Barthelemy that I have had the Honour of transmitting to you at different times. I now enclose three others—a fourth to the canton of Soleure of which I have not yet obtained a copy is more violent and peremptory than any of the others, I have also reason to know that very large sums of money have been distributed by Mr. Barthelemy on this occasion. If I may be allowed to judge from the information that has come to my knowlege I may say with confidence that whatever the raising this regiment may have cost to his Majesty, more than double that sum has been expended in opposing it.

The regiment at this moment, if I may believe the account of an officer just returned from Villingen, consists of 1200 effective men. How it has ever proceeded so far towards its completion is more than I can undertake to explain.

Besides the political difficulties that one might naturally have expected it has had to encounter the whole of the Spanish interest which has been openly directed against it particularly in the Catholic Cantons, and in the Valais where that Court is now raising a Regiment. It was impossible to make any remonstrance to the Spanish Minister on this subject upon the ground of the present Alliance existing between the two courts, because the same direct opposition has allways been made to the French Levies by the Spaniards at the time of the

closest union between the courts of Madrid and Versailles. They have shewn on this occasion a particular degree of virulence.

The Piedmontese Interest has also (as I have before had the Honour of stating to y^r^ Lordship) been exerted against it with effect, though not so openly as the other.

The Austrians are perpetually trying the officers at their different Depots of Villingen and Waldshut—they stop their recruits at their passage over the Rhine—they seduce a great many and even take them away sometimes by force.

Whenever a soldier who is not a native of Switzerland is about to be punished he cries out that he is an Austrian, upon which he is immediately claimed, and the Austrian Officer who commands in the place orders him to be enrolled in some one of their own regiments.

I spoke to the Baron de Degelmann on this subject last week who promised me every assistance in his power, I have no doubt he will be as good as his word, but I fear it will be without effect.

Since I saw him I have learnt that an order had been given by the Prince of Furstenburg to remove the Depot from Waldshutt upon which I have written to the Baron the letter of which I send a copy enclosed. I can have no doubt that it will have the effect of causing that particular order to be recalled.

The Canton of Fribourg from which we might naturally have expected the greatest assistance, has been our most decided enemy, from a principle of jealousy at having no officer named upon the staff of the Regiment.

The most successfull measure adopted by Mr. Barthelemy was that of gaining the different Bailiffs within whose Jurisdiction the Recruits must necessarily pass. Twelve fine fellows all Swiss, were seized at once a few days since by the Bailiff of Baden, and sent back to their different homes and their conductors thrown into Prison.

Mr. Barthelemy's public notes though strong, are very moderate compared with his private ones—finding those less successfull than he had expected, he has adopted with success the measure of gaining or terrifying individuals, by addressing himself to them or their friends and relations personally. By this conduct he has caused (if I don't mistake) about 40 different officers to resign who had actually accepted their places and begun to recruit.

But it w^d be endless to state to y^r Lordship the different obstacles that we have had to encounter here. The whole, from the beginning, has been a scene of cabal and intrigue of which, without having been a witness to it, it is not possible to form an idea.

The whole has so far succeeded beyond my utmost hopes or expectations, and I feel it my duty to state to y^r. Lordship that the success of the measure must be chiefly if not entirely attributed to the zealous and unremitting exertions of the Lieutenant Colonel Mr. de Durler, to whose ability, good conduct and discretion I must ever bear the strongest testimony. I should mention also that the Baron de Roll has to my own knowledge expended a very considerable sum in gaining the leading persons in some of the lesser cantons—and that the exertions of these two gentlemen in their different ways have been of the most essential service to me in a political point of view, and have been one of the principal means of my obtaining a great deal of the private correspondence of Mr. Barthelemy, a circumstance that has enabled me to know what arguments I could use in opposition to his reasoning, with the greatest advantage, and to what question I ought to direct them.

I send your Lordship enclosed extracts from different Letters that I have rec^d. from the Lieut. Colonel, and for the reasons above-mentioned I venture to recommend them very earnestly to your Lordship's attention.

How far the different requests contained in them are possible to be granted, I cannot pretend to say, nor do

I mean to assert that they are all consistent with strict justice if considered *as claims*.

All that I mean to say is this, that if the success of this measure be considered as of real importance either in a military or political view, it can only be secured by the exertions of the superior officers *considered as Individuals*—and that every possible encouragement should be given to them.

Your Lordship will please to recollect that this will be the first Swiss Regiment that ever was raised without either an avowed treaty, a subsidy to the state, or pensions to individuals.

In a political view I cannot help considering the thing at this moment as of importance, were it only considered as a real and a sensible blow given to the French Republican Interest here, as severe as it was certainly unexpected.

I believe I mentioned to your Lordship in a former letter that a person belonging to that mission had declared 'that the British Government had now fairly committed itself here and that it would most inevitably receive an affront.'

I know this language was repeated every where by their friends and agents, and their disappointment is the principal reason of the warmth and spleen that appear in all of Mr. Barthelemy's letters and notes, which are in a style so different from that which he had hitherto adopted in all his communications with the Cantons.

At the same time I can by no means answer, if he continue his remonstrances and bring the matter fairly before the approaching diet, that some vigorous measure will not be taken there, I really do not see how it will be possible for them to avoid it. In that case, and in that only, I should propose to bring forward the affair of the Swiss Troops left in Holland—privately i.e. but by no means publickly, as I am sure that no publick satisfaction can be obtained, but a firm and temperate language holden

in private to the leading members of the Cantons of Bern and Zurich, may have great effect and may induce them to be forward in finding out means to prevent the diet from coming to any determination upon the other question. Hitherto I have avoided all conversation upon the subject, though the Avoyer de Steiguer has often pressed me.

By leaving their men in Holland, they bring a lasting disgrace upon themselves, but in the miserable situation in which they leave them, those Regiments can be of no service to the Patriotic party, and would be among the first to contribute to bring about a counter-revolution whenever the thing should be attempted.

The ill humour of Mr. Barthelemy is very much augmented at this moment by a letter that an ensign in the Regiment of Roll, (a Soldier of Fortune) has written to him of which I enclose a copy. Mr. Barthelemy would I should think have acted much more wisely if he had thrown it into the fire. Instead of which he has made a formal complaint to the C. of Soleure of which Mr. Schartz is a member.

A very unpleasant affair has happened here to a Mr. Godart, a man of family here and a Lieutenant in the Reg. who has been apprehended on a charge of raising recruits, the proof is so clear that it is impossible to suppress it, and he will be publickly try'd before the 200. I fear the slightest punishment that will be inflicted will be 4 or 5 years imprisonment. He has thrown up his commission in the hope of diminishing his punishment.

This gentleman has a wife and children and but a very small fortune. He had the reputation of an excellent officer in the Regiment of Ernest where he had a company. If he be entirely abandoned to his fate, it will I fear have a very bad effect in this country. I will neglect nothing on my part that may contribute to save him, though I fear every attempt will be totally useless.

I do not believe there is a man in S. excepting those really in the secret, who does not believe that the British Government employ at the least £20,000 in the attempt, exclusive of the fair expence of raising the regiment. This idea has sometimes placed me in an awkward situation.

With respect to the possibility of raising any new corps, I can now venture to assure your Lordship that the thing is absolutely impracticable. I have sounded all manner of people that I have had the means of approaching and I find but one opinion on the subject.

As to the canton of Zurich which I should have been anxious to secure above all others, the inclosed letter, written by the best disposed person in the whole Canton, will satisfy your Lordship that nothing can be done there. Some persons at Fribourg held a very high language upon this occasion at first and talked of raising an entire regiment, but upon my questioning them closely wh^{r} their canton w^{d} support them against all the others who would certainly arm themselves against the measure, they were obliged to admit that it would not. Besides, every officer in the Regiment of Roll would use all his personal influence and interest against it, and it would be impossible to prevent them from doing mischief. Every regiment raised in this country that is not intended to be avowed by its state, must be raised either by the personal exertions of individuals or by the means of pensions distributed among the leading persons in the lesser cantons. But neither of these ways are admissible when the regiment is meant to be raised by one single canton.

The number of officers (between 40 and 50) to be taken out of one state would not admit of that *appearance of ignorance* which is necessary to a non-avowed Regiment, and without which no personal exertions nor the most extravagant pensions could avail anything at a time like this.

The only certain means of raising more men would be to add one or two companies to each Battallion—for instance

one company of fusiliers and one of Light Infantry to each, perhaps also ten or 12 men might be added to each company though this would not be approved of by the officers.

Or if the thing were meant to be done on a greater scale, *several* companies might be raised, all *in the same way*, and afterwards one or two new Battallions formed out of them—but this must be done very quickly and secretly.

This plan is the only one that I consider as feasible at this moment, were two Battallions to be raised in this manner, Fribourg might have one and the other might be distributed among the little cantons in companies which should allways belong to certain families.

Your Lordship no doubt is aware that there has been a constant jealousy and Rivalship between the Cantons of Soleure and Fribourg respecting the French Service of which these two cantons were always considered as the chief support. The family of D'Affry in particular is to the last degree mortified at the preference that has been given on this occasion to the Baron de Roll, and I much doubt whether any of them would serve under him, but many of the other families would, provided they had a Battallion given them, at the same time I doubt very much whether they would be able to perform such an engagement.

The mode of giving companies to particular families among the lesser cantons I consider as the only certain way of obtaining a decided influence amongst them, and through them at the Diet, where every canton, being on equal terms, it is of the last importance to establish an interest in those which may be most easily gained and governed.

Another plan that I consider as possible though yet very precarious, would be to take the whole regiment of Watteville (formerly the Reg. of Ernest) and incorporate it with the Regiment of Roll, it would on its present establishment

form a smart battallion. If the allies had any success in the beginning of the campaign I think the canton of Bern might be brought to *disband* the regiment, which is all that I should wish. I have spoken to the chief of the corps allready, who in that case would undertake to keep the men together, and the officers would have no objection to being incorporated with the Reg. of Roll on account of the clause in the Capitulation recommending that Reg. to the French Princes in case of a counter Revolution in France, and the opinion generally established here that in such case it would be converted into a Reg. of Swiss Guards.

I saw some time since a letter from Mr. Woodford in which he informed me that directions had been given to recall the different officers recruiting here for the French Corps. I am particularly thankful to Your Lordship for the attention you have been pleased to pay on this occasion to my recommendations. I can assure Your Lordship that the measure was highly necessary, at the same time I should be extremely concerned if the representation that I thought it my duty to make to your Lordship should be considered either as extending to all the officers employed here on the recruiting Service without exception, or to complain of any thing more than an *excess of Zeal* even in those who had been most imprudent.

If they had contented themselves with remaining on the frontiers and had employed officers or Serjeants, *natives of the Country*, to raise the men, a great number of Recruits might have been procured, and the whole thing would certainly have been connived at. The mischief has arisen from the Gentlemen employed not having had a sufficient previous knowledge of the Country, and the temper of its Inhabitants, which is every where directly hostile to the enterprize they had undertaken; so that in point of fact they had not only the Intrigues and opposition of Mr. Barthelemy and the French Party

to struggle with, but the persons best attached to their cause, were in this case most decidedly against them.

" The Affair of M. Godart would not have happened if the Imprudence of the French officers had not given rise to such repeated reclamations on the part of Mr. Barthelemy that it was impossible even for the Governments that were the best disposed to connive at the thing any longer.

Mr. Wickham to Mr. Trevor.

(Draft.) Bern: 2d June, 1795.

Sir,—Being at this moment extremely hurried I can do little more than send you the inclosed papers and acknowledge the receipt of your very obliging and interesting dispatches which were delivered to me by M. de Sançy on Sunday.

I shall just observe in answer to your and M. de Preçy's remarks on my idea of converting Lyons into a Capital, that I never meant to exclude the hope of rallying all the other Provinces more or less distant round the same point. All that I wished to say was this, that Paris being actually in the hands of the enemies of order and good Government some point or other capable of resisting with effect must be set up in opposition to it, and that none appeared to me so natural as Lyons whether it be considered in respect to its real magnitude and Importance, the present disposition of the Inhabitants, or to its means of communication with the Allied powers.

I wish the thing to be made as general as possible and I should infinitely prefer Paris to every other Point. But that being impossible I am willing to content myself with the next point that offers. But I am most decidedly of opinion that the Invitation holden out by Lyons should be general to the whole kingdom even to Paris itself—though its own immediate efforts must of course be confined to that which is in within its own reach.

It appears that the division of the fleet that sailed from Brest to Toulon has separated itself from the others and is gone or going from that port to the Isle of Hieres. Can no advantage be taken of the present Situation of Toulon.

I shall probably hear from Lyons to morrow. I shall forward M. de Preçy's Letters then immediately.

P.S.—On my arrival here from Basle I found that the Baron de Vignet had been making his Complaints all over the Town of the Conduct of Gen. de Vins, and saying that it was generally understood that he had private orders in his Pocket not to advance. I found the inclosed note from Lausanne respecting the Comte de Mestre on my table at the same time. As what he says was spoken in confidence it should not be repeated. Judge what satisfaction your Letters gave me after hearing these reports.

This is really very teazing and provoking, for whatever is said here is repeated to Basle immediately and of course exaggerated in its passage. I have spoken, prayed, intreated, almost threatened, but it is all in vain; there is no possibility of making the poor Baron hold his tongue. I know also that the Avoyer de Steiguer has spoken to him very seriously on the same subject.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

(No. 14.) Downing Street: June 6th, 1795.
(Received 6th of July.)

Sir,—Your several Dispatches to No. 33. inclusive have been received and laid before the King.

I have thought it right, as the Question respecting Lyons appears to press for an immediate Decision, to lose no Time in apprizing You, that His Majesty leaves it entirely to your Discretion to act, in that respect, as Circumstances shall appear to You to point out, for the Accomplishment of the Views explained to You in your

former Instructions. At the same time, His Majesty's Servants are of Opinion, that it would be desirable that You should, as far as possible, endeavour to carry along with You, on any Point of Difficulty, the Opinion of the Prince of Condé, with whom You have the Means of constant Communication. You will understand that we do not mean absolutely to subject your Decisions to his Opinions; especially as there may be Points on which You may not be at Liberty to make an unreserved Communication, even to him; but, on any doubtful Occasion, your having recourse to his Advice will be a Matter of Satisfaction to yourself, as well as to His Majesty's Servants.

I will write to You more at large by the next Packet; but I thought it material to lose no Time in giving You this Authority, in order that any favourable Opportunity may not be lost by the Delay. I am with great Truth and Regard, Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant,

GRENVILLE.

P.S.—Your receipt for £5000. Secret Service was received, in your No. 28—but the preceding Receipt for £3100. is still wanting.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

(Most Secret.) Downing Street: 8th June, 1795.

Sir,—Your Dispatches from No. 29 to 33 inclusive were received here on the 4th and 6th of this Month.

I have already explained to you shortly the extent of the discretion which His Majesty is pleased to entrust to you on the important subject to which those dispatches particularly relate, but it is proper that in this letter I should enter further into several particulars which are essentially connected with that business.

The two Points which present themselves for decision in consequence of your Dispatches are these,

First, The support to be given to Lyons in case of any hostile measures against that place being adopted by the Convention and

Secondly, Supposing no such measures to be adopted whether it would be right to bring forward the dispositions of the Royalists there into immediate action, or to endeavour at keeping them back for the present.

With respect to the first point there is no difficulty in authorizing you unlimitedly to give in such an event every degree of assistance of every sort which can at all tend to induce the people of Lyons to defend themselves and to maintain the principles which according to the various accounts transmitted by you appear to be so prevalent there. Even in this case a communication and concert with the Prince of Condé would be desirable, but the decision upon it is so clear that a moments delay ought not to be incurred by waiting for his advice. I have pointed out to you in my Letter No. 13, the source from which you might immediately draw a large pecuniary supply, and you would probably find no difficulty in procuring credit in Swisserland for any further sums for which you might find it necessary to draw. In order however to obviate any possible inconvenience of that sort I have written to Colonel Craufurd to desire that he will on your requisition advance to you *any* part of the money which has been placed at his disposal for the purpose of which you have been apprized, provided such requisition does not interfere with any immediate and pressing demands for the service of the Prince of Condé. By concerting the business with His Serene Highness, you will therefore be enabled to arrange it without difficulty.

With respect to the other question the solution of it here is attended with more difficulties, and it has for that reason been judged very desirable that you should in forming your own opinion upon it endeavour to procure the advice and opinion of the Prince of Condé, tho' as I have stated to you in my last Dispatch, His Majesty is

pleased ultimately to refer it to your own discretion. The advantage of bringing forward or keeping back an explosion at Lyons depends on a view both of the internal and external situation of France, and on the prospects and plans of the Campaign.

With respect to the interior of France all the information which is received by the King's Servants accords so entirely with that which you transmit and you are so perfectly enabled to judge upon the spot of the effect of any variations produced by the extraordinary scenes now passing at Paris that I have little to say to you upon that point; except to observe that the accounts from Britany and the Vendée are still very favourable and that it seems reasonable to expect that the encouragement which the Royalists there would receive from any event of the nature to which you allude taking place at Lyons would induce them again to come forward with such measures as would create the utmost embarassment to the Convention if obliged at the same period to take measures for the maintenance of their authority in such distant quarters.

The accounts which have been received here of what has happened at Toulon come to us only from Paris, and we are therefore unable to judge whether the revolt in that part is really to be ascribed as the Convention represents it to the prevalence of the Jacobins there, or whether the spirit of Royalty is at all mixed in that transaction.

But in either case that revolt must during it's continuance add much to the embarassment of the present rulers, tho' I conclude that they will find a greater facility in suppressing any Jacobin insurrection in that quarter than if Royalty is mixed with it.

In Lyons itself you are infinitely better able to judge than we are, whether the spirit which now prevails there, would be increased or diminished by being repressed for the present, and whether there is, all circumstances considered, a reasonable probability that the Royalists if

they now declared themselves would be able to maintain themselves without more certainty than it yet appears safe to reckon upon, of active co-operation from without.

His Majesty's Servants are very strongly impressed with the force and propriety of your remarks upon the advantage of placing Lyons at the head of such an enterprize; and they entirely agree with you as to the mode of doing it by putting the funds and supplies which you could furnish, entirely at the disposal of M. Preçy and of the people of Lyons. They feel also in the strongest manner the infinite advantage which would arise to the operations of the Campaign whatever they may be, from obliging the Convention at the opening of it to turn their attention to the interior of their own Country, instead of leaving them at liberty to pursue offensive operations elsewhere. The only drawback is the fear of precipitating the thing too much, and of risking by a separate enterprize of this nature the loss of a resource which if combined with other operations would be invaluable. The force of this objection you will weigh in concert with the Prince of Condé, and you will act upon it to the best of your own judgment in the fullest security that your conduct will be most favourably considered here after the many and striking proofs which you have given of zeal ability and discretion.

A Material point in the decision is the question as to the present or future prospects of assistance or co-operation from without. If immediate co-operation could be depended upon either from M. Clerfaye* or from General Devins, or still better if from both, there would seem to be hardly a doubt that the thing ought instantly to be tried. If a certainty could be obtained of such a co-operation at a fixed and not too distant period, it would then

* Field Marshal Francis Sebastian Charles Joseph de Croix, Count of Clerfayt, one of the most distinguished and honourable of the Austrian generals, at this time Commander-in-chief of the Imperial Army of the Rhine, b. in Belgium 1733; d. 1798.

be to be considered whether the advantages of such a combination would not overbalance those of immediate but separate action. But if such co-operation can neither be had in present, nor relied upon with certainty for the future, the temptations in favor of acting without delay are again much increased.

A great uncertainty still hangs over all the Austrian plans for military operations. I stated to you in my No. 13. that positive assurances had been given by Monsieur Thugut * of an intention to act in Alsace, and I have much reason to believe that the repeated instructions which M. Clerfaye has received from his Court all urge him to immediate and vigorous measures of offence. On the other hand the natural caution of his own disposition is increased by various embarassments which result from his present position, and which the Prussians studiously labour to increase, so that he has hitherto been restrained from active measures, and no adequate preparation as yet appears to be made for any enterprize of importance. These circumstances naturally diminish any confidence which we might be disposed to place in the assurances given at Vienna of vigorous exertion particularly as applicable to any distinct and specific plan of operations.

Some light upon this subject will probably have been derived to you from the interview which Colonel Craufurd will have had with M. Clerfaye, but I am not sanguine in the hope that such distinct explanations will have been given to that Officer as can safely be made a foundation for acting at Lyons with the expectation of assistance at a precise moment, or in any given direction to be previously settled. It may indeed be said that the two points in question are of a nature mutually to assist each other—that if a Counter-revolution had taken place at Lyons which called the attention of the Convention to that quarter, M. Clerfaye would be much more likely to act

* Francis Baron Thugut, Prime Minister at Vienna, was the son of a poor boatman at Lintz, b. 1739; d. 1818.

with spirit and vigour than he now is; while on the other hand, if the Austrian Army were acting offensively in any quarter, there would be much less danger in encouraging an explosion at Lyons. But if these two enterprizes are made to depend on each other so that the one shall not take place without a certainty of the other it is much to be feared that the Campaign will be lost in inactivity, and the occasion which now offers itself be suffered to slip away.

I have entered into this reasoning, because where I am unable to transmit to you positive instructions on a point of so much delicacy it seems right to put you as fully as possible into possession of all the considerations which appear to us to bear upon it.

You are already possessed of all the information which has been received here respecting Military operations in Italy and I conclude that Mr. Trevor will keep you constantly informed on that point, so that you will be enabled to judge whether your views respecting Lyons can in any manner be combined with what is passing in that quarter, where every account seems to confirm the expectation that much might be done by vigour and exertion. The conclusion of a peace between Spain and the Convention would however much strengthen the hands of the latter on that side. The journey of M. d'Yriarte is unquestionably undertaken with a view to ascertain what terms could be obtained for his Court, and it is to be feared that the distress of the Convention will induce them to go great lengths to detach Spain from the Alliance. The same consideration appears however to have had some weight at Madrid, and my last letters from thence which are dated the 6th of last Month speak more favourably than the accounts which I had before received of the disposition of that Court to continue the War, especially since the encouragement they have received by the Alliance signed between His Majesty and the two Imperial Courts. From Sardinia and Naples the strongest

assurances of perseverance are received, and the late transactions at the latter of those Courts seem to leave little doubt of the reality of that disposition there.

From all these grounds compared with the actual state of things in those provinces of France which are near to Lyons you will draw your own conclusions, and I have the utmost satisfaction in reflecting that the decision on so difficult a question (if it should occur,) being necessarily to be made on the spot and upon the spur of the occasion, is in the hands of a person in whom the King's Servants have seen so much reason to place the most entire confidence.

If in whatever manner, or by any course of events the questions respecting the internal Government of France should be brought forward, I do not feel it possible to add any thing to your first instructions on that point which you appear to have perfectly well followed up in the inclosures in your Dispatch No. 33. The four material points there detailed are those which are principally to be kept in view. Other subordinate points not inconsistent with them should as far as possible be kept distinct from the interference of this Country which is naturally directed much more to the establishment of such a Government as shall in it's general form and leading principles appear to afford a reasonable hope for the maintenance of domestic and foreign Peace, than to the discussion of modifications and details which are more immediately interesting to the people among whom such a Government is to be established. The assurances which you have hitherto given are such as I conceive to be well warranted by what has passed between His Majesty and the French Princes, and I have little doubt of their readiness to confirm pecuniary engagements, or even those which may relate to ranks and distinctions. But you will of course observe that what relates to *particular* offices and situations is a point of more delicacy,—with respect to that you cannot do better in the absence of

the Comte de Provence than by consulting the Prince of Condé.

It is hardly necessary for me to add that your intended visit to that Prince is entirely approved. With respect to the two questions stated by him as mentioned in your No. 32: the occasions to which they refer are under the present circumstances less likely to occur than perhaps appeared to M. de Condé at the time he stated them. There can however be no difficulty in your assuring him that in either case His Majesty would be disposed to take the most effectual mode according to the existing circumstances for enabling him to continue his exertions and you will consider yourself as authorized in such case to act provisionally for that purpose as occasion might require.

I am with great truth and regard, Sir, your most obedient humble Servant,

GRENVILLE.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

(Private and most Secret.) Downing Street: June 8, 1795.
(Received July 6th.)

Sir,—In addition to my public despatches of this date, I think it proper to mention to you in the most confidential manner a circumstance which may in some degree influence your decision respecting the time to be chosen for any public measures to be taken in favour of Royalty at Lyons.

By Communications which have been opened with some of the principal Chiefs in Brittany and the Vendée, we have the greatest reason to believe that the late accommodation has been made only with the view of gaining time, and particularly from the want of some articles of military supply the deficiency of which rendered their resistance difficult: and assurances have

been received of a disposition to show themselves again in support of the same cause whenever a proper opportunity should offer. It has therefore been determined to collect a pretty large supply of military stores of various kinds, and to attempt to land this in Brittany, under the escort of about three thousand men being the whole of the Emigré Corps of different descriptions which are now in England. This expedition is on the point of sailing, and under various pretences its destination has been kept so secret, that although some suspicion appears to prevail that preparations are making with a view to acting on the coast of France, there is I believe as yet, not the smallest idea of the real plan in agitation and much less of its state of forwardness. There is therefore great reason to hope that unless some untoward accident intervenes these men with the supplies will be landed at the place agreed upon, without even any considerable opposition, and should this be the case they will be immediately followed by about 2000 more troops of a similar description who will have been brought from the Continent with that view.

The nature of such a force landed in a friendly country is evidently such as to admit of great immediate extension, and there seems therefore much reason to hope that if the dispositions should continue the same this may be the signal for a general rising in those Provinces, in which case further measures would be adopted here for supporting them with a more considerable and more regular force. Supposing therefore that in other respects it was judged prudent to act at Lyons without delay, the prospect of success in both quarters would certainly be much increased by our having the means of combining these operations as much as possible in point of time. The expedition to Brittany is, as I have already mentioned to you, now on the point of sailing, it is probable therefore that by the time you receive this letter the rising in those Provinces, if it happens at all,

will actually have taken place, and on the first appearance of any respectable operation of this nature the King's intention is immediately to send the Comte d'Artois thither, leaving him at liberty to act as circumstances shall require. It is possible that information of what is passing in Brittany may reach you from Paris, but it is also possible that the attempt which the Convention will certainly make to suppress in the first instance any knowledge of these proceedings may for some time be successful. I have therefore thought it necessary to put you in possession of these circumstances leaving it to you to combine them with the actual state of things in the South East of France and to act upon the whole as you shall judge best. A communication will by this messenger be made to Marshal Clerfaye on this subject, and he will be strongly urged to assist the operation by some forward move if it is possible, and if not, at least by some very considerable demonstration.

I am with great truth and regard, Sir, your most faithful and obedient humble Servant,

GRENVILLE.

W. WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c.

(No. 16.) *Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.*

(Most Secret.) Downing Street, 8th June 1795.
(Received July 6th.)

Sir,—Since my Letter No. 15 was written I have received yours to No. 41 inclusive.

I have already stated to you what seems most material to be observed on the subject of your No. 33 to which 34 also relates. No communication of the kind you mention has yet been received, nor have I heard any thing of M. Gourgas. If any sudden explosion should take place it seems probable that means would be found of direct communication here as to every point of difficulty, and in that case we should be enabled to form our decision so as to meet the particular case. Without such

information it seems impossible to adapt any instructions to all the various cases that may arise, and no more can be done than to refer you to your knowledge of the general dispositions of this Country leaving the rest to your discretion as far as it shall be necessary for you to decide on the spot. No precise terms of Peace can of course be accepted or held out by you (in the event of any change of Government) either in the King's name or still less in that of His Majesty's Allies, nor could it be necessary to say any thing without reference here on the very delicate subject of indemnity. It would be very much to be wished that such a system of Government might be established by such an event as should have a reasonable chance of permanence as far as that can be looked for under the innumerable difficulties which any Government in France must have to encounter; and perhaps the general wish for repose which usually succeeds such storms as these may make the task less difficult than it may at first appear.

With respect to the Prince of Condé you will have learnt the means which were taken from hence to supply the wants which there seemed so little probability of the Austrians relieving. The steps taken by you on that subject are entirely approved. I have also to express to you the most entire approbation of your conduct and language on the subject of the Constitutional party. It is certainly much to be wished, that all the friends of Monarchy and order in France could be brought to unite their efforts, but there seems much reason to doubt the possibility of this.

I am inclined to believe that the journey of M. Hardenberg to Berlin is in some degree connected with this subject; and it is the more necessary that I should state this to you as General Pichegru's name appears to have been referred to in your communications from Paris. In passing thro' Frankfort M. Hardenberg communicated to a Minister of one of the German Princes, that Merlin de Thionville and Pichegru had formed a plan for proclaiming

the young King, and that he was going to Berlin to persuade the King of Prussia to support this project. If this intelligence can be relied on as I believe it may, and if M. Hardenberg's information had any other object than that of entire deception, the only construction which can be given to this measure is, that these persons seeing the rapid turn which things are taking in favor of Monarchy in France, are fearful lest the change should happen in a manner to destroy their influence and to favour the views of the Allies; and therefore that Barthelemi, Merlin, and Pichegru, possibly in connection with the Constitutionalists, have formed some plan of Regency or other limitation calculated to maintain their influence, and that they are endeavouring to induce the King of Prussia to enter into this scheme as the only means of preventing his being completely the dupe of the step he has taken in deserting the Alliance. You will therefore give the utmost attention to this point, as it may lead to the most important consequences.

Your precautions on the subject of the French Princes are highly proper. You can alone judge from the circumstances of the case how far in the event of any sudden turn of affairs at Paris it might be proper for you to apprize Monsieur of it; but it is probable that the accounts which according to your last letter you expected to meet on your return to Berne, may throw some light on this subject, and enable me to send you more precise instructions on this and on many other points connected with this important subject than it is possible for me now to do, being wholly unapprized of the projects and views of the parties concerned.

I am with great truth and regard, Sir, your most obedient humble Servant,

GRENVILLE.

P.S.—I have received the Receipt for £3000. Secret Service Money, enclosed in your No. 36.

W. WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

The Duke of Portland to Mr. Wickham.

London: Friday, 12 June, 1795.

Dear Sir,—I have repeatedly reproached myself with not having opened my wishes to you, and the letter I received yesterday from our friend the Dean,* at the same time that it confirms and strengthens those wishes adds considerably to the reproaches to which my silence has subjected me. When I found the loss of poor Brodrick was unavoidable, I had You very early in contemplation as his successor but until his dissolution had taken place I did not feel myself at liberty publickly to avow the thought. Occupied as you then were and in the act of rendering those services to the publick of which I was a constant witness, I felt it unbecoming me to entertain a wish of inducing You to quit the station in which you were placed, and I can assure you that upon Your account I should have believed such an attempt impracticable. I therefore, and *for that reason only*, desisted from submitting my ideas to You, but I never lost sight of them or even desponded of the opportunity which should give me the means of proposing to You the first official situation in my own department, and which, I give You my word *I never will fill with any other name than Yours* but in consequence of the most positive disclaimer and renunciation of it on Your part, which however, I have the pleasure of thinking from your letter to L^d^ Grenville is an event as improbable as my hopes would lead me to render it. After this declaration I need not say that the office of Under Secretary of State waits and will patiently wait Your return home, that it is *perfectly possible as you see* to keep that situation open as long as

* Dr. Cyril Jackson, the eminent Dean of Christ Church, and sub-preceptor to the Prince of Wales and Bishop of Osnaburg; he refused the Bishopric of Oxford and Primacy of Ireland, resigned his Deanery in 1809, and died in 1819. He was a relation and valued friend of Mr. Wickham.

You please, that is, as long as You judge it to be material to His Majesty's service that you should remain upon Your present post; and that you cannot furnish me with so good a reason for this determination as by feeling it to be Your duty to remain where You are, notwithstanding the personal responsibility and dangers which you are certainly daily liable to. In revolving as I have frequently done what might be said for and against your acceptance of the situation I wish You to occupy the duration of my own political and natural Life has frequently recurred, and upon the best consideration I have been able to give it I am clearly of opinion that it is not such an objection to You as need deter You from filling it. Whether in case of a change you would choose to remain in the Secr^y^ of States Office it is impossible to determine, but considering the reputation you have established and the rank you hold in publick estimation it is not in the nature of things that You can be removed from it without fair and full equivalent and without being always looked up to as a person whose services any Government must be desirous of availing itself of—as long as You remain in it, it is certainly more beneficial than any compensation You would hope for for foreign services, and offers besides opportunities of improving Your own fortune or that of Your Son, by the W. India patronage of the Secr^y^ of State upon whom, without flattery, I should imagine You would acquire as powerful a claim as any of Your official Predecessors but I ought not to endeavour to delude or to impose and I should not offer to you prospects which it may probably not be in my power to realize and I think I can confidently assure You that unless Your inclination and interest concur, and your coolest judgment confirms, I wish You too well to desire You to change Your situation, I mean the political walk you have now entered, with the view to accept that which is open in my department. If the Under Secretaryship of State should continue to

appear as eligible to You as Your letters to L^d^ Grenville entitle me to infer, I shall be very happy; but should You see reason to alter that opinion, You may be assured that You will as fully possess my best wishes, and just as strong a claim upon my best services, as if You had acceded to the proposal which I now make You.

Believe me sincerely, Yours ever,

PORTLAND.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq.

(No. 49.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft. Most Secret and Confidential.) Bern: 15th June, 1795.

My Lord,—It appears by the inclosed dispatch from Mr. Trevor which he has been pleased to trust to me open, that General Devins is disposed to abandon the idea of advancing towards the Var, and that he has now formed the project of making his serious Attack on the side of Savoy.

If that be really so I consider it as the most fortunate circumstance that could have happened to the Interests of His Majesty and the Common Cause in this part of the world.

An Invasion in Provence, however successful must ever be looked upon as a partial operation when considered with respect to the rest of the kingdom, unless made by a most^e^ powerful force, and supported by a strong party or the most violent dissensions among the Inhabitants of the other Provinces.

I am aware that an Austrian Army acting in the South would be supported by the operations of His Majesty's Fleet—But the advantage to be derived from those operations must necessarily be confined to the immediate neighbourhood of the Coast, and in the present state of those Provinces it would be absolutely impossible for an Army to exist at any distance from it, whilst the enemy were masters of the Course of the Rhone and the Saone.

There would probably be little doubt of success in the first instance, but there does not appear any great decisive measure to which that success would lead. The Army now in Piedmont is perhaps fully equal to the defence of the country against any enemy whatever—but a body of 25 or 30,000 Men which is the utmost that could be detached from it with safety to any one point must be very insufficient for any real offensive operations carried on at any distance from the frontier—The combined forces in that quarter for instance do not appear by any means equal to the undertaking the siege of Toulon in form strengthened as that place now is, and I fear it is but too certain that a voluntary surrender or co-operation must not again be looked for—Besides, a siege of any kind would probably be fatal—It would give the Enemy time to recover from their first Consternation, and enable them to seize the principal posts and passages with which that Country abounds, some of which are so situated as very materially to endanger the retreat of the Army in case of failure. I forbear to mention all the other advantages they would derive from their situation—they are too obvious.

A covering army would also be indispensably necessary to the Besiegers which the weakness of the Allies would not permit them to form—and excepting the attack of Toulon I see no other great measure that could be adopted.

The operations therefore of this Campaign would probably terminate on that side by a retreat over the Alps before the fall of the Snows should render such a measure impracticable or by defending the Banks of the Var and maintaining the Army in the County of Nice by the assistance of His Majesty's Fleet.

For my own part I cannot help being of opinion that the most effectual service that could be rendered by the fleet to the common Cause, would be a constant and most vigilant Cruise conducted so as effectually to cut off all supplies whatever from the Southern Ports which the

reinforcement now expected will I hope enable them to effect. It seems an undoubted Fact that the enemy has hitherto found means to elude the utmost vigilance of our naval Commanders, and that not only the Southern Provinces have been supplied abundantly, but that Paris itself has received very large quantities of Grain from thence.

This idea with respect to an invasion in Provence is not merely a fancy of my own—it was the decided opinion of one of the best officers in France, the late General Conway with whom I passed the whole Summer of 1792 upon the frontier in the neighbourhood of Chambery—I had there repeated conversations with him upon the subject, and his constant observation was that the South of France could only be conquered from the North—Among many other reasons he dwelt much upon this, th t every Step you gained in repulsing the Enemy from the South you drive him into a better Country where he could find his subsistance constantly increasing as he retreated, all which he would take care to eat up or destroy, before he abandoned each successive post.

On the other hand by an Invasion on the side of Savoy you fall immediately upon Lyons. The advantage of the position of that place as dividing the Kingdom into two and cutting off all Supplies from the Southern parts have been so often and so fully pointed at that it would be useless to dwell upon them.

It has however at this moment and under the circumstances of the intended Campaign a most singular and decided Advantage which I believe I have before ventured to point out.

The intended operations in Franche Comté which appear now to be determined on render the acquisition of that place absolutely necessary. The two Great Armies of the Allies, supposing the Austrians had penetrated into Franche Comté, are so near together as really to be able to give each other effectual support in case of

need—they have at all events a safe and speedy communication thro' a neutral Country for conveying Intelligence from one to the other, and for combining and concerting all their operations. Neither success nor disaster can happen to either of them without it's being known to the other so soon, as that advantage may be taken of the one, and the mischief of the other guarded against, and yet they will be kept in effect so distinct by the very nature of the Country that the respective Generals cannot well interfere with each other's Command.

It is difficult to say whether Lyons would receive most assistance and support from the Jura or the Jura from Lyons—they act upon each other reciprocally in so many different ways.

Lyons was ruined in 1793, by the defection of the Inhabitants of the Provinces situated to the north of the Town, without whose Assistance the Republicans could never have carried the place, as its supplies could never have been cut off, and on the other hand no position in the Jura can be maintained with safety, if the Country be left exposed on the left to incursions from Savoy and the Country of Bresse, Bugey, and Gex, the evacuation of all which must necessarily either precede or immediately follow the possession of Lyons; if that possession be effected by the aid of, or in concert with the appearance of a foreign force coming from Mount Cenis, and if you suppose a force afterwards posted along the frontier of Dauphiné and Savoy and ready to fall upon the flank of any army that should attack either Lyons or Franche Compté according to circumstances—it is scarcely possible to conceive a position of so great an extent that may be more easily maintained, better supported when attacked in any point, or more easily supplied from without with everything of which it might stand in need.

With respect to the northern line of this Position military men seem to be agreed in opinion that if well defended, it is not to be forced - supposing therefore the

Prince of Condé to be once within that line, whether the Austrians shall then remain in Alsace or should recross the Rhine and continue to keep the enemy's Army in expectation of a new attack, would be perfectly indifferent.

These seem to be the natural advantages of an attempt on the side of Savoy taken principally as a military operation, but if it be considered as a political measure, or rather as a political measure joined with a military one, it becomes of infinitely greater Importance.

An Invasion in Provence would be a still more *partial* measure when taken in that point of view than in the other.

That Province makes a nation of itself, as well from its manners, antient Laws, Customs and prejudices, as from its local position, and has I believe very little communication with any other excepting its Ports. The Inhabitants are particularly afraid of seeing any armies amongst them on account of the total Ruin they bring on the Country by the destruction of their Olive Trees, which cannot be replaced but in a number of Years—I believe that the Combined Forces far from receiving any essential support, would meet with the most decided opposition there from the people of the Country, were it only because no active measures have as yet been taken to gain them, and since the Affair of Toulon they have imbibed the most violent hatred against all foreigners—the information I receive from every quarter and from every description of persons is uniform upon that point, it has never varied since I have been in the Country, and I am intimately persuaded that it would be universally the case, not only here but throughout France, wherever an Invasion were attempted that had not been actually concerted with the Inhabitants in the interior, and where their fears and Jealousies had not been first effectually allayed.

With respect to Lyons the case is very different—from some particular circumstances there is now a natural connection actually existing between that place and the

combined powers—means have been taken to augment it and the Inhabitants really look to foreign powers for Assistance.

I have however considered that subject so much at large in some of my former Letters particularly my No 13, that it would be useless for me to add anything here.

It was impossible for the Convention to overlook some of the scenes that have passed there, and it has long been evident that their forbearance was only owing to the circumstances of the moment, and that as soon as their fears from the new revolt of the Jacobins should be at an end, an attempt would be made to disarm the Town and to punish the Inhabitants most severely.

Your Lordship will perceive by the inclosed Letter No. 1, that there is now great reason to apprehend that a something of that kind will be soon attempted, and if it succeed the consequences will be most fatal, as all hopes of any co-operation with the Royalists on this frontier must be at an end.

The Inhabitants of Franche Comté will do nothing without Lyons—It is the constant Answer I receive from every part of that Province, and their determination is a right and a wise one, for besides the great weight and importance of such a place and the Consideration it would give to their Cause, they feel it is impossible for them to act without a Barrier on that side to protect them from the efforts of the Southern Army and that of Savoy.

If then Lyons should fall before Franche Comté should have declared itself, I am perfectly satisfyed that every person in place and almost every man of property in the Province, would not only refuse you their assistance, but that they would do their utmost to prevent their Country from becoming the seat either of an insurrection or an invasion on the part of the Prince of Condé (some peasants in the Mountains who are extremely well disposed alone excepted).

On the other hand the Lyonnese require *peremptorily* before they take up arms that a foreign force shall appear ready to protect them. Your Lordship will have observed that this has been the constant language of M. de Preçy—It is that of every other sensible Inhabitant with whom I have conversed upon the subject, and I am sure Your Lordship must be fully satisfied that it is dictated by prudence and not by fear. Besides the mere assistance to be derived from a foreign force, Savoy is as necessary to them as they are to Franche Comté, and Savoy however well disposed, neither will nor ought to take up arms, till it sees a force actually on this side of the Alps really capable of protecting it.

All Persons with whom I have had an opportunity of talking upon the question, most particularly M. de Preçy with whom I considered it in every possible point of view, have assured me that an Army acting in the South could not be considered as giving that *protection* to Lyons which the Inhabitants required—Its Scene of action must be too remote and it could not advance northwards without the danger of a new enemy appearing on its rear—It might be useful as a diversion, but its utility in that point of view, must entirely depend upon its force considered as relative to that of the enemy.

If it were not sufficient to prevent the enemy from sending a powerful Army against Lyons it would be in effect useless.

In one word the Lyonnese would have no *confidence* in such a measure and would consider it as entirely foreign to themselves.

The consequence of all this seems to be, that unless the Austrians and Piedmontese make their real attack on the side of Savoy, the Lyonnese will not take up Arms against the Convention—that if they do not, the Jura will remain quiet also, and that all hope of any effective and *general* co-operation with the Royalists in the interior must be at an end.

I am aware that it may be said, that at this moment Lyons will in all probability be forced to take up Arms whether a foreign force appear for the protection of its Inhabitants or no—I allow this to be true, and Your Lordship knows that it is my own private opinion that in such a case every effort should be made to support them—But in forming that opinion, I consider it only as a case of necessity, and by no means as a thing that would be *of itself* desirable, and I sincerely hope that that *necessity* may yet be avoided.

Upon the whole my Lord, the present plan if put in execution with spirit and ability appears to me to be the only one that can hold out any reasonable hope of success. It were to be wished that the Austrians had brought a larger force into the field, but as that cannot be we should endeavour to make up for the defect, by employing the utmost activity in uniting and giving spirit and Courage to the Royalists in the interior, and in contributing as much as possible to the rapid formation and increase of the Prince of Condé's Army.

I dare not yet venture to act in support of the first point in the manner I could wish. It will be necessary first to see General Devins in motion on the side of Nice and to be assured that he will meet with no real obstacle to retard his operations. But as soon as that shall be the case Your Lordship may rely on the most constant and zealous exertions of my humble talents in furtherance of the object in view.

The Arrival of Col. Craufurd will be a great relief to me, as I shall direct all the Intelligence collected on the side of Basle to be regularly transmitted to him. M. D'Artez will also remain there, and I shall remove myself somewhere to the side of Lausanne for which I have now a reasonable pretext. I shall take M. de La Tour with me for the purpose of carrying on the Correspondence with the Prince de Condé.

I have chosen that situation as the only one from whence

an active communication can be maintained with Turin, Lyons, Savoy and the Jura.

It is absolutely impossible to do any thing of the kind from hence—a whole week is sometimes lost between Lyons and Turin by the letters coming round here.

By the means of M. Bayard's friends at St. Claude, Col. Rolan at Romain Mottier, the Abbé de Chafoy between Neufchatel and Bienne, and two other persons of Confidence at Yverdun and Soleure, a daily correspondance will be established along the frontier, which will be extended from St. Claude to Lyons as soon as the campaign shall be about to commence, and by the means of the Colonel's Peasants and M. Chafoy's Priests will be done at no very great expence.

The first great object will be to connect the Department of Franche Comté with Lyons by a Correspondance between their different Administrators, and that is the utmost to which we can venture to go as yet.

The whole Measure will not be without its difficulties, as Your Lordship will perceive from the annexed Note of Mr. Barthelemy's, No. 2, that he is already thoroughly aware of the project—But he cannot possibly defeat it unless he send a powerful army immediately into Franche Comté—He may send out all the Emigrants, but that will answer no end, as the same services will be performed by Swiss. The worst that can happen will be the expence of a few hundred Pounds more (for the Swiss must be paid) but I believe the Business will be better done.

I beg leave however to observe that in holding out a prospect of Success founded on this project, I by no means mean to say that the whole thing is not still full of obstacles and difficulties.

Most of those which I have formerly pointed out continue to exist in their full force, and I beg Your Lordship will have the Goodness to consider every thing that I have here stated, as connected with my former dispatches upon the subject.

If I say nothing more upon it, it is entirely to avoid wearying Your Lordship by useless repetition.

(No. 50.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Extract from Draft. Most Secret.) Bern: June 15th, 1795.

. . . . . .

As to Franche Comté I have little or nothing to add to the different information I have hitherto given.

I told Your Lordship in a former letter that I had rather checked my regular correspondence on that side. It really was not adequate to the expence. It requires at least 4 days for any person to come here and return home to the frontiers of the Pays de Vaud.

The Peasants in the mountainous parts are disposed at this moment to take up arms, and would do so immediately were they encouraged, but the Inhabitants of the Towns are by no means so, and among the Peasants themselves only those of the Mountains.

The Priests are to the last degree imprudent. Even the elder ones and those upon whom I thought I had good reason to rely are almost as bad as the rest.

Your Lordship will perceive by the inclosed letters Nos. 3 4 and 5 from the Abbé Chafoy the late Grand Vicaire of Besançon (a cautious and prudent person in general who certainly may be able to render great Services) that there was a plan formed for securing the Chateau de Joux which he had certainly not discouraged—to say no more.

I sent off an express immediately to stop the project and fortunately it arrived in time.

The extract of Col. Rolan No. 5 alludes to the same Affair.

This attempt will probably do a great deal of mischief as it may cause the Garrison to be changed or augmented; and one of the present Officers had actually engaged to deliver the Fort to a Gentleman stationed on the Frontiers

by the Prince of Condé whenever the proper moment should be arrived.

One great obstacle to any project in Franche Comté arises from the character, old habits and prejudices of the people. Besides the causes of disunion common to all the rest of France they have a number of their own.

I often find persons whom one should naturally suppose to be nearly united by their profession of the same public principles, who detest each other, and cannot be brought to act together now, because they had formerly acted with different parties in some great provincial Question.

They are full of prejudices of this kind and carry them to such a point as really to do mischief.

I sent a very confidential Peasant of the Country to Besançon, to procure for the Prince of Condé an exact statement of the number of the Swiss established there—a point that was considered as very essential. He was stopped on the Frontiers by the Comte de Montesson, a Gentleman stationed there by the Prince himself, who upon hearing the man's story was very much alarmed in the first place to find that he had been with the English Minister, but when he found that a Gentleman had been present at the interview, who had once voted against him in the States General of the Province on a question respecting the Parliament of Besançon, he immediately concluded that there must be some deep plot in the Case, put the man into a postchaise and drove off with him to the Prince to communicate all his Suspicions and to make the poor man tell the whole truth there. The Prince I am sorry to say had not the Courage to scold the Gentleman as he deserved.

The tone and manner of the Prince's Army is also very different from what it ought to be at this moment, It is difficult to conceive the style of their conversation without having heard it. It must however be entirely changed before they enter into France, or it will produce the most

serious mischief. The Prince is well aware of this, but has not the courage to attempt to check it. Your Lordship will perceive from Mr. B.'s letter No. 6. that it is the same thing at Lyons.

As to what is passing on the side of Alsace and Basle Your Lordship will receive very full information from the Report No. 7. and the Reports Nos. 8. to 15.

The negotiations for Peace seem still to be at a stand. Mr. Yriarti however sees Mr. B. very often, but he is far more prudent and silent than the other negotiators who have Appeared there.

It is the general opinion that he is actually empowered to treat with Mr. B. and that the negotiation is far advanced. I can learn nothing positive myself.

Mr. Wickham to Colonel Craufurd.

(Draft.) Berne: 24th June 1795.

My dear Sir,—This Letter will be delivered to you by Mr. Bayard under the name of *Schmidt officier Anglois*. I have no doubt that you will find him as zealous intelligent and prudent as I have described him to be.

He is very anxious that the Prince should give him a Letter for M. Seriziat the Commander of the National Guards at Lyons; and *that* for two Reasons both of which appear to me excellent.

First—because that officer is personally connected with Kellerman who was *certainly* well disposed to have assisted the Lyonnese on the former occasion if circumstances would have permitted him. Secondly because the National Guard being now the only *organised* Body at Lyons is perhaps the only one with which a Correspondance can at present be carried on.

This will be more easy as the two persons who are next to him in Command are perfectly well disposed and

have already communicated very fully and openly with Bayard.

Seriziat is in truth only the *equal* of the other two in respect of the Town of Lyons, there being three Legions each of which has its separate Commander who commands the whole by turns during the Space of ten Days. But Ceriziat is also a Maréchal de Camp in the Army, and therefore in Case they were called into Action, either within the Town or with Any of the Armies, he would probably take the Command of the whole.

Savaron who had formerly declined the Command of one of the Legions is now about to take the Command of a Corps of light Troops and will then rank with the other three.

He is the person of whom M. de Preçy as well as all the better parts of the Inhabitants have the highest Opinion.

It seems therefore if Cereziat can be gained—that here is the very thing we most want ready formed—*A Body* that has the Confidence of the People—a political Existence—the means of correspondance with the neighbouring departments without giving *in the first Instance* any cause of Jealousy or Suspicion—Arms in their hands—and what is perhaps more than all the rest a very limited Number of *Chiefs*, so that the secret part of the Correspondance may be carried on without the fear of its being discovered.

I say nothing of their different characters, Bayard will explain all those to you very fully and clearly. I will only observe that if Savaron becomes one of them I should be disposed to have full and implicit Confidence in him.

The more I think on the subject, the more I am satisfied that the money should be considered as coming from the Prince of Condé. Nothing will contribute so effectually to raise his Character and to increase his Influence *within*, as the idea that he has funds to dispose of. In

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writing to the different Administrators &c. he should take care to inform them distinctly of this, and at the same time I think he should insinuate that *des Personnes* well disposed towards their Causes and the Interests of the Kingdom in general, have furnished him with the Means &c. &c. &c.

Tinseau* was the person whom La Tour mentioned to you as being so thoroughly acquainted with Franche Comté.

He will set off from hence on Saturday and pass by Schaffousen that he may avoid the P. of Condé's Army. You will find him somewhat eager and impetuous, but he is very easily managed by civility and attention. I send you the inclosed note from Genoa. Be so good as return it by Bayard.

My reports from Alsace state that the French are preparing to pass the Rhine below or near Mayence, and that they are also marching Troops this way.

More I see and hear of the public opinion in this country, more I am satisfied that the death of the Young King will prove a fortunate Circumstance for the Cause of Royalty.

The new one must be made in some shape or other an agent, should it be necessary to take the step that Gen[l] Clairfait seems to approve of. I can plainly see that there is here a dread lest he should take some public step such as calling on the Cantons for assistance according to their Treaty. This in the end may be possibly turned to some advantage. But unfortunately we are too far from our Courts and our Courts are too far from us and from each other.

* Charles Marie Thérèse Léon Tinseau D'Amondans, b. 1749, an engineer officer in the army of Condé, a strong royalist and employed by Louis XVIII. In 1799 Suwarrow made him chief of his staff; he was afterwards greatly in the confidence of the Comte D'Artois; he was the author of numerous political writings, and died in 1822.

Colonel Craufurd to Mr. Wickham.

Mulheim: 26th June, 1795.
(Received 28th.)

My dear Wickham,—Bayard arrived yesterday afternoon. I got him dinner in my Quarters, and kept him snug 'till it was dusk, when I took him to the Prince of Condé. The Duke of Bourbon* was present. He began by reading to the Princes the Memoire which he had given You, and afterwards we conversed upon the subject full two hours. The Princes were extremely satisfied with Him, and He with them. They are agreed upon all points. But, tho' they have given him the strongest Verbal assurances possible, and authorised Him to give the same to Seriziat, the Chiefs of the Jura, or any other principal Persons who may be disposed to serve the Royal cause, they could not be persuaded to give him any thing under their hand as yet. The Prince of Condé objects—that he is not yet sure of Seriziat, and therefore cannot commit Himself so far as to write to Him—That the Administrators of the Jura have not yet declared themselves to him either directly or indirectly—and He thinks it would not be prudent to give them the first written assurance on his part. But, that Bayard may repeat every word of last night's conversation, and may inform them from Him in the most positive manner, that the moment they will give him the least written intimation of their intentions—or if they absolutely refuse this—if they will only send him a verbal declaration of their determination to serve to the utmost of their power the Royal cause, He will in return write to them in a manner that must be perfectly satisfactory. He cannot be brought to do more—first because he is afraid of being publicly

* Louis Henri Joseph Duc de Bourbon, afterwards Prince de Condé and last of his race; b. 1756, d. 1830.

committed—and secondly because He does not think the King would approve of his taking such a step, 'till authorised, as it were, by such an assurance as I have mentioned above from those with whom he is to communicate. However, nothing can be more explicit than his declaration to Bayard—That He is preparing to advance into the Jura with a formidable force, supported by the whole Austrian Army. That every possible effort will be made to establish a firm footing on the other side of the Rhine. This done, That He will advance to Lyons immediately if it shall appear advisable. That such as put themselves forward to serve the cause shall be rewarded in every manner that they can require. That the most conciliating clemency shall mark His progress. That he has not the most distant idea of vengeance—nor will he permit any person under him to discover in word or deed such a Sentiment. But that he expects unequivocal support of the Royal cause in what he calls its ancient purity—that is without modification. At the same time He earnestly intreats all such as are well disposed to be assured, that he does not ask them to declare themselves 'till they see the most decided certainty of solid support—but on the contrary he begs them to remain quiet, and to content themselves with working in secret until they shall receive from him an assurance that all His measures are finally taken, and that He is now ready to support them with a certainty of success.

Such is the tenor of his conversation with Bayard, and he added a promise of every reward to Bayard personally that He could desire, or the Prince confer. He recommended to him to lose no time in forming the connection between Lyons, and the neighbouring departments as far as possible—and to bring him without delay the assurance which he requires from such of the Chiefs as can be gained at present.

He presses much the point of Kellerman, which he considers as very essential.

Nothing will contribute more to the success of the cause than gaining the Heads of the National Guard, and I should think that they may be the most proper persons to form the Secret committee of financë, &c. In short, as soon as they can be made to understand each other perfectly, it must be this committee that directs all the interior management of Lyons. With respect to the other departments, there seems not much more to be done, than to gain the Administrators if possible, and to prepare the insurrection as far as one can by such means as they point out.

The Prince is very sensible of the Generosity of the Proposal to send in the money under his name, but He wishes not to put himself forward in this measure 'till he is convinced of the Opinions of those who are to have the distribution of it—Observing, that if they are constitutionalists instead of Royalists, the King will be displeased with him for not having exacted from them their conversion to pure monarchical principles—Therefore He thinks you had better send what money you may judge necessary in the mean time in any manner that seems the most eligible, and afterwards, when the communication is actually Opened between Him and the Chiefs, or even Seriziat only, to let the supplies go in under the name of the King.

I mentioned La Tour as the Person you propose to be established at Lausanne as the King's Agent to concert measures with the Lyonnese and other Departments. He approves of him extremely, and He will mention him to the King immediately.

I assure you I did all I could to make the Prince give Bayard the written assurance he seemed to wish, but finding it impossible excepting under the circumstances I have explained above, I then took as much pains to convince Bayard, that the full and very explicit declaration he had received from the Prince of Condé as well as the Duc de Bourbon will be quite sufficient. Upon the whole

Bayard seems satisfied with his reception—and I assure you that the Princes are equally so with him. I have had a great deal of conversation with him, and I find him exactly what you described. He is really an uncommon young man. He seems fearful lest Seriziat may not believe that he has been with the Prince of Condé—but in the first place He is so well known to have been a confidential Aide du Camp of de Preçy's, that surely they will be disposed to give him credit for all he says—and in the next place if they will not believe what he asserts, they would be equally disposed to discredit the authenticity of the Prince's handwriting.

You see, My dear Sir, how difficult it is to make use of these Arch Royalists in the manner we could wish. They are always suspicious that we incline to retrench their Prerogative. The Prince evidently suspects Lyons of an inclination towards the constitution of 91—and He is very much afraid of taking any step that may appear to commit him as an indirect supporter of any principles excepting those of pure Royalism. It is impossible almost to make them understand that their great object should be to get a firm footing upon any terms, and that then they will have an opportunity of arranging things according to circumstances. In short you know all this history better than I explain it. Therefore I shall conclude by saying, that the Prince is of opinion, we shall not be able to shew ourselves in great force in the Jura, and well supported, for these two months to come. I am inclined to think so too, because you will see that the Austrians have not crossed the Rhine before the middle of *July at soonest*—That He will do every thing in his power to gain, in the mean time, the Governor of Besançon, and Pichegru if possible—And will take every step that depends upon him to encourage the Lyonnese, and cement the union between them, the Jura &c. In this particular he will take no step that is not maturely concerted with You. With regard to Besançon and Pichegru

he may possibly get at them by some Private means of his own. He looks upon Bayard as the principal instrument to employ at Lyons &c.—and you may depend upon his rewarding him accordingly.

The more I think of it, the more I am convinced that we should not advance 'till we are in sufficient force to insure very rapid and brilliant success—and we must endeavour to prepare matters so that Besançon opens her gates to us. Bayard seems much of this opinion, and I do not think he has any fears respecting the movements of the Convention against Lyons in the mean time. He has an excellent idea of endeavouring to corrupt any troops that may be sent there. If this can be done after our Committee is established, the arrival of troops there may be a benefit instead of an evil. At any rate we cannot advance into the Country 'till the successes of the Austrians, and our force are sufficient to insure us against a check—so we must keep every thing well concealed 'till then, unless some great convulsion happens at Paris, whose effects extend to this side—then indeed it may be advisable to hazard much more than would be justifiable at present.

Be assured I am equally sensible of the excellence of the choice that Government has made in You—and believe me it gives me the utmost satisfaction to have established between us that confidence so necessary for the success of the common cause, and so agreeable when considered as the basis of private Friendship.

Excuse this miserable scrawl—written really stans pede in una. Yours most truly,

C. CRAWFURD.

P.S. I am this instant setting off.

I incline towards Bouillé too—and I will mention Him.

Mr. Wickham to Mr. Trevor.

(Draft. Most Secret and Confidential.) Bern: 25 June, 1795.

Sir,—I have many thanks to return you for all your obliging and interesting Letters. An uncommon press of business and an absence of some days has prevented my acknowledging them sooner. All your inclosures have been forwarded. As to my Instructions as far as they relate to France they are extremely general.

The truth is that I have none regularly drawn up and can only collect the line of conduct that I ought to adopt and follow from the different parts of my official correspondance, and the conversations that I had with my Lord Grenville before I left London.

In general I consider myself bound to support the efforts of the combined forces *without*, by communicating with the Royalists *within*, and to furnish these latter with the means of coming forward when a proper opportunity shall offer, taking especial care not to commit them to any exertion till they can be assured of being supported from without. In the effecting this end I am particularly directed to endeavour to derive from the Rank and Situation and character of the Prince of Condé all that assistance which they would naturally afford, and especially to urge that point in all my communications with the Imperial Minister.

I am entirely of your opinion that Lyons may do herself much hurt by too much eagerness. I have spared no pains to prevent it even at the risk of passing successively for *inept* Constitutionel and Jacobin.

I am however upon the whole highly satisfyd with the present appearance of things in that quarter. M. Bayard is just returned from thence and brings me the most satisfactory account of the general disposition of the Inhabitants.

However before I proceed to give you an account of what I have done with respect to him it will be necessary to mention to you that Colonel Craufurd has been sent to the P. of Condé's army with full powers to augment it to any extent that circumstances will allow of, that it has been determined to raise 8 new Battallions and 2 Regiments of Cavalry for which it is thought that men may speedily be found, the officers of which are all to be taken from his own army, that is from his Compagnies nobles. To these it is intended to add the Regiments of Rohan, Beon (?), Bouillé, Choiseul and Damas now in our pay, possibly also the new Regiment of Rolle. That the Austrian Government has also been strongly pressed to add to it the Regiments of Royal Allemand, Saxe and Berchini. that all the Regiments *a cocarde blanche* excepting those of D'Hervilly and d'Hector having entirely failed in raising their men, it is intended to form one strong regiment of the whole and to unite that also to the Prince's army. that Their pay is to be encreased to that of the French Regiments in time of war, and The compagnies nobles are to have a shilling a day, so that If the reuniting should succeed and the Regiments of Saxe, Berchiny and Royal Allemand be given up, the Prince will have an army of 20,000 men in its form entirely French and composed entirely either of Frenchmen or of Foreigners who have been allways attached to their service. Should this corps not be completed before General Clairfait is ready for actual service, or should it even then not be found sufficient for the purposes intended, a large Body of Austrians will be added to it and placed under the command of the Prince. So that for the first time we shall really see a *French army* entering France, the utmost wish of the Royalists will then have been complyd with and if this measure fail they will have nothing to reproach us with.

That it is I believe the intention to make every effort to throw this army into the interior whilst the combined

forces shall continue to occupy the whole force of the enemy by the most vigorous efforts possible.

It is very obvious that the success of such an enterprize must very much if not entirely depend on the previous communication that shall have taken place with the Inhabitants from within, and cautious as I have hitherto been on that point, yet I have allways foreseen that there must be a moment at which that caution must cease and more active measures be adopted.

That moment appears to me to be now come, and in that idea I shall now endeavour for the first time as much as possible to connect the town of Lyons with the neighbouring Departments.

With this view I have sent Mr. Bayard to the Prince of Condé from whom he will receive Letters to the Administrators of the Department of the Jura which is at this moment particularly well composed, as well as to the Commanders of the National Guard at Lyons. He will take letters also from other individuals and if the thing succeed and the communication be established between those two Departments, preparations must have allready been taken for extending it much further and the great difficulty appears to be in forming a *Body* at Lyons capable of carrying on a correspondance of this kind and of being entrusted with the funds necessary to give it effect. None has occurred to me to be so natural in the present moment as the Chiefs of the National Guard. They are in truth the only persons who have a right to assemble together privately—they have a fair pretext for correspond^{g} with their neighbours—they have the confidence of the people—they have arms in their hands and their number is so small (only 3) that one has the best hope there of managing any thing with success.

It has been determined therefore with the Prince of Condé that this plan shall be adopted.

To effect it, it only remains to gain Seriziat entirely to the Prince's interest. This Bayard is clearly of opinion may

be done by flattering his vanity, and he has allready had some conversation with him to that effect. His principal objection seemed to be that they had no funds, and Bayard did not think it wise to say that they would find any till he had first consulted me.

Savaron in whom every body has confidence, is about to take the command of a corps of Chasseurs, by which means he will become immediately one of the chiefs.

It would be useless as well as improper to enter more fully into the *detail* of our proposed operations. The inclosed draft of one of my last letters to Lord Grenville will show you the general light in which I am disposed to consider the subject—I will thank you to return it immediately.

Every operation on the side of the Rhine as well as in the interior should if possible be so combined as to take place at the moment that General De Vins appears on the top of Mount Cenis, which epoch I am sorry to see by your account is likely to be still delayed.

I have good hopes from the interior, but I am by no means blind to the many difficulties that exist and present themselves in every direction. It is our part however not to be terrified by them and to set our shoulders vigorously to the wheel, for if this attempt should fail we must give up the contest at once and only endeavour to do it with as good a grace as possible.

The great difficulty arises from the contentions, prejudices and jealousies of the different parties particularly in F. Compté where, beside those that are common to all Frenchmen, they have a number of local prejudices of their own relating to their parliaments, Provincial Assemblies &c. &c. which it is impossible to get the better of.

You have seen enough of the emigrants yourself to know that upon this head I do not complain without reason.

What is to be done about the new King? much will depend upon the measures that will be adopted respecting

him and I have no light to guide me from which I can form any thing like a conjecture.

I agree with you most entirely that a Declaration is absolutely necessary. It is impossible to have pressed that point more strongly than I have done at home. I agree with you also that the Declaration of Toulon would be sufficient.

I will send you all particulars of Broè and his correspondance in my next.

For the present, I think it would not be amiss to put some persons on their guard, as the Genevese whenever they are employed have allways views and attachments of their own to which every thing else is considered as secondary. I have seen enough to satisfy me that he ought not to know *too much.*

I know nothing of the reasons of Mr. de St. Firmin's recall.

I shall go at the beginning of next week to a country house that I have taken near Lausanne, Fauxblanc belonging to Mr. Polier on the road to Vevay.

I will thank you in future to direct your letters to me at *Lutry* by which means I shall have them in time to answer by the same Post—may I not hope to see you there in the course of the summer?

You would see by my letter that I had by no means confidence in Mr. de St. Favre. But the part I had to play here was at that moment extremely difficult, and from some particular circumstances it was necessary for me not to reject him altogether, had I acted otherwise I should have increased the jealousies and suspicion of a set of people—whom it was my interest at that moment entirely to gain. Had Colonel Craufurd been arrived at the Prince's army when Mr. de St. Favre arrived here I should have taken courage and sent him about his business, but an unfortunate delay in the execution of some Promises that had been made had revived the old Jealousies there in so violent a manner, that it was necessary at any risk to

quiet them. In general since I have been here in allmost every measure that I have adopted I have been obliged to chuse between two evils. In future I hope things will go on differently.

Colonel Craufurd's arrival is a relief and a comfort to me of which it is difficult to form any idea. He appears allready to have gained a great ascendancy in the Prince's army.

I have a number of other things to say to you but I am in want of time.

I was afraid at one time that the Convention was sendg. large forces into Savoy. I went immediately to Chamberry and enclose you the report I received.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

(No. 19.) Downing Street: July 6th, 1795. (Received at Mulheim 26th.)

Sir,—Your Dispatches to No. 51 inclusive, have been received and laid before The King.

You will have learnt from Colonel Craufurd, the Particulars of the Arrangement which he has settled with The Prince de Condé, and also the general Plan of Operations which Monsieur de Clerfaye has communicated to him. This Plan, if fairly and vigorously acted upon, seems to embrace all the Objects which could be wished for, but I have still great Apprehensions that the Enemy will find the Means of diverting Monsieur de Clerfaye's Attention to another Quarter, when the Moment for acting shall arrive. It is however material, that nothing should be omitted on Our Part, to facilitate the Execution of that Plan; and I have the utmost Satisfaction in thinking, that from your Zeal and Activity, every thing that can be done, in the Quarter where you are, may be confidently expected. We received Yesterday the satisfactory Intelligence, that the Royalists were disembarked in Quiberon Bay, without any Loss, on the 27th ultimo, and that Sir J. Warren was employed on the

28th in landing the Stores and other Articles which had been sent under his Convoy; that their Reception had been highly favourable; and that they were proceeding to distribute Arms to the Inhabitants of the Country, who were coming in with great Eagerness to join them. I have made Use of this Circumstance as an Opportunity for again urging Monsieur de Clerfaye to make such Exertions as may at least prevent the Possibility of the Convention recalling into the Interior of France, any Part of the Force now on the Rhine.

I am the more anxious on this Subject, as, both from Your Letters, and from what we have since learnt from Paris, it appears, that the State of Lyons is brought to a Crisis, the Convention having resolved to adopt vigorous Measures against that Town. You will long since have received my Letter, with the fullest Authority to use every Exertion that may conduce to enable the Royalists there, and in the Environs, to maintain themselves; and it can therefore only remain for the King's Servants to wait the Issue, which we do with much Anxiety. We trust that the Diversion in Britany may favour the Efforts of the Royalists in the South; but it is, at the same Time, impossible not to feel much Uneasiness, when the backward State of the Austrian army is considered.

I have written to Colonel Craufurd to urge the Prince of Condé on the Subject mentioned to You, relative to the Temper and Language of his Army.

You will of course have given every Encouragement to the Idea of Operations on the Side of Savoy, as Colonel Craufurd informs me, that this is regarded by Monsieur Clerfaye as a Point of much importance to his intended Operations.

A proper Person will immediately be sent on a confidential Mission to the new King, whose Right of Succession is of Course acknowledged by His Majesty as incontestable, and who must therefore be considered

as inheriting the Claims and Rights of His Brother and Nephew, though the Moment for any formal Step of Recognition may possibly be deferred with Advantage, till it can be taken by all the Powers in Concert, and at a Moment when there is a Party formed in the Interior. One of the Objects of this Mission will be, to recommend, in the strongest Manner, some public Declaration of Forgiveness, and a Desire to unite all Parties; and I will instruct the Person who will be sent, to request that some Means may be found for enabling you to hold the same Language, as coming directly from The King.

I am, with great Truth and Regard, Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant,

GRENVILLE.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.

July 10th, 1795.

Col. Craufurd will have informed you of the result of Bayard's visit to Mulheim, and of the Prince of Condé's refusal to write a Letter of encouragement either to the Chiefs of the National Guard of Lyons or to the Administrators of the Jura until they should first have written to him.

I can readily understand the Prince's feelings and I by no means take upon myself to blame his Conduct on this occasion, but it is *unfortunate* that H.S.H. could not have been persuaded to have acted otherwise.

Much useful time will be lost, the enemy in the mean time will adopt *in principle* the very measure that I would have recommended to the Prince, and your Lordship will observe from Doulcet's Report that the Convention sensible of its own danger is now determined to accept the Services of every party, the pure Royalists only excepted. Besides I must doubt whether either of the

persons to whom I wished the Prince to address himself, can now be persuaded to commit themselves in the way H.S.H. seems to expect.

They have no confidence at all in the people who are about the Prince of Condé and in general all persons of any Influence who have remained in this part of France dread the return of the Emigrants almost as much as the Revival of the power of the Jacobins, and I am very sorry to say that the conduct of many of those whom I have seen does but too well justify these apprehensions.

The Prince cannot be persuaded of the truth of this fact and it is very much to be lamented that H.S.H. should suffer himself to be deceived by the misrepresentations of those persons to whom he ought not to listen for a moment.

I forbear to trouble Your Lordship with the many particulars of this kind that have come to my knowledge because they would do no honour to any of the parties concerned and because it is my duty in some way or other to get the better of all such Obstacles.

I will just say in general that it is impossible for me to see any person whose principles have not always been those of pure Royalism, without his being immediately denounced to the Prince of Condé as a dangerous Man capable of giving me very bad advice and misleading me, and I am represented as entering into all his views.

There is a miserable Correspondance established between this country and the Army that does more mischief in every way than I can possibly describe—M. de la Tour and myself have written Letter upon Letter on the Subject but all in vain, and we pray both of us most anxiously for Col. Craufurd's immediate return as the only person capable of counteracting its effects.

I am under the necessity of desiring M. de Favernay to join his Reg^{t} immediately and of concealing the Leave of Absence that His Majesty had been graciously pleased to grant him.

The Prince wrote me a Letter (which I have destroyed) to desire that I would not employ him any longer as he was known to be in habits of Intimacy with M. Mallet du Pan and to have communicated the result of a Journey he had made into F. Compté to some persons connected with the Constitutional Party.

In Mr. Favernay's place he sends me the writer of the Letter which I inclose, who had himself gone to Mulheim for the purpose of denouncing M. Favernay. He is a very good man, but totally incapable of forming any thing like a plan, indiscreet to the last degree, is besides violent and hot headed and detested by his Peasants whom he has been threatening with Vengeance ever since he left the Country.

In the same way almost every person I have employed on the side of F. Compté has been taken away from me.

Only last week the Prince wrote to M. de la Tour to say that he had received certain Intelligence that M. de Monciel had sent both Money and *large Quantities* of Corn into F. Compté for the purpose of effecting a counter revolution in his own way.

I have hitherto submitted to all this in the hope that by patience and perseverance I should at last gain my point, but I find that it is now impossible to go on any longer, and I have therefore written to Col. Craufurd to request that he would talk with the Prince upon the subject in the most firm and explicit manner, and represent to him how absolutely necessary it is that H. S. H. should have the same Confidence in us, that our own Inclinations as well as our positive orders have always induced us to repose in him.

I should desire M. de la Tour to return to Mulheim which I know would be agreeable to the Prince himself, but I am sure if he were there, he would pass for a thorough Jacobin in less than a fortnight.

Mr. Trevor to Mr. Wickham.

Turin: July 18th, 1795.
(Received 31st.)

Sir,—M. de Preçy is returned from Verona, he insists much on the expediency of our enabling him to raise a Corps, to which he is persuaded all the Royalists of the Lyonnois and neighbouring Departments will flock—*Monsieur* is equally desirous of this; he proposes this Corps to be in the service of His Sardinian Majesty, to act where it may be judged most expedient.

I desire your opinion as to the propriety of this measure, and how far I may consider myself authorized to give it effect under the general instructions I have received, couched indeed in the strongest Language to do my utmost to promote the interests of the Royalist Party *in the interior* and to advance any moderate Sum which I think will be really applied to that purpose.

As a mere measure of a small additional force from without I should by no means adopt it—as likely to give encouragement to the interior, which however disposed I am sensible cannot act, without some assistance and approximation of this sort, it perhaps comes directly within the line of my instructions and ought not to be neglected. It is only in the light of a counter-revolutionary measure that I consider it of consequence, but as such I think it cannot be adopted with much Success, till we know the dispositions of His Majesty and the Allies with respect to the acknowledgement of *Monsieur*.

I think it proper to send you the following Extract of a Note I have just received from M. le Comte de Hauteville upon this subject: 'Lord Grenville s'est aussi expliqué sur 'les sentimens de votre Ministère à l'egard de la reconnois-'sance de *Monsieur* en sa qualité de Roi de France; son 'opinion est qu'il ne faudroit point de reconnoissance 'isolée, mais que toutes les Cours coalisées se concertassent

pour là faire ensemble lorsque l'on aurait obtenu qu'un Parti fût formé en France pour proclamer ce nouveau Roi, qui serait ensuite soutenu.'

I regret M. de Preçy's remaining useless here. I thought he might go to the Army of Condé authorized by you to raise his Corps there where the basis and means of effecting such measures are already established; it may also be thought immaterial on which side he enters France, as it seems to me very improbable that Devins should do without Clairfayt, or Clairfayt without Devins.

I depend upon your goodness to let me receive an answer to this Letter by an Estafette by the 27th together with the latest news and Papers you can send me; you may write the 25th.

I forward to you as usual my Dispatch and enclosures, I wish I may be in time for the private occasion as perhaps you will agree with me in thinking the Papers A and B as worthy of serious attention, they are the production of two Persons with whom I am in confidential relation, and whose abilities and Character merit every consideration.

I have the Honour to remain with Sincere Regard, Sir Your most obed^{t} and faithful Servant,

JOHN TREVOR.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have seen *Monsieur's* Letter to His Sardinian Majesty in which he lays much stress upon the object in question, and requests His Majesty to join his application to the King to those which he had ordered Messrs. de Vintimille and Preçy to make to me.

His Sardinian Majesty is naturally well disposed to the measure which is calculated to augment his forces and consideration without any fresh charge to his Finances; His Ministers think it would be also useful in a political light and propose the Vallée d'Aoste as the proper place for assembling such a Corps.

If His Majesty did not already pay a considerable

Subsidy to His Sardinian Majesty, the benefits of which have not yet been felt to the extent which might have been expected, I should hardly hesitate as to the immediate adoption of this measure, but I feel that this consideration throws a peculiar difficulty in my way, which would not perhaps occur under other Circumstances, and the more so because I understand that the assistance lately given to the Army of Condé is a stipulated application of part of the Austrian Loan.

Should you think these Considerations of less weight and that on the whole they ought to give way to the probable result of Superior utility—have the goodness to tell me on what footing, what pay, with what Uniform and Cockade this *Legion de Preçy*, if it is to exist, had best be formed, and what has been adopted in this respect with regard to any other French Corps in our pay —it would be essential that an English Commissary should regulate everything with respect to these points and that is what M. de Preçy particularly desires.

This Gentleman has just desired me to let you know that M. de *Crangeac* and *l'Abbè Bouillet* who will call upon you. (they will come from Constance) are two Persons who may be highly useful, and in whom you may have a perfect Confidence.

J. T.

Mr. Wickham to Sir Morton Eden.

(Draft. Most Secret and Confidential.) Mulheim: 21st July, 1795.

Sir,—In consequence of your letter of the 4th Instant which I received at Lausanne on the 13th. I set off for this place on the following day and shall remain here till the arrival of Mr. de Bellegarde.*

I feel it my duty to send off an express immediately to inform you that an officer arrived here from Mr. de

* Henri Count of Bellegarde and General in the Austrian army, b. 1755; d. 1831.

Charette's* army yesterday with the most earnest request that a diversion might immediately be made on this side without which Charette seemed to think it would be impossible for the Royalists to maintain themselves in Britany.

He considered his own corps as in perfect security as long as he remained quiet in his present situation, but he is unable to march to the relief of the others or to give them any assistance whatever, having no means of putting his army in motion nor any direct communication with them.

He had been entirely successful, in three different attacks that he had made on the several corps of the Republicans stationed in his neighbourhood. In the first affair they counted above 800 of the enemy dead in the field. The officer was present at the first and second affair in both of which several prisoners were taken. Charette told them all that they should certainly be put to death if the convention attempted to punish any of the Chiefs of the Chouans whom they had detained.

He met in the neighbourhood of Laval (?) a large detachment of the army that had been encamped in the neighbourhood of Paris which had marched there with incredible diligence. A great part of the army employed in Holland was also arriving by rapid marches on the side of Normandy—considerable detachments have been made from this army.

It is much to be feared therefore unless a diversion be immediately made on this side that the enemy will succeed in crushing this new enterprize which is infinitely more formidable to them than all the forces of the combined powers of Europe united.

The necessity of this diversion becomes every day more pressing, because the enemy being intimately persuaded that the Austrians have no serious intention of

* François Athanase Charette, the famous Vendean general; b. 1763, put to death 1796.

passing the Rhine have also sent some large detachments to the side of Italy where the rapid successes of General De Vins have given them a most terrible alarm. They are also endeavouring by every means in their power to form the regiments in the Southern Provinces and though the business is very imperfectly done, yet still they succeed in getting a number of men who would much more willingly unite themselves to the Royalists if any Body of them could any where be got together.

I send you inclosed the last letter I have received from my correspondant at Paris who keeps up a communication with Charette, as also two letters from Lyons from which you may collect how very essential it is that not a moment's time should now be lost.

Upon the subject however of an invasion either in F. Compté or Alsace I think it my duty to say to you most explicitly, that unless it be intended to put the Prince of Condé fairly forward and to suffer him to act immediately in the name of the King of France, I am intimately persuaded that infinite mischief must accrue to the common cause.

Upon this point and upon this one only Col. Craufurd and myself may possibly have some difference of opinion arising very much from the difference of our respective professions. He being more disposed to consider the thing in a military and myself in a political point of view.

The Colonel is no doubt as much persuaded as myself of the necessity of an immediate diversion, but he would rather wish it to be made by the Austrians alone because the Prince of Condé's army is not yet by any means in a situation to act by itself. I am on the contrary most decidedly of opinion that even were the Prince's army still weaker than it now is, it should immediately be made use of, and that not an Austrian should be suffered to cross the Rhine unless the Prince were to follow him immediately. In that case it would certainly be necessary to support him with some Austrian Regiments. I need hardly say

how invaluable those of Saxe, Berchini, and Royal Allemand would be to him on such an occasion, not only in a military but in a political point of view, as No measure would so effectually contribute to remove the mistrust and jealousy of the views of the House of Austria that is so universal both in F. Compté and in Alsace.

The Prince himself would particularly wish to have a few corps of Hungarian Infantry.

I have had a long conversation with the Prince of Condé on the subject of my letter of the 13 instant, and I hope I shall be able to bring about what I wished without any other interference.

The situation of this court of Verona (?) is what most embarrasses us.

The Prince will do nothing without the authority of the King, and the clamour of the Royalists *of every colour* about his public acknowledgement by the allied powers is something of which you can have no idea.

How far and at what moment such a measure would be adviseable it is not for me to say, but I am perfectly certain till it be done either directly or indirectly they will have no confidence whatever in us.

I saw last week a very artful and mischievous letter upon the subject written from a person in place at Paris to his friend in Switzerland advising him to propagate and encourage that idea among the Royalists because he was perfectly certain from the nature of the British Government that the Ministers would never dare to adopt such a measure. The most adviseable thing would be that the new King should give full powers to the Prince of Condé and declare that he would himself remain perfectly inactive till he could enter into the Kingdom. The Prince of Condé is very anxious that he should come into this neighbourhood that is to the distance of 10 or 12 leagues behind the army. All persons *within* are clamorous for declaration or manifesto, both from the new King and the combined powers.

I ought to inform you that Mr. Mallet Dupan who is in close correspondance with Mr. de Colleredo at Vienna is closely connected with the party in Switzerland that is most violently abusive of the British Government. I have seen some of his letters full of the most virulent invective against all our measures and views which he paints in the most amiable colours as somewhat more weak than wicked.

Colonel Craufurd is not yet arrived from Frankfort. I expect his return with the utmost impatience.

The enemy is apprehensive of an invasion by the Prince of Condé's army through the Canton of Basle but I believe they have not an idea that the Austrians will attempt to pass the Rhine.

I hope General De Vins will now turn his thought entirely to the side of Savoy.

That you may see the way in which I have represented this matter both at home and at Paris, I send you the draft of my last dispatch to the office on that subject begging you will read it with the indulgence, that the hurry in which I am necessarily obliged to write even on the most important subjects will require, and return it immediately.

Lord Robert Fitz-Gerald to Mr. Wickham.

Bognor, near Chichester, Sussex: July 28d, 1795.
(Received August 6th.)

My Dear Wickham,—Having learnt from Mr. Moore that a Messenger leaves Town to-morrow to convey to you my Recal and your Credentials, I can not let him go without thanking you for your Letter from Mulheim but especially without congratulating you most sincerely on your appointment to succeed me at Berne. Your nomination to that Post although nothing more than the just reward due to your zeal and activity, I imagine comes sooner to you than you was aware of and must consequently be the

more pleasing and it is in this supposition that Lady Robert and I take such particular Satisfaction in it. To make the Residence palatable it must be seasoned with something of the sort, and although I was persuaded your Services there would be requited handsomely, yet I could not guess when that would be, and I rather felt for you when I considered you were labouring so hard in a subordinate Capacity attended with little Emolument, for to speak plainly to live abroad one must be paid for it or otherwise it is the Devil when once one has tasted of this dear Country. Considerations of this nature take me to Copenhagen with a lighter heart than I should otherwise go and I shall reckon myself still happier there if in a reasonable Time I am relieved by you in the Capacity of Envoy Extra[y] with which it is I go out.

. . . . . .

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

(No. 21.) Downing Street, July 24th, 1795.
(Received August 6th.)

Sir,—I have the Satisfaction to acquaint you that it appears, by the Accounts from Britany, that the Progress of the Insurrection there, continues to give the strongest Hopes of Success particularly as it appears that, in addition to the favourable Disposition manifested in every Part of Britany, which even exceeds the most sanguine Expectations that had been formed on that Subject, the Inhabitants of the Vendée are again in Arms under their former Leaders Charette, Stofflet and Sapineau, and that the Spirit of Revolt against the Convention is gaining Ground very rapidly in other Parts. Yet, notwithstanding this very promising appearance of Affairs on that Side, it is much to be feared that the disciplined Troops, which the Convention is marching against the Royalists from all Parts, may arrive in Time to avail themselves of their natural Superiority over the less regular Force of the Royalists,

though assembled in greater Numbers; and consequently that the Beginning of this great Plan may be crushed, before the Succours of British Troops, which the King is about to send there, under the Command of Earl Moira, can reach the Place of their Destination. In this situation it affords matter of the utmost Concern and Uneasiness here, to see, that the Inactivity of the Austrian Army on the Rhine has left the Enemy at Liberty to detach so very considerable a Part of the Force which is opposed to Marshal Clerfaye.

In this State of Things, I think it very material to direct Your attention to the infinite Importance of creating some Diversion, if possible on the Side of Lyons and Franche Comté, which could be done with much less considerable Efforts, and with a much greater Prospect of Success than it could, under different Circumstances, when the Convention was enabled to direct its whole Attention to the Eastern Frontier of France. I am in anxious Expectation of receiving from You the Details of what has passed at Lyons in consequence of the late Decree of the Convention but I cannot help fearing from the Accounts published at Paris the Convention has been successful in crushing for the Moment the Spirit of Royalism there. I am confident that no Effort will be omitted on Your Part to profit of the favourable Opportunity which the present Moment appears to offer and to second by some Movements in the South of France the Operations now carrying on in Britany: but till I receive from You the Account of the present State of Affairs in Your Neighbourhood it is impossible for me to give You any detailed Instructions, or to do more than to authorize You to exert every Effort for an Object so important in itself, and so extremely urgent in point of Time.

I am with great Truth and Regard, Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant,

GRENVILLE.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

Sir Morton Eden to Mr. Wickham.

(Most Secret and Confidential.) Vienna: July 30th, 1795.
(Received August 6th.)

Sir,—The Chevalier Artez arrived yesterday with your Letters and their very interesting inclosures; These I now return with my sincere acknowledgements for the Communication.

Long before the expedition to the Coast of France took place, my great object was to urge this Court to some vigorous attempt on the side of Upper Alsatia; the news of the actual descent and the necessity of a powerful diversion in its support, have furnished me with new and powerful Arguments for the carrying into immediate Execution the Assurances given me long ago. The Attempt will, I trust, be made immediately:—General Bellegarde, who carries a letter from me to you, sets out this Evening, charged with the Emperor's Orders relative to the arrangement of the plan. He will go immediately to the Prince of Condé's Head Quarters, and will be met there by some Officers from the Austrian main Army, and I hope, by You and Colonel Craufurd, as your presence and authority may be very necessary.

No intention exists to send forward immediately the Prince's Army: On this point, this Ministry have long had the same opinion, which Colonel Craufurd has expressed to you, and you will feel that your Letter to Lord Grenville of the 10th of July, does not enable me to remove the grounds on which it is formed. His army is considered as too weak to act by itself, nor would it be sufficiently strengthened by the three Regiments of Cavalry, consisting altogether of 1200 men, and by a few Hungarian Corps, could this Court be prevailed upon to grant them; since, if as you state, those persons of influence who have remained in Your part of France,

place no confidence in those about the Prince, and if the return of the Emigrants be dreaded as much as the revival of the power of the Jacobins, no rising could be expected in their favor, and the Army of course would be devoted to immediate destruction, and our hopes on that Side blasted. All this is perfectly well known to this Ministry, and consequently any attempt to prevail upon them to intrust the expedition to the Prince of Condé would be ineffectual: nor can I, conformably to my instructions (particularly with the impression made on my mind by your Letters,) bring it forward, whilst there are any hopes of the Austrians undertaking offensive operations. They abide by their assurances, that whenever the Emperor's Army be sufficiently advanced to render it expedient and practicable to send the Prince forward, it shall be done with such a reinforcement as the Circumstances will admit, and with the fullest powers to act as events may require.

As to the Recognition of Monsieur, it is a business of too important a nature for me to take any steps in, but in absolute Conformity to the orders that I may receive from home, where the wish, I believe, is to acknowledge Him, if we can gain such a footing in France as to justify the Measure.

General de Vins's last letters were of the 19th from Vado, where he was waiting for the Co-operation of our fleet:—The Austrian Minister readily admitted the weight of your Arguments, as set forth in your most able and interesting Dispatch of the 13th of June; but insisted that the plan, from the advanced state of the Season, was no longer practicable, at least for General de Vins as all Operations on the side of Savoy must cease about the middle of September; the passage of the mountains being no longer practicable after that time.

Your task is an arduous one, and rendered more so by the jarring elements that you have to unite. Your account of their levity and intractableness coincides with

what has been constantly said here, but which I thought to be in a great measure, the Effect of prejudice and exaggeration.

I sincerely congratulate you on your New appointment, which is the most gratifying proof of a full approbation of your Conduct. I intreat you to let me hear from you when your leisure will admit of it and be assured that You will ever find me ready to co-operate with you to the utmost extent of my power.

I have the Honor to be with great and unfeigned regard, Sir, Your most faithful H^ble^ Servant,

MORTON EDEN.

—— WICKHAM, Esq.

Mr. Wickham to Mr. Trevor.

(Extract from Draft.) Mulheim: 2^d^ Aug^t^, 1795.

——I can now do no more than refer you again to what I have there said for my own opinion upon the subject which has since been entirely confirmed and justifyd by the answer I have received from Lord Grenville who supposes that 'I shall of course have given every encouragement to the idea of operations on the side of Savoy as *it is regarded by Mr. Clairfait as a point of much importance to his intended operations'!* and it is to this last observation that I beg most particularly to call your attention.

Colonel Craufurd with whom I have just had a long conversation upon all the points connected with your late dispatches is *most decidedly* of opinion that the operations on this side must be extremely narrowed, their great object changed, and the greatest mischief accrue to his Majesty's interests and those of the common cause, unless General De Vins persist in his former resolution, and from the knowledge I have of the general nature of these operations I can have no doubt of the truth and justice of his reflexion. In truth the more I reflect upon the expedition into

Savoy, the more I am persuaded not only of its importance but of its being essentially necessary to the execution of any great plan that should have for its object the shaking of the power of the Convention in the center of the Kingdom itself which can only be effected by transporting at once into the interior Provinces a force *capable of giving a permanent protection to the efforts of the Royalists.*

The measure proposed has now received additional force by the renewal of the war in Britany and Poitou and the descent that has been effected in the Bay of Quiberon. It has now become absolutely necessary to endeavour to connect the operations on this side with those that may be carried on from the coast and some very active measures have allready been taken to that effect. You will learn enough of their general nature from the inclosed report to Mr. de Preçy, which if this letter should find you at Lausanne or if Mr. de Preçy should be absent from Turin, you are requested to open. Proper officers have been sent to take the direction of affairs in that quarter and to establish a communication with the Vendée.

The most positive orders however are given not to shew themselves till they shall have received the signal from hence, which of course will not be given till I have the certainty that one of the armies shall be in motion.

A correspondance as safe as the nature of such a communication will permit has I hope been allready established.

I conceive that it would be improper for me to enter into any further details at this moment. I have I hope said enough to shew you the general nature of the operations intended all of which have been calculated upon the assurance given by General De Vins, that he should make his great effort on the side of Savoy, and I fear also that with respect to some few, but very few, persons who are allready gone out of the country, I am to a certain degree

committed. This is certainly a circumstance that ought not to be lost sight of.

I have only therefore to submit to you and Mr. Drake, to whom I beg you will have the goodness to communicate the contents of this letter that we on this side rely most entirely on your exertions, and that we shall continue to entertain the hope that you will bring the General back to the adoption of his original Project, to which at one time he seemed so entirely attached.

You will find from the inclosed letter of Bayard, that the affair of Lyons is much less important than was at first supposed and that it will only become so by our neglect.

Lyons may in effect become of infinitely more importance to us by guarding its appearance of submission to the Convention till the moment that General De Vins shall be at its gates, than it ever could have been by taking up arms of itself, and a blow struck at that moment will probably decide the fate of the South of France.

Mr. Drake's plan* would appear to me excellent if there were not a much greater one in view. My objection to it is that it is merely a detached and a partial operation, and that it tends to separate our force, which is what we ought to avoid above all things at this particular moment.

Considered as a diversion however, if a sufficient force should be left behind when General Devins advances towards Savoy, I should think it might have an excellent effect, and might greatly contribute to the success of the principal expedition. I should wish you however to observe that if from necessity or any other reason the plan of operations in the South should finally be determined on, you may rely upon it that I shall not have another word to say upon the subject, that I shall support the wisdom of the measure in public, and will give it every encouragement and assistance in my power with as much

* Note by Mr. Wickham. 'A plan to attack the Isles of St. Margaret.'

zeal and earnestness as if it had met with my approbation from the commencement.

I informed you of the Peace with Spain on Friday last—the principal articles are the restitution of all conquests—the cession of the Spanish part of St. Domingo, and the acceptance of the mediation of Spain for a peace with all the Italian Princes specially the King of Sardinia. What effect this will have upon your Court you are the only Judge. In my mind neither this peace nor the success of the enemy at Quiberon ought to have any effect whatever upon our individual exertions, and I cannot but consider these checks as a call upon us to redouble our zeal and vigour, untill we shall receive counter-orders from home.

I ought to inform you that the letters from Italy make the most unpleasant observations on the inaction of our fleet and the want of co-operation with the Austrians. With respect to Mr. de Preçy, you will learn from Bayard's letter that the intention was to have made him pass into the interior and place himself at the head of the immigrants in the Foret at the moment that one of the armies should be ready to enter into France. Believe me the difficulties of making him pass the frontier are imaginary if common prudence be observed.

I have sent persons in every direction and never yet have either had an emissary stopped or a letter miscarried. Were such a step taken all the young men at Lyons would flock to his standard immediately. Measures are taken, provided the town of Lyons continue its submission to the Convention, to pass sufficient funds to that place from whence they can easily be conveyed to him and the direction of them will be left entirely at his disposal.

The Prince of Condé approves most entirely of this project and the officers whom we have sent from here, who are persons of character and military knowledge, are gone with the intention of preparing things for Mr. de Preçy's arrival under whose order they are to be.

Since the receipt of your dispatches His Serene Highness, Colonel Crawfurd and myself have had a long conference upon the subject which we have examined in all its points and we all continue firm in our opinion that our original plan ought to be persevered in, or rather that it would be impossible now to make any alteration in it.

You will please to observe that we have at this moment some difficult points to carry with the Austrian Generals in which we should never succeed if we had not a prospect of this kind to present to them.

The uncertainty of Mr. de Vins only renders this operation in the *Foret* more necessary.

As to the plan of raising a regular corps under Mr. de Preçy's command in Piedmont, both the Prince and Mr. Craufurd are most decidedly against the measure, as tending to divide the forces of the Royalists without, which ought if possible to be collected in one point to which object all the operations of the Colonel have been entirely directed.

He is of opinion however that advantage might arise from having an imperfect corps ready at the moment that General de Vins should enter into Savoy which might be made the *point de ralliement* for such well disposed persons as should be disposed to join the Royal Standard, but in that case if it be to be paid by His Majesty, it ought to be considered as making a part of this army and the officers should receive their appointments from thence, and it should be considered as remaining there only by permission from the Prince—upon this subject I will write to you again more in detail.

The difficulties that we meet with in recruiting here convince us that it would be impossible to raise any corps fit for service *without the Kingdom* under several months, and what we want is something that would be fit for immediate action.

If the plan of sending Mr. Preçy into the Foret should ultimately not be approved of which must be determined

at a conference that will take place here in a day or two, his future destination should depend, as it seems to me, upon the resolution of General de Vins. If he determine to enter into Savoy, Mr. de Preçy ought I think to accompany him with the command of a corps of the nature of the one alluded to. If that idea be given up, he ought by all means to come here and enter with the Prince of Condé, who if abandoned by General de Vins must endeavour to get down to the side of Lyons by himself. In either case I have no doubt that the young men of Lyons would flock to his standard, but I fairly own for myself that I think they would render much more effectual service by staying at home.

These are all the reflexions and considerations I have to submit to you upon the subject of your dispatches. I beg you will consider them with your usual indulgence and accept my warmest thanks, which I cannot repeat to you too often, for the constant and open communications with which you have never failed to honour me since the commencement of our correspondance.

Do not be too much alarmed at the success of the Patriots in Britany. Sombreuil's corps has been surprized but the principal corps under D'Hervilly and Puisaye is safe. The Comte d'Artois is embarked, and the Duke de Bourbon left this place a week since to follow him. I should tell you that you may not accuse me of inattention, that my appointment as Minister Plenipotentiary is in the Gazette, but I have no official information of it.

I hope we shall be able to bring General Clairfait into the field should General De Vins turn his face on this side.

I need not say how infinitely important it is that the operation on the side of Foret should be concealed to the last moment.

Mallet Du Pan in consequence of a letter from Broé has written to his Brother to remove from Geneva. If this is known to me, you may be sure that it is not concealed

from many others. I beg you a thousand pardons for not having yet sent you some of Broé's correspondance.

In general he boasts much of intimacy with General De Vins, and represents himself as being in the secret of all his projects.

I hope I shall find you on my return to Lausanne.

Mr. Wickham to Sir Morton Eden.

(Draft.)
(Most Secret and Confidential.) Mulheim: August 6th, 1795.

Sir,—Your very important Dispatch of the 30th ult° was delivered to me this Morning by the Chev^r d'Artez and your Letter of the 29th by General Bellegarde about one o'Clock this Afternoon.—I make haste to answer them as a Courier from London who is about to proceed immediately to Vienna has just arrived.

I am much concerned that the extract of my Letter to Lord Grenville of the 10th July should have furnished you with arguments againt a Measure that I have always considered as the most important of all to the Success of the operations of the present Campaign.

It was the intimate conviction of its Importance and of the necessity of removing every obstacle to its entire execution that induced me to write my complaint in so very strong a manner because I felt and knew that there were many persons ready to take an unfair advantage of the Conduct I complained of, and to represent to the Court of Vienna as an unquestionable evil that which I had by no means abandoned the hope of getting the better of.

In my letter of the 21st inst. I also stated to you that I had then good reason to hope that I should be able to effect a change in the Conduct of the persons attached to the Prince without any other assistance. But I should have spoken much more plainly upon the whole Subject if I had not considered it as a point entirely decided that the name and personal Character if not the Army of the

Prince of Condé should be brought forward immediately upon the very first Commencement of active operations.

It is true that I had stated expressly that the return of the Emigrants was dreaded by many of the leading persons remaining in Franche Compté as much as that of the Jacobins—But that expression should have been accompanied with two reflexions which I should most certainly have made if I could have conceived that there had been a possibility of throwing the Prince of Condé so much into the back Ground.

The first.—That all the leading Persons now remaining in the Interior are necessarily such as have either more or less contributed (?) to or acted under the Revolution in some one of its Stages and that no Communication whatever had as yet taken place between that description of persons and their Princes respecting whose future conduct and intentions they had no Information whatever and were consequently full of the most serious Alarms, precisely because they had as yet had no opportunity of forming such a Communication.

The second.—That the great object at which I have been so long labouring, which made me so particularly anxious to secure the Services of M. de Monciel in particular, is in the establishment of such a Communication on a proper basis which I am perfectly sure would have had the immediate effect of allaying all prejudices and Jealousies, and would have established a real Confidence immediately.

I should add two other Observations. The first that this has been already done with effect at Lyons in the very case I alluded to in my Letter to Lord Grenville—The Person to whom the Prince of Condé peremptorily refused to write notwithstanding the earnest Intreaties of Colonel Craufurd and myself upon being told that the Prince would by no means reject his offers if he made the first application, did not hesitate to write a very proper and explicit Letter immediately.—Yet this man has been

deeply concerned in the Revolution and at this moment is in a very important Post.

The second.—That however the Entrance of the Prince of Condé may be dreaded by the *leading persons* who think they have their sins to answer for, the Peasants and the Lower Class of people in general have a high respect for him, whilst on the other hand Foreigners of every description particularly the Austrians in Alsace and the English in Provence are universally feared and detested by all ranks of the people. At the worst therefore by putting the Prince of Condé forward you only take the choice of the Lesser of two evils.

I make haste to make these observations to you because every Information that I receive from the Interior tends to confirm me in my original opinion that if the name at least of the Prince of Condé be not immediately made use of, it will have the most fatal effect in those neighbouring Provinces and I have no doubt that its Influence will be felt even to the Coast of Britany and the Vendée.

I have therefore most earnestly to intreat of you, being intimately persuaded that it will be for the Good of His Majesty's service, that you will press the Court of Vienna not to suffer an Austrian Army to pass the Rhine without an appearance of co-operation and concert with that Prince, to such an extent at least as that it may be seen most manifestly that it is the Intention for him to march into the Interior as soon as his Army shall be in a condition to effect such a movement, and that a public proclamation of his own to this effect may accompany the Manifesto of the Austrians.—I fear this is all that can be hoped—but I repeat it, it would be infinitely preferable if the Army could be removed across the Rhine, were it not to act at all—It will be the only means of encouraging the desertion in the enemy's Army.

All the *reasonable* Men here have promised me in the most solemn manner their active assistance to prevent any

improper Language or Conduct in any Individual of the Army.

I shall write much more at large as soon as our Conferences with Gen[l] Bellegarde shall have finished (to the first of which I am now summoned). But this point appears to me of such infinite Importance that I cannot delay a moment in expressing to you my sentiments upon it in the most open and unequivocal manner.

Col. Craufurd will have informed you that his first opinion is entirely changed upon that point from the Information he has now received of the State of the Interior.

I cannot conclude without observing that if the expedition into Savoy be abandoned, all hope of active co-operation with the Royalists for this winter is at an end, and you will no doubt feel the necessity of uniting all our efforts to prevent this War being continued to another, which from the short Conversation I have had with Gen. Bellegarde appears to be considered as a matter of course by the Austrians.

I have stated my reasons at large in my Dispatch to Lord Grenville which I last communicated to you. I had long since sent them to Mr. Trevor to whom I thought it right to address myself as M. Thugut in answer to my former Question on a Similar subject informed me through you, that Gen[l] De Vins had full Powers to act as he pleased.

I had ever since been very much at my ease because, that General informed Mr. Trevor that upon full C sideration, he was now *de cœur et d'âme pour l'expedition en Savoi.* It is only five days since, that I was informed that he began to change his opinion.

I see from the short Conversation I have had with Gen[l] Bellegarde that it is the wish that such an operation should be performed by the Piedmontese. My knowledge of the Country, of their Army and of their commanders

warrants me in saying very decidedly that they are not equal to it.

I trust therefore that you will still continue to press that operation on the Court of Vienna—Believe me it is absolutely and indispensably necessary to any plan that might depend at all on a Co-operation with the Royalists.

If however that *cannot* be done, I should submit to you with great deference that Gen^{l}. De Vins should receive positive orders to establish himself without the Alps during the Winter in a situation where he may be supplied with Provisions by our Fleet. Otherwise as soon as the first snows fall All their Troops employed in the Southern Armies will march either here or to the Vendée.

I take Shame to myself for not having written to you oftener—but I always considered the business on this side completely decided and looked only to what I conceived the more difficult points viz: that of Savoy and Lyons.

I beg a Thousand pardons for this hasty Scrawl—I return you many Thanks for your kind Congratulations, my Letters of appointment are only arrived to day.

Mr. Windham to Mr. Wickham.*

London: August 7th, 1795.

Sir,—Lord Grenville has, I know, written to you on the subject of the Baron de Rolls' Regiment; and I take it for granted that He has by this time conveyed to you a formal authority to determine his situation either for Corsica or for the Prince de Condé's army, as you should think most desirable. The reasons for one or other of these destinations are so much better known to you upon the spot, than they can be to me, that I hardly think it necessary to say anything upon the subject. The Baron, I find, as well as most of his Officers, prefers greatly the being employed in Corsica; the reason given by the Baron being, the personal inconvenience likely to result

* Mr. Windham was Secretary at War from 1794—1801.

to himself and his Officers, should the army of Condé in its passage into France be placed under the necessity of violating the Swiss Territory. In every other view the junction of it to the Prince's army is in my opinion to be preferred. It must be left to you to judge how far the reasons on one side or the other are to be considered, as of most weight. It appears to me, that, if they go to the Prince of Condé, no change must be made in their establishment, nor in the powers, by whom they are to be paid; at least not without a free and unbiassed consent on the part of the Regiment.

M. D'Andigné, who is here, and on whom I am inclined to place the most perfect reliance, has stated to me, that those who are at the centre of the correspondence, which He contributed to establish, begin to feel themselves embarrassed for want of funds to supply their current expenses. The expenses, which he spoke of, were not of great amount, but such as in six months might not amount to more than £1000. Among different expedients for supplying them with what was necessary for this purpose, it seemed to me that the best was, that they should address themselves to you by the means of some confidential person, who at the same time, that He explained their wants and concerted the means of relieving them, might open with you a new channel of communication, a Person, therefore, will probably soon be sent; and who I conceive will be a M. Brottier.*

As you mention in one of your late despatches a difficulty of conveying money to Lyons, without the intervention of some house, to which the fact must in consequence be known, I wish to suggest, to you, whether an expedient may not be resorted to, of which I have found the use on another occasion, of employing Hammersley's Circular notes. These are so well known, as to be

* André Charles Brotier, b. 1751, transported to Sinnamary after the 18th Fructidor; he died there in 1798. He published several works.

payable in almost any place, without its being known to the persons, who issue them, from what place and still less for what persons they are intended. At least it would be easy for Govern^t. so to arrange it with Mr. Hammersley in this instance. I want Lord Grenville to send you out a quantity, to be used or not as you shall see occasion.

I am sorry to find from Col. Craufurd's letter that some suspicion or dissatisfaction has arisen in some quarter with respect to M. Faverney. It does not appear, however, to have place with Col. Craufurd; and therefore I hope it is without foundation.

I have the honour to be, Dear Sir, your most obedient and faithful Servant,

W. WINDHAM.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Wickham to Sir Morton Eden.

(Most Secret and Confidential.) Mulheim: August 8th, 1795.

Since my last, I have had several conversations with General Bellegarde, and have communicated with him very fully and confidentially upon all such parts of the intended campaign as in any way depend upon a Co-operation with the Inhabitants of the neighbouring Provinces.

I have been extremely sorry to find that he had no authority whatever to come to any resolution or even to encourage the acting in any particular way rather than another, but that the whole would probably be determined at Vienna, or by General Wurmser* on his arrival here which of course will not be till long after my departure.

This is very different from what I had expected and I cannot but consider it as a most unfortunate Circumstance

* Dagobert Sigismund Count of Wurmser, the famous Austrian general, b. 1724; about this time appointed to the command of the Austrian forces on the Upper Rhine; d. 1797.

for the Interest of the Common Cause, as it will necessarily throw a great Impediment in the way of my correspondance, both with Mr. Trevor, M. de Preçy and the whole of the Interior, and prevent me from executing with effect the positive Commands I have received from His Majesty to endeavour to combine such movements as may take place in the neighbouring Provinces with the operations that shall be carried on from without, which cannot be done without some previous knowledge of the precise nature and extent of those operations.—It being at present out of my power to help myself, I must endeavour to do the best that I can, and I shall therefore make haste to repeat to you the substance of what I stated to General Bellegarde, of which you will have the Goodness to make what use you think proper at the Court of Vienna.

First then as to Franche Compté—it will be very easy to cause partial Insurrections of the Peasants in the Mountains in the whole Line from St. Claude to Porentrui—They are in general perfectly well disposed to undertake such an enterprize, they would I have no doubt engage in it without at all considering the consequences and would probably be sufficient to resist with effect, if commanded by good officers who could easily be sent to them, any attempt that might be made to suppress them either by the neighbouring departments, the Garrison of Besançon or even the few Regular Troops that could now be spared from the wretched Remains of the Republican Army stationed in Savoy.

But any attempt of this kind must be much too feeble to stand against the efforts of a regular Army which would certainly be employed against them immediately, and I am most entirely persuaded would terminate in the total destruction of all the persons engaged in it. I continue therefore in the same opinion that I had when I had the honour of writing to you and Mr. Trevor in the month of April last, that it is my duty to discourage every such enterprize and by no means to give it the sanction of His

Majesty's Name till I can safely promise an effectual support and Protection to the Persons who shall have undertaken it—

Many of the Royalists, admitting the truth of what I here say, may tell you that it would be a very easy thing to establish what is now commonly called *Le Chouannage* in the Country—That is, to carry on the war by the Peasants *in the manner* in whch it has been hitherto done with so much success in Britany—But I can by no means agree with them, because whatever may be said of the Spirit of Royalty that certainly does now exist in those Mountains, it is of a different kind from that which is to be found in Britany, or rather it may be said to proceed from a different cause, being chiefly if not entirely produced by the efforts of their Priests and their attachment to their Religion—In Britany the spirit of Revolt has been excited and directed by the great landed Proprietors and *Seigneurs* who remained in the country, to whom in general the Peasants were in the Habit of looking up with esteem and Veneration—Whereas in Franche Compté where the most odious of the feudal rights were exercised with an unexampled degree of Rigour, it is a notorious fact that the Animosity of the Peasants against their Seigneurs broke out with much more violence and at a much more early period than in any other Province in France, and I can say from my own knowledge that this animosity* still exists in some particular districts, that it is much strengthened by the fear of punishment in the case of a counter revolution, and that these sentiments are artfully supported and fomented by the Persons of every description who are interested in the Continuation of the present Government, consequently any system that depended on the national Connection between Landlords and Tenants or the *Seigneurs*

[* N.B.—I do not, however, mean to say that this is universal, or that it may not be removed by a proper communication between these two descriptions of persons through the medium of their Priests.]

and their Peasants must not be depended on in that country—

I am therefore on every account and after having thoroughly considered the whole subject, most decidedly of opinion that any *partial revolt* of the Peasantry, unconnected with those of the neighbouring Departments, and unsupported by an effective force situated in such a manner as to give them an effective Protection, is an idea that ought to be entirely discouraged.

What that form ought to be, and what position it ought to take for effecting the above purpose, must be left to the Military to determine, and Colonel Craufurd, with whom I have the happiness to agree in every point, will have the honour of writing to you very fully upon that part of the subject.

I shall only say that as to the position, it ought to be such as *effectually to cover* the Province where it is wished that the Insurrection should take place, so that the Inhabitants may assemble, arm, discipline themselves, and make their necessary provisions *behind the protecting Army**, without a fear of being suppressed or even interrupted in their first operations.

The position concerning which Colonel Craufurd will write to you, will probably effect this purpose on the Northern and North West Frontiers of Franche Compté— But upon the above principle it is also necessary that that Province should be protected on the South, South-East and South-West,† which can only be done *either* by an army entering into Savoy and placing itself on the frontiers in such a manner as to fall on the rear and flank of any body of men that should attempt to enter franche Compté on that side—*or* by an insurrection at Lyons and the

[* N.B.—I consider this as an indispensable point.]

[† N.B.—It is almost entirely protected on the East by Switzerland, the only passage open on that side, viz. the Faucilles in the Pays de Gex may be rendered totally impracticable in the course of one night.]

neighbouring Departments—*or* by strengthening the Prince of Condé's army so that, immediately on the Austrians passing the Rhine, he may march down to the South, and seize all the passes leading into that Province from Burgundy the Lyonnois and Savoy which, if he confined his operations to the Mountains, would not be difficult.

As to the Expedition in Savoy I can add little to what I have already communicated to you on the subject—I must however call your attention to one point. In all human probability it would have been the one measure that would have decided the Swiss Cantons, if not to declare in our favour, at least to assist us secretly in all our operations. The army would have been supplied *de Jure* from Swabia through Switzerland—for by that Invasion the King of Sardinia only enters *into his own dominions* and he has an immediate right to demand the Passage for provisions of every kind through the Country of his Ally, and I am *certain* that it would not be refused him—The Swiss have constantly asserted and maintained that point with respect to corn, horses and cattle purchased by the French Republic in Germany, and I have allways admitted it foreseeing the case when we might so soon have occasion to make use of the same principle. Besides, that their own inclination would lead them to this measure, they are committed so entirely upon it that it would be impossible for them to recede.

I should also add that the martial spirit of the people would be revived by the neighbourhood of the armies, and that there is every probability that the greater part of the troops that had formerly served in France would join the Prince of Condé. I should not forget what ought certainly to make some impression at Vienna, that all communication with Paris being entirely cut off, Mr. Barthelemy and the whole of the corps diplomatique now assembled at Basle would be obliged to separate; and as it would be difficult to find another Place having a free communication with Paris where Mr. Barthelemy

could give the others the meeting, the Congress would in all probability be obliged to adjourn *sine Die.*

In short the more I consider the thing the more I am persuaded of its infinite importance. It would have entirely changed the nature of the whole Campaign, which on its present principles must be considered as a *mere diversion* in favour of the war carried on from England, to a great and brilliant enterprise that would have struck a blow against the Convention in the very center of the Kingdom, where alone it is now vulnerable; and the attempt alone would have immediately raised the character of the House of Austria, in the opinion of the Empire and the rest of Europe, and probably secured to it that preponderance which it seems at this moment in such danger of losing from the adoption of the contrary system, i.e. of feeble, ill-timed and inadequate measures—

As to the second point, viz. the Insurrection in Lyons, I have before told you that it must depend entirely on the operations in Savoy—Without an armed force established in that country capable of protecting them, the Inhabitants neither will nor ought to expose their unfortunate City to a second siege.

The idea of such a thing must therefore be given up altogether if the project of the Invasion in Savoy be finally abandoned. It might however still take place, if from other causes the Departments surrounding the town were once to be in a decided state of revolt, which being an event not quite impossible (though by no means probable) I shall speak to you of it more at large by and by.

As to the third point, viz. the seizing immediately the passes leading into the mountains of Franche Compté from the South, South East and South West by the Prince of Condé's army—this measure necessarily becomes of the very last importance if the invasion in Savoy be given up, as without one or the other, upon the principles I have above laid down, all idea of co-operation

with the Inhabitants of Franche Compté must be abandoned.

I leave to Colonel Craufurd to explain at large the practicability and the means of executing a project of this kind. I wish to confine myself to the principle on which, if practicable, I think it ought by all means to be adopted; and this I hope I have allready sufficiently explained.

It seems to me that the Court of Vienna cannot be too deeply impressed with its importance, because if all idea of such a co-operation be abandoned for this campaign, what can we hope for but the conquest of two or three small towns on the Banks of the Rhine of little consequence in themselves, and perhaps, which I very much doubt, to the maintaining themselves in winter cantonments between the Rhine and the Vosges.*

I fear an enterprize of this kind, which necessarily carrys with it another year's war, will but ill correspond with the views and expectations of his Majesty's Ministers as to the assistance they were to receive from the Court of Vienna, as in all the communications with which they have honoured me they have allways appeared to me to consider an effective co-operation with the Royalists as the great object of the campaign.†

For myself I must say that it is something very different from what I was taught to expect, and if nothing more be intended, I shall have most sincerely to lament the conduct I have adopted in pursuance of the Instructions I have received from Home.

For though in my communication with the Royalists in the interior I have constantly discouraged every attempt

[* N.B.—Both Gen[l]. Bellgarde, and Gen[l]. Lauer assured me that they had not artillery enough to undertake the siege of a place of the first order.—W.W.]

[† N.B.—Upon this point I should observe that Gen[l]. Bellgarde seemed to me at first to consider all idea of advancing into the country as quite given up for the campaign —and that the operations of this Autumn should only be considered as preparatory to those of the next Spring.—W.W.]

to shew themselves till a more favourable opportunity should offer, yet I have uniformly informed them, that sooner or later the protection which they required would be assured to them, and a real and vigorous effort made in their favour during this campaign.

I write upon this subject with the more earnestness because I have seen the certain proof under Mr. Barthelemy's own hand-writing, that he has made great use of the inactivity of the Austrian Troops to insinuate (according to the different purposes he had to carry, or the different persons whom he wanted to gain) 'that no dependance can be placed on the Court of Vienna for the protection of such states as may remain in its alliance, and that that Court has no other view in this war but to aggrandize itself at the expence both of its friends and foes, from one of whom it only wished to obtain Alsace, from the other Bavaria.'

As much of the above reasoning as I could decently use I stated repeatedly both to General Bellegarde and General Lauer, and was supported by Colonel Craufurd in every point of it. Those Gentlemen either were or pretended to be thoroughly convinced of its propriety, and were even anxious that either Colonel Craufurd or myself should go to Vienna on purpose to explain the whole of it to you more fully than could be done by Letter—Upon full consideration however we both of us thought proper to decline undertaking the Journey.

There were some other Points that made the subject of our Conversation that I should also wish to repeat to you.

In the first place I found with much pain that General Bellegarde was of opinion as well as yourself, that it was not the Intention of the Court of Vienna to employ the Prince of Condé's Army immediately—He even thought that it was intended to send him round into Italy. Colonel Craufurd and myself opposed this latter plan with all our force and endeavoured to convince the

General of the absolute necessity of employing the Prince's Army here, ostensibly at least if not actively, in the moment of the very first operations. You are already acquainted with our reasons for pressing this point with so much earnestness, I shall therefore not repeat them.

General Bellegarde said that the Austrians did not wish to employ the Prince of Condé's Army immediately because it was particularly to be desired that it should be kept entirely separate from their own, and that it was not yet strong enough to act by itself.

To this we answered that it might be most usefully employed in the way they most desired to defend the Passes of Porentrui, to which it was of itself nearly if not quite sufficient, and both the Austrian Generals admitted the Justice of the proposal.

We declared that we accepted it only as the lesser of two evils and persisted in our original advice that it might be reinforced and sent down to the Southwards.

Secondly we stated to the Austrian Generals very explicitly the absolute necessity there would be that they should give the most clear and explicit declaration of their Intentions, before they entered into Alsace—Gen^{l}. Bellegarde seemed to be of opinion that this would be done, and he appeared thoroughly aware of the extreme Jealousy entertained by the Inhabitants of that Province against the Designs of the Court of Vienna.

We pressed also upon him the wisdom of permitting the Prince of Condé to use the new King's name immediately, and of suffering no *place* to be taken in the name of the Emperor. Indeed I cannot too strongly recommend this point to your consideration, being intimately persuaded that it will prove the Corner Stone on which the Success of the whole operations will turn, and I should hope if General De Vins really intends to enter France on either side that he would have positive instructions to the same effect.

You will please to observe that I by no means venture

to say that such a Measure would be without its difficulties and objections—I only speak of it as relative to the particular object of this Campaign, which I am sure will come to no good end if any other Line be adopted.

Thirdly—I mentioned to M. Bellegarde my hopes for the Project contained in the inclosed Letters. This is what I alluded to above when I stated the possibility of the Departments round Lyons being in a state of insurrection. But you will observe that I can give no encouragement to this Project unless either General De Vins enter Savoy, or the Prince of Condé march down to the Southward—I see however the possibility of an Insurrection breaking out of itself in that quarter, particularly if the Austrians were to obtain a decisive Victory over the enemy in Alsace.

As soon as we can promise any effective assistance from without, I really think the Project cannot fail of Success, and the situation of the Country where it would show itself is certainly the most important of any in France. If it take effect and if Charette should at the same time make any progress, I am not without what I think well-founded hopes that the two may be united together, and that by such an operation the Kingdom might really be separated in two Parts—Proper Persons have been sent to endeavour to accomplish this point.

I need not state to you of what Importance it would be to the operations of General De Vins whether he were to act on the side of Savoy or in Provence, as it would in either case materially derange all the correspondance and communication of the Enemy with Paris, render his supply of Provisions very uncertain and all his movements very dangerous, as he would constantly be exposed to be attacked or harassed in his rear.

Fourthly—I particularly requested General Bellegarde, if the expedition into Savoy should be entirely abandoned, to press upon his Court the Importance of a powerful

diversion in the South to be operated by the Army of General De Vins where he will certainly have the advantage of being able to make a winter's Campaign as long as our fleet shall remain Masters of the Sea.—The Court of Vienna must be sensible of the importance or rather of the necessity of this measure, without which all the Army of Kellerman reinforced by that of the Eastern Pyrenees will be let loose upon us.

The above is only the *outline* of our conversation—and long as this Letter is I feel there are yet many points that I have left unexplained because it would be impossible to do otherwise without entering into endless detail.

This does but make me lament the more that I have not had the opportunity of seeing any person charged with any thing like discretionary powers by his Court, a circumstance that I had been taught to expect from the very first, and which I should have considered as of the very utmost importance to the Common Cause at this moment.

I cannot conclude without calling your attention once again to the idea of cutting off all communication between Switzerland and Paris—for my own part I know nothing that would be so likely to have an effect on the general affairs of Europe. Had it been done a month since we certainly should have heard nothing of the Peace with Spain—Let us yet hope that it may be in time to prevent that of the Empire.

You will observe that from the uncertainty in which General Bellegarde has left every thing, I return back to Lausanne without being at all more able to direct myself than I was when I first came here.

I have the satisfaction however to inform you that we separated from the Austrian Generals, each of us I really believe perfectly satisfied with the other, seeing things in general in the same point of view, and well disposed to act together in our respective departments with real confidence and zeal for the Common Cause—

W. WICKHAM.

Lord Macartney to Mr. Wickham.*

Verona: August 10th, 1795.
(Received 26th.)

Sir,—I take the earliest opportunity of acquainting you that His Majesty having charged me with a particular commission to the French King, and ordered me to reside near his person, I set out from England in the middle of last month, and arrived here a few days ago. You will probably have already received information of my appointment from My Lord Grenville, and of his directions to me to correspond with you on all public business, which our respective situations may enable us to promote by mutual communication. I shall therefore not fail to give you the earliest notice of every thing passing here, which I imagine you may be desirous, or interested to know, and I shall flatter myself with hopes of a similar return. I must however observe that as at present I assume no public Character, it will be proper that your letters should be addressed to me, as a private person. I have now only to add that I am furnished with the Office Cypher and that I have the honor to be with great truth, and regard,

Sir, your most obedient and most faithful humble Servant,

MACARTNEY.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.

(Extract from Draft.)
(No. 66. Most Secret.) Mulheim: 12th August, 1795.

I have often ventured though with great diffidence to communicate to Your Lordship my own suspicions of the Court of Vienna. I cannot but consider them as entirely confirmed, as well by their Conduct on this occasion as

* Sir George Macartney, C.B., b. 1737; an eminent diplomatist, created Earl (Ireland) 1794, Baron of Great Britain 1796; d. S.P.1806.

by the most extraordinary and unaccountable Inactivity of General De Vins, who has now lain upon his Arms a whole month without attempting the most trifling attack upon the Enemy—I might also add by the very extraordinary answer of the Emperor to the conclusion of the Diet.

In saying this I do not by any means venture to accuse His Ministers of direct treacherous Intentions towards His Majesty, but of the greatest uncertainty and Timidity in their Councils, and of giving repeated Assurances of what they were neither able nor willing to perform.—I mean to say that from the first beginning of the Prussian Negotiation they never have been serious in their Intentions of attacking the French upon the Rhine and that they never meant to commit their great army at all.

In forming my opinion upon this point, besides what I have been able to observe myself, I relyed principally on these two points, to both of which I have had the Honour of repeatedly calling Your Lordship's attention.

Firstly—The entire security of the French Government, who if they had any real Jealousy of the Austrians, or the smallest suspicion that they were serious in their Intentions, would never have suffered either Savoy or Franche Compté to have remained in the defenceless Situation in which they now both are.

Secondly—That all the most Intelligent Persons in the different Governments in Switzerland who are always well informed of what so nearly concerns themselves were most decidedly of that opinion and governed their Conduct accordingly.

With respect to the attack now intended I am intimately persuaded that it is only *an experiment*—and I much fear that precisely for that reason it will not have any good effect.

If however the Austrians send from 70 to 80,000 good Troops across the Rhine such a movement must necessarily create a very powerful diversion, particularly if

they succeed in maintaining themselves there, of which the two Austrian Generals and Colonel Craufurd seem to have no doubt. I own I shall not be so sanguine in my expectations unless they should make at the same time a very serious diversion below.

I had great Satisfaction in seeing that both the Austrian Generals, particularly General Lauer, entered most entirely into all our ideas of the necessity of converting this Operation into something more important than had been originally intended.

Baron M. Degelmann to M. Wickham.

Bale le 15 aout, 1795.

'Monsieur!—Il y a bien longtemps que je n'ai eu de vos nouvelles—et si je ne vous savois occupé comme vous l'êtes—je serois peiné d'être oublié de vous.

'Permettez-moi—Monsieur—de faire à votre Excellence mes complimens les plus sincères sur sa nomination. Il n'en fut jamais de mieux justifiée par le mérite—le caractère—le zèle et tant de qualités essentielles—et si rares cependant parmi les Diplomates. Je prie votre Excellence de me conserver ses bontés et son amitié.

'Vous savez sans doute—Monsieur—qu'il a courru ici le bruit que Mr. de Hardenberg iroit à Paris. Il ne s'y est pas rendu encore—mais il y a envoïé un Courrier.

'Les Ministres Pacificateurs ont fait une promenade hier au soir à St.-Louis et y ont rencontré quelqu'un de conséquence avec lequel ils se sont abouchés. Les uns disent que c'étoit Pichegru—les autres Merlin de Thionville. Ce qui est sûr—c'est qu'il partit un Courrier prussien et un Hessois qui est—à ce qu'on assure—Mr. de Waitz lui-même.

'On dit—que Mr. de Hardenberg a fait un office au Comité de Salut Public pour demander une suspension d'armes pour l'Empire—et que cette demande a été éludée par une réponse du dit comité qu'on dit être faite avec beaucoup d'addresse. Je ne vous parle pas de la nouvelle

qui regarde Mr. de Wurmser. Vous en êtes sans doute parfaitement instruit.

'Veuillez ne pas garder un long silence avec quelqu'un qui professe pour vous un attachement aussi vrai que moi —et agréez les sentimens de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être—Monsieur—de votre Excellence—le très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

'LE BON. DE DEGELMANN.'

P.S. to Letter to Sir Morton Eden.

August 18, 1795.

I ought to mention to you in the strictest secrecy that having an opportunity of seeing a very confidential private correspondance of Mr. Barthelemy, I have observed of late that his language with respect to the court of Vienna is entirely changed. It was but very lately that he represented their intentions as extremely perfidious. Now he speaks of them with a certain degree of respect and represents the Emperor as the Dupe of the Courts of London and Petersburg.

I have myself no doubt that this is either the preliminary to some secret offer of a negotiation or that the thing has been allready hinted at and not *absolutely* rejected. I am aware at the same time that this change of language may possibly be adopted with the express purpose of exciting jealousy. Possibly also he may have learnt that I had seen his correspondance. If so it was a natural line for him to take. I wish therefore to do nothing more than mention the fact as not undeserving of some attention. I ought however to add that I have other reasons for believing that the attempt will be made independent of those which the treaty with Spain naturally points out.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

Downing Street: September 8th, 1795.
(Received at Bern, October 2nd.)

Sir,—Your Dispatches to No. 68, inclusive, have been received and laid before the King.

I have already expressed to You my Desire to be informed of your Opinion respecting the best Mode of deriving Advantage from the Reform of the Swiss Regiments in Holland. I have to add that it would be particularly desirable if it could be managed that this Event should lead to the Possibility of procuring Troops, which could be employed in His Majesty's foreign Possessions; and that, considering the Pressure of the present Moment in that respect, His Majesty would not disapprove of your taking any provisional Steps, which could lead to the Accomplishment of that Object, without subjecting this Country to a larger Expense than that of British Troops employed on the same Service.

Before You can receive this Letter, Genl. Wurmser will be arrived at his Head Quarters, and You will have been enabled, by his first Operations, to form some Judgment of his Intentions. I am sorry to say that the Language at Vienna, though in its general Tenour perfectly friendly to His Majesty's Views, is nevertheless, as with respect to the Operations of the Campaign, but too similar to that which, in your No. 66, You state M. Bellegarde to have held to You and Col. Craufurd. The Idea of sending the Prince of Condé round to Italy has lately been mentioned by the Austrian Minister here, as one which his Court wished him to suggest for the King's Consideration. A mere Reference to the Period of the Year at which this Suggestion is made, affords but too decisive an Answer to it. The Timidity and Uncertainty of the Austrian Government is certainly, as You suppose, the real Ground of the Inactivity of their Army; though the Conduct of Marshal Clerfaye in that respect cannot be excused by this Plea. In truth, a Government of more Vigour would not have been so ill served; nor would a General of more Exertion have been left so destitute of Means to execute the Orders he received. All that remains for His Majesty's Servants, either at home or abroad, to do on this Point, is to stimulate, by every

possible Effort, the Government and the Generals of that Power, whose Exertions can alone produce any Effect upon the Continent of Europe: and I shall accordingly write, without Delay, to Sir Morton Eden, in Conformity to the Ideas stated to him by You in your Letter of Aug. 8. In this Situation of Affairs, it is impossible not to approve the Line of Conduct which you state as that which you have adopted, with respect to the Interior. An unsupported Explosion of Revolt could only tend to crush the Party by whom it was undertaken. But if the Situation of Affairs, so likely to change from Day to Day in France, should afford a greater Hope that a Royalist Party could maintain itself in the South, without Foreign Assistance; or if, without your having laboured to produce it, any Event of that Nature should of itself break out in that Quarter; in both those Cases, His Majesty would entirely approve of every Exertion you could make, for the Support and Assistance of the Royalists in the Interior.

His Majesty has (as you will probably have learnt before this Letter reaches You) sent Monsieur,* with a Body of British Troops, destined to facilitate His Landing on the Coast of France, and joining the Army of Mons. de Charette. The Operations for that Purpose are probably already commenced, and very recent and certain Intelligence of the State of Affairs in that Quarter seems to confirm the Hope, that, even in the worst Events that can reasonably be looked to, Mons. Charette will be able to maintain himself in the Country he now occupies during the whole of the Autumn and Winter, and till the Republicans shall be enabled, by an Austrian Peace, to bring a very great Force against him, with the necessary Stores and Magazines for acting regularly in the Conquest of a Country in which every Inhabitant is their enemy. During such an Interval, many Events may arise in the

* Afterwards King Charles X.

present State of Opinions in France, which may lead to a more favourable Result; and as far as these can be promoted by Intelligence and Zeal in your Quarter, I am confident it will be done. Some Expectations are formed here from the Discontent which has been excited by the Decree for continuing the present Conventionalists, as Members of the new Legislature. But our Accounts of the Country at large, in this respect, are not sufficiently extensive to enable us to judge with much Certainty on this Point. It would certainly be in every View an Object of much Advantage, if the Primary Assemblies were to reject the Decree, and to elect the full Number of Members, especially as it must be hoped that these Elections would, in many Instances, fall on those Royalists who have already introduced themselves into the Municipal Offices. It is hardly necessary for me to say, that this latter Object is of Course to be forwarded, by any Means which may be in your Power.

I am with great Truth and Regard, Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant,

GRENVILLE.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

Sir Morton Eden to Mr. Wickham.

(Most Secret and Confidential.) (Cypher.) Vienna: Saturday, August 22nd, 1795. (Received September 4th, at Mulheim.)

Sir,—I have been favoured with Your letters by my Servant, and M. de Vassé; those by the latter I received on Wednesday.

After a careful Perusal of them and those of Colonel Craufurd transmitted to me in the same packet, I had a long conference with the Austrian Minister, to whom I very forcibly stated the different points which they contained. It certainly was desirable for you, for the regulation of your Correspondence with the Interior, to know before your return to Switzerland the precise Plan of Operations to be pursued by the Austrian Army. The

general object, as appears particularly by Colonel Craufurd's Letter, was stated by General Bellegarde. But you must be aware that it would have been unbecoming in him to have definitively settled any plan of Conduct of himself, when at the very time of the Conference he knew superior officers to be on the road to take the command of the Army. Your Idea of directing the Operations principally to the forwarding the Royalists and to attack France in the heart of the Country, is so advantageous and has ever been so conformable to my wish, that I did not hesitate a moment to submit it again to the Consideration of the Austrian Ministry, supporting it with the Arguments furnished by your letter of the favorable disposition of the Country, and suggesting for its execution the plan proposed by Colonel Craufurd. Mr. Thugut said that their object was to proceed by regular military progress. That their misfortunes in Alsace, experienced by an unwise reliance on the assurances of the Emigrants, rendered this Precaution more than ever necessary. That he considered Colonel Craufurd's Plan, especially at a moment when the French were assembling great reinforcements in Upper Alsace, as too hazardous to be adopted, since in case of failure the Army would be driven headlong into the Rhine, it not having the security which the possession of Brisach or Schlestadt together with Huninguen would give to it. That as to the employment of the other great Corps as proposed by Colonel Craufurd in support of the expedition into Upper Alsace and the leaving only Thirty Thousand men on this side of the Rhine; he looked upon it from every consideration as well political as military to be altogether inadmissible. The Plan adopted, he said, appeared therefore to be the only wise one, and nothing, he continued, would engage H. I. M. to depart from it, but such Proofs that the Country would immediately rise on the approach of an Army, as after being maturely examined by the Emperor and His Ministers, H. I. M. could place a just reliance on.

All, he said, that had been communicated on this head amounted only to assertions without any Information on what they were founded, and that after the past calamities he could not undertake to recommend a Plan the success of which depended on so vague a foundation, and the failure of which would destroy so great a part of the Emperor's Army and be attended with the most fatal consequences to his Dominions and to the common Cause. This reasoning, he said, must extend to the strengthening the Army of Condé till the progress of the main Army could insure it Protection. If however, he added, His Serene Highness thinks himself strong enough to go forward alone immediately after the Passage of the Rhine no objection will be made to it here, nor did he observe that any objection existed to the stationing H. I. M. in the Passes of Porentrui if that be preferred by the Prince. This answer was so decided, that being unable to remove his objections, since I am unacquainted with the Grounds on which your expectations are formed, I could only urge active and vigorous measures in the execution of their own plan and the support of the Royalists in as far as may be possible. But as your plan if found practicable would contribute most essentially to put a speedy end (which we must all have so much at heart) to the War, and as you are the only person who can remove the doubts and objections existing here, I scruple not to submit it to your consideration whether you may not find it advisable to resume your idea of coming hither. Instead of conversing with me only, I will (overlooking what might be apparently an Interference with my functions) introduce you to the Austrian Minister, to whom you may fully impart the Grounds on which your opinions are formed, and I will most willingly and readily support you to the utmost of my power. I should observe that I see no chance of the Austrians acting (?), as you wish, in the name of the French King. A Proclamation by the Prince of Condé or the

Duke of Berry will probably be allowed; but whilst the Negotiation of the Empire for Peace (which is an untoward Business) is going on, and the Two Courts are still undetermined as to recognizing *Monsieur* as King, nothing further can be expected unless in the event of great Success. As to the operations on the side of Savoy, from the wretched State of the Piedmontese Army, which you represent to be even worse than I thought it was, I see no probability of any thing being undertaken there this year, since the Season for action, finishing so early as the 20th of September, does not leave any hope of General De Vins (whose progress in the Riviera of Genoa, the clearing of which with the reconquering the County of Nice have always been looked upon as the primary objects) being able to act himself in that Quarter, where no Magazines are prepared, nor Mules, Three Thousand of which he says would be necessary to be purchased. He will however have positive orders to keep Kellermann so employed as at least not to admit of his making any detachments from his Army. . . . .

I have the Honor to be, with great Truth and regard, Sir, Your most Obedient Humble Servant,

MORTON EDEN.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.

No 67. (Extract from Draft.)
(Cypher.) Bern: 22 August, 1795.

Some persons now at the head of the Sections of Paris have written to their friends in this country to say that they shall undoubtedly succeed in reestablishing Royalty, provided they are left to themselves. They say they are determined to have no communication whatever, direct or indirect, with the Emigrants or the Princes, being convinced that there is no reliance to be placed on their discretion. These letters are from Persons connected

with the Constitutional Party, but they are exactly conformable to every thing that I have learnt lately from the Inhabitants, both of Lyons and Franche Comté, where the late events that have happened at Lyons, particularly the formation of *the Society called La Société de Jésus*, appeared to have made the deepest impression.

Besides the annexed Letter No. 1, I have received what I consider authentic information, that the Convention is about to make a desperate effort against the Vendée immediately, that they are about to send a considerable force in separate detachments to the West Indies, and that they are sending out several experienced officers and non-commissioned officers to North America, who are to endeavour to pass from thence to the Islands. Mr. Teissonet and his companion passed the Rousses safe a few days since; they reached Morez the same day, where they obtained regular passports. Their Journey was known, but the object of it supposed to be only the Jura. Strict orders were given to arrest them on the frontiers, but, their guide, who is returned, accompanyd them as far as Lons le Saulnier, where I hope they are out of all danger. Two days after their departure a Mr. D'Antraigues, a French Emigrant officer, perfectly unknown to me, arrived at the house of the person upon the Frontier who had procured them their guide, said that he was sent by me, and stated so many particulars respecting Teissonet's intended project, as left no doubt of the truth of what he advanced. The person in question furnished him with a guide who conducted him safe along the frontiers, but refused to say anything of the road that Teissonet had taken, or the place to which he was going. Neither the Prince of Condé nor myself have ever seen or heard anything of D'Antraigues, and I am sure that Mr. Teissonet himself had had no communication with him: what his intention or his orders may be I cannot pretend to say.

All the administrators in the Jura have been changed. The system of Terror is about to be renewed there.

Your Lordship will learn some particulars from the enclosed note No. 2. I have no confidence at all in the spirit of the Inhabitants, or any idea that they will attempt to make any resistance. I repeat to your Lordship that the dread of the Emigrants in the greater part of that province is nearly as strong as that of the Terrorists, and your Lordship will observe from the enclosed letter No. 3 that the same imprudence has marked the conduct of the emigrants in another quarter (cypher ends). On my arrival here, I found Mr. Imbert Colomay, the late *Prévôt des Marchands* at Lyons, who had been waiting for me about three weeks. He is just returned from Russia with the intention if possible of making a last effort in the cause of his King.

I need hardly mention to your Lordship that this gentleman was for many years the leading person in Lyons, where he enjoyed the highest reputation and most extensive influence and ascendancy over the minds of his fellow citizens. He is the Person whom all the principal inhabitants of Lyons have long been wishing for, and also is perhaps the one man capable of forming and conducting an enterprize of any consequence in that place.

He will be strictly watched from the moment of his arrival there; but he has not the smallest apprehension for himself and seems confident that Lyons would declare itself immediately on his arrival there, if such a measure was prudent, and that it could even now maintain itself for two months if it were sure of being relieved at the expiration of that time, provided that is, that Teissonet's project took effect in the neighbouring Province. Without foreign assistance, however, he is most clearly and decidedly of opinion that nothing ought to be attempted, because it would be absolutely impossible to succeed, though if he were assured of receiving that assistance at the last, he would by no means advise any further delay.

I have introduced him to Mr. Trevor, with whom we have had long and repeated communications on every

point that in any way related to the Business. Mr. Trevor has written again to the Court of Turin and General De Vins, to press them in the strongest manner to attempt something on that side, I fear however, that it will be all in vain, and Mr. Trevor's hopes are far from being sanguine.

M. Imbert as well as all the sensible people of Lyons whom I have seen, disapprove very much of M. De Preçy's entering into the service of the King of Sardinia and still more of his project of raising a corps. Had he remained quiet as M. Imbert has done, he would now have the same right to return to Lyons, the first decree by which he was excepted from the amnesty granted to the Lyonnese having been entirely repealed. I know not what to make of it, but the fact is really so. It looks as if they were about to make a fortified camp in the Vosges. I ought to mention to your Lordship on this occasion that M. Imbert was the Person who brought M. de Preçy forward at Lyons and proposed him as the commander in chief. He met Messrs. Teissonet and Bayard at my house during my absence, and they concerted all their measures together.

The Republicans have sent large reinforcements from the army on the lower Rhine into Savoy and Dauphiné—above 15,000 men have passed through Lons le Saunier.

They have traced a camp for 10,000 men at Bourg in Bresse, the position that I have been all along apprehensive of their taking, and above 4000 men are actually arrived there.

This corps will be ready to fall upon Savoy, Lyons, or Franche Comté as occasion may require. Among those allready arrived are some of the worst disposed Battallions in the whole army who have been selected on that very account. This might do good if there were more energy in the country. As it is I fear it will have a contrary effect.

On the side of Porentruy and the upper Rhine the enemy has also taken the alarm and for the first time

appears to believe the Austrians in earnest. If the passage be not effected in a week I have very serious doubts whether it will be practicable at all, i.e. whether the Austrians will dare to attempt it in the face of the forces that will be then assembled. Pichegru has established his head Quarters at Altkirch and a strong party of Artillery is forming behind Huninguen. I do not find however that they have as yet any considerable magazine: much conjectures are formed on a circumstance that lately took place at Strasburgh; many of the canon have been taken from the ramparts and removed into the interior of the country on the road to Paris.

Mr. Windham to Mr. Wickham.

London, Aug^{t} 28th, 1795.

Sir,—A person, whose name and character you are acquainted with, and who appears from all the intercourse, which I have had with him, greatly to be relied upon in point of judgement, as He may be, I am persuaded, perfectly so, in respect of integrity, has lately put into my hands a memorial, the object of which is to recommend the exciting an insurrection in the Cevennes. The means proposed for that purpose have little in them different from what must be proposed in every Case of the same nature; except in so far as depends on the Character of the writer, and who offers himself for the service. He is an Ecclesiastick; of a family long established, and much respected in the country; who speaks the language of the country; is not prompted to the undertaking for want of means to live comfortably where He is; and is said to be possessed of all the personal qualifications, which should recommend a man on such an occasion. His name, as yet is not known to me; nor have I pressed to be informed of it, because He wishes, that unless his proposition should be adopted, He should not be known to have made it. He has requested too that in the first instance, even if his

name should be made known to me, it should go no further than myself. All this precaution might be as well calculated to excite distrust as to inspire confidence, if the voucher for his personal character, and the truth of what He says, was not the person I have above alluded to, viz: Mr. D'Andigné. The force of his authority is so great with me, that I should be inclined to send the person in question directly to you; apprizing him, that it must depend upon your judgement on the spot, whether He should be ultimately employed or not; if it did not seem to be Lord Grenville's judgement, that you should be previously consulted, so as to know, whether even if the person should be fit, and the measure feasible, you might not be already provided with as many agents for the purpose, as would be useful to employ.

I dispatch this, therefore, in order to know your opinion in that respect, reserving still the power, should it appear desireable, either from further knowledge of the person, or circumstances, that may appear in your correspondence, to send him off, before your answer can be received. The matter has been so lately mentioned to me, that I have not been able, as yet, to learn any further particulars, than those, which I have already stated.

You will find by a letter sent I believe by the last post, that the determination has been at last taken, to send Baron Roll's Regiment to Gibraltar. I regret the not having requested your Opinion before, as to the possibility of sending it to the Prince of Condé without the risk of such personal prejudice to the Individual Commanders by involving them in any violation of the Swiss Territory, or such publick inconvenience from the same cause, as should have made that measure, so desirable in many respects, not proper to be resorted to. It is not, I apprehend, the consideration of those inconveniences, that has determined the resolution taken in this instance: But in case any circumstance should prevent the execution of it, or that

means should be found of otherwise strengthening Gibraltar, I should be glad to know, what difficulties there would be in transferring them to the Prince de Condé, to whom they must make so valuable, and so seasonable an addition.

I hope in God, that the restrictions put on our operations on the Coast of France, in consequence of this last act of Spain, may not so far check the ardour of those in the interior, or leave them to such a degree unprotected, as to Destroy a prospect, the most promising of any that we have yet seen, of overturning this monstrous system, and thus affording either to this country or to Europe the only chance of being finally saved from its effects. I cannot but congratulate you, Sir, upon the share, which you have had in contributing to this great End—and have the honour to be

Your most obedient, Humble Servant,

W. WINDHAM.

Copy of a Note from Mons. Mallet du Pan, Sept. 16, 1795.

J'ai eu ce matin nombre de Lettres de Paris du 12 et du 13, et bien surprenantes. Nous touchons à des grandes scènes. L'opinion est unanime à considérer et à *traiter* la Convention comme un amas d'ennemis et de Tyrans.—Ce sentiment a été universel dans les Sections. On s'inquiète fort peu des adhésions des Provinciaux imbéciles et serviles, qui ne sont bons qu'à décroter les souliers des Marat et des Roberspierre. Cet infâme Lyon, Besançon, Dijon, Grenoble ont tout accepté.

Le Camp de Marly est à peu près gagné.

Il y a eu le 11 Conciliabule des meneurs—on a proposé de faire sortir la Convention de Paris; c'eût été le Coup de Grace: on a ajourné. Faute de moyens de Force on a recours à l'Artifice—Tout dépend de la décision pendante et du choix des nouveaux Députés—Les

Jacobins mêmes ne croyent pas au passage du Rhin; les Puissances sont dans un décri sans bornes; on croit généralement à Paris, Cabinets, Généraux, et Vérone conjurés avec la Convention. Tenez pour certain, et dites à qui voudra le savoir que si l'on travaille à rétablir la Royauté, infiniment peu de Gens travaillent pour le Roi actuel, et qu'infailliblement on se passera de lui, s'il ne veut pas une fois pour toutes se réconcilier avec ceux-là seuls qui peuvent lui rendre la Couronne.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

Downing Street: Sept^{r} 21st, 1795.

No. 30. (Most Secret.) (Received Oct. 29.)

Sir,—This Letter will be delivered to You by the Abbé de Villefort, late *Grand Vicaire* of the Province of Champagne, accompanied by a French Officer of Cavalry, a Native of Languedoc. These Gentlemen, from their extensive Connections and Influence, particularly in the Southern Provinces of France, are desirous to contribute their Assistance in encouraging the Royalists, wherever You may judge their Efforts are likely to be of most Use, under the present Circumstances. You will therefore give them particular Instructions for their Conduct, and furnish them with such Supplies of Money, from time to time, as You may judge requisite for the Good of the common Cause, and for which You are already entrusted with a discretionary Power. It is necessary for me to add that these Gentlemen are particularly in the Confidence of the Duc de Harcourt and M. Dutheil, who are charged here with the Affairs of the French King and of *Monsieur*.

It may be material for You to be informed, by this safe Opportunity, that M. Dunant, who is now at Paris, is the secret Agent of Gen^{l}. Charette, as well as of the Royalists of Anjou, Maine, Britanny, Normandy and Picardy, and has a principal Share in the Direction of the Motions of the Royalists in that Capital. I appre-

hend that M. de Villefort will be able to point out to You the Means of communicating with M. Dunant. It is possible that the latter Gentleman may proceed to Switzerland, for the Purpose of arranging a Correspondence with You.

I am, with great Truth and Regard, Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant,

GRENVILLE.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

Lord Macartney to Mr. Wickham.

Verona: September 21st, 1795.

Sir,—The King of France having occasion to send a Gentleman of his first confidence to the Prince of Condé's Army, upon very particular business, has appointed for that purpose the Count D'Avarey,* whose situation about his person, and whose distinguished merits in his service naturally pointed him out for the Commission. Should he happen to be in your neighbourhood, he will have the honor of delivering you this letter, and I shall esteem myself most particularly obliged to you, for any attention, and civilities that you may have an opportunity of shewing to him. There is nothing yet decided with regard to our removal from hence, but I shall certainly give you the earliest notice of it, as soon as I shall have it in my power.

I have the honor to be with great truth and regard, Sir, Your most obedient and most humble Servant,

MACARTNEY.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq.

* Antoine Louis François, Comte D'Avaray, b. 1759; d. 1811, maître de la garde-robe to Louis XVIII., who regarded him with as much affection as it was in that king's nature to bestow on anyone besides himself.

Mons. Mallet du Pan to Mr. Wickham.

Berne : le 25 7^{bre} 1795.

Monsieur,—Je répondrai à la preuve de confiance que vous me faîtes l'honneur de me donner, en la justifiant par tous les éclaircissemens qui sont en mon pouvoir.

Les personnes agissantes dont j'ai reçu les demandes me sont connues depuis très longtems : je me rens garant personnel de leur intégrité, de leur zèle, et de l'emploi fidèle qu'ils feraient de tout secours. La principale d'entre elles avec laquelle j'entretiens depuis plusieurs mois une correspondance suivie, tient en première ligne, à une Société de Royalistes qui ont prévu et préparé la circonstance actuelle de Paris : j'en ai toujours reçu les avis les plus sûrs, les plus pénétrans, les plus judicieux. Il est Vice-Président de sa section, et déjà nommé Electeur ; Administrateur dans la première Municipalité de Paris, ses principes ont été jusqu'au 5 8^{bre} 1789, ceux de la Révolution commençante et mitigée. Ensuite, désaprobateur prononcé de la Constitution de 1791, quoiqu'ayant constamment prêché en 1792 la réunion de tous les Monarchistes contre les Républicains, il fut, comme la plupart des honnêtes gens, victime du triomphe de ces derniers, obligé de s'ensevelir, ruiné, et incarcéré très longtems.

Il n'a qu'un système, celui de prendre pour base de toute restauration, les cahiers nationaux de 1789, et la Déclaration Royale du mois de juin suivant ; il ne tient jamais à aucune Faction ; mais il est persuadé de la nécessité de rallier toutes celles qui veulent finir la Révolution et la République, de mettre son espoir dans les moyens graduels, et de remonter la Monarchie *véritable* successivement, en écartant tous les moyens brusques et les idées absolues.

J'ai toute sorte de raisons de penser que, l'opinion de cette Personne est celle de sa Société, et de la plupart de ceux qui travaillent à rétablir la Monarchie. Toutes, sans distinction de Partis, Royalistes ou anciens Constitu-

tionnels, sont réunis au but fondamental de renverser d'abord la Convention, de créer un Corps Législatif digne de confiance, et de s'en servir à faire aussitôt l'appel à la Nation pour le rétablissement de la Royauté. Les questions ultérieures sur la nature de cette Royauté, et sur la restauration totale ou partielle, ont été ajournées très-sagement, afin de maintenir l'unité actuelle des vœux et des efforts.

Voilà le but général : quant aux moyens d'exécution, ils me sont inconnus, la prudence défendant de les livrer à la poste ; mais ils consistent, en général, à battre la Révolution avec ses propres armes, à créer, comme on y est parvenu, une grande force d'opinion, de résistance, et de vœux émis par les voyes autorisées, et de travailler à l'étendre et à la maintenir.

Je ne doute point qu'on n'ait agi auprès des armées ; on ne s'inquiète guères de celles des frontières, par la conviction où l'on est qu'elles seront infailliblement à celui qui prévaudra, et qui aura le pouvoir et le Trésor public.

Vous me pardonnerez, Monsieur, de taire le nom de *l'Individu* principal dont je vous donne le signalement moral. Je suis à cet égard sous la loi qui m'est imposée, et que les conjonctures rendent encore plus impérieuse.

En général, les Membres Royalistes survivans de l'Assemblée Législative, ont repris une grande faveur ; nombre d'entre eux sont déjà nommés Electeurs.

Les deux lettres que j'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer, Monsieur, sont (no. 1) la dernière que j'ai reçue de la Personne avec laquelle je correspons plus essentiellement ; (no. 2) une lettre de Bellamy mon compatriote qui, de Hambourg où il a monté un établissement, étant venu à Paris, et s'étant, à ma demande, appointé avec mes relations, fait l'offre que vous lirez dans sa dépêche, adressée ici sous un nom d'emprunt.

Avant même d'avoir reçu hier votre lettre, Monsieur, j'avais autorisé Bellamy à aller en avant, sans savoir encore comment je le rembourserais ; mais en lui

prescrivant la condition de ne rien livrer si les sections étaient culebutées, et de s'assurer si la circonstance rendait toujours l'emploi de cette somme nécessaire.—Ainsi l'intervention directe de MM. Zeerleder ne le sera pas, et c'est un bien. Bellamy tirera sur moi ou sur mon frère, et si vous le trouvez bon, Le Clerc prendra chez M. Zeerleder les fonds sous votre autorisation, et me les remettra sans que je paraisse.

Il serait, d'ailleurs, téméraire de ma part de vous promettre un succès certain. Mille incidents imprévus peuvent renverser le plan projetté, et raffermir la Convention. Je ne puis, par exemple, répondre de l'effet qu'aura produit le débarquement de Monsieur; je tremble que la Convention ne s'en serve pour légitimer des mesures de terreur, et pour refroidir ceux qui craignent une contre-révolution absolue par les armes.

Je vous demande la grâce de me renvoyer les deux incluses, aussitôt que vous les aurez fait transcrire, et de me croire avec les sentimens les plus distingués, Monsieur, votre très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

M. D.

P.S. Si les explications que j'ai l'honneur de vous donner vous paraissent trop incomplètes et peu satisfaisantes, je n'entens point me prévaloir de l'offre que vous avez la bonté de faire, ni prétendre que vous ratifiez un sacrifice qui ne vous paraîtrait pas assez motivé.

P. S. Au moment de fermer ma lettre, j'en reçois une seconde de Bellamy, que je joins à la précédente, en vous priant de me la renvoyer avec les deux incluses.

Prince de Condé to Mr. Wickham.

à Mülheim: ce 27, 7^{bre} 1795.

Je vous fais, Monsieur, mes plus vifs et mes plus sincères remercîments, de la manière pleine de grâce, dont vous avez satisfait à ma demande; j'espère que vous voudrez bien sentir, à quel point il est important, que

vous vous rendiez aussi, à l'empressement que j'ai, de vous voir avec moi, ce que je vous ai marqué par ma lettre du 24, qui a dû vous être remise par l'Abbé de Landrevy; j'ai beaucoup de choses à vous confier, et à concerter avec vous, avant de recevoir les réponses que nous attendons; je vous demande donc en grâce de venir, aussitôt ma lettre reçue, et de rester le tems nécessaire: rendez-moi la justice, Monsieur, d'être aussi persuadé, que vous devez l'être, de la confiante, et véritable amitié que je vous ai vouée. L. J. B.

King Louis XVIII. to le Duc de Harcourt.

(Copy.) Vérone: le 28 7^{bre} 1795.

J'ai reçu lundy dernier, mon cher Duc, votre réponse à ma lettre du 14 août, mais J'ai voulu me donner quelques Jours de réflexion avant d'y répondre. Je ne puis qu'être sensible à l'intérêt que le Gouvernement Britannique prend à ma conservation, mais en même temps, je vois qu'il se trompe sur l'importance de cette même conservation, et son erreur est peut-être naturelle, parceque l'Angleterre étant encore à la fin du 18^{e} siècle, il n'est pas facile d'y comprendre qu'en moins de 6 ans, la France soit retournée à la fin du 16^{e}, si ce n'est même à une époque encore plus reculée—ma position est celle de Henry 4, excepté qu'il avoit beaucoup d'avantages que Je n'ai pas. Suis-je dans mon Royaume? Suis-je à la tête d'une Armée qui connoisse ma voix? ai-je porté les armes depuis l'âge de 16 ans? ai-je gagné la Bataille de Coutras? Non: je suis dans un coin de l'Italie; ceux qui combattent pour moi ne m'ont pour la plupart jamais vu; je n'ai fait qu'un bout de Campagne, où Je n'ai pas vu brûler une amorce; mon inaction forcée prête aux calomnies de mes ennemis, et m'expose de la part de ceux mêmes, qui me sont fidèles, à des Jugements que Je ne puis même qualifier de téméraires, car ceux qui les portent ne peuvent pas savoir la vérité. Est-ce ainsi que Je puis reconquérir mon Royaume? En supposant même que les efforts de mes fidèles

sujets fussent tels que Je n'eusse, pour ainsi dire, qu'à venir me mettre la Couronne sur la tête, est-ce ainsi que Je puis acquérir la considération personnelle, moins utile peut-être à un Roi du 18e siècle, mais absolument nécessaire à un Roi du 16e, tel que Je suis. Mais dira-t-on, 'si les succès de *Monsieur* sont tels qu'ils puissent promettre d'heureuses suites, et qu'ils offrent pour vous une véritable sûreté, alors on vous transportera dans vos états.' Hé bien, c'est ne rien faire pour ma considération, que de me faire arriver, lorsque les grands dangers seront passés. Dieu m'est témoin, et vous le scavés aussi, mon cher Duc, vous qui connoissés bien mon âme, que J'entendrois avec joye répéter le fameux cri des Israëlites, *Saül en a tué mille, mais David en a tué dix mille*, mais la satisfaction du frère ne feroit rien à la gloire du Roi, et, je le répète, si je n'acquiers pas de Gloire, si mon trône n'est pas entouré de ma considération personnelle, mon règne pourra être tranquille par la lassitude générale, mais je ne jetterai jamais les fondements d'une édifice solide.

'On craint pour ma vie, ah que cette considération est foible à côté de celle de mon honneur! quelle différence de responsabilité pour le Gouvernement Britannique, qui en a le choix? La vie d'un homme et le destin d'un Empire, quelle alternative! et comment peut-on balancer? ne croyés point que ce soit le sang de Henry 4, qui bout cependant dans mes veines, qui me fasse parler ainsi. J'ai examiné de sang froid ma position, et jusqu'à quel point ma vie peut être précieuse. Si je péris la Couronne passe à mon frère, qui est du même âge que moi, son fils aîné a 20 ans faits, le Cadet en aura bientôt 18, assurément il faudroit bien du malheur pour que la succession périclitâte, ainsi de ce côté il n'y a aucune inquiétude à avoir, et le père, et les enfants pensent exactement comme moi. Si Je péris, loin que cet événement décourageât mes fidèles sujets, ma chemise teinte de mon sang rallieroit tous les Royalistes bien plus sûrement qu'aucun autre étendard. Il n'y a donc rien à craindre pour ce Roi, qui

ne meurt jamais en France, et dont sans doute le ministère Britannique craint de prendre la vie sous sa responsabilité, car Je suis trop sûr de sa noble façon de penser, et j'espère moi-même en être trop bien connu pour supposer même, que ses inquiétudes puissent porter sur mon individu. Mais, si Je reste en arrière, si je ne travaille pas moi-même, je ne dis pas de la tête, mais du bras, à monter sur mon trône, Je perds toute considération ; il ne faut pas imaginer qu'on se persuade jamais, que c'est malgré moi, que Je n'aurai pas joint mes fidèles et braves Sujets, et alors mon règne sera plus désastreux, que celui de Henry 3.

Le Passage du Rhin, la Saison qui s'avance, tout concourt à me prouver, qu'au moins pour cette année, le corps de Mr. Le P. de Condé n'agira point. De plus, Mr. de Thugutt vient encore de dire, sans être provoqué, que je n'y pourrois pas jouer un rôle convenable. Je suis moi-même convaincu, que si ce corps n'agit point, j'y serai bientôt presqu'aussi déplacé, qu'à Vérone. Que me reste-t-il donc? La Vendée—qui peut m'y conduire? Le Roi d'Angleterre. Insistés donc de nouveau, dites de ma part aux Ministres, que Je leur demande mon trône, ou un tombeau. La Providence choisira, et je souscris d'avance à son choix, mais tout tiers parti est dangereux pour ma gloire, dangereux pour le bonheur présent et futur de mon Royaume, dangereux même pour le repos de l'Europe qui est incompatible avec l'état présent de la France, et s'il m'est permis de parler de moi après avoir parlé de si grands intérêts, insupportable pour mon âme.

Voilà ce que Je veux que vous disiez, que vous fassiés sentir au Cabinet du St. James, avec toute l'énergie qui est dans votre âme; ajoutés une considération bien plus petite, puisqu'elle ne regarde que moi, c'est qu'il me sera bien doux de devoir mon trône, ma gloire, et le salut de mon Royaume, à un Souverain aussi vertueux, que le Roi d'Angleterre, et à des Ministres aussi éclairés que les siens.

Adieu, mon cher Duc, vous connoissés toute mon amitié pour vous.—

Mr. Wickham to Lord Macartney.

(Draft.) Berne: 4 Oct. 1795.

. . . . I durst not venture to write to your Lordship from Mulheim till I know something certain of your destination of which I have as yet heard nothing, but I presume that the late events in Germany will have entirely put an end to your project of going to the neighbourhood of Pfortzheim. I have therefore advised the Comte du Pac at all events to go on to Verona, and have ventured to detain him to day that I might give you some account of the intelligence from Paris the general outline of which you will find in the inclosed Gazettes.

I have received some letters myself and have seen a great many others. Upon the whole it appears to me very clear that the Sections are well conducted and they have able persons at their head, that they are determined to resist the Convention, that they have the means of doing so, and, what is of no less importance, that both parties are so committed that they cannot now recede. All the Departments *immediately* surrounding Paris appear also to be in the same situation, so that the Troops (which I believe do not exceed 15,000 men) dare not quit their respective stations for fear of leaving an enemy behind as formidable as that which they are going to attack.

Notwithstanding the last decree of the Convention, the Sections continued assembled on the night of the 28th and debated on matters very foreign to the nomination of their Electors, and I am informed from very good authority that active measures had been taken for resistance in case the Convention had attempted to have interrupted them.

Among the Electors named there are certainly some who are known to be true and determined Royalists, but it cannot be disguised that by far the greater part are persons who either still *are* or *have been* friends of some

one of the different governments and parties by which France has been so long distracted, and that though the Royalists are extremely active at this moment and appear to gain, yet that all the power and authority of the Kingdom, in case the convention should be *legally* overthrown, would rest in the hands of persons of the above description.

What the event of the struggle will be it is impossible to foresee, but it seems certain that the crisis is such as that the fate of France for some years to come must necessarily be decided in the space of a few weeks. This is surely therefore the moment for the King to endeavour to conciliate the different parties by some more active and direct means than any that he has yet adopted, and to relax from that extreme rigour which I believe to be as contrary to his own principles and feeling as it is to his own interests and those of his Kingdom. In submitting this matter to your Lordship, which I do with the utmost deference, I forbear to enter into any detail or to enlarge at all upon the reasons that seem to make such a line of conduct at this moment not only prudent but necessary, being perfectly aware that I can say nothing that your Lordship's judgment and experience will not have allready suggested.

I shall content myself with stating two facts, both of which may be of importance in your Lordship's hands at the present moment.—*The first*, that the conduct of the King in taking away the appointment of Prince of Poix has made a deep impression not only on this side of the country but more particularly at Paris, where I know it is made use of with the greatest effect not only by the Republicans but by the ill disposed leaders of the Const: Party such as Montesquieu; and even in this country if ever I venture to say, what no one will believe, that the conduct of the Emigrants and particularly that of the Royal family will be very different from what the imprudence of their language seems to threaten, I am constantly

answered by that fact, to which it is impossible to make any reply.

The second, that having yesterday received the visit of a principal agent of Charette sent on purpose to concert measures with me, he assured me that a reunion of parties was become absolutely necessary, and that without it it would be impossible to do more than maintain themselves in the Vendée, and that Charette himself was decidedly of that opinion. I pay the more attention to what this person stated to me, because he has resided still more at Paris than in the Vendée, has carried on all the communications between those two places as well as the correspondance between the King and Charette. He is fearfull of holding this language himself to the King lest it should be known to the persons around him, which might be productive of much mischief, but upon his return it is his full intention to engage Charette to write himself directly to Verona in the strongest manner upon the subject. In the mean time the occasion is lost perhaps irretrievably. If your Lordship therefore could contribute to effect any such end I sincerely believe that you would be rendering a most essential service to the King himself as well as to the rest of Europe.

The Person in question is of opinion that the King's correspondants at Paris should be immediately charged and authorized to speak directly in his name to the leading Persons at Paris, and for myself I can see no other way of doing the thing.

The King himself seems to me to have a more immediate interest in adopting such a line of conduct than any other person. If the convention should be overthrown quietly and legally and the cry of Royalty should not immediately become general, I tremble for the consequences. The new assembly will be composed of able and of ambitious men who will certainly do nothing in his favour without making their own conditions, which will be more or less humiliating according to the line of conduct that

he shall have personally adopted. They certainly will never suffer the power to go out of their hands—consequently the King will find himself in the very awkward situation either of renouncing the crown alltogether, or of involving the country again in all the horrors of a civil war, or of retracting openly his own Declaration which has been issued with so much solemnity, whereas if these persons were induced to act in concert with the King and particularly with Charette in the first instance, their general measures would naturally take a stronger colour of Royalty, and they might be led insensibly to steps from which it would be difficult or impossible for them afterwards to recede.

Everything, in my mind, depends on the impulsion that shall be given in the first moment when open war shall be declared against the convention. If the Leaders of the sections should once encourage the *cry* of Royalty at Paris I am satisfied that the natural extravagance and enthusiasm of the nation would again show itself and that the movement would be too prompt and too rapid to admit of their giving any direction to it.

I repeat to your Lordship again that I submit these reflections to your consideration with the utmost deference, and I have no doubt you will give them no more credit than they appear to merit in themselves.

I have as yet no certain account of the debarkment of Monsieur, though there seems no doubt of the fact. Charette is perfectly satisfyd that he shall be able to maintain himself, but he does not consider himself equal to advancing into the country unless all the neighbouring Province should be in insurrection. The affair of Chartres and of Dreux seem to promise something of consequence on that side could the troops be effectively employed elsewhere, but there is nothing that can resist a regular army.

In one word, If the Parisians could be induced to throw themselves into the arms of Charette, I should consider the whole business as effectually over; if not, I fear we

shall gain but little by the change even if they succeed to the utmost of their wishes.

An insurrection is forming in the Foret: I myself am clearly of opinion that M. de Preçy should have positive orders to come to the Frontiers. His presence may be necessary every day and at Turin he is quite out of the reach of everything. He seems to me to be too timid. He will be necessary to put an end to the contentions that are arising among different persons for the command of the party in question. All hope of foreign assistance being now at end, I am convinced that no party of any consequence can be formed in opposition to the convention but by an union with Paris.

I am sorry to inform your Lordship that the same injurious suspicions of the intentions of the British cabinet continue to prevail among the greater part of the emigrants.

*Lord Macartney to Mr. Wickham.**

Verona: October 15th, 1795.
(Received 29th, at night.)

Sir,—I have to acknowledge the honor of your letter from Berne of the 4th instant, by the Count Du Pac, for which I return you a thousand thanks.

Long before I received it, I had had many conversations with the French King, and with the Marshal de Castries and the Baron Flachslanden, who were the only Persons with whom their Master had authorized me to talk upon business, and I had often suggested to them my ideas, which in a great measure correspond with yours. I have ever found all three perfectly of the same opinion at bottom, though their manner of delivering them was different. The Marshal's tone was more gentle, and courtly, though not less decided than the Baron's, the King's a medium between both, but always uniform, and

* Many short sentences and sometimes single words in this dispatch are in cypher.

firm. The Marshal to my great regret left us a fortnight ago, and I believe does not mean to return. Since the receipt of your letter, I have not failed to renew my instances to the King and the Baron, and in order to give them the greater weight, I have taken the liberty of strengthening them by making use of your name, and arguments, as from your situation, correspondencies, and discernment, you have had opportunities of being acquainted with many material points, which could not have come to my knowledge.

I shall not at present trouble you with a detail of all that has passed, but only give you a short result of the whole. It is said to me that in fact there is nobody of mention amongst the Revolutionists either sufficiently united or sufficiently honest and preponderant for the King to treat with. But if there should be such the Count D'Artois who is on the spot, is the proper person to negociate and will certainly be glad to have the benefit of Charette's—(a few undecyphered words occur here).—Before the Count's departure from England, the King's Agents in France were authorized to explain his manifesto and to say that he could not avoid making a general exception of all the Regicides from his amnesty, yet there might be services of such a nature, as to entitle even them to his Clemency. Our Ministers at home are fully possessed of this idea, and have probably already treated with some of the Leaders of the Convention upon this ground—(two lines occur here undecyphered)—many may pretend to influence, who in fact have it only so far as to enable them to do mischief, but not to perform service. All others are included in the oblivion, and have therefore nothing to fear as to their persons, and as to future advantages, they may earn them by their conduct, and their merits towards the King's restoration.

With regard to the French Constitution it is regarded particularly by the King with the same fondness as the common Law was contemplated by My Lord Coke, as

the wisdom of ages, the perfection of reason &c., and as the only kind of Government suitable to the French nation. At the same time he admits that many serious abuses had crept into it, of which he is determined to purge it, if he should be restored, for none of the abuses does he look upon as making any integral part of the real constitution itself, which in his opinion is as little despotic as our own. On the whole he thinks a sufficient authority has been given to the Count D'Artois, to our Ministry and to his Agents at Paris, to effect a revolution in his favour, if there be a sincere disposition in those upon whom it is supposed to depend. In regard to all other means, it can never be too late to submit to the humble condition which it may possibly be intended to propose to him.

I have given you this short sketch of the sentiments that prevail here. The King is a man of good understanding, and of extensive information. In all his discourses he professes the utmost moderation, and integrity, and those who have had opportunities of knowing him best, seem persuaded of his sincerity.

I cannot pretend to have sufficient experience of him to judge myself of his real character, but I have never observed in him any fluctuation of opinion, with regard to what has already past, or what he thinks ought to be done. He speaks of the principal persons concerned in the Revolution without any appearance of rancour, and of the revolution itself with a degree of calmness and dispassion that one would scarcely expect. As to the Prince de Poix, he told me long since that he had so little resentment towards him, he should not be unwilling to employ him in various situations suitable to his rank, but in a confidential place, as Captain of his Guard, he could not in justice to himself consent to it. He owned that it would have been more politic to have concealed for a time his intention of discharging him, but his heart revolted at any kind of duplicity, and he hoped that the

frankness of his conduct in this instance would recommend him to every honest man, however it might be disapproved by others. Whether the dismission of the Prince was solely a measure of the King's or not, I am ignorant, but it is not only looked upon as disastrous by all whom I have spoken to on the subject, but declared to have been taken against their opinion.

In my letter of the 21st of September I recommended to your attention the Count D'Avarey as being a gentleman of the King's first confidence. This is certainly the case, and from his attachment and services he appears to deserve it. I have indeed every reason to believe that he enjoys the greatest share of his personal friendship. As the King however did not desire me to communicate with him on business, and as the Count himself did not come forward upon that footing, I could not well be the first to invite him to a political intercourse, as it would have given me the air of conducting my mission by intrigue, and might have occasioned a coldness in others, who seemed disposed to act towards me with frankness and cordiality. It may, however, be very useful to discover, if you should find an opening, the real sentiments of the Count D'Avarey with regard to the Baron de Flachslanden; the reason given to me for the Count D'Avarey's mission was that he might have an opportunity of conversing with Madame Royal when released before he reached Vienna, as the Emperor had refused the King her Uncle's request that she should join him there, but probably the Count has other Instructions besides.

Inclosed I send you the copy of a note which I have received from the Baron de Flachslanden, recommending the Abbé de Vilfort to me for a letter to you, which I have given him in consequence. He tells me that he left London the 22nd of last month and was expedited by My Lord Grenville to Verona with dispatches for the King, after the delivery of which, he was to proceed

with My Lord Grenville's letters to you. He did not bring me a single line.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and regard, Sir, your most obedient and most faithful humble Servant.

MACARTNEY.

P.S.—You will please to continue to direct to me to this place at Signor Alberto Albertini's.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.

(Draft.) Mulheim, 20th Oct.

My Lord,—Your Lordship's Dispatch No. 31 having followed me to Lausanne I received it only this morning. Unfortunately I shall not be able to read it till my return as it is written in the new cypher which at the moment of my leaving home it would hardly have been prudent for me to have brought with me so near the enemy. I have not yet received your No. 30.

(Cypher.) We yesterday received a very satisfactory message from Pichegru and a letter from his Adjutant-General. He repeats the strongest assurances of his good intentions and his full determination to attempt something whenever a favourable opportunity shall offer. He persists in saying that he is sure of his work, he only desires a little time that he may not be obliged to act the part of Dumouriez. He has openly remonstrated against the whole affair of the passage of the Rhine and will do any thing in his power to prevent succours being given to those who are on the other side. He has taken advantage of the affair of Heidelberg to complain to all his officers of the conduct of Merlin and to insinuate how disgraceful it is for them to be commanded by a deputy of the convention and from thence to inspire them with a disgust for the convention itself. He does not appear at all alarmed for

the consequences of the affair of Paris. He will take care to keep proper people at Besançon and Huninguen. He has received orders from Paris to displace the present commander of H. who was strongly attached to him, but he has put another there equally good. He has particularly desired that we would draw the attention of Bacher to some other point, and requests above all that we will keep his army constantly supplyd with copies of the King's manifest and counterrevolutionary Pamphlets of every kind, all which he says may be sent under cover to him by the common Post.

His army in general appears strongly attached to him. His staff is perfectly well disposed, but there are a number of officers who must be disposed of in some way or other before he can attempt to do any thing.

Upon the whole he seems perfectly aware that he has undertaken no easy task, and rather too mistrustful of his own ability to execute it.

I write to day to know if an insurrection be excited in the Frontiers of the Jura whether I can rely upon his being able to favour it indirectly, and particularly to send such regiments against the Insurgents as shall either join them or at least do them no mischief. If his answer be favourable, the thing shall be immediately undertaken under the orders of General Malseigne.

It grieves me to quit Mulheim under these circumstances, but my return is absolutely necessary, my whole correspondence is again deranged and some Bills drawn from Lyons have been protested. I think it possible that something may be done in the South this winter, but no operations should be undertaken the success of which must depend on the happening of such an event. A corps of about 300 men is formed in the Gevaudan under the command of a Mr. Mercier; a Garde du Corps—about 6000 men from the army of the Eastern Pyrences—have marched against it. They have taken up their quarters at Rhodez and Milhaud, hitherto without any effect as

Mr. Mercier is constantly removing from place to place, so that they know not where to follow him. It appears that the intended Insurrection at Orleans has broken out sooner than was intended. I have heard from Mr. Le Veneur since his arrival there—he was perfectly satisfyd with every thing that he had seen. I have sent him two most excellent Swiss officers and several serjeants who have formerly served in France, also four good officers of Artillery; his ammunition, Powder, &c. were purchased at the camp of Marly.

I learn from Bayard that several Generals of the army near Paris had been gained besides those named by the convention. He treated himself directly with one of them, who only desired a small sum to distribute among his soldiers. Unfortunately there was not a penny to be found.

Neither the Prince of Condé nor myself receive any more letters from thence. Mr. Le Maitre, the principal correspondent of the King, has been arrested (cypher ends).

Mr. Yriate is recalled. M. de Cammano has been at Basle to receive his papers. This gives rise to many conjectures. It is said that the French fleet of 5 sail of the line that sailed lately from Toulon is gone to Carthagena.

There are scarcely any Troops now left on the opposite bank of the Rhine between Basle and Strasburgh. General Pichegru has left Manheim, and is now somewhere near Germersheim: It is said that he blames very openly the conduct of Merlin de Thiouville, and that in general his army has shown much dissatisfaction at the conduct of that Deputy.

Prince de Condé to Mr. Wickham.

'à Mülheim: ce 6 9^{bre} 1795.

Je ne pers pas un moment, Monsieur, à vous confier *sous le plus grand secret*, que j'ai reçu cette nuit, l'ordre

cy-joint de m'entendre avec le Général Melas, pour passer le Rhin ; comme les préparatifs peuvent entraîner 4 ou 5 jours de délai, il est de la plus grande importance que rien ne transpire à cet égard ; il est instant cependant, que sans en dire positivement le motif, vous ne négligiez rien, pour faire éclater tout-à-l'heure le Lyonnois et la franche Comté, où le Général Wurmser vient me jetter *tout-de-suite* ; permettez-moi, à cette occasion, de vous faire un petit reproche, de ce que vous me laissez ignorer *entièrement*, tout ce qui se passe dans ces Provinces, ainsi que dans la Forêt et le Velay, où l'on assure qu'il y a une forte insurrection ; je crois qu'il est essentiel que je sois tenu au courant ; si ce n'est plus comme ordonnateur, ce qui est fort simple, au moins comme grandement intéressé. Vous sentez, Monsieur, que d'après l'événement que je vous annonce, et ce que je vous dirai tout-à-l'heure, il est de la plus absolue nécessité, que vous vouliez bien m'assurer que je ne manquerai pas d'argent, tant pour augmenter mon armée, des habitans et *troupes*, qui pourront se réunir à moy, que pour achat d'armes, dont je manque absolument, et pour les dépenses secrettes et imprévues ; il est aussi essentiel que je sache les fonds que vous me destinez, et le lieu où je pourrai les toucher, à mesure que j'en aurai besoin ; en tout, il seroit bien à désirer, que vous vinssiez faire un tour ici, quand vous aurez arrangé le mouvement des Provinces, chose qui m'est absolument nécessaire pour la cause du Roy ; le tems qu'il faut pour préparer l'éclat, le fera éclore précisément, au moment où il le faudra ; *mais il n'y a pas un instant à perdre, à l'ordonner* ; vous voudrez bien parler en mon nom, sur cet objet, si vous le jugez nécessaire ; je n'envoye point d'ordres directs, comptant sur vous comme sur moi-même ; mais sentez, je vous prie, combien ma petite armée seroit compromise, si la franche Comté ne se déclaroit pas sous 8 jours.

J'ai encore à vous confier une chose très-heureuse, et qui vraisemblablement, entre pour beaucoup dans la

détermination du projet ; M. de Wurmser m'a fait envoyer un Courier exprès par le Comte de Barbanson, pour me dire, qu'il étoit résolu à tenter de faire déclarer Pichegru et son armée pour le Roy, en lui proposant de me donner la main pour entrer en Haute Alsace, et m'introduire ensuite en franche Comté ; le Général paroissoit desirer mon intervention ; cette proposition, en me faisant grand plaisir, n'a pas laissé, je vous l'avoue, de m'embarrasser, d'après ce que vous savez, et ne voulant jamais, avoir l'air de contribuer et de consentir, à aucune apparence de démembrement, dont la proposition peut-être sousentendue, pourroit être faite à Pichegru ; voicy comme j'ai tâché de m'en tirer ; j'ai répondu, que j'étois assez heureux pour avoir prévenu les désirs de M. de Wurmser, en envoyant à Pichegru, et qu'il avoit toujours été dans mes intentions, de ne rien finir que de concert avec le Général autrichien ; (je n'ai point parlé de l'état où en sont les choses) que la démarche que se proposoit M. de Wurmser étoit très-conforme à mes désirs, qu'elle me faisoit d'autant plus de plaisir, que puisque le Général de S. M. I. vouloit bien admettre un Prince du sang de france, à y concourir, cela me prouvera de plus en plus *les vues généreuses et désintéressées* de ce souverain ; qu'en conséquence, je n'hésitois point à m'y livrer, et qu'ayant des raisons pour croire, que Pichegru écouteroit peut-être moins favorablement (même malgré ses revers) les étrangers *seuls*, que si je paroissois pour quelque chose, dans leur démarche, j'envoyois un billet à cachet volant, à remettre, à Pichegru, par l'homme qu'on me mandoit qui devoit m'être chargé, (je vous en envoye la copie.) J'oubliois de vous dire, que M. de Wurmser me faisoit dire, qu'il comptoit mander à Pichegru, *qu'il favoriseroit de tout son pouvoir*, sa jonction avec moi. Je me suis déterminé à l'envoy du billet, parceque j'ai craint, que Fauche n'engageât Pichegru, à repousser bien loin la proposition, ne doutant pas, qu'elle ne contrariât ma négociation, et qu'alors les Autrichiens, piqués de sa réponse, ne me permissent plus de profiter

du succès que pourroit avoir ma démarche personnelle. Je vous observe, que comme il est bien évident, que vous m'avez gardé le plus profond secret, j'ai craint de compromettre le Gouvernement Anglois, et vous deux personellement vis-à-vis de la Cour de Vienne, en avouant que je m'étois conduit avec votre participation et par vos conseils; je n'ai pas dit un mot des Anglois; je ne l'ai pas nié, mais je ne l'ai point dit; ce qui vous laisse toute liberté de dire et de faire à cet égard, tout ce que vous jugerez à propos, *en m'en donnant avis*; j'ai déjà mandé tout cela à M. Crafford; mandez-moi promtement, je vous prie, ce que vous allez faire, sur quoy je peux compter, et rendez justice, Monsieur, à tous les sentiments de considération, de véritable estime, et de sincère amitié, que j'espère, que vous me connoissez pour vous.

LOUIS JOSEPH DE BOURBON.

Vous avez été instruit des succès prodigieux des Armées Impériales par M. D'Egelmann; vous savez que nous n'avons plus personne à Basle, ce qui m'est fort incommode. Cy-joint un paquet de M. Crafford, qui arrive dans le moment par Estafette; il ne savoit rien encore, de l'ordre qu'on nous a envoyé.

Mr. Wickham to the Prince de Condé.

(Draft) Lausanne: 10 Nov. 1795.

Monseigneur,—La Lettre que votre Altesse Serenissime a bien voulu m'écrire en date du 6, m'a mis la Joie dans l'âme. Il est vrai qu'on ne nous donne que fort peu de tems pour combiner nos moyens, mais il faut profiter de celui que nous avons de manière à n'avoir rien à nous reprocher.

Voici ce que j'ai déjà fait et ce que je me propose de faire—

Le Chevalier qui est admirable pour sonner la trompette

est reparti ce matin pour Lyons, avec tous les fonds que Phillibert [Imbert Colomés] et lui ont demandé. Ils vont ranimer le commerce dans le Velay et la Forêt et faire marcher leur monde sur Lyon; dès que la Garnison en sera sortie pour les repousser, la ville se déclarera. J'ai fait chercher M. de Précy qui j'espère sous dix Jours sera rendu à Lyon et prêt à se mettre à la tête du rassemblement qui s'y formera. Tissot travaille dans ce moment la partie de St. Claude et Lons le Saulnier, qu'il conduira aussi sur Lyon. Dès que le tout sera réuni de manière à tenir tête contre les forces républicaines déjà dans le pays, et qu'ils auront eu le tems de ramasser quelques vivres, un gros corps restera dans le pays pour couvrir Lyon pendant que le reste marchera sous les ordres de M. de Preçy, avec Tissot pour commander en avant-garde, à la rencontre de votre Altesse. Mais on ne peut pas se dissimuler que le tems nécessaire pour se mettre en marche *avec sûreté* ne sera pas moins de trois semaines, à dater d'aujourd'hui.

En attendant, voici ce que je propose de faire de côté de F. Compté—Les Antonis ont parfaitement bien travaillé la ville de Besançon. Tous les vignerons et les ouvriers sont à leur disposition et Antoni le cadet s'est fait mettre dans la Garde Nationale avec le rang de major. Folney se tient prêt à entrer dans la ville au premier signal—tout le monde s'accorde sur ses talents militaires. Il est du reste de la choix de Malseigne. Je propose donc à votre Altesse de lui envoyer l'ordre de prendre le commandement provisoire de la ville. Vous n'aurez qu'à envoyer à l'Abbé de Chafoy, qui le lui fera passer par un Prêtre. L'ordre pourroit être en blanc, de manière que le Prêtre ne sçaura pas ce qu'elle contient, mais cet homme doit être instruit du secret pour faire paraître l'encre, qu'il doit communiquer à F. en lui remettant la lettre. Je lui ai déjà fait dire de rentrer en ville et de s'y tenir caché.

Mais comme la citadelle est *mal commandée* et que sans elle la ville ne peut rien faire, les Antonis demandent qu'on commence par faire éclater une insurrection dans les

montagnes pour que les Habitants puissent avoir un prétexte plausible pour demander à garder la citadelle, ce qui sera en quelque façon nécessité par la sortie des troupes de ligne contre les Insurgés.

A cet effet, J'ai déjà écrit à l'Abbé de Chafoy pour faire agir ses Prêtres, mais il faut faire plus. Depuis la malheureuse affaire de Pontier qui a entraîné le bannissement d'Antoni, nous n'avons plus de lieu de rassemblement. Il faut tâcher donc d'y suppléer autant que possible par les moyens de l'Abbé de Chafoy. Dès que Tinçeau me sera arrivé je le ferai partir pour tout arranger avec le digne ecclésiastique. Il me semble que Pontier devoit rentrer de son côté et se tenir caché dans la maison de quelque bonne dévote. Je vous avoue, Monseigneur, qu'on ne le mettra pas facilement sous.

Mais il y a bien d'autres moyens. Laissez faire les femmes et surtout les dévotes—on doit également faire entrer (ou se tenir sur la première portière) tels officiers et *sous-officiers* que Malseigne nous proposera. Si Fenouillot ne vous est plus nécessaire, je tiens *infiniment* à ce qu'il soit de la partie. Il faut absolument donner à Malseigne quelques Bas officiers et soldats éprouvés. Il y en a dans le Régiment du Dauphin, à ce que me dit Antoni, qui sont du Pays et bien connus à Malseigne—tout ce que j'ose demander est qu'ils soient du choix de Malseigne même ou de Pontier.

Il me semble que Malseigne et Pontier, dont je n'ai aucune nouvelle, doivent se concerter avant le départ du dernier, et qu'on devroit tâcher de faire sonner le tocsin partout et faire éclater une aussi grande étendue de Pays que possible dans le même instant. L'arrivée de Malseigne chez l'Abbé de Chafoy doit en être le signal—en même tems Antoni lui-même doit partir pour Besançon pour avertir ses frères &c. &c. &c. de ce qui doit arriver dans les montagnes et combiner toutes les mesures à prendre dans la ville. Il me semble que votre Altesse devroit faire partir Malseigne deux Jours avant celui qui

sera fixé pour le passage dès qu'il sera *décidé* définitivement, et en même tems lui donner l'ordre d'agir sur-le-champ.

Je propose de lui attacher Tinçeau et tels autres officiers que le Général choisira lui-même. J'envoie à Besançon (où, à ce que m'assurent les Antonis, on trouvera abondamment de tout) 500 Louis pour gagner et payer la populace. J'en enverrai ensuite autant à l'Abbé de Chafoy et j'en donnerai deux ou trois mille à Malseigne, ou plutôt à Tinçeau comme son Trésorier. Les demandes sont si considérables et les espaces si rares, que je ne sçais pas où trouver de l'argent. Pour les armes, il y en a très-sûrement dans le pays de quoi suffire pour le premier moment, et Antoni m'assure que l'Arsenal de Besançon en est abondamment pourvu et qu'on en fera passer tout de suite dans les campagnes dès qu'on sera maître de la Garnison. En même tems j'écris à un fort brave homme nommé (non *Mont*genet mais) *Mon*genet dans les montagnes qui dominent les plaines de côté de Beffort et Vesoul. Il travaille depuis longtems les mineurs et les exploiteurs de Bois. Cette partie est infiniment importante pour vos plans actuels. Je lui envoie aussi de l'argent. Les Montjoye (il me semble) pouvoient rendre des services de ce côté-là.

De Lyon on fera partir des Canons pour la côte d'Orléans, Nevers, pour toute la F. Compté, le Bourg, la Bresse, le Bourgogne et tout le midi. On tâchera de faire éclater autant de mouvement que possible à la fois pour distraire l'attention des agents de la Convention et de leur généraux des vrais points et pour les obliger à séparer leurs forces. Je crains que nous ne soyons bien en arrière avec toutes nos combinaisons, cependant comme vous ne pourrez pénétrer dans la F. Compté le jour même de votre passage, il est à espérer que nous aurons toujours le tems nécessaire, à moins que l'ennemi (ce qui est bien à craindre) ne profite du premier moment pour mettre nouvelle Garnison dans Besançon et pour en désarmer tous

les Habitants. Voici mon calcul. Nous sommes actuellement au dix. Le courier sera rendu chez vous le 13. Malseigne et tout son monde pourroient bien être rendus à leurs Postes respectifs après s'être concertés avec vous avant le 18 ou le 20 au plus tard—et le 19 ou le 20 on pourroit éclater. Je crois que tout sera préparé à Besançon pour ce jour-là—vous sentirez bien qu'on ne pourroit pas agir plus tôt, et je souhaite infiniment que le passage soit renvoyé jusqu'au 15 ou 16 pour le moins. S'il se fait plus tôt il faut se fier beaucoup à l'éclat qu'il produira et à la promptitude avec laquelle j'espère que vous serez mis à même de marcher en avant. Dans ce cas-là je crois que l'insurrection pourroit se faire d'elle-même.

Il faut que vous fassiez l'impossible pour faire venir tout votre monde. Que font Bussy, Hohenloe &c. &c. &c? Dites-moi, s'il vous plaît au vrai quel sera votre force effective. Une fois rendu dans la F. Compté vous en aurez assez je n'en doute pas, mais je suis inquiet sur les difficultés du premier moment.

Ma grande confiance est en Baptiste [Pichegru]. Du reste je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que nous n'avons pas négligé celui dont Tissot nous avoit parlé. Philibert [Lhbert Colomès] en a de grandes espérances.

Pour de l'argent J'ai l'honneur de vous rappeller que tout ce qui regarde votre armée, *&c. &c. &c.* est absolument du fait de Mr. Craufurd. Tel a été l'arrangement fait définitivement à Londres et (outre l'importance de la chose) ce n'est que la grande intimité et amitié qui règne entre Mr. Craufurd et moi qui m'a fait faire les avances pour la marche de Baptiste. Il est impossible que Monsr. Craufurd tarde un instant à revenir quand il sçaura *la résolution* prise. Je lui écris par ce courier pour le conjurer de partir sur l'instant même, quelles que soient les raisons qui le retiennent auprès du Maréchal Clairfait. Il vous a répété plusieurs fois les ordres qu'il avoit reçus en partant de Londres. Il me semble qu'ils sont clairs et précis et qu'ils doivent satisfaire pleinement tous vos souhaits et

dissiper toutes vos inquiétudes. C'est un Homme plein de courage, de zèle, de talent et de bonne foi. Ayez pleine confiance en lui. Il ne vous trompera jamais. J'irai cependant lui donner rendezvous dès qu'il sera arrivé ou à Mulheim ou en France, et vous pouvez compter que tout ira à votre gré.

Cependant, pour éviter toute possibilité d'un retard fâcheux, Je vous envoie des lettres de change pour 5000 livres sterling payables à Mr. Menau l'aîné, avec instante prière de ne les employer qu'en cas de besoin urgent—avant de les envoyer au Banquier pour payement il faut l'en avertir en lui remettant la lettre ci-jointe. Je vous prie de me faire passer une quittance pour Monsr. le Chevalier de Contye. Du reste ces 5000 livres ne doivent nullement entrer dans le compte de l'armée—ils doivent être surtout, avec l'approbation de Mr. le P. de Condé, à l'achat des armes. Il me semble qu'on doit prier les Autrichiens de vous en fournir autant que possible ; vous en aurez le plus grand besoin.

Je n'ose pas venir vous joindre avant le passage—un tel voyage pourroit bien donner lieu à des conjectures. Vous sçavez aussi que mes moutons de Lyon ne sont pas de l'espèce la plus traitable. Je n'ose pas les abandonner encore à eux-mêmes. Cette dernière expérience m'a coûté un peu trop cher.

Je ne peux pas trop vous remercier de la manière dont vous avez traité l'affaire de Baptiste [Pichegru] en ce qui regarde le Colonel Craufurd et moi, rien ne peut être plus sage, plus mesuré, plus noble et plus délicat. J'en aurai toujours une vraie reconnoissance. Je n'ose pas profiter de la permission que vous voulez bien me donner de vous offrir mes conseils pour ce que doit se dire à l'avenir, mais je serai toujours très-content de me conformer à ce qui sera jugé convenable entre vous et le Colonel Craufurd à cet égard.

Je n'ai pas besoin de vous avertir qu'il sera essentiellement nécessaire de faire répandre une quantité prodi-

gieuse de petits écrits, et surtout que le manifeste soit court, *mais très-court*, énergique, et en même tems plein de clémence, d'indulgence, et même d'oubli du passé.

On ne peut pas se dissimuler que le tout ne soit très-mal cousu excepté du côté de Lyon (car pour les ressources [?] du Père Joseph je n'y fais que peu d'attention). Il est donc essentiellement nécessaire que le premier coup se fasse avec rapidité et avec éclat. Prêchez donc cette doctrine à Monsr. de Melas, mais Prêchez-la-lui nuit et jour. J'ai vu avec un plaisir extrême qu'on vous assure que vous serez puissamment secondé. Je compte sur une tentative plus forte encore de côté de la basse Alsace.

Le plan ci-dessus donné est nécessairement subordonné en tout à l'approbation de son Altesse sérénissime Monsr. le Prince de Condé, auquel je vous prie de le présenter. Dans tout ce que j'écris dans l'intérieur je donne pour raison de la promptitude qu'on exige, qu'un mouvement décisif dans l'intérieur pourra bien faire agir les Autrichiens dans un moment de succès si inattendu de leur part.

J'ai fait presser *autant que possible* les Piédmontais et le Général De Vins. J'envoie à ce dernier les Journaux de Francfort qui sont bien faits pour le stimuler. La Saison est défavorable, mais j'espère qu'on nous donnera pour le moins *l'apparence* d'une diversion.

Je plains l'absence de Monseigneur le Duc de B. tous les Jours davantage.

J'avoue franchement mes torts en négligeant de vous écrire—comptez sur mon exactitude pour l'avenir.

Lord Macartney to Mr. Wickham.

Verona: November 13, 1795.

Sir,—I had the honor of writing to you on the 15th of last month by the Abbé de Vilfort, and I now take the opportunity of Mr. de Preçy, to mention to you that since that time, I think, the King of France has been gradually relaxing in some points, and is now nearly brought to the

disposition that was to be wished. I have not failed to reiterate to him at every favorable moment those sentiments of conciliation, which are so necessary to his interests, and I believe he has taken some pains of late to convince people, that he sincerely entertains them. I am this moment come from him, and after a pretty long conversation on the present state of his affairs, he told me that the Powers, and instructions which he meant to give to the Count de Preçy, would be such, as he believed both you, and I would approve.

Mr. de Preçy, and the Marquis de Digoine talked over with me the enterprize in which they are to engage, and they appear to me very well qualified to conduct it.

By yesterday's post we learn that the Duc de Bourbon is returned from the Isle Dieu, where he left Monsieur on the 17th October. If the Junction with Charette was thought impracticable, His Royal Highness proposed to repair to Jersey or Guernsey, till a propitious moment should offer.

I have the honor to be with great truth and regard, Sir, your most obedient, and most humble Servant,

MACARTNEY.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.

(Draft.) Lausanne: 14th Nov. 1795.

My Lord;—I have only the time to inform your Lordship that every thing on this side the country remains exactly in the same situation as when I wrote last.

I intreat your Lordship to be my mediator if I should appear to neglect my correspondance in this critical moment.

(Cypher.) I am constantly and actively employed, and as I make it a duty, which past experience renders necessary, to trust to no one but myself for the smallest matters of detail, I really have not an instant to myself.

I know I can at all times rely with the most entire confidence on your Lordship's indulgence; but indeed, my Lord, you can have no idea of the constant stretch of attention that the work I have now undertaken requires. I really dare not sit down to write a detailed account of what is going on. To furnish the whole of this frontier from Lyons to Porentruy with *gold*, arms, powder, shoes, &c., and to carry on a most extensive correspondance without committing myself in this country or suffering my agents to be detected in the other, and to put the whole in motion with so very short a notice, is really more than one person can well go through.

Besides, your Lordship will easily judge from my correspondance I am the only person who has really obtained any confidence from the people of Lyons, and who at the same time can make himself obeyed by them, which is no easy task to go through with. All that I can now say is that every thing is preparing to assist the Prince effectually, that if he can penetrate into F. Compté immediately, I have not a doubt but that he would succeed in his great object. I intreat your Lordship to send us the D. of B. immediately.

Mr. Preçy will be here in a few days.

Mr. Wickham to Sir Morton Eden.

(Draft.) Lausanne: 17th Nov. 1795.

Sir,—The Prince of Condé has informed me that he is to cross the Rhine supported by a corps of about 12,000 Austrians, and to endeavour immediately to penetrate into Franche Compté.

Though it is much to be lamented that I could not have been informed of this Intention sooner for reasons that I shall presently mention to you, yet I know that it was impossible, and I still flatter myself that the happiest consequence may be expected from this enterprize, provided

it be pushed forward with vigour and supported *throughout* by a powerful Austrian Force.

In all my correspondence both with His Majesty's Ministers and yourself, whenever I have spoken of the favourable disposition of the Inhabitants of the Southern Provinces, my reports have always been accompanied with the most positive assurances that it would be impossible in the present situation of Things to give any effect to that disposition unless a Force were sent to the assistance of the Royalists capable of giving them *in the first moment* an effective protection.

I have never failed at the same time to say very openly that the jealousy universally entertained of the designs of the House of Austria would be another almost unsurmountable obstacle, unless some more effective means were taken to remove or at least to allay it than had been hitherto attempted. After having obtained much fuller information than I had hitherto possessed, and after having given the most attentive consideration to the whole Subject, I continue still in the same opinion. If therefore I am not mistaken, a due Consideration of those two points as connected with the Measures proposed to be adopted will enable me to form some probable conjecture of the Hopes that we ought to entertain of their success.

With respect to the first of these objects I am very fearful lest the Force intended for the expedition should not be found sufficient, unless the Country be really destitute of Troops for its defence or unless 10 or 12,000 Austrians at least march forward with the Prince and assist him in forcing his Passage into Franche Compté, which measure would necessarily require another Corps stationed on the Rhine to protect the passage and secure the communications.

If it be intended that the force above mentioned should remain on the Rhine whilst the Prince alone attempt the passage into Franche Compté, it can never be expected

that His Serene Highness will be able to overpower any *effective opposition.*

The augmentation of his little Army has been so effectually impeded and retarded that I should presume 1,000 Men would be the utmost that he would be able to muster.

Besides, his force consisting almost entirely in light Troops and Cavalry, he will be unable to resist with effect the attack of regular Battalions.

I cannot therefore too strongly recommend to you the necessity of pressing this point upon the Austrian Government, if it be not yet too late, as that upon which the whole success must necessarily turn and which in all human probability will decide the fate of the War.

You will observe that circumstances have so entirely changed that I no longer ask what I considered so essentially necessary in the Month of August, viz. that the Austrians should themselves advance so as to cover Franche Compté. I am now firmly persuaded that it will be sufficient if they enable the Prince to force the defiles of the Mountains, and that his own Army, small as it is, will be strong enough to maintain itself there.

You will please also to observe that I am far from disapproving the attempt imperfect as it must be when made on the other plan, because even in that case I think there are still reasonable Hopes of Success. Had it been possible to have given more time to combine the Prince's March with the Movement that could have been excited in the Interior, I think it could not well have failed, because those movements would have been directed immediately upon the rear of the Line of defence that the Republicans must necessarily have adopted, and have rendered it so extremely insecure that they must have been forced to abandon it and leave the Passage open.

At all events, the same measure will certainly be attempted, but it is to be feared, either that it must be done prematurely and without sufficient preparation, or that

it must be delayed till the enemy shall have had Time to have received considerable reinforcements and have strengthened himself in the several advantageous positions that the Mountains of F. Compté and the Pörentrui afford in such Numbers, and till both Friends and Enemies shall have learnt the weakness of the Prince's force before any effective blow shall have been struck; the probable consequences of which discovery in all their extent it would be useless for me to attempt to point out to you.

In the mean time, however, every Thing has been done that the shortness of the Time would permit to assist and support the operation in whatever way it be attempted. The Town of Lyons on the first news of the Prince's having crossed the Rhine will, I believe, most undoubtedly declare itself at all risks. I have the positive assurances of M. Imbert Colomès to that effect, whose name and reputation ought surely to be known to M. Thugut. I know they are to M. Pelin. A partial Insurrection will at the same time take place in the Mountainous part of Franche Compté; but I am less sanguine in my Hopes on that side, the reports of the Royalists as to the Opinion and Energy of the Inhabitants of that Province having been always very much exaggerated.

I have sent for M. de Preçy, who will probably be at Lyons on the 24th or 25th, about which day every Thing will be ready prepared for taking up Arms; and if the Inhabitants find themselves sufficiently strong to oppose the Republican Troops in their Neighbourhood, which I doubt, a body will be sent forward immediately into the Jura to assist the Inhabitants of that Department and to endeavour to effect a Junction with the Prince.

I repeat to you again that if His Serene Highness be able to force his way into Franche Compté either by the Porentrui or by Besançon, it seems to me almost impossible that the measure should fail of entire success, because, besides the prodigious effect that his appearance will necessarily occasion in the Country and the encourage-

ment it will give to all his Partisans, He will really be able to give the Inhabitants *that sort* of protection which I have so constantly represented as the one essential point, and which may now be afforded by a much less effective force than would have been sufficient for that purpose in the course of the Summer, *the astonishing success* of the Austrian Armies having entirely changed the face of Things in this quarter—I am only fearful lest, from the natural Strength of the defiles through which he will have to pass, he should be unable to penetrate without an Austrian Corps being given him to strengthen his Army. If that cannot be done, the event must necessarily be doubtful and must almost wholly depend on the force that the Republicans will be able to collect in the first moment. The Lyonnese and their neighbours, as I have said before, will certainly attempt the Junction, but I am seriously apprehensive that they will not be strong enough to succeed in such an enterprize. It is on this account that I so much lament that more time could not have been given to prepare matters in the Interior. You will recollect that the Inhabitants are almost every where disarmed, and the contracts that had been made for a supply of Arms and powder in the course of the summer were all suspended after the resolution of the Court of Vienna to remain on the defensive on the Upper Rhine had been communicated to Colonel Craufurd, and there is now no time to renew them. Wherever, therefore, the Republicans enter in force, they must necessarily have the superiority. Our only hope, in case the Austrians should not enable the Prince to penetrate into F. Compté immediately, must be that they will find such full employment for the enemy's Troops, that it will be not only impossible for them to make any considerable detachments, but that they will also be obliged to recall many of those already in the Interior, in which case the Inhabitants would have time to arm and form themselves, as I am certain that they will meet with no opposition from any of their own municipalities or National

Guards unless the dread of military execution should again compel them to act against their fellow Citizens.

In this view of the Business I need not say to you how fatal the Inaction of the Piedmontese and Austrian Armies in the South may prove to the whole enterprize, nor of what infinite importance it is, that they should receive immediate and positive orders at least to Assume the appearance of acting offensively. One Post carried on the Top of the Alps would alarm the entire line of the enemy and oblige them to put the whole of it in motion immediately.

However formidable their entrenchments may be in the Mountains, they cannot be superior to those which M. de Clairfait has forced, and in a line of such an extent there must certainly be some weak points. I am aware of all the difficulties that the Season presents, but it must be remembered that the Republicans carried some of the most important posts they now possess in the very depth of Winter. Whether however this be practicable or no, *a certain appearance* of offensive operations may at least be assumed that cannot fail to have a powerful effect upon the enemy at the moment that all his attention will be directed to a most alarming insurrection in the Interior, and which on the first moment he will naturally conceive to have been undertaken in concert with the offensive operations from without.

I have left nothing undone that depended on me to forward this great point. I have pressed it again in the strongest manner upon Mr. Trevor and Mr. Drake, who indeed are already most entirely persuaded of its infinite importance, and have left nothing undone any more than yourself in the whole course of this summer that might tend to accomplish this most desirable object. I have forwarded to the latter by express every Thing that I could collect relating to the late brilliant successes on the Rhine that might tend to stimulate General de Vins to action; and from the Ambition of that General and his

Jealousy of the military reputation of Marshal Clairfait, I have the most earnest hope, if he met with encouragement from home, that he may yet be induced to undertake some enterprize of Importance. If that cannot be done, I almost doubt whether, as we are probably to have another Campaign, it would not have been wiser to have suspended this enterprize till the Spring, when a powerful invasion might have been made on the side of the Alps, as I tremble for the consequences both for the present moment and the future, if the Royalists in the South should be unable to resist the Armed force that will be employed against them.

As to the other point which I have alluded to above, I mean the necessity of allaying the Jealousies that are entertained of the designs of the House of Austria upon Alsace, I can add little to what I have said on a former occasion. I fear, I must already have tired you on the subject, and nothing but the most intimate persuasion of its infinite importance could induce me again to recur to it. I must however repeat that I consider it as the corner stone of the whole operation, and that every well informed person that I have seen, who has had any knowledge of the real State of the Interior, whether a Frenchman or a Foreigner, a Friend or an enemy, has been uniformly of the same opinion.

If the Court of Vienna assume the Language and Conduct of a fair and generous friend and Ally of the Monarchy and the well disposed part of the French Nation, I am most intimately persuaded that the happiest consequences might very fairly be expected to follow, both to the common Cause and to her Interests in particular.

The Prince of Condé has repeatedly said to me, what I believe to be correctly true, that the Court of Vienna might gain much more by negotiation hereafter, than by the Sword now.

The last Time that I saw him he added nearly these words—'If she deal fairly with us there is not a Frenchman

who will not be ready to acknowledge his obligations and to agree to any reasonable *sacrifice* by way of Indemnity, but by making me play a part unworthy of my Country, my name and family and my own personal reputation, she will exasperate all the well disposed people and render the War so entirely national that whatever be the form of Government adopted hereafter, she can hope for nothing but what she can gain by the point of the Sword, against an enemy determined to contest every inch of Ground to the very last extremity.'

I allow that the Language and Conduct of the Emigrants are often such as to put the most determined patience to too severe a trial. No one has had a more thorough experience of it than myself, and therefore, I may be allowed to speak without prejudice in every Thing that I say in their favour.

I admit that in many points they are and probably will remain incorrigible—but really some allowances ought to be made them, in consideration of the wretched State of existence in which they have passed these last five years, the mortifying disappointments they have so often experienced, and the *insulting* and humiliating manner in which they have in general been treated by almost every Court and people excepting our own—and we ought to consider them with a greater degree of Charity as Persons really at this moment *not themselves*, and wholly incapable of moderating their own Language and Conduct; but even, if we were to set aside for the moment *all reasons* of Honor and delicacy, and consider the thing solely as a question of political calculation, my opinion would be still the same, as I cannot help considering them at this moment, in the present uncertain state of Things in France, and particularly whilst Charette and the Royalists in the west continue to exist, as a powerful Instrument in our hands, that it is our Interest to gain, and whom by care and good management we may employ most usefully to our own advantage. In the same point of view, I

venture to submit to your better Judgement, supposing Alsace to be the real object of the Court of Vienna, whether *the actual possession* of all its strong Towns by the Austrian Troops, with a claim of an Indemnity for the expences of the War in reserve, would not be as real a security for the future possession of that Province, as any that it could acquire from mere conquest, and whether the active and cordial co-operation of the well disposed Inhabitants of the neighbouring Departments would not infinitely facilitate its subjection. It seems to me that the Tide of the House of Austria is now at the highest, and that its fortune may be determined for ever by the conduct it shall adopt in the present most interesting moment. I should feel far less anxious about her decision if I were not myself intimately persuaded that the Interests of our own Government as well as those of the rest of Europe were most deeply implicated in the event.

'The late brilliant and astonishing successes of their Armies are of a nature to encourage our most sanguine hopes. I own, however, that I am fearful, lest those of the Court of Vienna should be raised too high, and that ideas of Conquest should render their Ministers, *blind* to their *true* Interests and to the most speedy and efficacious means of obtaining and securing them.

I have thought it right to bring all those matters to your recollection, that the Court of Vienna may not say hereafter, 'In case the expedition should fail, either *from want of a sufficient force*, or from their treating the invaded Territory as a conquered country, that they have been deceived by the exaggerated reports of the Royalists.' This was the conduct they adopted after their last Invasion in Alsace, and nothing can be more unjust than the reproaches they have made to the Royalists on the unfortunate issue of that Campaign.

In answer to the doubts entertained by the Court of Vienna as to the real disposition of the Inhabitants of the

Southern Provinces if this sudden change (?) in the state of Affairs had not taken place, it was my intention to have requested you to have proposed to Mr. Thugut to send me an experienced officer of penetration and discernment, furnished with proper passports as Inhabitant of a Country not at War with France, who would have had the courage to have visited these provinces throughout their whole Extent. No doubt such a one might have been found—I would have given him every facility for his entry and for his Journey from Geneva to Lyons, Marseilles and Toulouse with the most perfect safety. Such a measure, if the choice had been well made, would, I am sure, have perfectly satisfied the Austrian Ministry of the reliance that might fairly be placed on the disposition of the Inhabitants of the Provinces South of Lyons, Dauphiné alone excepted, provided that Court were determined to act fairly with them. There are, however, two leading facts to which it might be useful to call their attention, so very notorious as to be known to all France—the first, the scenes that have passed at Lyons and the necessity under which the Convention has been, of entirely disarming the Town—the second, that not a single Priest or Emigrant among the Thousands who have entered since the Month of March last, have been either punished or brought before a Tribunal. Numbers having been denounced and arrested and as constantly released by the municipal officers themselves of their respective Districts. Third—the public and unanimous nomination of Mr. Maddier as a Deputy to the new Legislature, though one of the most firm and determined Royalists of the Constituent Assembly who, though of the Tiers Etat, uniformly voted and spoke in favor of the old Government from the first to the last.

I may add *to you* that this same Gentleman was known by the greater part of his Electors to have been actually nominated by a coalition of 4 neighbouring Departments, viz. La Garde—Vaucluse—La Drome et L'Ardêche, not only to correspond with M. Imbert and the Royalists of

Lyons and with my agent, but to enter with the former into active Measures for the reestablishment *not of a constitutional Royalty* but of their old Government.

M. Duplantier, who has begun to speak in the new Assembly with several others of less note, are nearly in same situation.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.

(Draft. Private.) 18th Nov.

I am obliged to recur again to your Lordship's Goodness and to entreat that your Lordship will pay such Bills as you shall receive on known houses, without my specifying the sums, provided the whole do not exceed the estimate contained in my letter of the——. Far from being able to send off Mr. D'Artez, I find the Post-day come round again without my having had a single moment to myself, and many things of importance yet undone.

(Cypher.) I entreat your Lordship to rely with the most entire confidence on my exertions. If it be possible at all, a powerful diversion will take place on this side within a month.

Lyons will not be ready in less than three weeks; the northern parts of the Jura perhaps about the same time. The Southern are ready now, but I am obliged to delay the explosion from the fear of committing Lyons and the North too soon. If it be not prematurely discovered, this last business will be effective. It will be absolutely necessary to destroy the new Bridge below Geneva, the road from Gex to St. Claud which is built upon Piles, and the Fort de l'Ecluse. This must all be done the same night and from this country. The operation therefore is not easy, but I think it will succeed.

I have written to the Prince of Condé to request that he will not push forward till he shall receive the signal from hence unless he find the Passes of Porentruy entirely without defence. He is not satisfied with the delay, but Prudence requires it. Pichegru has left only

4000 now in all F. Comté. He could not with decency leave less. We have nothing therefore to fear but from the Southern armies. I have left nothing undone that would tend to stimulate Gen. Devins. Kellerman has returned rather an evasive answer. The chief contractor and two other Generals are entirely gained, and Kellerman's Adjutant, General Collinet, is in our pay. Maddier, one of the new deputies, was our principal correspondent in the South, and known to be so to two-thirds of his electors. If your Lordship should learn by the Paris papers that Fort St. André sur Salins is surprized, you may consider it as a decided proof that the affair in the Jura has succeeded to our utmost wishes.

Orleans is disarmed. I have a letter from Stofflet to the King of the 27th of October. He is without fear as to himself, his difficulties with Charette seem irreconcileable. It is difficult to imagine the life I have passed the last six weeks in arranging those which subsisted on this side. I find now by late experience that nothing but a decided tone of authority has any effect upon them. I entreat your Lordship to send the Duke of B. as soon as possible. No men can be raised till the affair of the Duke's Regiment is finally settled.

Note of Specie sent to William Wickham, Esq., by Hon. John Trevor, Nov. 19th, 1795, by the hands of Mr. de Preçy, and on account of His Majesty's Service.

Borderaux du 15me Novembre 1795.

Louis 100 à 27·12·6 de Piémont .	£ 2762—10—
Louis 411 à 27·15 do.	£11405— 5—
Louis 78 à 28 do.	£ 2184— 0—
Louis 350 ℔ M. Negri à 27·15 . .	£ 9712—10—
. . . 23½ quadruples d'Espagne à 94 do.	£ 2162— 0—
19 demi double de Portugal à 52	£ 988— 0—
	£29214— 5—

4 paquet à Louis 100 .	400
7 ditto à Louis 50 . .	350
un ditto à — 63 . .	63
un ditto à 63 double Louis	126
	939

un paquet de . . 23½ quadrouples d'Espagne
un ditto de . . . 19 demi-double de Portugal.

JOHN TREVOR.

Mr. Drake to Mr. Wickham.*

Genoa: November the 22nd, 1795.

Dear Sir,—Mr. Trevor has duly forwarded to me Your Letter to him of the 17th November as well as the Copy of Your Dispatch of the same Date to Sir Morton Eden. I am very much obliged to You for the Communication of the latter, and I very sincerely hope that the Court of Vienna will listen to the very sound advice with which it is replete.—I know not if any sudden change may have taken place in the Sentiments of that Cabinet, but I have the strongest Grounds for believing that only a few Weeks since, the Restoration of Louis XVIII. to his Throne did not make any part of the System of the House of Austria: and that, provided any sort of monarchy was established, it imported little to the Interests of that House upon whose Head the Crown was placed.

I send this by Mr. Bazille, who arrived here a few days ago in company with Mr. Loys, formerly Maire of Arles, both of whom have been employed by me in Provence since the month of August last. The object of their

* Francis Drake filled several diplomatic posts in Italy and Germany. An account of the transactions which obliged Mr. Drake to quit Munich in 1804 will be found in the Annual Register for that year, pages 162, 163, 622, 630, and 639 to 641. It is sufficient here to remark that though Mr. Drake may have been wanting in discernment in the agents he employed, yet that affair left no stain whatever upon his character. Mr. Drake was Recorder of Wells, and died in 1821.

Journey hither was to lay before me a *Tableau* of the Coalition which has been formed in the neighbourhood of Tarascon, together with an *arrêté* of the Leaders of it, both of which Mr. Bazille will communicate to You, and will give You any Information on the Subject, which You may require. You will see by the Tableau that in the small space which this Coalition comprizes, being only Three Districts of la Gard, there are nearly Ten Thousand men ready to take up Arms whenever the Signal may be given to them. I have not received of late any Accounts of the Progress which has been made by our Agents in other Parts of the Country, but I can venture to say that we shall have from Sixteen to Twenty Thousand Peasants, including the above 10,000, under Arms in the Country which lies between the Durance and the Sea. You will observe that the Insurgents will have occasion for 5,000 Stand of Arms at least, and that they are totally destitute of Ammunition and Provisions. I inclose a list (No. 1) of the Articles which they stand in need of, all of which, except the Flour and the Money, will be supplied from the Arsenal of Turin, and I have already taken the necessary measures for their being embarked at Vado, and landed at la Tour de Bouc. The Flour may be sent from hence, by neutral Ships, up the Rhône to Arles. Part of the military Stores are I understand already sent or upon the point of being sent from Turin, and the Flour is already ordered; but neither the one or the other will be sent off till I hear from You that the Insurrection at Lyons is finally determined on.—You are better informed than I can be, of the Propriety of accelerating or retarding the Explosion in question. The Districts with which I correspond must rather be considered as an accessory than as a Principal, and must consequently follow and not give the Example. Was I to look to that District abstractedly, there can be no doubt but it would be preferable to defer the Explosion till the Month of March, as our Coalition will then have acquired a greater Degree of Consistency,

and as the Republican Armies would be then occupied on the Frontiers, whereas during the Winter the Republick will be enabled to draw Troops from the Frontiers of the Two Departments of les Hautes and Basses Alpes, and to employ them in the Interior. I mention this circumstance merely as affecting our friends in the South: You will weigh it in your mind, and if you think, from a Review of all the Circumstances, that the Explosion should take place immediately, you will be so good as to send me immediate notice, and You may depend upon being seconded to the utmost of my power. I only beg leave to observe that it would be better to reserve our Strength till the next Spring, unless there should be the fairest Prospect of Success in the present moment. I beg to repeat to You that nothing will be done in the South till I receive the Signal from You, and I have strictly enjoined all our Agents to take no Step whatever which might lead to a Discovery of their Designs till they receive further Directions from me.—I have sent Mr. Bazille to Lausanne to wait your Commands, and he will proceed to Tarascon with the utmost Expedition in order to set every thing in motion in that quarter as soon as he receives your Directions for that purpose. Mr. Loys his Companion is returned to Marseilles by Sea. In compliance with the 5th Article of the abovementioned *Arrêté*, I have furnished Mr. Bazille with a sealed private Signal to be used with His Majesty's Ships, a Copy of which I shall deliver to Capt. Nelson, who has undertaken to convoy the Military Stores to the Port of Bouc. With respect to the 6th Article, I am sorry to say that I know of no Person proper to direct the Military Operations of the Insurgents. I have therefore instructed Mr. Loys to advise them to confine themselves for the present to acting in small Parties of 6 or 800 men untill some military Chief can be found. Mr. Tinseau, who is now with You I believe, would be very proper for this Service, and if he could be prevailed

upon to undertake the Mission, I am persuaded he would fullfill the Duties of it with Zeal and Ability.

I can say nothing positive as to the Town of Marseilles. The Inhabitants are in general bad, but I have notwithstanding great Hopes that the Example of Lyons may give Energy to the well disposed part of them.

I have particularly recommended to Messrs Bazille and Loys to make the Powder Magazine of St. Chamas the first object of their attention, and I have advised them to destroy it in case they should not be strong enough to keep possession of it. I have given them the same advice with respect to the Tour de Bouc, which is by far the most important Part of our Plan, as it is by that Point alone, that we can hope to throw in any Succours.

Upon the Article of Succours, I must beg leave to observe to You, that I am as yet without any Authorization whatever from His Majesty's Minister on this Head. Those which are mentioned in the inclosed will be but barely necessary for the Coalition in question, independently of the Demands which I may hereafter receive from other quarters.—The Expence to be incurred will I foresee be very great, for the Article of Flour alone will amount to upwards of 30,000 Pounds Sterling. I have written to Mr. Trevor to state to him my Embarrassments on this Point, and he in answer has transmitted me an Extract of a Dispatch from my Lord Grenville to him, in which His Lordship directs him to concert measures with You as to the object of Expence. I therefore must consider myself as acting under My Lord Grenville's Instructions to You, and every expence which may be incurred will be incurred in virtue of those Instructions. The plan which I have traced for myself is to have all these Succours prepared, and ready to be sent off upon the first Intimation from You, and the Determination as to their being actually sent off must necessarily rest with You. If the Insurrection should actually take place, the Money will be well employed. If it should not take place, the Expence of the

Transport from Turin to the Sea-Coast will be the only Expence incurred.—I have just sent Three Hundred Louis d'ors to Marseilles to be distributed amongst the Chiefs of the Insurgents, in order to enable them to promote Desertion amongst the Republican Troops, and to purchase the Arms of the Deserters.

I have the Honor to be with great Regard and Esteem, Dear Sir, your most obedient and faithful Humble Servant,

FRANCIS DRAKE.

WILLAM WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

Enclosure in Mr. Drake's Letter.

Note of the Provisions wanted by the Insurgents.

5000 Fusils avec Bayonnettes.
3000 Pistolets.
10,000 Poignards pour la Défense personnelle au lieu de Sabres.
3,000,000 Cartouches de fusil à balle.
300,000 Cartouches de pistolet à balle.
20,000 quintaux de farine.
500 Louis en or pour mettre les Chefs en état d'engager les soldats à quitter leurs Drapeaux en leur achetant leurs fusils; ainsi que pour subvenir à plusieurs Besoins sans être forcés de lever des Contributions dans le Pays.

Lord Macartney to Mr. Wickham.

Verona: Monday, November 23, 1795.
(Received December 3rd.)

Dear Sir,—Last night at 7 o'Clock P.M. M. de la Chassaigne arrived here, and delivered me your packets. I immediately carried him to the King who gave him a very gracious reception, and I have his Majesty's directions to inform you, that, although on account of the numerous applications for distinction and promotion, he had made a sort of rule to delay conferring them for some time, yet on the present occasion he should deviate from it, and as a mark of his particular esteem for you, and in consideration of the merits of those Gentlemen

recommended by you, he should grant the Croix de St. Louis, and the rank of Major to Mr. de Chassaigne, and also the rank of Colonel to Mr. Tessonet. The proper expeditions for the purpose will be sent under cover to Mr. de Preçy. The ostensible answer to Mr. Imbert will be short, and a letter, such as you propose, will be addressed to the Inhabitants of Lyons. The King was much pleased with the letter from Stofflet, and his Coadjutor, and will write to him without delay. His Majesty is, and has been ever since I arrived here, extremely desirous to quit Verona. He wished much to follow his Brother to the Vendée, if it had been agreeable to the Court of London, but at any rate he thought it advisable to get nearer to the Prince of Condé's Army, and for that purpose, as you probably know, he asked an Asylum first at Pfortzheim in the Margrave of Baden's territories, and secondly, on that being refused, he asked one at Rottenburgh, which the Emperor equally declined; So that his residence here has been absolutely, for want of any place to put his head in, to the northward of the Alps. He is now going to make another attempt to obtain the concurrence of the Court of Vienna for his removal, and I shall write, as I did before on a similar occasion, to Sir Morton Eden, to request him to second with all his credit and influence the King's desire on the present occasion, which, on account of the new prospect of things which is now opening to us, is very different from the former. The King, however, who has no very favorable opinion of the Court of Vienna, is apprehensive that even in case of her consent, an unpleasant circumstance may arise to himself, which is, that if he enters France with the Austrians, they might repeat the scene of 1793, and take possession of Alsace, in the name of the Emperor; and yet he at present sees no other way of getting into France, but by their means, for, though the King of Sardinia would probably give no sort of obstacle to his penetrating by way of Savoy, as you propose, which

would be the shortest, yet all those about him here, who pretend to know best, consider the measure as highly ineligible, and not to be *now* thought of.

The Count D'Avaray set out yesterday morning for Inspruck, in order to meet Madame Royale and (if permitted to speak to her) to compliment her on the part of her Uncle. She was expected to arrive there on the 25th instant in her way to *Vienna*, for no instances of the King could induce the Emperor to allow him to have the disposal of her. I delivered to the King your letter to the Count D'Avaray, which he immediately opened, and read, and told me that he was happy to find that you and his friend D'Avaray were upon so agreeable a footing together. D'Avaray indeed had upon his return here expressed himself in the strongest terms of the kind reception, which you gave him, for which, as I took the liberty of recommending him to you, I return you my best thanks. We are now upon the most confidential terms, and he has fully opened himself to me upon all the points of business that I wished. He certainly was vested with all the powers of regulation, and decision which you mention.

Mr. de Chassaigne only waits for my letter, I therefore conclude it, and beg you to be assured of the true esteem, with which I have the honor to be, Dear Sir, Your most obedient, and most faithful humble Servant,

MACARTNEY.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c.

P.S.—The late insult upon the King will only serve to give strength to Government by increasing the zeal of all good Subjects. In my newspaper, there is the list of the Minority, and I don't observe the addition of any one respectable member to it since the last Session of Parliament.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.

(Draft. Private.)
(Cypher.) Lausanne; 25 Nov. 1795.

My Lord,—As Mr. D'Artez was getting into his Post Chaise last night, the arrival of Colonel Craufurd obliged me again to suspend his departure, which I did the more readily as Mr. de Preçy arrived at Vevay last night, and a serious consultation with him is become absolutely necessary on account of a most unfortunate event that has happened on the Frontier.

Mr. de Besignan, of whose imprudencies I have so often complained and whose return to Lyons I had contrived to delay under different pretexts for these last 2 months, has been arrested on the Frontier with all his papers, in which allmost every well disposed person in the Interior, as well as all manner of persons without are directly committed, Mr. Imbert and all his friends here escaped, and every thing is in confusion at Lyons.

I know that he had amongst his papers letters from the principal Administrator of the Department, District and different Municipalities of the upper Loire, from the Prince of Condé, the King, &c. &c. &c. He has none from me, but I fear that among his own memoranda there may be found many papers in which my name will be mentioned.

I find that the Colonel has communicated to your Lordship his fears that the intended expedition of the Prince of Condé will either not take place at all or be executed in such a manner as to make it really desirable that he should remain where he is.

I sincerely hope that no other evil may arise from this whole affair than the loss of the money expended.

I am fortunate beyond measure in obtaining the advantage of a conference with Colonel Craufurd at this difficult moment, and am particularly happy to find that

we see the thing in the same light throughout and we have not a difference of opinion on any the slightest point.

It will be impossible to take any resolution upon the subject of Col. Craufurd's last dispatch until we shall have had some further conversation together.

Prince de Condé to Mr. Wickham.

A Mulheim, ce 28 9bre 1795.

Dans le désespoir que me cause, Monsieur, l'ordre* cy-joint que je reçois dans le moment, il ne me reste en vérité que la force de vous dire, que tout est changé, et perdu pour cette année-cy; quelle politique, grand Dieu! n'en perdez pas moins, Monsieur, vos glorieux travaux; quoique le Ciel me refuse l'extrême bonheur d'y participer, mes vœux les plus ardents, n'en seront pas moins pour les succès, de tous ces braves françois, qui vont tout risquer pour leur Roy; sauvez la france, Monsieur, et immortalisez l'Angleterre; c'est une gloire qui vous est réservée; pour nous, nous allons végéter, et languir dans l'attente des événements; puisse le Ciel nous ramener bientôt aux pieds d'un Trône que nous étions appellés à défendre, et qu'il ne nous est plus permis d'aborder un jour, qu'en sujets constamment fidèles; cette funeste nouvelle me donnant beaucoup d'affaires, trouvez bon, que je ne vous en dise pas davantage, et que je me borne à vous renouveller les assurances de ma profonde estime, et de ma tendre et confiante amitié pour vous.

LOUIS-JOSEPH DE BOURBON.

Comme les préparatifs continuent toujours, je crois que Melas va passer, d'abord que je serai parti; cependant, cela n'est rien moins que sûr.

Je joins ici, ma réponse au Général Wurmser.

* An order from General Wurmser to the Prince de Condé to march his corps to Wisloch, a town of Baden eight miles from Heidelberg, and there to await further orders.

En cas que Lyon se déclare *en force*, mon petit-fils, plus heureux que moi, sera aux ordres des Royalistes, si on le croit utile à la chose.

*Lord Macartney to Mr. Wickham.**

Verona: December 5th, 1795.

Dear Sir,—On Sunday last Mr. Nightingale delivered to me your letter of the 23rd ultimo, inclosing one for Count D'Avaray. He is not yet returned from Inspruck, nor do we know, how soon he will leave it. A report at present prevails here, that Madame Royale had fallen ill on her road through Alsace, and had not been able to proceed, so that it is uncertain when her liberation will take place.

You may rely upon it, that the Prince of Condé is in an error, if he imagines that the King entertains the slightest distrust of him, or that any person about His Majesty has sufficient weight, to impress him with an opinion to his highness's disadvantage.

When the King acted as Regent, he issued letters patent conveying very full powers to the Count D'Artois, and to the Prince of Condé, under which they are both now acting, and of which I now enclose you a copy, as it would seem, by your desiring other Powers, that you had not seen them. If on perusal, you think them to be insufficient, you will be so good as to send me a draft of the specific powers, or instructions, which you conceive to be omitted, and to be necessary to strengthen the Prince's hands for his Sovereign's Service, and I will use my best endeavours to obtain them. I have already at different times given my opinion, that, at a moment like this, his Highness should be invested with every authority that he can desire—and have been answered that he was so.

I flatter myself that before this letter can reach you the

* Many parts of this letter are in cypher.

Prince of Condé will be already advanced into Alsace, in consequence of Mr. Wurmser's letter to him notified by Mr. de Mélas, inclosing the proclamation proposed to His Highness to issue *totidem verbis without the slightest alteration*, as soon as he shall have passed the Rhine. The great point is once to get a footing in France, to obtain which, I think, the Prince should take the shortest way, without stumbling at any little difficulties, or delicacies, that may occur in his commerce with the Austrians. By the words they have put in his mouth—they have effectually barred themselves from conquest or dismemberment on that side of France, for they never could have the effrontery to chicane, or equivocate hereafter upon the expressions of the Proclamation or the mode of transaction, especially as the whole emanates from themselves, and is accepted in honor and good faith by His Royal Highness. This is clearly my opinion, and that of the Bishop of Arras* also. It often happens that one way of eluding perfidy is the not seeming to suspect it.

The Prince having demanded instructions from the King on occasion of the abovementioned Proclamation, will, I hope, receive from His Majesty such an answer, as will relieve him from any embarrassment that he might have felt from it. Allow me here to add my opinion, that the Prince in his present circumstances should without hesitation take upon himself to act according to his own Judgment, as he thinks best for the interests of his Sovereign. I am persuaded that whatever he does will be approved here.—I do not however mean to say, that he did wrong by any means in writing to the King on occasion of Mr. Wurmser's Letter and Proclamation.

The late misconduct, and misfortunes in the Riviera di Genoa has entirely deranged your idea of a possibility of the King's getting into France by way of Savoy. I indeed wrote you word that it was not thought advisable here by

* Louis Marc François Hilaire de Couzier, Bishop of Arras, b. 1732, d. 1804. He had previously been in the army.

some Gentlemen who pretend to be better Judges of the matter than I did, and the truth is, that notwithstanding Mr. De Vins's confidence in his own security, there were some Officers in his Army, who all along entertained apprehensions of what has happened.

The Bishop of Arras proposes to set out for Turin in two or three days.

The Duke de la Vauguyon, landed at Naples from Spain in the middle of last month, and is expected here every day. I believe it is meant, that he should take the chief lead in the King's Councils here, but it is not absolutely certain, that he wishes to do so himself.

Before I conclude, I beg leave to state to you a fact, which may not be improper for your information. On the 11th of October the Comte du Pac delivered me your dispatches of the 4th of October, and the next day on my asking him, (by way of conversation), how long he intended to stay at Verona, he said that he waited my orders; I answered him, that I had no orders to give him, as whatever I had to write to you, I could send by the post; I accordingly prepared my dispatch in Cypher, but the Abbé de Vilfort passing through this place in his way to you, I gave him my letters. And this I mentioned to Mr. du Pac soon after, and from that moment to this Mr. du Pac has never uttered a syllable to me, as if he conceived himself in any degree under an expectation of being sent back to you, but remained here, as several other Frenchmen do, because, I imagine, they do not well know where else to go to. He, however, desired the Marquis de Duras to speak to me on his subject and to say that as he had conceived himself to be in our employ, he supposed he was to receive a certain daily pay. I told the Marquis, that I conceived no such thing, that I had no authority to engage any Gentleman on such a footing, but that if the Comte du Pac was under difficulties, I would with great pleasure give him my assistance, but that it must be considered as merely an act of private friendship from one

Gentleman to another, and by no means on account of any public claim. He has never spoke to me himself on this subject, although he lodges in the same hotel that I do. I have just troubled you with this little detail, which is perfectly exact, that in case he should write to you, the matter may be fairly before you.

I have the honor to be, with since esteem and regard, Dear Sir, Your most obedient and most faithful humble Servant, MACARTNEY.

December 6th, 1795.

P. S.—We have not yet received any letters from Vienna, in answer to our application there, but I trust that the next post will bring us such, as we wish.

We are now told, that the report of Madame Royale's being taken ill, on her road through Alsace, is not founded, and that she was still at Paris on the 18th of last month. I can't avoid thinking it somewhat singular, that we should receive such a variety of contradictory intelligence relative to that Princess. It is certainly circulated with Industry, and would appear to originate in contrivance, but it does not y etappear for what particular purpose.

M.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq.

Enclosure in Lord Macartney's Letter.

Lettres Patentes du Régent de France portant ampliation de Pouvoirs pour S. A. S. Prince du Sang Roial, Louis-Joseph de Bourbon Prince de Condé.

Louis-Stanislas-Xavier de France, fils de France, Oncle du Roi, Régent du Royaume, au nom de Louis 17, par la grâce de Dieu Roi de France et de Navarre, à notre Cousin Prince du Sang Roial, Louis-Joseph de Bourbon, Prince de Condé, Colonel-Général de l'infanterie françoise, &c. Salut:

Les droits que vous avez à notre confiance, comme à celle de tous les loyaux François, par le zèle et les succès avec lesquels vous vous êtes constamment emploié pour les plus importants

intêrêts de la Couronne, nous portent à ajouter de nouveaux pouvoirs à ceux que nous vous avons donnés précédemment, et dont vous avez fait un usage aussi utile pour l'Etat, que glorieux pour vous. Prévoiant maintenant que l'éloignement où vous serez de nous, pourroit occasionner des retardements préjudiciables à l'exécution de nos instructions et de nos ordres, nous avons jugé devoir vous déclarer expressément ce que nous entendons qui soit par vous fait, statué et ordonné, en ordonnant De Par Le Roi et le Régent de France, comme aussi De Par le Lieutenant-Général du Royaume, dans le cas où notre très-cher et bien-aimé frère, Charles-Philippe de France, vous transmettra nos ordres.

A ces Causes, nous vous avons autorisé et par les présentes Lettres vous autorisons :

A vous emploier au rétablissement du bon ordre et de l'autorité Roiale dans celles des Provinces de France où vous pourrez vous porter, et autres Provinces voisines dans lesquelles vous pourrez exercer les pouvoirs que nous vous confions, avant que nos ordres ou ceux du Lieutenant-Général du Royaume y soient adressés directement; à commander dans les dites Provinces, et faire tous réglemens et ordonnances nécessaires pour que l'ordre et la tranquillité publique y soient rétablis et maintenus.

A lever des troupes au nom du Roi et du Régent de France; recevoir à récipiscence celles qui après avoir été emploiées par les rebelles, rentreront dans le devoir, leur accorder amnestie et pardon, ainsi qu'à tous autres sujets du Roi qui, par leur conduite, se montreront dignes de grâce; commander tous gens de Guerre en notre absence et en l'absence du dit Lieutenant-Général du Royaume; commettre des Officiers Généraux, pour commander sous vous, ainsi que des Officiers particuliers dans les différentes grades.

A faire publier et exécuter partout où besoin sera, nos ordonnances, édits, déclarations, lettres patentes, à les adresser aux cours du Royaume, pour y être lues, publiées et registrées en la forme ordinaire.

A faire percevoir les impôts et autres revenus publics et à les emploier comme vous jugerez convenir au service du Roi.

A révoquer ou suspendre tous Officiers militaires, et tous les Agents de l'Administration cy-devant établis, lorsque vous le jugerez nécessaire aux intérêts du Roi.

A commettre provisoirement aux emplois de commandants, d'intendants et commissaires départis, et à toutes autres places de l'Administration publique; même aux différents offices de judicature, tant dans les cours que dans les tribunaux inférieures: voulant que les commissions provisoires que vous aurez données pour les dits emplois, places et offices, aient leur plein et entier effet, en vertu des présentes lettres patentes, jusqu'à ce que des brevets, ou des provisions aient été délivrés par nous, ou par le Lieutenant-Général du Royaume, si nous le trouvons convenir, aux Officiers que vous aurez commis.

Voulant que les actes qui seront faits par vous, au nom du Roi et du Régent de France, sous votre seing et votre sceau particulier, aient les mêmes valeur et effets que s'ils émanoient directement de nous, et que vous vous conformiez au surplus à tous ordres qui vous seront donnés de notre part ou de la part de notre très-cher et bien-aimé frère Charles-Philippe de France, Lieutenant-Général du Royaume.

Et comme il ne nous est pas possible de revêtir des formes ordinaires les ordonnances, déclarations et lettres patentes qu'il nous a paru important de faire publier sans délai dans les différentes Provinces qui reconnoîtront l'autorité du Roi, nous en avons fait attacher, sous le contre-scel des présentes, des expéditions approuvées de nous, afin que les différentes Cours du Royaume puissent connoître que les dites expéditions sont conformes à notre volonté, et que prenant égard aux circonstances, elles les fassent néanmoins lire, publier et registrer, en attendant que nous puissions leur en adresser des minutes dans la forme accoutumée.

Si Donnons en Mandement aux Armées et féaux les Présidents, Conseillers et Gens tenants les Cours de Parlement du Royaume, que les présentes, ainsi que les ordonnances, déclarations et lettres patentes attachées sous le contre-scel d'icelles, ils aient à lire, publier et registrer, à ce que personne n'en ignore.

Donné à Hamm, en Westphalie; sous notre seing et notre scel ordinaire et sous le contre-seing du Ministre d'Etat le Maréchal Duc de Broglie, le huitième Jour du mois de Novembre de l'an de grâce mil sept cent quatre-vingt-treize et du Règne du Roi, le premier.

LOUIS-STANISLAS-XAVIER.

Prince de Condé to Mr. Wickham.

A Kentzingen, ce 7 x^bre 1795.

Tinceau m'est arrivé hier, Monsieur, je ne sais trop pourquoy, mais très à propos, pour vous porter d'une manière sûre, une lettre intéressante. Si vous avez retardé, d'après ma marche, l'effet de tous les ressorts que vous faites mouvoir depuis si longtems avec tant de générosité, d'intelligence et d'activité, il est de toute importance, que vous ne les démentiez pas tout-à-fait, et qu'au contraire vous les mettiez en état d'être employés peut-être très-incessamment. On m'a envoyé hier un homme de Strasbourg, il n'y a pas 400 h. de garnison dans la Ville, et pas 200 dans la Citadelle; ceux qui y commandent sont aussi bien disposés que la Bourgeoisie, mais ils ne veulent pas livrer la Ville, d'eux-mêmes, surtout tant que nous n'en approcherons pas; à la vérité, ils demandent qu'on passe le Rhin, le plus près d'eux possible; mais ils ne ferons rien sans l'ordre de Pichegru, qui est *maître absolu* de son armée, comme des Places; ses négociations avec moi, *mais aussi avec les Autrichiens*, sont dans la plus grande activité, et nous ne pourrons rien faire sans eux; heureusement que leur proclamation que je vous ai envoyée, *mais qu'ils n'ont pas encore produite*, est rassurante, et me met plus à mon aise, *pour le moment*, il faudra voir si la conduite répondra aux promesses; mon homme d'hier m'a dit, que Pichegru et la Ville avoient déclaré aux Autrichiens qu'elle ne se rendroit *qu'à Louis* 18; alors, je me suis déterminé, pour assurer le succès, à travailler entièrement de concert avec les Autrichiens, et j'ai fait partir sur-le-champ Legrand avec mon homme, pour aller trouver M. de Wurmser à Manheim; le second dira tout ce qu'il fait (il y étoit décidé même avant de m'avoir vu,) et le premier veillera à nos intérêts; cet homme prétend que cela doit être fait dans dix jours; il parle d'un assaut pacifique, auquel il répond qu'on n'apportera *aucun* ob-

stacle ; mais cela peut avoir son danger pour les accidents, et pour les suites, vu l'espoir du soldat, qui, malgré toutes les précautions qu'on prendroit, ne sépare guères dans sa tête le pillage, d'un assaut ; j'aimerois beaucoup mieux la sommation pure et simple au nom de Louis 18 ; je ne puis savoir encore, ce dont on conviendra ; voilà où en sont les choses, elles exigent le plus grand secret, je vous prie de n'en écrire encore à personne, pas même par Courier ; je vous en envoye un sur-le-champ, si la chose s'arrange et réussit ; je m'attens à être arrêté avec mes colonnes, à Bühl. J'oubliois de vous dire, que Strasbourg est en grande correspondance avec Lyon, et qu'on m'a fait dire que du moment que la première Ville se rendroit, le coup retentiroit jusqu'à Marseille. J'ai bonne espérance, je vous l'avoue, et j'ai été enchanté de vous la faire partager ; je crois qu'il seroit utile, (et mon homme me l'a bien dit) que vous m'envoyassiez plus tôt que plus tard, un crédit sur les banquiers de Strasbourg, dont je ne me servirois que dans le cas où j'y entrerois. Cy-jointe une lettre qui m'est arrivée pour vous, *telle qu'elle est* ; il ne me reste, Monsieur, qu'à vous renouveller les assurances de ma profonde estime, de mon entière confiance, et de ma tendre amitié pour vous. LOUIS-JOSEPH DE BOURBON.

Prince de Condé to Mr. Wickham.

A Bühl, ce 19 x^bre 1795.

Je profite, Monsieur, de l'occasion du voyage de M. de la Granville, Maréchal de camp, dépêché près de vous par M. Crafford (l'oncle) ; les choses sont encore dans le même état, et j'attens sous 3 ou 4 jours les réponses du No. 1, [Strasbourg] et de *Z* [Pichegru] ; mais les *Y* [Les Autrichiens] ne m'en donneront vraisemblablement pas le tems, tant ils ont d'empressement de m'éloigner d'un endroit, où tôt ou tard, je puis être infiniment utile, pour me porter dans un autre, où je serai parfaitement inutile, et je m'attens

tous les jours à recevoir l'ordre de poursuivre ma route, pour arriver à ma 1re destination ; ce sera la seconde entreprise, *de toute importance*, qu'on m'aura fait manquer, car si l'on avoit suivi la 1re ordonnée, je serois à présent possesseur de la Pendule [Huningue], j'en ai reçu depuis 8 jours la presque certitude, on m'en croyoit encore à portée ; au reste, j'ai rempli tous mes devoirs, en faisant comme Prince françois, toutes les représentations possibles, par l'utilité dont il étoit pour la cause, que je restasse tout l'hyver à portée du No. 1, vu ses dispositions et celles de *Z*, et en disant toujours, comme soumis au Chef de l'armée Impériale, que j'étois prêt à marcher où l'on voudroit, en demandant cependant que ce ne fût pas sur les derrières des montagnes, où j'ai su qu'il y avoit des avis à Manheim pour m'envoyer ; je souhaite, Monsieur, que vous approuviez ma conduite, attendu que je fais le plus grand cas, de votre suffrage personnel.

Clairfayt pousse toujours sur Treves, et toutes les nouvelles disent que Jourdan a repassé la Moselle ; Pichegru défend toujours les lignes de la Queich, qui ne sont point attaquées ; au contraire, c'est lui qui attaque presque tous les jours les avant-postes Autrichiennes ; tantôt ils sont poussés, tantôt ils repoussent, et tout cela n'avance pas de grand'chose.

Nous attendons avec grande impatience les suites du terrible échec que les Autrichiens ont éprouvé en Italie et qui, je crois, vous occupe beaucoup ; il n'y auroit qu'un moyen de s'en relever, si les Patriotes ont l'audace de s'avancer dans les plaines du Piémont, ce seroit de les y attaquer vigoureusement, leur retraite devant être à présent coupée par les neiges ; si on les laisse s'établir là pendant l'hyver, l'Italie sera en grand danger au Printems prochain.

L'état de délabrement des finances du Gouvernement françois, délabrement dont on est convenu publiquement dans les différents Conseils, d'ailleurs peu d'accord entr' eux, et la défection des armées Patriotes, vont finir la

chose sous peu de tems, pourvu que les Cabinets étrangers veuillent avoir un peu de patience, ne pas se presser de faire une paix peu honorable, me soutenir fortement, et me placer dans la partie où je puis être le plus utile; personne n'est plus en état que vous, Monsieur, de faire sentir ces vérités; je vous les recommande, et vous prie de rendre justice aux sentiments d'estime, de confiance, et d'amitié que je vous ai voués, depuis que je suis assez heureux pour vous connoître.

L.-J. B.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

No. 34. (Cypher.)

Downing Street: Decr. 25, 1795. (Received Janr. 16th.)

Sir,—The daily expectation of hearing from You and Colonel Craufurd the final determination which might be taken relative to the operations projected in the quarter where you reside has prevented me from writing to you on the subject of your late dispatches, as it was evident that any Instructions which could be transmitted on the point in question must be materially varied both in their application and effect by the various course of events to which that determination might lead. Your Letter of the 25th November, which is your last dispatch which I have received, still leaves us in the most anxious expectation on that head, though I am induced to hope that no Measures will ultimately have been taken (supposing it still practicable to act at all after the late discovery) without more certain support from the Austrians than our last Accounts either from the Austrian Cabinet or the Army. I feel however great Satisfaction in reflecting that in this anxious and critical Moment the Conduct of the Business is left to your Judgement, of which you have given so many satisfactory proofs. (Cypher ends.)

I inclose You, a Copy of His Majesty's Message to Parliament, on the Subject of the Possibility of Negotiation

with France in the present Circumstances. As the Language of this Message is in exact Conformity to the Views and Sentiments stated at the Opening of the present Session, I should not have thought it necessary to furnish You with any Explanation on this Subject, if so much Pains had not been taken to misrepresent its real Purport and Tendency. You will observe that this is a Communication made by His Majesty to His Parliament, and therefore confined within the Circle of the different Branches of the British Legislature; But that it is in no Respect an Overture to the Enemy, except in so far as he may be inclined to act, not upon any Communication made to *him* but upon the public Notoriety of the Sentiments which His Majesty has expressed on this Occasion. Its Effect goes no further than to state the Removal of that additional Difficulty which has hitherto existed in the Way of Negotiation by the Want of any Government of any Description in France. It places this Country with respect to France in the same State as to any Negotiation for Peace in which Belligerent Powers stand towards each other in the Case of common Wars in Europe. But the Possibility of opening such Negotiation, and still more that of concluding Peace, is necessarily to be governed by that to which it must always be subject, namely, the Existence of a Disposition on the Part of the Enemy to treat for Peace, and to accede to such Terms as the Situation of His Majesty and His Allies entitle them to require. I am sorry to say that the Conduct of the Directory of France has lately afforded Room to doubt whether such Disposition exists on their Part; But on the other Hand, every Circumstance which we learn relative to the Interior of France, confirms the Opinion entertained here of the pressing Necessity for Peace in that Country, and of the universal Desire for it;—and the late Measures of Finance are certainly well calculated to render the first of them still more evident, and the latter more urgent than before.

In all Your Communications upon this subject, You will conform Your Language strictly to these Ideas, omitting no Opportunity to impress those with whom You converse with the . . . . . .

[About four lines of this despatch are here obliterated.]

. . . . . at the same Time, the strongest Assurances of His Majesty's Determination to prosecute the War in Conjunction with His Allies, with Energy and Vigour till it can be brought to such a Conclusion as the Interests of this Country and of Europe require.

I am, with great Truth and Regard, Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant,

GRENVILLE.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

Prince de Condé to Mr. Wickham.

A Bühl, ce 27 x^bre 1795.

Courant* qui vous remettra cette lettre, Monsieur, vous apprendra l'accident qui est arrivé au pauvre *Louis* [Fauche Borel] dans le No. 1 [Strasbourg], mais j'ai tout lieu d'espérer qu'il n'aura pas de suites fâcheuses pour lui; notre affaire n'est pour rien dans son arrestation, et vous verrez par les lettres que Courant vous montrera, et qui contiennent absolument les mêmes avis que celles que j'ai reçues, qu'il n'y a rien à craindre pour ses papiers, mais peut-être pour les lettres de change, et l'argent monnoyé, quoique j'espère beaucoup qu'il se tirera bien de ceci; je n'ai pas besoin de vous prier de faire pour lui, tout ce que votre intérêt et votre humanité vous suggéreront; je ne négligerai rien de mon côté, pour contribuer à sa liberté, et je ne doute pas que Baptiste [Pichegru] ne fasse de même; comme la correspondance *toujours active* avec ce dernier, a pris une autre voye, je crois le séjour de Louis désormais inutile au No. 1, et

* The agent at Strasburg.

puisqu'il a une fois fixé l'attention, il est plus prudent qu'il en sorte, et qu'il repasse de ce côté-cy ; je le lui conseillerai, d'autant plus que Baptiste n'ose plus le voir.

Ayant appris, qu'on vouloit m'envoyer à Rothembourg, soit en totalité soit en partie, ce qui étoit encore pis, j'ai couru à Manheim pour détourner ce coup, qui auroit rompu toute correspondance, et qui auroit atterré les espérances de l'intérieur, car on me fait toujours l'honneur d'avoir les yeux fixés sur moi, comme si je n'étois pas le jouet, et pour ainsi dire, l'esclave de mes associés ; (ah! Monsieur, quand me tirerez-vous de cette position?) j'espère être parvenu à mon but.

Baptiste n'est pas d'avis de l'entreprise sur No. 1, il ne la rejette pas absolument, mais il y trouve beaucoup de difficultés, il prétend qu'il a de plus grands projets, qu'il faut le laisser faire, et qu'il veut me donner *tout, à la fois* ; ce sont ses termes ; je lui ai cependant récrit, pour lui démontrer, de quelle importance il seroit pour lui-même (qui j'attend a être destitué, mais qui *ne le craint pas*,) que je fusse dans le No. 1 pour le recevoir avec son armée, sur laquelle il compte, ou qu'il s'y jettât pour m'en ouvrir les portes ; il auroit voulu qu'on me fît passer le Rhin, et qu'on me mît très-près de luy, mais les Autrichiens ne veulent plus que je le passe, et comme ils sont *déterminés* à se retirer, j'aime beaucoup mieux passer mon hyver dans ces cantons-cy, où je suis à portée *de tout* pour la campagne prochaine, et beaucoup plus en mesure pour la correspondance de l'intérieur, et avec vous, que si j'étois dans le Palatinat, pour n'y rien faire, ou pour être forcé de me retirer ; je ne vous cache pas que j'en ai ma suffisance, de voir, ou de partager tant de retraites, car le mouvement qu'on va faire, en est encore une, et après de si prodigieux succès, nous voilà avec les Autrichiens au point où nous en étions sur le Rhin, au commencement de la campagne de 1793.

Je ne sais pas, et vous savez sûrement mieux que moi, ce qui se passe dans la politique, mais il se passe quelque

chose; la Cour de Vienne ne veut pas qu'on avance, et j'ai la certitude que Jourdan a proposé une armistice à Clairfayt, que l'officier patriote, qui a porté la proposition, a obtenu de passer au milieu de l'armée autrichienne, pour aller trouver Pichegru; que Clairfayt a communiqué la proposition à Wurmser, que celui-cy a envoyé sur-le-champ un officier de l'Etat-Major au Général la Tour, et que cet officier doit vraisemblablement aller plus loin, puisqu'en partant il est venu chez Barbanson, *prendre le billet que j'avois donné pour faciliter à l'envoyé de Wurmser de parler à Pichegru*; le passage de M^do^ Royale, se trouve au milieu de tout cela; et Bellegarde devoit partir pour Vienne le 25 ou le 26; il tenoit son voyage sous secret; vous conviendrez qu'il y a de quoy donner carrière à son espoir, en fait de conjectures.

Il me semble qu'il seroit bien plus simple, et bien plus convenable pour Monciel, que ce fût le Roy qui lui écrivît, et cela feroit encore bien plus d'effet; ce n'est pas, que s'il me mandoit qu'il trouve tout simple, que je ne me sois pas livré à lui, vu la différence que j'ai dû croire dans ses principes et dans les miens, mais qu'il peut m'assurer, qu'il est absolument dans mon sens, je ne lui répondisse une lettre honnête; mais comme son amour propre ne lui permet pas de laisser soupçonner qu'il a eu des torts, (ce qui ne les effacera pas) je vous avoue, qu'une plus grande recherche de ma part, me coûteroit infiniment, et que si par amitié pour vous, je faisois la chose, je craindrois, et je suis même sûr, de la faire de mauvaise grâce, ce qui gâteroit plus les affaires, que cela ne les accommoderoit; mais l'expédient que je vous donne, arrange tout, et tout *au mieux*.

J'oubliois de vous dire, que Baptiste [Pichegru] m'a fait dire, qu'il m'auroit livré la Pendule [Huningue]; s'il y avoit quelque moyen de s'en rapprocher, ce seroit le mieux de tous, et vous devriez l'exiger de la part de votre Cour; *son voisinage* me persecute pour me demander à éclater, et cette contre-marche de ma part arrangeroit

tout le monde ; je vous écrirai demain ou après-demain, sur *ce voisinage*, par un homme qu'on m'a envoyé ; je vous renouvelle, Monsieur, tous les sentiments, toute la confiance, toute la tendre amitié que j'espère que vous me connoissez pour vous.

Les armées Patriotes sont exaspérées au dernier point, contre leur Gouvernement ; plus de 6,000 officiers ont donné leur démission. Il m'arrive des Gentilshommes, et des déserteurs Patriotes, énormément ; en voilà plus de 300 depuis 8 jours, et plus de 1,000 ou 1,200 depuis Mülheim ; si M. Crafford n'augmente pas nos fonds, je ne sais pas comment nous allons faire.

1796.

Baron de Degelmann to Mr. Wickham.

Bâle, le 1mier Janvier 1796.

Monsieur!—Permettez qu'à ce renouvellement d'année je présente à Votre Excellence mes vœux très-sincères, tant pour le succès des intérêts communs à nos deux Cours que pour la conservation et le bonheur de Votre Excellence. Je La prie à cette époque favorable de me continuer ses bontés, auxquelles je mets un prix infini.

La remise de Madame Royale de France a eu lieu le 26 Xbre, comme sans doute Votre Excellence le saura déjà, et comme j'aurois désiré le Lui annoncer de suite, si je n'avois été très-occupé avant et après cet événement. S. A. R. a passé la journée du 27 à Lauffenbourg, où une suite nombreuse l'avoit attendue depuis cinq semaines. Elle sera à Vienne le 9 ou 10 de ce mois. Cette Princesse joint à une Phisionomie des plus distinguées une grâce et une dignité qui La rendent encore plus intéressante qu'Elle ne l'est déjà par les malheurs qu'Elle a éprouvés.

Mr. de Carletti est arrivé ici il y a plusieurs jours; il veut attendre en Suisse les ordres qu'il compte recevoir dans peu de la cour touchant sa future destination. Les François parlent de la Trève comme d'une chose décidée; nous autres, ni à Bâle ni à Fribourg, n'en avons aucune nouvelle positive.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec le plus sincère attachement et une respectueuse considération, Monsieur, de votre Excellence, le très-humble et très-obéissant Serviteur,

Le Baron de Degelmann.

A. S. E. Monsieur Wickham,
Ministre Plénipot. de S. M. Brit. à Lausanne.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville

(Draft. Secret.) 5th Jany. 1796.

My Lord,—In my dispatches by M. Roland I had the Honour to inform your Lordship that I expected the arrival of M. de Preçy and M. Teissonet, with whom and M. Imbert I was to have a long conference as well on the present situation of things as on the possibility and means of acting in future under more favourable circumstances.

I proceed to state to your Lordship as shortly as possible the remarks of our joint conference which, without entering into local details, may be comprised in 5 articles.

1st. That nothing can be attempted during the winter in any case excepting that of a total dissolution of the Republican Army; a partial project of M. Teissonet, alluded to in his letter included in my dispatch by Colonel Roland, having upon the fullest discussion been found impracticable, though we are all but too sensible of the extreme inconvenience that must arise from its execution being deferred.

2ndly. That M. de Preçy engages himself at all events, excepting in the case of a peace with the House of Austria, and provided always that a sufficient provision of arms and ammunition be previously collected, to enter about the end of March or beginning of April and put himself at the head of whatever force can be got together, he himself not having the smallest doubt, however mistrustful and cautious he may be on other points, that in respect of numbers it would be even more considerable than what he himself could wish.

3. That in the mean time agents shall be appointed *one only in each district* * who shall prepare matters in the

* *Note at the side.*—The number and extent of the districts is settled; they do not exceed 5 in the whole, forming a circle round Lyons.

interior and correspond directly with a Council to be formed here, to whom alone they are to be known, from whom alone they are to receive orders and to whom they are to be entirely subordinate. This council is to consist only of M. Imbert, M. De Preçy, and another old and experienced General officer, native of Lyons, who has been resident here these last two years.

4. That the existence of the council, the names of the agents in the Interior, and the nature of their instructions, as well as the intended plan of operations, shall be entirely concealed both from the Prince of Condé and the King.

5. That during the 3 intervening months the necessary provision of arms, ammunition, shoes, cloth for tents, &c. &c. (without binding myself down to any specific sum) be made and as far as possible secured within the frontier or in such situation as that it may be easily transported there.

It is to this last article, and to the observations that I am about to make upon it, that I wish particularly to entreat your Lordship to direct your attention.

Independant of M. de Preçy's own opinion, which upon that point is not to be shaken, I am myself most intimately persuaded that nothing *effective* can be undertaken in the Interior unless the country intended to rise in insurrection be previously furnished with a competent quantity of provision, arms, and ammunition. As to Provisions, the researches of M. Imbert (who is the more to be credited as he was himself, by virtue of his former place, specially charged with the victualling of the Town of Lyons) have satisfyd me that there is abundance in the country and within our reach to answer all our purposes, either in the hands of the Farmer or in the Granaries of the different municipalities and those of the Republick, provided that the Province of Bresse be included in the Insurrection, and that the first forces collected be sufficiently formidable to make an incursion along the

Soane as far as Auxonne. A portion of the grain in the hands of the farmers must be purchased before-hand, in sufficient quantity i.e. to prevent the Insurgents from feeling any thing like want on their first rising, and to prevent them from pillaging the country. The rest must be seized as public property and formed into regular magazines.

As to arms and ammunition, I am satisfyd that there is nothing of the kind that can be depended on—There are not above 4,000 fusils in Lyons. L'Etienne en Forez has allways been considered as the great resource, but M. de Preçy observes very properly that an insurrection on that side will lead to nothing unless it be supported by one from the S. part of the Jura, and further that L'Etienne will not furnish any powder. Besides, from the most accurate information we are now enabled to say that the Republicans never suffer more than 4 or 5000 stand of arms to remain at that manufactory at one time, and Your Lordship will observe that we consider the affair of Besançon, where there are at least 10,000 Insurgents, as entirely separate from this, besides that the possession of that place is a thing by no means to be depended on.—To make a sufficient provision of these necessary articles it appeared to us upon a rough calculation which I am inclined to think has been taken rather too low, that the sum of 50,000*l.* will be wanting—Of this sum about 14,000 Louis d'ors are now secured in Lyons and the neighbourhood—and I have about 14,000 more in my possession—(including the 8000 last procured) of which however I shall be obliged to deliver to M. Imbert 2 or 3000*l.* to make good engagements allready contracted without—particularly for 10,000 pair of shoes purchased at Geneva in the name of an administrator of the army and which would have been all delivered at Lons le Saulnier by the 15th of last month if it had not been found necessary to suspend all our operations*—

* *Note at the side.*—These are a most necessary article as none

Your Lordship will observe that 22,000*l.* therefore will still be wanting and must be furnished before the middle of March, if M. de Preçy's plan be adopted and followed. How far it may be expedient to incur this very heavy expence, or to employ the sums allready in my hand to the same purpose, is a question which I dare not take upon me to decide, not only because it must depend very much on circumstances of which I can be no judge, but also because I see very clearly that I shall have full time to receive Your Lordship's answer to this dispatch, and to make the necessary provisions afterwards, without any real inconvenience to the public service. I have therefore determined to make no further advance of any kind without further instructions to that effect; and I must therefore entreat your Lordship to have the goodness to convey to me as soon as possible his Majesty's positive commands for the regulation of my conduct on this occasion. Your Lordship will probably observe that this determination is in some sense inconsistent with the execution of the fifth point agreed upon with Messrs Imbert and Preçy; and in point of fact, those gentlemen, since our last conference, have pressed me very strongly to authorize them to make some immediate purchases to a very considerable amount in this country and at Geneva, and to make the necessary advances without obliging them to send for any part of the money that is allready secured in the interior.

I have however answered them that though I feel all the inconveniences of drawing their money from Lyons, yet that I cannot venture to make any further advances untill I shall be directly authorized to do so from home; and that they must chuse between 2 evils, viz. either to adopt the measure in question, or to delay the purchases till I shall have received a positive answer, which in the common course of events I may have in time to allow

but people of property are now able to purchase any, and it would be impossible to set an army in motion in wooden clogs.

all the necessary measures to be taken before, according to his own opinion, it will be possible for Mr. Preçy to act.

I shall thank your Lordship, however, to let me have the decision as early as possible; for though we shall have really sufficient time to take all the necessary measures yet there will be *none to spare*, and the bringing all the purchases into the market at the same moment may perhaps be dangerous and lead to a discovery notwithstanding the utmost precaution. I should also observe to your Lordship that it is possible that I may be obliged to advance 1000*l.* or 1,500*l.* to M. Imbert to make good a contract allready signed for the purchase of 5000 pair of shoes at Geneva. I shall avoid it however if possible.

I should here venture to offer to your Lordship such arguments as occur to me either for or against the adopting of M. de Preçy's proposals, but they would contain nothing more than a repetition of what I have allready submitted to the consideration of His Majesty's Ministers on so many different occasions.

It seems clear to me that the enterprize cannot be well executed; or rather cannot be executed at all, at a less expence, and it is now evident that the well disposed inhabitants in the interior neither can nor will take up arms unless they see a force in which they have confidence ready to support them.

Again. If it be not the intention to carry on a vigorous *offensive* campaign, it would be better to abandon all such projects at once. But there is a most essential difference in that respect between the two Periods of January 1795 and January 1796. Much as I was against all idea of encouraging Lyons to take up arms unless a foreign force could march directly to its relief at the former of those Periods, I am now most thoroughly persuaded that under M. Preçy's command the people of that place would be both willing and able to maintain themselves and even to carry on offensive operations, provided they could only

have the positive assurance that the armies of the allies would *do their utmost* to find full employment for those of the Republick.

To account for the change in my opinion I should observe to your Lordship, that I not only rely upon the great change that has taken place in the public opinion upon the great diminution of the Republican armies by desertion, the difficulty of executing the requirements (?), and the loss of that enthusiasm by which they were formerly animated, all of which facts are now commonly notorious, but (perhaps still more) upon the extreme facility with which it has been proved to us that not only the Generals but all the administrators (?) of the different armies may be gained either by promises or by money. Besides what has passed on the Rhone and at Paris, I should observe to your Lordship that of 4 successive General officers stationed at Lyons 3 have been entirely gained, viz. Le Poypt (?), Colinet, and Mont-choisy. The latter is now there and in regular correspondance with this place. I should also mention that a correspondance has been again opened by the means of M. Le Close with General La Cours, and that that General appears extremely well disposed to render every service in his power.

No events of any real consequence have taken place on this side of the country—M. Teissonet, on his return to Lons le Saulnier, found the minds of the young men so exceedingly exalted, that had not M. de Preçy and myself interfered with our direct authority, he would have taken up arms immediately.

The Duke of Portland to Mr. Wickham.

(Private.) London: Sunday Even, 17 Jan^{ry}, 1796.

Dear Sir,—I received yesterday from the Chev^{r}. D'Artez your short Letter and a large Box of Plants for which I am much obliged to You as I am also for several sorts of Alpine Seeds which were transmitted to me a few days

before by Mr. Aust of the success of which I augure much more sanguinely than I do of the Plants, but *both*, as proofs of Your remembrance of me, I very truly value and hold in esteem. You and I must not be impatient for our Meeting, and so I constantly tell our friend the Dean who possibly thinks I deal in paradoxes when I insist upon the *present* impossibility of our coming together and in the same breath assert that I am making the greatest possible sacrifice to the publick in not urging your return. But you know the correctness of this statement and will I trust not question the veracity of my assertion.

I am, Dear Sir, most sincerely Yours, &c.

PORTLAND.

W. WICKHAM, Esq.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Macartney.

(Copy. Most Secret.) Lausanne: 19th January, 1796.

My Lord,—This letter will be delivered you by a young man of the name of Bayard, who was formerly Aide-de-Camp to Mr. de Preçy, and who has the good fortune to be highly esteemed by that General. I have employed him on several confidential missions, which he executed with the utmost intelligence, activity and address. I lately sent him to Paris to form a more regular correspondence with the Abbé Brottier and Mr. Duvergne de Praile, who are now considered as the King's principal Agents; and who have, from the first, maintained the most open and regular Communication with the Vendée. Those Gentlemen sent him forward towards Saumur, Angers, and other places on that side of the Country, with instructions, the nature of which he will have the honour of explaining to you. On his return to Paris, they gave him directions to proceed to Verona, to explain to the King the real situation of things, both in that Capital and in the Country that he had just visited,

and to state the necessity of the King's complying with certain demands contained in a letter of which he (Bayard) is the Bearer ;—the principal object of which is, to obtain an extension of Power for themselves, as well as for some of the Commanders in the Vendée and the Country circumjacent ;—the whole of which will be fully and clearly explained to your Lordship, if you should favour the young man with an audience of any length.

These Gentlemen, however, not satisfied with making a full communication to the King, are desirous that it should be made to him through the medium of the Count d'Antraigues, whom they consider as their friend and protector,—and therefore, Mr. Bayard is obliged, notwithstanding his own strong remonstrances, to make a long and useless journey by Venice.

Whatever, however, the nature of his communication with that Gentleman may be, I am sure that he will communicate it most fully to your Lordship, as I have ever found him faithful and open to the last degree ; and I have desired him to conceal nothing from you that he could have mentioned to myself. I wish him to return here as soon as possible, as it is my intention to send him to England, instead of suffering him to go directly to Paris, unless I should find him charged with some instructions of such real importance, as that the public service might suffer from his delay. Should that be the case, I shall direct him to go to London, either by Calais, or through Britany —but I should not wish this intention to be known at Verona,—as it might make the King's Ministers more cautious in the instructions they would give him, and much more reserved in their confidential, verbal Communications, which must otherwise, of necessity, be very extensive, as it would be too dangerous to commit to writing the whole of what they will have to send back in answer, to Paris.

As the persons about the King, might perhaps see with some pain, that an Agent employed on so very delicate

and confidential a mission, had long or repeated interviews with your Lordship, I have directed him to say, that he is charged specially by me to give you the most full and detailed account of the situation of Lyons and the Jura, as well as of the Countries that he has lately passed over, and of Paris.—Your Lordship will please also to recollect, that he is *really* my Agent, paid and employed by *me*,—and that in sending him to Venice and Verona, the King's Agents have taken a liberty which I can by no means approve of,—so far from it, that I should certainly have opposed his journey altogether, if I had not had a hope that the information he conveys might be really useful to your Lordship, in as much as it throws some light upon some of the secondary intrigues that are carrying on either at Verona, or by persons who though less directly connected with that Court, are not altogether without influence.

Your Lordship will learn with much pain, that the differences which have long existed between Charette and Stofflet are not likely to be appeased;—and that the dissensions among the other Chiefs are not less violent. Bayard will inform you that the opinion of the whole country through which he passed, was most decidedly in favor of Stofflet. This agrees intirely with the account I had received from the Count de Chatellen: This gentleman, an officer of great merit, belonging to the Prince of Condé's Army, had quitted the Service of that Prince, that he might partake in the expedition to Quiberon, when he was taken, and afterwards most fortunately effected his Escape from Vannes. He wrote to the Prince a strong remonstrance against the Supreme Command that had been given to Charette, declaring it to be entirely against the opinions of all the Bretons, who were, in general, decidedly devoted to Stofflet. I had the same account myself, from the Marquis de la F——, who also wrote in the same manner to the Prince of Condé. The part of Charette is warmly espoused by the Abbé Brottier and Mr. Duvergne,

and I believe their representations were the principal cause of the King's granting him the Supreme Command.

Whether this measure were originally a wise one, or whether (even supposing it were not) it would now be wise to retract it, is a point upon which I dare not presume to form a judgement of my own. Besides, His Majesty's Ministers at home, must have so much better, and more direct information, that upon that account alone, it would be very presumptuous in me to wish to give my opinion; and I must be contented with lamenting, that at this moment, so very serious an evil should exist. If I am rightly informed, His Majesty's Ministers have sent the Count de Moustier into Britany as *Commissaire du Roi*, charged with full Powers, and the necessary authority, to settle all the differences existing among the leaders of the Chouans. If it be really so, I believe a wiser measure could not have been taken,—and that it would have been difficult to have made a better choice of the person. I most sincerely hope that his authority may be extended to the Vendée. I take this opportunity of mentioning, that I was not able to take a Copy of Stofflet's letter to the King,—and that if your Lordship should be able to procure one, it might perhaps be acceptable at home.

Your Lordship will have learnt at the time, how Mr. Imbert's projects intirely failed through the imprudence (if not the wickedness) of Mr. Besignan. Bayard will also give your Lordship full information upon that point, as well as upon the present situation of things on this side of the Country; and upon that subject I shall beg leave to refer your intirely to him, whilst I return to the consideration of some points in the different Letters with which your Lordship has honoured me, that I have hitherto neglected to answer.

I was much flattered and honoured by the attention that the King was pleased to pay to my request in behalf of Messieurs Tissot and La Chassagne. I beg you will have the goodness to assure His Majesty of my sentiments on

this occasion in the most respectful manner, *and in such terms as your Lordship shall think most convenient and right.* As your Lordship would probably collect from my open letter to Mr. d'Avaray, I had not neglected, in the time, to second your request to Sir Morton Eden, for the removal of the King nearer to the seat of action;—Sir Morton has probably given the same answer to us both, —viz.—That under all the then circumstances, His Majesty's Ministers did not wish to press the point upon the Court of Vienna, who seemed to shew an invincible repugnance to adopting it. As to the taking possession of the places that may hereafter be conquered in the name of the Emperor, an event that the King seems, not without reason, so much to apprehend,—I send Your Lordship inclosed, an extract of one of my Letters to Sir Morton Eden in which the subject is mentioned, the spirit and sentiments of which, are exactly conformable to what I have repeatedly written to the same quarter; so that, in case you should have the patience to run it over, your Lordship may see that I have neglected nothing to bring the Court of Vienna, to view and consider the whole business in the same light that we have done in conformity to (what appeared to me at least) the real views and intentions of His Majesty's Ministers; *and certain intended proclamations*, of which I believe your Lordship has had communication, are well calculated to satisfy our doubts upon that head.

As to the late mission of the Count d'Avaray *to pay the Compliment*, of the ill success of which he complains to me most bitterly; I think it right to inform your Lordship, that I am disposed to believe, that the Court of Vienna will have a ready answer to give hereafter, to any remonstrances that may be made on that subject.

That Court has *certainly* been informed, that the most indiscreet language has been holden respecting the journey of the Princess, and the intentions of the Emperor, by all persons immediately attached to the King, (by none more

so than by Mr. D. himself) as well as by the Prince of Condé, and the principal persons about him. But this is not all. The same persons were forming all manner of idle and impracticable projects to prevent the Princess from arriving on the Territories of the Emperor. Bayard will speak to your Lordship with confidence on the subject, and can give more information than any one. I paid but little attention to it at the time, considering the whole as an extravagance;—but I am sorry to say, that I have now good reason to fear, that the Court of Vienna was well informed of everything that had been intended, as well as of the indiscreet language that had been holden.

I consider myself, much obliged to your Lordship for the communication of the powers given to the Prince of Condé; I was already acquainted with the outlines of them, and with the text of some of the most important passages.—I dare not venture to say that any objection *ought* to be made to them; but yet I could have desired, that they had been much more full and general, and as free as possible from all restrictions. I mean to say that they should either have approached as near as possible to a real delegation of the Royal power, or that there should have been many more particular clauses, and little or no reservation. I should especially have wished that,—instead of authorising His Serene Highness to make provisional appointments only, it had been thought expedient for the King to have declared at once (*considering the distance from the Scene of Action* at which he was obliged to reside, the impossibility of his uniting himself to the Prince, and the necessity of concentering all the powers in one point), that he would confirm *quamdiu se bené gesserint* all appointments of all persons made by his Serene Highness.

I shall not, however, enlarge upon this subject *now*,—meaning to trouble you again with it *very soon*. In the meantime, if your Lordship would take the trouble to enquire after some powers granted to the Prince before

the present King became Regent, I believe you will find them in some respects (although I cannot exactly recollect the expressions) larger and more clear; and your Lordship will please to observe, that though the instrument in question, professes in the beginning, to *enlarge* the powers formerly given to His Serene Highness, yet the beneficial effect of that clause seems to be entirely defeated by a subsequent one, which being in these words—'Nous avons jugé devoir vous déclarer expressément ce que *nous nous entendons qui sont par vous fait, statué et ordonné*, will cause the present powers to be considered rather as an *explanation* than an *extension* of the former ones.

With respect to the intended passage of the Rhine, on which we had all built such sanguine hopes, I am sorry to inform your Lordship that I am satisfyd that the thing was never seriously intended; at least in no other point of view than as a diversion in favor of the siege of Manheim. The last letter from the Prince, containing only a few lines, is very satisfactory. He seems to have good hopes that the Austrians will allow him immediately to take advantage of the favourable disposition holden out by some persons in a neighbouring province. My letters from that quarter, would induce me to hope that his expectations were well founded, if I had not been so often deceived by false promises on that side.

With respect to the Count de Pac—he has no claim whatever upon me, much less upon your Lordship. I sent him to England at his own request. He wished to go there himself, but *could not*, without having a leave of absence from his regiment, which I procured for him. His journey to Verona was no doubt voluntary,—at least, I should have sent forward the messenger that came to me if M. de Pac himself had not stated, that he particularly wished to go to Verona: I never held out any hope to him that he was to return to Switzerland; nor could he have any reason for believing it, other than that his own imagination suggested: I have written to him, to

say so myself;—and I have no doubt but that he must be fully sensible of the truth of what I say.

As the Duke of Vauguyon is now at Verona, I will thank your Lordship to tell me, whether he still keeps up any communication with his Son the Prince of Car—. That young man has been lately here, making me an offer which I am by no means disposed to encourage, being inclined to consider him as little better than an Adventurer.

The Abbé de la Comte, a member of the *right side* of the Assemblée Constituante, has lately communicated to Verona, the result of a Conversation that he has had with the famous M. d'André, member of the *Coté gauche.* I should be very curious to know the opinion that has been formed upon it, by the King and the persons about him. I am, myself, very much disposed to believe that it might lead to some good. Having been, in some measure, the means of bringing about the meeting, and of disposing each party to meet the other graciously, I am anxious that this opportunity that the two parties have found of talking together, may not be altogether thrown away.

A memoire was lately delivered to me, tending to bring about a reconciliation of parties,—in which it was, amongst other things, proposed, that such persons as Mounier, Mallet-du-Pan, &c. should be called to the Councils of the King, and that the Prince of Condé and the Emigrants should forbear all further acts of hostility against the Republicans. I have since learnt that a duplicate of it was sent to Mr. de Flachslanden, with the addition of a very severe reflection on the views of the British Cabinet, and a Caution to the King against throwing himself into the arms of that Court. It was delivered to me by a well disposed person, but dictated by a party of Constitutionists, who do great mischief in this Country by their eternal intrigues. I should also be

very anxious to know whether any notice has been taken of it.

I beg your Lordship a thousand pardons for all the trouble I am giving you. And intreat you to believe me to be &c., &c.

Colonel Craufurd to Mr. Wickham.

Manheim: 22nd Janʸ. 1796.

My dear Wickham—Your agent Fauche, who has been employed to carry on the correspondence with 24, left Strasbourg immediately after his examination, which turned out very fortunately for him, and he came directly to this place, having been accompanied, as he informed me, to the French advanced Posts, by 24's Adjutant General—I questioned him much, and the following is the result of his information, which I think necessary to communicate to You, in order that by comparing it with what he says to Yourself, You may be able to form a better Judgment of his veracity, and of the dependance to be placed upon him—I did not send my letter by him, lest he should have suspected its contents, and consequently been more upon his guard than he will probably be now.

The principal points upon which I interrogated him were the following:—

1st. Pichegru's Opinion respecting the passage of the Upper Rhine by the Prince of Condé and General Melas in the month of November.

2nd. Pichegru's Opinion respecting the delivering up of Strasbourg.

3rd. Pichegru's Opinion respecting the best situation for the Prince of Condé to remain in for the present.

4th. The footing upon which Pichegru is with Jourdan —and whether or not they have had any communication upon the subject of what we suppose to be Pichegru's intentions.

5th. Whether Pichegru talked much against the existing Government in France? Whether he expressed positively his determination to take a decided part against it? and whether he gave any intimation of what his real plan is?

To the first of these interrogatories he answered :—

'That Pichegru told him, he never had the smallest apprehension of the passage of the Upper Rhine at the period in question, because the force apparently destined to effect it was not adequate to undertake any solid operation, especially when surrounded by Fortresses which it had not the means or time to besiege—It was to this security, he says, that Pichegru attributed his having drawn most of his Troops from Upper Alsace in order to augment his Army on the Lower Rhine.'

This reasoning is so military, and so just, that it seems very likely to come really from Pichegru—But it by no means agrees with what the Prince of Condé states to have been the case—Viz.—That Pichegru had left Upper Alsace bare of Troops on purpose to favour His Serene Highness's operations—and that he would have delivered up Huningue to him immediately upon his entry into the Country.

To the second he answered :—

'That Pichegru was positively against the delivering up of Strasbourg, or any other Fortress—or as he termed it, against any such partial operation—saying that success was alone to be expected from general and not from partial measures'—Fauche added, 'that the affair of Strasbourg was never brought to any maturity, nor was there ever any thing really solid to go upon in the whole negotiation.'

This differs widely from the contents of the Prince of Condé's letters on that subject—and makes one by no means regret having withheld the funds that he applied for so earnestly, when he represented his getting possession of Strasbourg as reduced to a certainty.

To the 3rd. he answered:—

'That Pichegru said, the Prince of Condé had better remain where he now is for the present—viz. at Bühl and in that neighbourhood, as in that situation he is always able to march to any point that circumstances may require.'

I repeatedly asked him if Pichegru wished the Prince to cross the Rhine now, and to be at Spire and in that neighbourhood—He invariably answered 'No—quite the contrary—for Pichegru had observed that such a movement taking place at present might create suspicions.'

General Barbançon, who is stationed by the Prince of Condé at Marshal Wurmser's Head Quarters, tells me, that in the Evening of the day on which I had seen Fauche, he said precisely the contrary to him (the General), as to the Prince's passing the Rhine—But he constantly persevered with me in the same answer—This may be an inaccuracy of General Barbançon's.

To the 4th he answered:—

'That upon being questioned to this point Pichegru had always said, that he was sure of Jourdan but never entered into particulars—However, that he knew Pichegru had gone from Manheim the latter end of October or beginning of November, (he could not speak positively to the exact date) and met Jourdan at Worms—at which time he concludes they had a conference upon the subject of Pichegru's supposed intentions.'

Now here Fauche is detected in a very great inaccuracy, to say the least of it. Because at the period in question Jourdan had just crossed the Rhine at Neuwied, Cologne, &c. after his retreat from before Mayence, and it is a certain fact that he was then with his Army, making preparations for advancing to the Hundsruck. Of course therefore he could not have been at Worms.

I questioned Fauche repeatedly on this point (without giving him the least hint of my suspicions), and he persevered in the same answer.

To the fifth he answered :—

'That Pichegru, though cold and reserved in his manner, had talked much against the existing Government—That he said it was impossible for France to go on any longer without a King—That the Prince of Condé might be that King if he chose—That He (Pichegru) was resolved to support the Royal against the Republican cause—but that the manner of doing it must be left to himself—That His Army was firmly attached to him—That he intended to make them declare themselves as soon as circumstances should render such an avowal of their principles prudent—And that the *Pear was now nearly ripe*—However, he protested against any partial operation, and expressed himself decidedly against delivering up a Fortress.'

The rest of Fauche's conversation consisted in the commonplace accounts of discontent in the Army—Desertion into the Country—Want of Money, &c. &c.—I questioned him a little with respect to the manner of employing the money that had been intrusted to him—and he informed me, that he had given but a small part to Pichegru, having distributed the rest amongst many of the Officers of his Army.

I must own to You that I have my doubts as to this man's veracity—In one instance, viz. his answer to the 1st query, You will observe, that he is detected in a great, and very important inaccuracy indeed—Nor can I conceive that a man of Pichegru's prudence and wisdom, if he is really well inclined, would have allowed Fauche to distribute money in his Army—because the very circumstance of a Swiss Merchant living about Pichegru's Head Quarters and giving money upon any pretext whatever, could not fail to cause suspicion—This therefore creates a doubt in my mind either on Pichegru's or Fauche's account.

All Pichegru's reasoning respecting the danger and perhaps futility of partial operations in this Quarter, and

his objections against giving up a Fortress, or taking any step which though not important enough to insure his success, would be sufficient to discover his intentions, appear to me to be what one might expect from a wise, prudent, and experienced man, who waits patiently till the opportunity arrives of striking his blow effectually—But how does it agree with what the Prince of Condé has so often said of his willingness to deliver up a Fortress?

In short, I assure you I have many doubts respecting this affair—But whether the suspicions ought to fall upon the accuracy of the Prince of Condé and Fauche, or whether upon the reality of Pichegru's good intentions, I must leave to be decided by You, who are certainly in possession of better information on those subjects than I am. I have thought it necessary to state to You the above facts, in order that You may have every material that I can furnish You with which may be in any way assistant towards enabling You to form Your opinion upon so delicate and extraordinary a matter.

Believe me ever Most sincerely Yours

C. CRAUFURD.

Mr. Wickham to Mr. Liston and to Mr. Baldwin.

(Draft.) Lausanne: 22nd Jan. 1796.

Sir,—I have the Honour to inform you that a Mr. Beauchamp, Nephew of the late titular Bishop of Babylon, is now at Venice on his road to execute a mission of importance from the French Republic to the Iman of Muscate. I have reason to believe that among other objects he is principally to endeavour to obtain an exclusive commerce in that Port for the French subjects and their allies, to establish a more regular communication between Europe and the East Indies by land for their own couriers, to intercept those of the English East India Company, and to extend the sale of the Coffee of the Isles of France and

Bourbon in the Ports of the Red Sea, so as that they may penetrate into the Levant hereafter in such abundance as to affect the sale of the West India Berries, from which it may reasonably be inferred that the French Government consider the future possession of their West India Islands as very precarious.

Mr. Beauchamp is now waiting at Venice for the presents intended for the Iman. Fortunately a Mr. Meynier, who was the Bearer of them (as well as of those intended for Constantinople) has been arrested on his road at Basle at the request of M. Barthelemy on a charge of having embezzled a part of them. The journey of Mr. Beauchamp will probably therefore be sufficiently delayed to allow of measures being taken to counteract the effect of his mission. I should hope this letter would reach you in time for you to inform the Residents at the different British Factories in those countries of the object of his Journey.

I have reason to believe that he has a particular mission for Balsora and another for Bagdat, where he formerly resided.

I have written to Sir Richard Worsley at Venice to request that he would forward to you any further information that he might procure concerning this gentleman and particularly of the moment of his intended departure and of the route he intends to follow.

I believe he is himself a well-disposed man and no ways attached to the present Government in France I believe also that he has no hopes of success in his present mission. You will be the best judge whether any advantage can be taken of this favourable disposition.

George Baldwin.

The Avoyer de Steiguer to Mr. Wickham.*

Berne, le 25 Janvier 1796.

Monsieur,—Si j'ai été vivement affecté des soupçons que, des insinuations étrangères, sans doute, ont cherché à mettre, dans le Publiq, au sujet de votre séjour à Laussanne, je ne le suis pas moins, Monsieur, de l'extrême sensibilité que vous en témoignez.

Je suis aussi indigné que vous pouvez l'être des Bruits, qui ont, pendant quelques moments, pu inquiéter un Publiq, depuis trop longtemps agité par les convulsions de la Révolution françoise, pour ne pas recevoir sans examen tout ce qu'on leur dit menacer sa tranquillité.

Trop rapproché des objets qui occupent ce Publiq, le Gouvernement, constitué comme il l'est, peut difficilement prévenir, que quelque membre n'en parle dans ses Assemblées.

Voilà, Monsieur, précisément notre cas; mais dans les ordres donnés par le Gouvernement d'approfondir la source des Bruits qui courroient, de transport d'armes, de poudre, d'argent, par le Canton, en France, vous n'êtes pas nommé, Monsieur, ni dessigné sous aucun rapport.

Nous avons trop de preuves de l'Intérêt que S. M. B. daigne prendre, dans ces tems orageux, à notre Conservation et à notre tranquillité, de votre Zèle, Monsieur, à remplir les vues bienfaisantes du Roy, pour que vous ayez jamais à craindre quelque manque d'égard pour la Couronne Britannique, ou de confiance pour un Ministre qui, comme Vous, Monsieur, en faittes si dignement et avec autant d'aplaudissement toutes les fonctions.

Mais vous, vivant dans un tems où les soupçons et les insinuations insidieuses sont partout à l'ordre du jour—

* Nicolas Frédéric de Steiguer, born 1729 of a Patrician family of Berne. A man of the highest capacity, of antique patriotism, and one of the most illustrious of the heroes of Switzerland. Died 1799.

leur donner de l'importance, quand on peut les mépriser, est en quelque sorte en attaquer la Suisse.

Vous joueriez, Monsieur, à coup sûr, le jeu desautheurs de ces Bruits, si, trop Sensible, vous faisiez de cela une affaire ministériale qui, obtenant par ça une Considération et un Eclat qu'elle ne peut jamais mériter, compromettroit peut-être votre Cour, notre Gouvernement, vous-même, Monsieur, et sûrement tous vos amis. Et voilà, je n'en doute pas, ce qu'on s'est proposé. Venez donc, Monsieur, je vous en conjure, nous aider à déconcerter tous ces sinistres projets. Votre présence seule les détruira à l'instant même.

Les preuves les moins équivoques, de notre respect et de notre Vénération pour le Roy et l'Empire Britannique, comme de notre confiance particulière pour Votre Personne, Vous convaincront toujours, Monsieur, et convaincront S. M. B. combien le Gouvernement désire conserver un Ministre qui nous est cher, et qui jouit unanimement de l'estime et de la considération générale.

Recevez, Monsieur, avec votre bonté ordinaire, ces réflexions, dictées uniquement par mon amour pour ma patrie, le devoir de ma place, et par l'attachement aussi vrai qu'invariable que je vous ay voué.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec les sentiments de la plus haute et respectueuse considération, Monsieur, votre très-humble et très-obeyssant Serviteur,

DE STEIGUER, Avoyer.

MR. WICKHAM.

Prince de Condé to Mr. Wickham.

A Bühl, ce 27 Janvier 1796.

Je profite, Monsieur, de l'occasion de Lavignac, a qui Tissonnet mande de venir le trouver sur-le-champ, sans lui dire pourquoy, pour vous mettre un peu au fait de l'état des choses : non-seulement les vexations Autrichiennes continuent à nous persécuter (je ne parle que des Bureaux de l'armée, car pour la Cour, je suis fort loin d'avoir à

m'en plaindre), mais M. le Margrave s'en est aussi mêlé, d'une manière très-malhonnête ; aussi les Bourbons se priveront-ils, de *l'insigne honneur* d'être ses Courtisans ; ceci est une petite épisode fort indifférente aux affaires ; je ne vous ennuyerai pas de ses détails. Vous devez savoir que *toute* ma Cavalerie Noble a été envoyée dans le pays de Rothenbourg, pour la faire vivre, dit-on, mais dans le fait, par l'influence toujours supérieure des sous-ordres malveillants ; cette séparation, qui n'avoit jamais eu lieu depuis 5 ans, m'a été pénible ; la rupture possible de la trève, vu le succès de nos projets, dont je ne cache rien au Généraux Autrichiens, m'auroient paru des raisons, de ne pas m'enlever une *grande* partie de ma *petite* force ; depuis cet ordre, et même avant, il a été question de nous établir, avec ce qui me reste, à la rive gauche du Rhin, du côté de Spire, Baptiste [Pichegru] le désiroit, et par les nouvelles que j'ai reçu hier du N° 1 [Strasbourg], le désire encore, mais cela n'a rien fait, et nous avons reçu l'ordre de nous fixer ici, où nous ne sommes pas mal, d'ailleurs, tant que les deux cas que je viens de dire, n'existeront pas. Baptiste toujours excellent, et qui ne varie pas, quoiqu'il aye rejetté l'entreprise sur le N° 1, fait tout ce qu'il peut, à ce qu'il paroît, pour faire prononcer sa destitution, qu'il regarderoit vraisemblablement comme un moyen d'éclater ; il a tenu sur les fonds de baptême un enfant baptisé par un Prêtre non-jureur ; il s'est absenté de son armée, le jour de l'horrible fête ordonnée pour célébrer l'anniversaire de l'assassinat de Louis 16 ; vous conviendrez que tout cela ne doit plaire, ni aux impies ni aux Régicides ; le Général Oudinot, Patriote pris devant Manheim, et s'en retournant sur la parole, par les derrierres de l'armée, en passant à Hechingen, a demandé à parler à un officier de mon armée, qui s'y trouvoit pour les remontes ; après les plus grandes protestations qu'il pensoit comme nous, il l'a chargé spécialement de me dire, *que je pouvois compter sur Baptiste*, ce qui prouve que ce dernier ne se cache pas trop de ses intentions, et ce qui me confirme dans l'opinion qu'il est de bonne

s rien ne finit; le Jacobinisme et la Terreur, nger les esprits, mais en subjuguant les provinces, ient leur empire; il n'y a que la présence d'une armée, qui puisse faire renaître le courage des opprimés, et réprimer la férocité des oppresseurs; l'Alsace est toujours meilleure que jamais, avec la même aversion cependant pour Changes de domination; l'évènement que nous désirons, accorderoit vraisemblablement tout; du moins il faut s'en flatter, car la même disposition, grâce aux soins de Baptiste, est dans sa famille, comme dans le peuple. Je suis bien en peine de savoir où vous en êtes là-bas, et j'écris à Tissonnet de ne rien faire sur toutes choses, que de concert avec vous, ou par les ordres de Vérone; il sembleroit par une de ses lettres, qu'il va éclater avant 15 jours; apparemment que vous auriez jugé que c'est le moment; mais je ne puis le croire, car vous m'en auriez vraisemblablement averti; Baptiste a été affecté, (car je suis son confident intime) des arrestations de Bezançon, parmi lesquelles il s'est trouvé un Ecclésiastique de ses amis; il m'a fait dire, (comme Louis [Fauche Borel] ne vous l'aura pas laissé ignorer) qu'il étoit à peu près sûr de sa Cavalerie, et qu'il travailloit le reste; les choses en sont là; et malgré l'ordre qu'on m'assure que le Directoire a donné, de reprendre toute la rive gauche du Rhin, coûte que coûte, je suis persuadé que tout ira bien, si l'on favorise mes négociations, en les appuyant par une force prête à les soutenir; mais si les souverains se laissent aveugler par le désir, par cette apparence de gloire plus brillante que *solide*, de s'aggrandir le plus possible, si les prétentions ne sont pas *modérées* au-delà des Mers, et *nulles* pour le Continent de la France, l'Europe se trouvera bientôt plus dévastée par le triomphe et le torrent des opinions erronnées, que par la continuation de la guerre la plus juste, et la plus importante qu'il y eût jamais, pour l'existence de la société humaine; pardon, Monsieur; de cette digression fort inutile, surtout vis-à-vis de vous, dont le Gouvernement éclairé sait sûrement mieux qu'un autre,

combien il est du devoir des vrais hommes [illegible] s'occuper autant de l'estime et du bonheur des gé[illegible] futures, que des applaudissements momentanés [illegible] contemporains.

J'attens des nouvelles de vos cantons, avec l'impatience que vous pouvez croire, et je me flatte que vous rendrez justice, Monsieur, à tous les sentiments d'estime, de confiance, et d'amitié, que vous avez su m'inspirer à si juste titre.

LOUIS-JOSEPH DE BOURBON.

Colonel Craufurd to Mr. Wickham.

Manheim: 29th Jan^{y}, 96.

My dear Wickham,—Enclosed is a letter from me to the P. of Condé and the Pamphlet that it alludes to. I am sure you will think I have done right.

Yours ever,

C. CRAUFURD.

Colonel Craufurd to the Prince de Condé.

(Copy.) À Manheim, ce 27 Janvier 1796.

Monseigneur,—Je viens de voir par hazard une addresse aux François qui sort du Quartier-Général de V. A. S. Et indépendamment de la surprise que j'ai dû ressentir en voyant une publication de ce genre sans que V. A. S. m'eût fait l'honneur de me communiquer ses intentions, je ne sçaurois me dispenser de faire quelques observations sur deux passages. Le premier se trouve en page 5; sçavoir—'*Et n'auriez-vous subjugué l'Europe?*' &c. Le second se trouve en page 8; sçavoir—'*Soldats François, vous avez fait trembler l'Europe,*' &c.

J'ai toujours été d'avis que de flatter l'amour propre de l'armée, et la piquer d'honneur, étoit le plus sûr moyen de la ramener. Mais, Monseigneur, en ayant recours à ce moyen-là, il ne faut pas perdre de vue tout ménagement pour les Puissances qui soutiennent votre cause avec tant de générosité et à tant de frais. Les expressions que je viens de citer sont faites (quoique certainement sans intention de la part de V. A. S.) autant que

[redacted]our offenser ces Puissances-là. Et je ne puis jamais [redacted]e qu'une telle publication soit mise en jour sans pro[redacted]ontre de la manière la plus solennelle et la plus forte, [redacted]ans prévenir Votre Altesse Sérénissime qu'elle ne peut produire qu'un très-mauvais effet chez les Puissances qui ont certainement les droits les plus forts à la reconnoissance de la Noblesse Françoise.

Si les expressions dont il est question renfermoient des vérités, elles ne seroient pas moins offensantes. Et puisqu'elles ne le font certainement pas, elles ont l'air de vouloir à toute force diminuer l'éclat des grands efforts et des succès si brillants des Alliés, pour relever celui des armes ennemies.

Je vous fais, Monseigneur, ces observations de la manière que ma situation auprès de V. A. S. autorise, et avec toute la franchise que les bontés que V. A. S. a bien voulu avoir pour moi m'inspirent.

Au reste, Monseigneur, j'espère que je réussirai à empêcher que V. A. S. ne fasse une démarche qui pourroit être si nuisible à sa cause et à ses propres intérêts.

Mr. Wickham to General Pichegru.

(Draft.) Le 30 Jan. 96.

Je viens de voir le voyageur, Louis [Fauche Borel]. Je suis on ne peut pas être plus content du rapport qu'il m'a donné et de son voyage et de votre santé. Ménagez-la, je vous en prie, pour l'amour de tous, et surtout de votre nombreuse et malheureuse famille, dont l'état actuel m'a vivement affecté. Comptez sur moi pour tous les services que je serai en état de leur rendre. Du moins n'auront-ils rien à craindre dans les premiers moments. Je pourvoirai à tous leurs besoins, ce qui doit vous tranquilliser vous-même dans le cas que votre maison résout à suspendre ses engagements actuels. Quand mon ami ou le bon vieillard qui vous a fait écrire par Louis trouvent bon de me demander, je me rendrai dans vos cantons, où j'aurai le plaisir le plus sincère à vous voir, et à vous témoigner de vive voix tous les sentiments dont je suis pénétré pour vous et mon admiration des

efforts généreux et honorables que vous voulez [redacted] pour relever votre famille de l'état étroit et péni[redacted] a plu à la bonne Providence de les placer moment[redacted] sans doute pour les rendre à l'avenir plus dignes de [redacted] bénédiction.

Je dois, cependant, vous avertir que, comme le voyage est long, les chemins mauvais, et qu'il me faudra peut-être deux jours pour me préparer, vous ferez bien d'avertir le bon vieillard à tems, qui me fera arriver tout de suite.

On ne me paroît pas sans inquiétudes de côté de la maison Rougemont (?); pour moi, je suis extrêmement tranquille, et parfaitement disposé à laisser le tout à votre prudence, dont vous avez donné déjà tant de preuves.

Malgré vos malheurs et ceux de votre famille, qui doivent vous être encore plus sensibles, je ne peux dans ce moment qu'envier votre sort.

Dans l'espérance de vous embrasser bientôt, je vous prie de me compter parmi les meilleurs et les plus fidèles de vos amis. BLUET [Mr. Wickham.]

P. S. Je vous prie de me donner au plus tôt un apperçu approximatif aussi exact et détaillé que les circonstances le permettront de tous vos besoins.

Colonel Craufurd to Mr. Wickham.

Manheim: 2nd Feby, 1796.

My dear Wickham, — I send you copy of another letter from me to the Prince of Condé relative to the Pamphlet about which I wrote to you on the 29th of last month. I cannot send you his letter, to which mine is an answer, because there are things in it that I cannot trust to the post. He wrote to me very strongly, protesting against all responsibility; calling his past conduct in proof of his good intentions, &c., but said that he had desired the Pamphlet not to be circulated.

Yours ever, C. CRAUFURD.

Colonel Craufurd to the Prince de Condé.

À Manheim, 31 Janv. 1796.

Monseigneur!—J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que Votre Altesse Sérénissime m'a fait celui de m'écrire en datte du 29 de ce mois, et je m'empresse d'y répondre.

Certainement, Monseigneur, personne n'est plus convaincu que moi de la droiture et de la loyauté de Votre Altesse Sérénissime; personne n'est plus que moi pénétré de vénération pour Elle, et personne ne sçait plus que moi admirer Sa grande et digne conduite—Sa fermeté à toute épreuve au milieu de tant de dangers, et Sa constance sans égal dans Ses malheurs. Avec ces sentiments donc, Monseigneur, qui sont véritablement ceux de mon cœur, ce seroit difficile que je reprochasse à Votre Altesse Sérénissime l'intention de faire une démarche qui fût calculée exprès pour offenser les puissances qui ont tant fait pour soutenir Votre cause. Je suis bien persuadé, Monseigneur, que Vous n'en êtes pas capable; mais quelquefois, en lisant les écrits sur un sujet qui nous intéresse très-vivement, on n'envisage que l'objet que l'on veut atteindre, l'effet que l'on veut produire, et on ne pèse pas les expressions autant que sa position rend peut-être nécessaire. On est naturellement échauffé par l'espérance de réussir dans ses vues, et on n'aime rien rabattre sur le moyen qu'on croit être celui qui doit assurer le succès. C'est une raison entre autres pourquoi, Monseigneur, je le regarde comme essentiel que Votre Altesse Sérénissime honore Msr. Wickham ou moi, mais plutôt le premier, au point de nous consulter avant de mettre en jour une publication sur les affaires qui concernent les Alliés. Nous serions alors à même de faire nos refflections sur les passages qui auroient pu par hazard échapper à l'observation de Votre Altesse Sérénissime, et par ce moyen-là on éviteroit peut-être des mésentendues.

Le jugement du plus éclairé est souvent aidé par le foible avis de ceux qui lui sont très-inférieurs, surtout lorsqu'il s'agit d'un sujet sur lequel ces derniers sont censés pouvoir penser avec plus de sang-froid, quoiqu'ils s'y intéressent de cœur et d'âme.

J'accepte avec infiniment de reconnoissance, Monseigneur, tout le conseil que Votre Altesse Sérénissime veut bien me faire l'honneur de me donner. Je suis extrêmement flatté par cette marque de la bienveillance d'un Personage si illustre, et je plis

volontiers devant un esprit si supérieur au mien ; ma[illegible] présent cas, permettez, Monseigneur, que je Vous obse[illegible] ce ne fut jamais mon intention de protester contre une p[illegible] tion *anonyme*, ni de donner par mes représentations de [illegible] portance et d'éclat aux brochures de cette foule d'écrivains ordinaires que l'on ne peut que mépriser ; en particulier, je ne ferois certainement pas une démarche si peu digne d'un homme qui devroit avoir d'autres occupations ; et si je le faisois dans mon caractère publique, je croirois manquer au Roi mon Maître, qui daigne m'honorer de l'exécution de Ses ordres.

Je ne pouvois jamais, Monseigneur, regarder la publication dont il est question comme une brochure *purement anonyme dans toute l'étendue du terme*, car quoiqu'elle ne fût signée de personne, elle a été écrite au Quartier-Général de Votre Altesse Sérénissime, et a été imprimée dans Son imprimerie, et elle a été envoyée par Ses ordres, pour être distribuée ; elle étoit donc au moins protégée. Et comme je ne pouvois jamais me douter qu'une pareille chose fût imprimée dans l'imprimerie du Quartier-Général de Votre Altesse Sérénissime sans Sa permission, ce ne fût qu'à Elle que je devois m'addresser au sujet de certaines expressions lesquelles je ne pouvois pas passer sous silence. L'évidence de la fausseté de ces expressions, comme dit très-bien Votre Altesse Sérénissime, est éclatante ; mais si je disais des injures de quelqu'un sans qu'il les méritât, il en seroit certainement offensé, quelque injustes qu'elles fussent. Si j'avois trouvé cette pièce par hazard chez le libraire, je l'aurais lue, comme j'ai lu plusieurs autres, sans faire la moindre attention aux deux passages en question, excepté peut-être en les titrant de Jactance. Mais le moment qu'une pièce quelconque sort de l'imprimerie de Votre Altesse Sérénissime, qui a des relations si immédiates avec les puissances Alliées, elle doit nécessairement exciter toute mon attention, parce qu'elle ne peut plus être indifférante ; et quoiqu'elle ne soit pas honorée, Monseigneur, de l'illustre Nom des Bourbons, elle ne peut qu'être censée protégée par Votre Altesse Sérénissime ; paroissant donc sous ce titre-là, ni ma Cour ni la Cour de Vienne pouroient jamais supposer que je n'en eusse pas connoissance. Après avoir considéré, Monseigneur, ce que je viens de vous sousmettre, je ne doute guère que Votre Altesse Sérénissime ne me rende justice, et Elle sera sûrement d'avis que je n'aie fait que mon devoir en Lui faisant les représentations que renfermoit ma dernière.

[redacted] rien au monde, Monseigneur, que je ne ferois pas [redacted]ter l'exécution des vues de Votre Altesse Sérénissime [redacted] mes ordres à cet effet, et je ne vois pas la moindre [redacted]tion contre la distribution de tous les petits écrits possibles entre l'armée de Pichegru, pourvu seulement que ces écrits ne renferment pas des expressions du genre de celles dont il est question; car je ne puis jamais consentir de mon côté à la publication de propos qui sont si offensante pour ma Nation et ses Alliés. D'ailleurs, on peut sans cela flatter suffisamment l'amour propre de l'armée ennemie; mais avant de rien publier à l'avenir, j'ose proposer à Votre Altesse Sérénissime de bien vouloir consulter au moins M. Wickham, qui certainement ne donnera jamais de mauvais conseil. Ce n'est nullement contre l'idée de travailler l'Armée Ennemie que je suis, mais je voudrois seulement y mettre le ménagement nécessaire, ce qui cadre, je suis sûr, avec la façon de penser de Votre Altesse Sérénissime.

Au reste, Monseigneur, la brochure en question me paroît très-analogue à la chose, à quelques expressions près qui peuvent en être distraites sans l'affoiblir, ce qui alors l'appropriéroit à la circonstance en détruisant tout l'inconvéniant. Je ne doute pas que M. Wickham ne soit du même avis.

Lord Macartney to Mr. Wickham.

Verona: February 2nd, 1796.

Dear Sir,—I am to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th of January, inclosing one for Sir Richard Worsley, (which I forwarded immediately) and the extract of your dispatch to Sir Morton Eden of the 18th November.

As Mr. Bayard was very desirous of proceeding to Venice with the utmost expedition, I detained him as short a time as possible; long enough, however, to learn from him the principal matters alluded to in your letter, and a general idea of the state of things in those places which he had lately visited. I expect him back to-morrow, and hope to have some more conversation with him, as he seems intelligent, temperate, and an impartial as well as an attentive observer. In the mean

time, I shall mention a few things, which perh[illegible] may be perfectly acquainted with. Charette appe[illegible] be the principal favorite here, being personally kn[illegible] to one or two persons, who, though not Ministers, are not without a degree of credit. He is, it is said, a *Gentleman by birth*, which circumstance is of no small weight at this little Court. He has also served in the Navy, and is conceived from the part he has been able to act for so considerable a space of time past, to possess great talents, both civil and military. His letters, though not elegantly, are well written, and indicate the man of business; and he appears to go to the Point, without stumbling at difficulties, or chicaning for terms. He seems conscious of his superior abilities, and therefore will not relish an equality, much less a preference in Stofflet, but he does Justice to Stofflet, and I understand they are now likely to draw well together. Charette is a Lieutenant General, and we understand that Stofflet is satisfied with the rank of Marechal de Camp, which was some time since conferred on him. The Cordon Rouge was sent at the same time to Charette, but he says that, however flattered by the distinction, he does not mean to wear it, at least for the present, as it would excite envy with regard to himself and might lay the King under inconveniences with regard to others, who might wish for the same honor.

From a number of papers transmitted here by the Duc de Harcourt, who received them from Monsieur Count D'Artois, when at the Isle Dieu, and which I believe were laid before My Lord Grenville, it appeared that there was a very numerous, and formidable body of Men in Poictou and Britany, but particularly in the latter, regularly organized, and commanded by able Officers, and their subalterns directed by a regular Council, and acting under their instructions; that part of them had arms, and the rest, who had them not, were trained to the use of them, and all equally zealous in the

[redacted]ause, and impatient to avenge it. People here are [redacted]ore persuaded, that if the Count D'Artois, but still [redacted]re if the King also, could contrive to get into Britany, or the Vendée, and were well supported from England, the most reasonable hopes of success might be entertained; but whatever of this kind may be intended at home, a considerable time must elapse, before it can be put in execution. In the mean while, Monsieur has been sent to reside at Holyrood House in Scotland, in order to secure his person against arrest for debt, and there he must remain till means are found for enabling him to go at large. It was proposed that the King of Sardinia, his Father in Law, should invest him with a diplomatic Character which, you know, would by the Statute of Queen Anne fully answer the purpose, but this was flatly refused by the Court of Turin, which, I think, sufficiently exposed their nakedness, timidity, and propensities. Recourse has been since had to the Empress of Russia, to grant a credential of this kind to Monsieur, and I think I know that great Lady too well to doubt of her agreeing to it. It will be a fine decoration to the diplomatic archives of Muscovy to inrol a presumptive heir of the french monarchy, a Sprig of Charlemagne's Crown, in her list of Embassadors. She will scarcely let slip the opportunity of sticking such a feather in her Imperial Cap. A little before Monsieur was sent to Scotland, he dispatched Monsieur de Moutier to Britany with very ample powers, and instructions to act in his Affairs there, which powers, and instructions were laid before My Lord Grenville, whose note thereupon to the Duke de Harcourt, with the Duke's in return, I now inclose to you. It has probably been sent to you, but if not, the communication from me is a secret between us. You must be a better judge than I can pretend to be, what effects may result from this, in Britany, and your neighbourhood. Our little Court here don't seem to be so much alarmed either by the note, or by the King's

message to his Parliament, as I should have ex[redacted] but it arises from their firm, and I am disposed to t[redacted] their well grounded conviction, that no peace is pr[redacted] ticable before another Campaign. Whatever happens whether a continuation of the War, or a protracted suspension of hostility, I have no great expectation of any thing very effectual from the management of the Court o Vienna. I judge, however, from general appearanc only, for though I sometimes receive letters from Si Morton Eden, they have seldom yet contained any thin very satisfactory to my mind. They are all written in his own hand, (not a line in cypher) sent by the common post, and bear the appearance of being opened in their passage. With regard to the people about the King, however displeased with the Court of Vienna, yet they are discreet, and reserved enough on its subject in their common discourse, though in private conversation with me they very plainly discover their Sentiments, but if other frenchmen talk freely of the projects of the House of Austria, they do so without any authority or countenance, as far as I can learn; but to stop the intemperance of an Emigré's tongue would require more power than was ever possessed by Louis the 14th, or indeed any Monarchs whosoever, at their acmé of Dominion.

The Duc de la Vauguyon, who is a man of business, and of considerable abilities, takes the lead here at present, but the Count de St. Priest, Uncle of Mr. d'Antraigues, is soon expected as his Auxiliary in the management of Affairs. How far they may agree together is a matter of doubt; before the late subversion, I understand that they had very little connexion with one another. As the Duke de la Vauguyon never mentioned his Son the Prince de Carency to me, I was cautious of asking him any questions on his Subject, but I am just informed, that the latter is expected here immediately *from Munich* to join his Father.

Some time ago, a Mr. de Castellas a Gentleman of one

[redacted]ost powerful families at Fribourg, passing through [redacted]n his way to Naples, told the King, that he would [redacted]t with a favorable reception in that Canton, if he chose to reside there; I wrote this to My Lord Grenville, but I am since assured, that though the general disposition there is perfectly good, yet there is a considerable party in opposition to the Castellas family, who would strongly oppose such a measure. I wish to know your opinion upon this. If the Court of Vienna continues obstinate in refusing the french King such an Asylum, as he desires, and Fribourg could receive him, I presume he would be in perfect security, as long as he resided there, would be near the sources of good intelligence, and might from thence get speedily into France, if his presence were thought necessary by any considerable party in a situation to support him.

The Regiment of Rolle, and the corps under the Duc de Caylus's direction, crossed through this territory to Mantua in the course of last week, without any unpleasant occurrence. I suppose you know the objection made at Venice, and that in consequence they were to have marched to Trieste, and embark there—but the delay, expence, desertion and other casualties, together with the difficult embarkation at Trieste, and subsequent risk of the Voyage, striking my mind very forcibly, I hit upon a method, which happily succeeded, and secured their passage without committing either the Venetian Government, or myself. They must now proceed to Civita Vecchia, unless the Great Duke of Tuscany can be prevailed upon to grant, or connive at their going directly to take shipping at Leghorn. The whole number of effectives does not exceed 1800 Men, but the number of women accompanying them is much beyond the usual proportion. Colonel Durler told me he had encouraged the recruiting of Ladies, as much as possible, with an eye to the future population of Corsica, which Island is said to be much in want of good Subjects.

Stofflet's letter was a very proper one, and I easily have taken a copy of it myself, or obtained o the time you sent it me, if I had known your wishes, I am afraid it is now too late.

Whatever new powers might be necessary for the Prince of Condé, would, I believe, be granted readily enough, but it is now generally believed here, that his Army is to be incorporated into that of Wurmser, and consequently His Highness reduced to a mere Austrian Instrument, without spring, point, or edge, but what comes from the Vienna shop. I nevertheless much doubt the truth of this intelligence, as, though I can't trace it to its true source, I know that it does not come from the Prince of Condé himself.

With regard to Mounier &c., I understand that he made certain offers here of his services, and those of his friends, but they were not much listened to. They were considered, as neither properly disposed to do what was wanted, nor able to do it, if well disposed. Mounier, you know, is gone into Saxony to superintend the education of some Gentleman there, I forget whom. With regard to D'André he is looked upon as a very able man, and as capable of being very useful, if in any office of trust at Paris, or in the Provinces, but at present he is not thought to have much more weight than any other emigrant of his Class. People here don't seem to think that there are many frenchmen *out* of France, that can serve them very essentially *in* France.

As Mr. Bayard will not be returned from his second trip to Venice before I leave this place, I must now close my letter and refer you to him for such further information relative to Verona and Venice, as he can furnish you with.

Having obtained permission from home to make an excursion for a few weeks, I propose setting out for Rome, via Ferrara, Rimini, Ancona, &c., in three or four days but I shall certainly return in the course of next month.

[redacted]mean time, any letter, addressed to me at Mr. [redacted]ni's at Verona, will be taken proper care of, and [redacted]warded to me.

I have the honor to be, with sincere regard and esteem, dear Sir, your most obedient and most faithful humble Servant,

MACARTNEY.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq., at Lausanne.

P.S.—I forgot to mention to you that a part of Mr. de Moutier's instructions is to try Mr. de Puisaye, against whom there are many very serious accusations. From Mr. de Moutier's general character, I should hope that he would conduct himself with prudence, and address in the execution of his Commission, either by immediate activity, or by proper delay according to the circumstances.

M.

(No. 3.) *Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.*

Downing Street: 9th February 1796.

Sir,—Having already apprized You of the Terms and Nature of the Message which His Majesty has been graciously pleased to send to His Parliament, on the Subject of Negotiation with France, I now inclose to You, the Copies of a Paper published in the Name of the Executive Directory at Paris, and of a Message addressed by that Body to the two Branches of the Legislature there.

There are but too many Reasons to apprehend from the Terms of these Papers, especially the last, and still more from such Information as has lately been received, respecting the present State of Parties at Paris, and the Character and Views of the present Leaders there, that the Conclusion of a Peace on such Terms as would satisfy the just Expectations of His Majesty, and His Allies, and provide for the general Interests of Europe, is still at a Distance: His Majesty has therefore determined to

continue the most active and extensive Prepara[redacted] prosecuting the War, in Concert with His Allies, an[redacted] Vigour and Energy in all its Parts. And my ot[redacted] Dispatches of this Date, will inform You of the Directions which His Majesty is pleased to give for the Regulation of Your Conduct in this respect, and for enabling You to continue those Exertions which You have hitherto made with such distinguished Zeal and Ability.

But His Majesty's Servants have submitted to His Majesty, their humble Opinion that, while on the one Hand every Exertion should be made for the vigorous Prosecution of the War, it will, on the other hand, be conformable to His Majesty's Sentiments of Humanity, and to His Paternal Care for the Welfare of His Subjects, that proper Steps should be taken to ascertain whether there really exists on the Part of the present Government in France, any Disposition towards the Negotiation and Conclusion of a general Peace on such Grounds, as would be fit to be proceeded upon by His Majesty and His Allies. In order, that if such Disposition should be found to exist, His Majesty and His Allies might be enabled to enter, without Delay, and in Concert with each other, upon the great Work of a general Pacification; and that, if, on the contrary, the same Principles and Views which induced the Leaders in France to commence unprovoked Hostilities against so many of the Powers of Europe, should unhappily still be found to direct their Councils and Conduct, it may be apparent to all Europe, that the Continuation of the Calamities of War can be attributed to the same Cause only to which they owed their Origin, and that His Majesty and His Allies, have omitted nothing on their Part, by which the War, into which they were originally forced by the Aggression of France, might be terminated on just secure and honorable Grounds.

I am now to convey to You, His Majesty's Commands, that immediately after the Receipt of this Dispatch, You

communicate the Contents of it in Confidence to Ministers of such of the Allied Powers, as have Ministers resident in Switzerland, and that after having so done, you should then proceed to transmit to Monsieur Barthelemy a Copy of the inclosed Note, either signed separately by yourself and in His Majesty's name only, or conjointly with such of the Ministers of the Allied Powers as may be sufficiently authorized by their Courts to sign it, in the Name of their respective Sovereigns. For the purpose of its being safely delivered to M. Barthelemy, you are at liberty to make use at your discretion, of the intervention of any of the Magistrates of any of the Swiss Cantons; carefully explaining to such Magistrates that your request extends no further than to the delivery of a Paper which you wish to communicate to M. Barthelemy and not to any interference of any sort, with respect to the Contents or Subject of it. And if any of the Ministers of the Allies shall be ready to concur with you in this measure in the Manner above mentioned, You will concert with them the time and manner of doing it, so as best to manifest the Union and Harmony, which so happily subsists between the Allies.

You will observe that the Note, which you are thus to transmit is intended to procure from the present Rulers at Paris, an Answer to the three Questions there stated—Viz. Whether there exists any disposition to open a Negotiation with His Majesty and His Allies for the Conclusion of a general Peace on just and suitable Terms by sending Plenipotentiaries for that Purpose to a Congress at such place as may be agreed upon hereafter? Or whether there is a disposition to communicate to His Majesty and His Allies the general Ground of Pacification which would be proposed by France, in order that His Majesty and His Allies may then have an opportunity to examine in Concert with each other, whether they afford any ground for such a Negotiation? Or thirdly whether

France has any other mode to propose for attaining the same object of a general Pacification?

You will understand that it is not intended to authorize you to receive from M. Barthelemy any other than a written Answer to these Questions, nor to enter into any personal Intercourse with him, and much less into any Sort of Negotiation or discussion of the Points to which the abovementioned Questions relate. You are even to decline any Interview with him in Case it should be proposed on his Part. And it is very necessary that you should distinctly explain your Instructions in that respect to the Ministers of the Allies with whom you may have to act on this Occasion, and keep them constantly informed of every Occurrence that may have relation to it. There are many Circumstances in the present Situation of Affairs which concur to prove, that the great Object of France continues to be, that of disuniting and separating the Allies, and these Attempts must therefore be counteracted by a more than ordinary Attention on their Part to remain firmly and inseparably united and to concert together, as far as possible, on every material Step which can affect the Continuation or Termination of the War. The Object of the present Overture is only to learn, whether France is disposed to treat for general Peace, and in what Manner. The mode of conducting any such Negotiation on the Part of the Allies so as to prevent the Intrigues of the Enemy from raising Misunderstandings and Jealousies among them must be the Object of a future Concert, and the details must in Part depend on the Choice which France may make between the Alternatives now presented to Her.

Whatever may be the Answer you may receive, you will immediately and without waiting for further Instructions from here, communicate it to the Ministers of the Allied Courts (or such of them as may be in Switzerland) and you will forward it to me by a Messenger for His Majesty's Information. You are not in the first instance

any Communication on this Subject to any except to the Ministers abovementioned. But if a different Line of Conduct should be observed by Monsieur Barthelemy or by other Persons of that Nation, and you should find that any Misrepresentations on the Subject are circulated in Switzerland, which may in their effect be injurious to the Interests or Honour of His Majesty or His Allies, You are then at liberty to explain the fact as it really is, to such Persons as you may think proper, taking care however not to publish any authorized declaration upon it without fresh Orders from hence.

I am, with great Truth and regard, Sir, your most obedient and humble Servant,

GRENVILLE.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

Note.

Les Sous-signés, &c. &c., sont autorisés à faire parvenir à M Barthelemi le désir de leurs Cours de savoir par son Canal les dispositions de la France, par rapport à l'objet d'une Pacification générale.

Ils demandent en conséquence à M. Barthelemi de leur transmettre par écrit (et après avoir pris les informations nécessaires) sa réponse aux Questions suivantes :—

1°. Est-on disposé en France à ouvrir une Négotiation avec Leurs Majestés Impériale et Britannique et Leurs Alliés pour le rétablissement d'une Paix générale sur des Conditions justes et convenables; en envoyant pour cet effet des Ministres à un Congrès à tel Endroit dont on pourra convenir ci-après?

2°. Seroit-on disposé à communiquer aux Sous-signés les bases générales d'une Pacification telles que la France voudroit les proposer, afin que Leurs Majestés Impériale et Britannique et Leurs Alliés puissent ensuite examiner de concert si elles sont de nature à pouvoir servir de fondement à une négotiation pacifique?

3°. Ou bien désireroit-on de proposer une autre Voie quelconque pour parvenir au même but d'une Pacification générale?

Les Sous-signés sont autorisés à recevoir de la Part de M. Barthelemi la réponse à ces Questions, et à la transmettre à leurs

Cours respectives: mais ils n'ont aucune autorité p
avec lui en Négotiation ou discussion sur ces Objets.
Fait à, &c.

Colonel Craufurd to Mr Wickham.

Manheim: 12th Feby., 1796.

My dear Wickham. . . . You desire now to know exactly my Opinion respecting Pichegru, and the probability of the Austrians aiding him in his plans.

With regard to forming any decided Opinion upon Pichegru's intentions, I must own it appears to me extremely difficult for there is a great deal to be said on both sides. But after having given the subject the most mature consideration that I am capable of, I am inclined to form the following Conclusion—viz., That he has not made up his mind as to the party that he will support—but he is endeavouring to gain the confidence of his army sufficiently to be able to dispose of it as he may think fit—and then at its head he intends perhaps to force the establishment of that form of Government which the time and circumstances may induce him to prefer.

This is, I think, the general object of his conduct—and in the mean time he keeps tampering with the Prince of Condé, cautiously avoiding, however, to commit himself too much. Observe that he invariably refuses to deliver up a fortress, or to take any step himself or allow any step to be taken by others that might bring things to an issue. And I should not be much surprised if he communicated to his Government the Correspondence that the Prince of Condé carries on with him. Not in the design of positively betraying the Royal Cause, but merely to prevent Suspicion falling on himself, because the moment that the Directory begins to mistrust him, they will remove him from the command and of course defeat his scheme of being the Arbiter of the fate of France at the head of his army. You will observe too that the act of revealing the Secret of this Correspondence whilst it would tend to pre-

[redacted]icion falling upon Pichegru and remove from him [redacted] of becoming a sacrifice to the indiscretion of the [redacted]grants could not accelerate any plan of the French Government, nor frustrate any of the Prince of Condé—because Pichegru *of himself* has refused to execute any thing that the Prince has proposed to him, and the Directory cannot do more—for no names are mentioned in the Correspondence, therefore no persons can suffer in consequence of it—and nothing is said, I believe, in any of the letters that relates to any other part of the Country but that immediately under Pichegru's direction. He has lately again pressed the Prince to remain where he is at present—evidently because the Condé army passing the Rhine during the suspension of hostilities would naturally create alarm upon the part of the French Government, which is the thing of all others that he must of course wish to avoid.

Whilst he is playing this double game, or rather whilst he is taking every step to retain his command, he neglects nothing that may contribute to the success of his Army, and to the increase of his military reputation. He exerts himself I understand as much as possible to prepare things in the best manner for the Opening of the Campaign —and through Mouchet, who, you know, corresponds from Strasbourg with Marshal Wurmser and the Prince of Condé, he has frequently asked for an exact state of the Austrian Army. Now this state is certainly of consequence to him if he intends to command against the Austrians this Campaign, but if on the contrary he had hopes of making his Army declare *immediately* for the King, it could be of no consequence at all.

Pichegru perhaps thinks that the only chance he has of acting a leading part in France is by keeping the command of an Army which sooner or later will probably decide the fate of that Country—and he seems determined not to give in to any measure whatever that might hazard the failure of this great plan. Therefore like a wise and

prudent man he will strike no blow 'till he sees th[illegible] be done with real effect. When that opportunity offer I dare say he cannot well calculate himself. A[illegible] whether after all he will declare for one branch of the Royal family or for the other, or whether he will adhere to the Republicans, it is extremely difficult to decide, and in my opinion it will depend entirely upon the circumstances such as they may appear when he finds himself able to dispose of his Army as he shall chuse. His Personal attachment to the Royal family is not to be brought into the calculation at all—because it is impossible to determine whether he has any or not. He was not known to them in any degree previous to the Revolution—and the Republick has made him what he is—therefore, however he may dislike some of the members, he perhaps may not have any great aversion to the form of Government itself—Or at least it seems highly probable that he fluctuates between Monarchy and Republicanism, waiting for events to decide which he shall espouse.

On the other hand it may be objected 'How came he then to write in terms of such attachment to the Prince of Condé? How came he to make him such promises? and how came he to desire even that hand bills should be sent to his Army, calculated to convert them to the Royal Cause?'

The answer to the two first of these observations is plain. If he corresponded with the Prince of Condé at all, he could not well do it in any other terms than those he has made use of; and his promises have only been those of general support, without ever consenting to adopt any proposition that might tend to bring things to an immediate issue. The affair of the hand bills is, I own, less easy to account for—but is it not possible that he may take at the same time his precautions to prevent their distribution? Or perhaps he intends through them to feel the pulse of his Army, and should he find it positively disposed to second him in support of Royalism he

[redacted] perhaps declare on that side, and act against [redacted]publicans. Whatever part he takes, I think he will [redacted]ays endeavour to manage matters so, that the first proposal comes from his Army to him and not from him to his Army.

This circumstance of the hand bills is the only one that it appears to me impossible he should have communicated to his Government, if he means that they should be distributed—because they never could approve of such a measure. But are we certain that he has really asked for them, or is it an idea originating at Bühl or in the heads of Fauche or Mouchet? This does not appear to me as yet quite clear.

In mine respecting Fauche you will have observed that my confidence in him is not by any means illimited. It is no doubt possible that part of what he said to me might have proceeded not so much from an intention of deceiving, as from a desire of giving himself more importance, and of answering my questions in what he thought a satisfactory manner. But when an Agent employed on such a delicate occasion, is detected in so great an inaccuracy as he was, it diminishes extremely one's reliance upon him, should it not go the length of creating serious suspicion.

Of Mouchet I have not the least knowledge, but I do not like his repeatedly asking for a state of the Austrian Army.

After imparting to you my various doubts and conjectures I think it right to mention that I beg you will consider all I have said in the light of observations coming from an indifferent Person—and that you will form your own judgement quite abstractedly from any influence that my reasonings might have. Because I do assure you it is with great difficulty that I can bring myself to any fixed Opinion upon the Subject. You have more Channels of information respecting what passes in France than I have. You know the Agents employed much better than

I do. And of course your conclusions must certain than mine can possibly be.

Upon the Austrians I think you may rely if once French Army should take a decided part, or if Pichegru clearly demonstrates to them that he will act against the Republican Government, *and that he has the power of executing his good intentions.* They have that confidence in him personally, which his general Character merits—and if he does not go straight to his object, but temporises so as to have the appearance of intrigue, I am convinced it is because he finds *it impossible* to do otherwise. I believe that real fraud and treachery are foreign from his nature, however he may be under the necessity of practising much political subtilty and circumspection at present.

If you see this matter as I do you will agree with me in thinking that all the Operations of the Campaign should be founded upon real military Calculation, which, in the supposition that if the force we shall have is ably managed, will probably lead us to the attainment of at least very weighty objects—and if during the Operations any favourable circumstance should arise from defection of the Republican Army, or otherwise, then of course every nerve must be strained to profit of it, nor should any thing be neglected that can tend to produce events of this nature. But after all that we have experienced I am inclined to think that such incidental advantages ought now only to be considered as collatteral speculations, and by no means be any longer made the principal object—lest we should be drawn aside from sure and solid benefit in pursuit of what we may again fail to attain as we have done hitherto.

However, I offer my sentiments as those of a very humble, and in politics a very ignorant individual, who would never have spoken so fully had not you desired him to do so. And before I conclude I must assure you that I have no biass or prejudice whatever—but I will do my utmost to execute

[redacted]uctions of whatever nature they may be, under [redacted]n conviction that they will proceed from minds [redacted]ated very far indeed above mine.

As you desire to see me, I think it right to tell you that I shall be at Bühl the beginning of next week—and should it not be convenient for you to come there I will meet you wherever and whenever you may point out.

C. CRAUFURD.

Mr. Wickham to Colonel Craufurd.

(Draft. Most Secret and Confidential.) Lausanne: 13 Feb., 1796.

My dear Craufurd,—Your letter of the 22d Jan. only reached me yesterday. I could certainly have wished to have seen it sooner, for a reason I shall afterwards point out to you. I have, however, the satisfaction to inform you that in my conversations with Fauche, I had paid the utmost attention to all the points you mention, and I will now proceed to state to you the result of his answers and my own observations, taking them in your own order.

1st. As to the intended passage of the Rhine by the Prince of Condé, in the month of November. Upon this point Fauche assured me most distinctly that Pichegru had repeatedly assured him that he did not believe it would be attempted, *giving for reason of his belief that the force was not sufficient, the strong places too numerous, and the season against the operation.* To my question whether Pichegru had not the determination at that time, in case the passage should be attempted, to deliver Huninguen to the Prince, and to facilitate his passage, he answered distinctly, *No*, for that his projects appeared about that time to have entirely changed, and that he no longer talked of delivering up Huninguen or any particular place but *of gaining his whole army*, and even that when he had the former project in contemplation, he never spoke but of the Prince of Condé alone, and that his plan was intended to be as far as possible

independant of the Austrians, whom he then s[redacted] consider as natural enemies, but whose hearty co-op[redacted] he *now* said was absolutely necessary to the succes[redacted] his enterprize.

You will naturally suppose that the objection you mention, viz., the contradiction of this account with the assurances given by the Prince of Condé, did not escape me. I accordingly pressed it upon him in the strongest manner. To this he answered that he had never given any authority to the Prince of Condé to say that Pichegru had withdrawn the troops at that moment for the purpose of facilitating the passage.

That previous to that period, he had frequently assured the Prince, as he had been authorized to do by Pichegru, that everything was preparing for the delivery of that place, though not immediately; it was even possible, he said, that after his interviews with Pichegru at Manheim, before the General had entered into any particulars with him, and had only expressed his general *good intention*, that he might, in writing to the Prince, have applyd *them* to the old affair of Huninguen; but that he does not recollect having done so, and that he thinks it much more probable that the Prince himself should have made such *an application*, or that he should have procured his supposed information from some other quarter.

If I recollect right, but I will not be quite positive, he added, that Pichegru expressed his uneasiness lest if the thing were attempted, he should be obliged to bring his men face to face to the Prince of Condé before they were prepared for such a meeting.

Upon the whole of this point, I need not say how adviseable it would be that you should see the whole of the Prince of Condé's correspondance. There is, however, a fact that I should wish to mention to you that seems in some measure rather to confirm a part of what Fauche here says: I mean as to the mistrust entertained of Austrians by Pichegru.

[redacted]ember perfectly well, that towards the middle of [redacted]t, certainly before the passage of the Rhine by [redacted]rdan, the Prince having, according to his custom, endeavoured to inspire Pichegru with a portion of his own fears through the medium of Fauche, Fauche answered that he had mentioned this circumstance to Pichegru, who said that he would take care to prevent their active interference, by finding them sufficient employment below. I have not the letter by me, but this fact was certainly communicated to me, as well as to the Prince of Condé, by Fauche's correspondant at Basle, and it is more than probable that I transmitted it home at the time. I remember it made a considerable impression on my mind, as I learnt the history of Jourdan's invasion a few days afterwards.

2d. As to Pichegru's opinion respecting the delivery of Strasburg.

Upon this point Fauche answered me, as he had done you, that Pichegru was most decidedly against it, and that the whole plan was the work of some persons who were quite unequal to the task; particularly two persons named Mandel and Princeps, who were sent by the Prince to General Wurmser; and that here again the Prince of Condé had applyd the general assurances given by Fauche, of the good disposition of the Inhabitants, and of the Army to his own projects. Here, however, I must do justice to the Prince as well as to Fauche; both of them had written to me to say that Pichegru did not approve of the Plan.

3d. As to Pichegru's opinion respecting the best *present* situation for the Prince of Condé to remain in. To this he answered, *at Bühl*: for that Pichegru had desired him particularly to say to the Prince, 'Qu'il étoit bien à Bühl, et qu'il devoit s'y concentrer.' He added, however, that upon Wurmser's saying that Bühl would not be possible, on account of the want of forage, and the complaints of the Margrave, he assured the Marshall that

Spires would be preferable, and more accd
Pichegru's views, than removing the Prince to
burg; that in consequence of this conversation, an
Wurmser's own desire, he wrote to Pichegru for his opinion,
whether the Prince had not better remove to Spires.

Having no reason at that time to suspect that he had given a different account to any other person, I did not question him any further upon this point. I remember, however, that he observed to me that the Prince expressed a strong desire himself to go to Spires, and that he asked me whether I myself saw any solid objection to such a measure.

4th. As to the communication between Pichegru and Jourdan.

He gave me exactly the same account as he gave you, with this remarkable addition, that it was understood among the well disposed persons in Pichegru's army, that the abandonment and capture of the Park of Artillery, stores, &c. &c., after the affair of Mentz, was owing to a plan concerted between those Generals in an interview which they had had at Worms some days before. Upon my desiring him to fix the date of this interview, I found him quite inaccurate as to the date of any one transaction; but this did not make any unfavourable impression on my mind, as I found him equally inexact with respect to his last Journey to Mulheim and Lausanne, and we all know that there are persons who never can acquire that sort of memory. But as to the fact itself, it appeared to me so improbable, or rather impossible, that I could not help giving him repeated caution to take care of what he said, as I observed that it was impossible it could be true. He persisted, however, in his former assertions, and fixed the epoch somewhere about the end of October or beginning of November. I asked him where he learnt this fact: he said that Badonville had expressly told him so at his first interview with Pichegru at his head-quarters at Irtzheim (?), after the retreat to the Queich.

He said that Pichegru himself never named this interview, but that he once said to him that he was sure of Jourdan. Upon my pressing him to fix the date by some fact, he said, as far as he recollected, it was upon the affair at Heidelberg. You will judge how far this interview was then practicable; it seems to me as improbable at this epoch as at any other.

5th. As to the general conversation of Pichegru, his plans, &c. &c., it would be endless for me to enter into the whole detail of what he stated to me. Some things certainly seemed to me strange, contradictory, and allmost unaccountable, others rational and probable. Besides, the reasons that I shall hereafter state to you for placing confidence in Fauche, and supposing him to be a person of credibility, I have found that much of what appears contradictory may be solved by attending closely to dates, and by recollecting that Mr. Fauche himself has no idea of attending to them, and a long conversation with General Danican * (who is now here), has convinced me that many things that I had thought absolutely incredible, particularly in what related to the way of living, the poverty, the strange *propos*, &c. &c. of the General officers, is quite common in the Republican army. The great and leading points in which Fauche persisted are these :—

1st. That Pichegru from the first has expressed the strongest inclination to serve the Royal cause without ever entering into any particulars as to the particular form of Royalty, &c. &c. to which he was most attached, though he allways expressed a particular esteem for the Prince of Condé ;—that he was at first disposed to attempt a partial project with a part of his army only ;—that he then intended to deliver Huninguen to the Prince ;—that during Fauche's

* Auguste Danican, a French general of distinction, b. 1763, sentenced to death on account of the part he took in the 13 Vendémiaire, but escaped. He was author of some political publications, and d. 1848.

absence, which continued five weeks, his opinion totally changed, and that his only idea now is that the whole army may be gained, and that as that event is not very far off, he is decidedly averse to any partial operation which might spoil the whole;—that to any project of this kind the cordial co-operation of the Austrians, and the assurance on your part, or mine, that he shall not want money to pay his army in the first moment, are absolutely necessary, both of which must be had before he can act at all;—that his plan is to march directly to Paris with the Prince of Condé and the King, leaving the Austrians masters of a part of the Frontiers.

As to the employment of the money, I should be as moderate as you in any other case where I had a worse opinion of the person; and I own that in this it appears to me in many instances strange and improbable.

But as other facts that appeared equally improbable at first have turned out to be true, I shall suspend my Judgement till you shall have made the enquiries I am about to point out to you, and which appear to me to be of the very last importance, as they will go to prove or contradict most unequivocally the existence of the correspondance itself; and I own to you that if it should be proved to exist at all, it is of itself so very extraordinary a circumstance that I shall readily give my assent to all the rest without enquiring too closely into particulars.

It is to the clearing up of that point, therefore, that in my mind all our enquiries should be directed.

In the first place, then, I should mention to you that when I saw Fauche here in September, I most particularly recommended to him to speak in the strongest manner both to the Prince of Condé and Pichegru of the necessity of keeping up a good and very confidential understanding with the Austrians, without whose assistance I assured him nothing effective could ever be done; and, particularly, above all things, I advised him to endeavour, in some way or other, that his intelligence

should pass through the medium of the Austrian agents, to the intent that their generals might be satisfyd of the reality of the correspondance, and not take it from the report of the Prince of Condé alone, of whom (not without some reason) they were extremely mistrustful. I spoke strongly to the same effect to the Prince of Condé in October. His Serene Highness, however, instead of following my advice, wrote to Fauche, towards the end of October, to be particularly mistrustfull of a person known by the name of *Furet*, resident at Strasburgh, *because he was the agent of the Austrians.*

This *Furet* is a Mr. Demouget, avocat of Strasburgh, who is in fact the Agent of the Austrians, having been the principal correspondent of General Klin-Klin, ever since the beginning of the Revolution, or at least of the War.

Fauche, however, in compliance with the general Instructions I had given him, and in defiance of the orders he had received from the Prince, not content with giving him his confidence, carried him to the General's head quarters at —— and introduced him formally to Pichegru as the Austrian Agent, and as the person most capable of carrying on the correspondance whilst Fauche should be absent.

This man, after this and two other interviews, crossed the water and gave an account of the whole to General Klin-Klin. This is a fact therefore of the truth of which you may easily and entirely satisfy yourself—at least as far as the evidence of Mr.—— can be attended to—by an application to General Klin-Klin. And if it prove true, I own I shall have little or no doubt or uneasiness about all the rest, and shall not quarrell with Fauche for any little inaccuracies or even any injudicious application of the money intrusted to him. If it be false, there is an end of the whole.

In the next place, you will recollect that in the month of October the Prince of Condé sent a letter to Pichegru through the medium and at the desire of General Wurmser. To refresh your Memory I enclose a copy of that letter,

together with the one which the Prince wrote to me on the occasion. This letter was not delivered at the time, but remained in the hands of General Barbançon, till the negotiations for the truce, when General Wurmser sent to demand it.

I learn from the Prince of Condé that this letter was actually delivered to Pichegru by the officer charged to negotiate the truce, and that he received a favourable though general answer, and Fauche tells me that Pichegru informed him that he had had a direct communication with the Austrians near Landau.

This again is a fact of the truth or falsity of which you may easily certify yourself, and which, if true, I consider as of much real importance, both in itself and as confirming the probability of all the rest. I shall wait with the utmost impatience for your answer upon these points. In the mean time I should show that I am strongly disposed to place confidence in Fauche for the following reasons, besides those which may be collected from the above statement of particulars.

1st. His own private character is excellent. He is of a decent family, established in good business, and undertook this affair most *readily* when first proposed to him, and left a good established business, *entirely from principle*, no money being then given him. I have made, particularly of late, the most accurate enquiries about his character, and I cannot find that there is a stain upon it, though he has numberless enemies among the Democrats of the country.

2nd. He is particularly noted in this country for the steadiness of his political principles, having been the object of Mr. Barthelemy's persecution in consequence of his having distributed and published numberless pamphlets in favour of the Allied Powers and against the French Revolution, and having afforded every kind of relief, pecuniary as well as other, to the Emigrants from Franche Compté.

3rd. The fact of his having been at Strasburg *actively em-*

ployed about the army (though scarcely credible in itself) is confirmed to me from other quarters that are perfectly unsuspected.

4th. The History of his imprisonment at Strasburg is clear beyond a doubt, as I have procured an attested copy of the whole proceeding on stamped paper from the municipality of Strasburg.

5th. It appears from that proceeding that there can be no doubt whatever of his being in intelligence with the principal officers, otherwise he could never have been saved.

6th. It appears clearly from the same proceeding that he was let out of Manheim at a time when he could only have left the town by connivance.

7th. His whole deportment is that of a person who has no idea that any one can entertain a suspicion of his veracity. His extreme anxiousness that I should go to join you is a proof that he did not fear the result of a comparison of our different reports and observations.

8th. He has been from the first anxious that another person named by me should be sent to him for the purpose of being introduced to Pichegru, and talking with him more fully upon the nature of his plans, the means and moment of their execution, and he now is desirous to go back to S. with an Austrian officer for the same purpose. These reasons strike me very forcibly. The time will not allow me to detail more. Pray don't forget to return me the Prince's letter by the first safe opportunity. I shall write again more at large upon this subject, as well as upon others.

Supplement.

I beg you will consider what follows as a continuation of my letter of the 13th Feb. If I am not mistaken in the favourable opinion I have formed of the person above alluded to, and if the two facts to which I have

principally ventured to direct your attention turn out to be true, you will no doubt agree with me that it is of the very last importance to his Majesty's service not only that the correspondance should be followed up most actively and that the most frank and unlimited encouragement should be given immediately to the Principal, but that you yourself should give the most close and vigilant attention to the whole business, so as to acquire as far as possible, without offending the others, a certain share in the direction of it, without which, rely upon it, the mutual mistrust of all the other parties will be productive in the progress of this business of some very serious mischief, and that you should be carefully informed whether either the Austrians or the Prince of Condé have any indirect or separate views of their own, different from those of his Majesty, or dangerous to the public and common service.

Anxious as I am that the most full and fair communication should be made to the Austrian Generals, because nothing can be done without their assistance, we must take care on our side that they use an equal degree of fairness with us, which I do not think they will have done in this case, if they have not communicated to you the affair of Furet or of the delivery of the Prince of Condé's letter. We should take equal care, if the Generals be well-disposed themselves, that their good intentions be not counteracted by secret instructions from their Court, or at least that such a thing should not pass without our knowing it.

It was for this reason in particular that I wished you to write to Sir Morton Eden. The fact being now known to the Austrian Government, it may be of importance that they should know that his Majesty's Minister was also acquainted with it. For any thing we know also it may be of importance to Sir Morton, in the course of his present negotiations, to be in possession of such a fact.

I own to you very fairly, that I am not quite free from apprehensions upon this point. You will recollect some of the conversations we have had together upon the subject.

I have only to observe upon them, that my fears are increased rather than diminished since that period.

It is, therefore, I repeat it, of the very last importance that you should follow up this business most closely *yourself*. If such an opportunity should really present itself, the King will have a right to *demand* from the Austrians that it should be neither neglected, thwarted, nor delayed from any private views of that cabinet; and it seems to me that the best way of preventing any thing of the kind from being *attempted* on their part, will be to show them at once that His Majesty's Ministers, both at home and abroad, whilst they act with every possible fairness and openness in all their communications, are really in possession of all the material facts relating to the whole transaction.

I am not entirely without apprehensions lest something should be proposed covertly to Baptiste, tending either to the formation of a particular kind of government, or to the putting the management of affairs into some particular hands, so as that the Austrians may, as the result of the whole, remain possessed of all the real influence in France, and that in their desire to effect this point according to their wish they may let slip such an occasion of striking a mortal blow at our common enemy as may never again present itself.

With respect to the object of Louis's journey here, it was founded, as he states, on five reasons.

1st, a mistaken idea that I alone could furnish the funds necessary for Baptiste's future operations, in consequence of which idea suggested by himself (as he says) to General Wurmser, *that General* had expressed a wish that I should not be at such a distance, and that you yourself had said it was unfortunate *that Mr. W. was not there.* 2nd, the desire of Baptiste himself, who wished to have the direct assurance from me that he should not be abandoned by the British Government, either at the first moment or at any subsequent period, in case he should find himself in diffi-

culty. 3rd, the idea that I might be of great service in allaying the jealousy entertained by the Prince of Condé of the Austrians, in preventing the Prince from being so extremely impatient. 4th, the idea that Baptiste might be obliged to act immediately, and that, therefore, it would be necessary to provide sufficient funds beforehand. 5th, that he might give me a faithfull account of all that had passed and receive my orders for his future conduct. As to the *first*, I answered that you had the same powers as myself on that point, and that in this particular case it was both more advisable and more correct that the money should come from you. That I could be only of service in assisting you with my credit, which I had allready done, and would do again, whenever called upon *by you*, but that I could in no case go to Manheim, or even to Bühl, without being expressly invited by you or the Austrians, and that I did not consider the pressing invitation which he brought me from the Prince of Condé as sufficient. You will observe that he seemed to me not to entertain the smallest doubt but that your letter when it should arrive would contain such an invitation on your part.

As to the 2nd, I wrote immediately myself to Baptiste the assurance required in the fullest manner.

3rd, As to the third, I answered that I felt all the importance of the thing, but that you alone were the Judge of the proper moment.

The fourth was answered by the first.

The last was extremely proper and right, and for his future orders I gave him only these, that he should put himself, together with the agent I had employed at Basle, wholly under your directions; that person, named Fenouillot, is a man of known and tryd integrity and extremely usefull in a certain way which will be pointed out to you. I added that the Prince had funds sufficient for every purpose, whatever might be said to the contrary by the persons about him, and that he might concert with you the means of employing them in this particular

case to the best advantage. In short, I repeated to him what I have so often said to the Prince, and desired him to repeat it again to his Serene Highness, that my confidence in you was unbounded and without reserve.

Before I finish, I wish to add a word respecting the conclusion of your letter of the 22nd Jan. That you should have many and strong suspicions I do not at all wonder; but if the two facts to which I have directed your attention turn out to be true, those suspicions must necessarily be in a great measure removed, and the great importance of the affair will necessarily appear to you most evident. For not only the material part of Fauche's testimony will be confirmed, but the inaccuracy of the Prince of Condé is sufficiently explained in my first letter. That of Fauche must be tried by the facts above alluded to; and as to Baptiste himself having for some time past never doubted of the reality of the correspondance, I had allways supposed either that the natural obstacles were really too great, or that he himself had not the talents necessary to encounter and overcome them. At all events, however, he is now compleatly committed; and I own to you that the project which he is stated to me to have adopted, viz., that of taking advantage of the breaking of the truce, &c. &c., has given me a very favourable opinion of his talents and Judgement.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

Cleveland Row: Feb. 19, 1796.

My dear Sir,—The Duke of Portland has boasted to me of a parcel of Alpine seeds and plants which he has received from you. This puts me upon saying to you (though at no very good season of the year for such a commission) that you would very much oblige me by anything of the sort that you could without trouble procure for me, though I am afraid I cannot insure them quite as

splendid a lodging, or as scientific treatment as they will probably have either at Bulstrode or at Welbeck.

Believe me ever, my dear Sir, most truly and faithfully yours, G.

Projet de descente des François en Angleterre. Dans une lettre de Kilien [Dandré].

Les travaux pour la Marine Françoise se poussent avec toute l'activité possible. On a fouré dans toutes les têtes françoises qu'il falloit un débarquement en Angleterre ; et quoique les hommes sages n'en voient pas la probabilité, il n'y a pas de doute qu'on le tentera. Les Gouvernans regardent même cette expédition comme un moyen ou d'acquérir une grande gloire, ou de se débarasser de 30 à 40 mille hommes, de la perte desquels ils se soucient fort peu. Voici le plan que l'on m'a rapporté, et qui paroît être celui de Carnot.

Trois corps d'armée et trois flottilles de frégattes, chaloupes canonières, batteaux plats, &c. Les quartiers-généraux des trois armées seront Cherbourg, Dunkerque, et Flessingue. Les troupes et les bâtimens seront disposés aux environs, de manière à se réunir dans 24 heures au premier bon vent. Une flotte telle qu'elle sortira de Brest, pour se faire poursuivre par la Flotte Angloise. Si elle peut l'attirer dans la Baye de Biscaye, on regarde la partie gagnée ; car on prétend que quand même elle battroit la flotte françoise, elle ne pourroit jamais regagner la Manche à tems pour prévenir la descente. Les trois flottes de débarquement doivent profiter du moment. Celle de Flessingue se portera vers l'embouchure de l'Humber, remontera autant que la marée le lui permettra, débarquera ses troupes qui doivent se porter sur Darbi. C'est le débarquement sur lequel on compte le plus, parce que—1°. Il sera protégé par la flotte Hollandoise. 2°. Parce qu'il n'y a point dans ces parages de Station pour les vaisseaux anglois. 3°. Parce que si on

peut faire parvenir l'armée jusqu'à la *Trent*, on se regarde comme à l'abri des revers.

La flotte de Dunkerque tâchera de pénétrer dans la Tamise, et tandis que les forces Angloises chercheront à couvrir Londres, elle débarquera sur Rochester ; et si elle peut s'emparer des hauteurs qui dominent Chatam, elle tâchera de brûler ce port.

Enfin la flottille de Cherbourg tentera son débarquement dans la partie des côtes qui est depuis l'île de Portland jusqu'au Cap Constard, en anglois *Start Point*, pour se porter sur Exeter. Cette dernière tentative sera exécutée par des *enfants perdus*, et on y compte peu. Il paroît que le Directoire se flatte beaucoup sur cette Triple entreprise. Soyés assuré qu'il la tentera, et qu'il se soucie peu de la perte des hommes.

Avant de la tenter, on fera vraisemblablement un essai sur Jersey et Guernesey. Si on y réussit, le Directoire échaufera la Nation, et parviendra à lui faire croire que l'Angleterre est aussi aisée à prendre, ce qui suffira à celui-ci pour entretenir d'asses grandes armées, et pour faire des tentatives.

Sir Morton Eden to Mr. Wickham.

Vienna : Monday Feb^{y} the 29th, 1796.

(Most Secret). (Received March 7.)

Sir,—The dispatch from the Office, with its inclosure, which I have the honor to transmit to you by the Messenger Bassett, was brought to me by him on Wednesday evening under a flying seal, with directions to communicate copies of them to the Austrian Minister, for the Emperor's concurrence in the important step determined upon by His Majesty, and afterwards to forward them to you with the result of my application.

It would be superfluous to trouble you with a detail of what has passed in my conferences with Baron Thugut on this business, I shall only therefore observe that,

notwithstanding my urgent instances, the Emperor declines joining the King in the declaration. Baron Degelman consequently will not be authorized to sign it with you, and it is probable that you will have to sign it singly: As however the utmost harmony subsists between the two Courts, you may think it right (and it would, I know, be taken well) to communicate to him what may pass on the subject.

I think it proper confidentially to add that, to the measure itself and to the wording of the note no objections are raised by this Government; and that His Imperial Majesty's public concurrence is withheld, from reasons which principally arise from *His peculiar situation.* The expression of 'His Britannic Majesty and His allies' will, it is thought, sufficiently convey the impression that the declaration is made by the King in consequence of a previous concert with His Allies, and that the most perfect union of sentiment exists between them; and to keep up this appearance, this Ministry think, that it is to be desired, that none of the Ministers of the less powerful Members of the Coalition may be authorized to sign the declaration with you, lest it should be from thence inferred, that the measure has not the Emperor's concurrence.

I have the Honor to be, with great truth and regard, Sir, Your most Obedient Humble Servant,

MORTON EDEN.

WM. WICKHAM, Esq.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Wickham to Baron de Degelman.

Bern: 5th March, 1796.

It is long since I have had the honour of writing to Your Excellency. You might, indeed, have been well alarmed for my safety, after the strange reports that were circulated at Bern.

Your Excellency will of course have supposed,—that I

only treated them with the contempt they deserved. I ought, however, in justice to the worthy Magistrates who are at the head of this Canton, to say,—that it was impossible for the Government to have conducted itself more honorably, more decently, more wisely, more respectfully to His Majesty, or with more personal attention to myself, than it has done on this occasion.

Their anxiety to repair the silly extravagance of two or three hot-headed democrats, has been extreme; and upon my present visit here with Mrs. Wickham, it would not be easy to describe to you, all the civility and attention they have paid us.

Your Excellency has no doubt been informed some time since, of the formal demand that is now made to acknowledge the Republic, and of the manner in which it has been made. If your Excellency is decided in the line of conduct that you mean to adopt on this occasion,—and if I can be of any Service, you may rely on my conforming my language, and all my proceedings exactly to Yours.

I have hitherto acted, as much as possible, according to the Line that we agreed together to adopt, at Basle upon another occasion. I have spoken upon the subject with the greatest moderation, and have expressed a strong reliance on the wisdom, moderation and firmness of the Government of this Canton.

I dare say, Your Excellency will agree with me, that to attempt to oppose the measure *de front*, would be the most unwise of all attempts; on the other hand, it is by no means impossible, that a delay may be obtained;—and it is to this point, I most humbly conceive, that all our efforts ought to be directed. I venture to submit this matter, with great deference, thus shortly to Your Excellency's superior judgement, and I remain, with the highest Consideration, &c.

(Signed) WILLIAM WICKHAM.

Colonel Craufurd to Mr. Wickham.

Manheim: 7th March, 1796.

My dear Wickham,—I have this instant received the inclosed Authority for the establishment of your Depots.

I have questioned Klingling particularly respecting what Louis [Fauche Borel] said about Furet [Demougé], and he confirms the intelligence.

The interview between the *Chiefs* is absolutely impossible.

The Officer mentioned by Louis [Fauche Borel] was certainly with B[aptist]e [Pichegru]—and received the sort of answer he says.

His release from Prison was *not in fact* owing to the intervention of any Commander—but proceeded from no proof being brought against him. This *he* tells me, adding that His Friend would have intervened had it been necessary.

He went out of M[anhei]m before it was invested on the left bank of the Rhine—at which period all persons might go out that chose—the more the better, for the purpose of facilitating the subsistence.

He was sure he had told us the same story, therefore of course he did not fear our meeting.

But the strong circumstance in his favour appears to me to be, his desiring an Officer to be sent with him—this leads me rather to suspect B[aptist]e than Louis. However, it is extremely difficult to say positively that either the one or the other ought to be suspected—and in such affairs one must undoubtedly risk money sometimes upon chance.

If you recollect, the letter of credit you sent me was not accompanied with any order on the Banker—and all that I can do now is to get money enough for the Condé army—I have been long without any credit from England.

Yours most affectionately and truly,

C. CRAUFURD.

Mr. Wickham to Colonel Craufurd.

(Extract from Draft.) Bern: 9th March, 1796.

My dear Craufurd,—I have received all your letters in due time, and now proceed to answer them by Louis [Fauche Borel], who returns to day to Bühl.

First, as to the great affaïr. If you have read the latter part of my last letter by Fauche, written in sympathetic Ink (which I very much doubt), you will see that the great point on which the whole turns, and to which consequently all our attention ought to be directed, is, in my opinion, the *existence or non-existence of the correspondance.*

If it do not exist, and has never existed, then are we the dupes of a set of Knaves, and we must pay for our folly.

But if it does exist at all, whether with more or less of exaggeration in the reports of our correspondant, or with more or less real good disposition on the part of Baptiste [Pichegru], it is still an affair that may in its consequences become of the very last importance, and may succeed or fail, according to the more or less attention that is given to it, and according to the means that are provided for ensuring its success. This opinion, however, being so fully explained to you in my last letter by Fauche, I shall no longer dwell upon it here. I shall only observe that principally for the reasons I stated to you in that letter, as well as for some others, I am myself most entirely persuaded, not only that that correspondance did and does really exist, but that it has been followed up with good faith on the part of the person employed by me. As to Baptiste himself, you must yourself be a much better Judge. I dare not venture to pass a decided opinion. I am, however, inclined to believe that he has been from the first well disposed, but that the work he has undertaken is above his powers.

I proceed now then to the second point, which is that

of the money; but first I should inform you, that determined to leave nothing undone, I wrote myself to Baptiste the inclosed note, which I beg you will return me. In answer to the Postscriptum, Baptiste informed me by Furet [Demougé,] that the sum of 4 or 500,000 Louis would be sufficient for the first moment, and that afterwards he thought the army would provide for itself.

Now upon that point I should inform you that I have received the most entire approbation of my conduct in commencing and following up the affair of Baptiste, and the assurance that a stipulation for the payment of his army for a limited term would have been approved of and ratifyd at home. I inclose you an extract from Lord Grenville's dispatch on that subject.

But I consider it as both right and necessary on every account, that the money should be taken from the fund of the Condé army. For besides that it will, I conceive, be found much more easy and natural *at home*, that the provision should be made in this way, it is most essential to the public service that you should appear to have the sole direction of the affair, and more particularly so of the *Coffre fort*. This is the constant language I have holden to the Prince. My letters to him contain reiterated assurances of the sole and absolute authority with which you are entrusted over this department.

It is not that I wish by any means to remove any responsibility from myself; on the contrary, you will see by the measures I am about to propose, as well as by my directly advising and encouraging you to follow up the business with spirit and perseverance, that I shall at least take a full share upon myself.

Your original instructions, the approbation lately given of your past conduct, the new discretion reposed in you, and the opinion of Lord Grenville conveyed so clearly to me in the inclosed extract of his last dispatch, all concur to remove every doubt from your mind, both of the propriety of the measure, and of the

full authority you have to follow it up, provided you yourself approve of the thing, and think it feasible. All that you want therefore, is a credit, which credit I am now about to procure you to the full extent of P[ichegru]'s demands.

Lieutenant-Colonel CRAUFURD.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.

(Draft.) Bern: 12th March, 1796.

My Lord,—The public attention has been very much directed of late to the Affair of *Madame de Soucy*, and a number of strange conjectures are now made as to the reason of her having been so suddenly sent away from Vienna.

Having the means of knowing the real history, which is not only curious, but in many respects extremely important and interesting, I make haste to communicate it to Your Lordship.

It is well known that Mad. de Tourzel had been originally appointed to accompany the Princess Royal of France to Vienna, and it is as generally believed that a demand to that effect had been made by the Court of Vienna, founded on this ostensible reason, that it would be necessary that the Princess should be accompanied by a person, who, from having been employed in her Service from her earliest years, might be really able to identify her person, and in whom, at the same time, from her known Character, respectability, and rank in Life, the Court of Vienna might be induced to place implicit Confidence.

For some reason or other, which I have not yet been able exactly to ascertain, Madame de Tourzel received very suddenly, a notification from the French Government that she would not be permitted to accompany the Princess. Mad. de Soucy supposes, that this resolution of the Directory, was owing to some private communication,

that was supposed to have taken place between that Lady and a Person at Paris, known to be attached to the House of Austria. Be that as it may, the permission was suddenly refused, and the Princess being desired to choose another person, immediately named Mad. de Soucy.

Madame de Soucy had been, for some time, connected with Madame *Benezech*, the Wife of the Minister of the Interior. This Mad. Benezech, a few days before the departure of the Princess, gave Mad. de Soucy several indirect hints of the possibility of the Princess being married to an Archduke, as soon as she should arrive at Vienna.

Mad. de Soucy, who, as I understand, is a Woman of Intrigue, and at the same time, extremely inconsiderate, immediately drew the inference from the hints of Madame Benezech, 'that the Marriage in question was the result of a Treaty between the Republic and the Emperor, and that it was intended to restore the Monarchy, in the person of an Arch-duke, to the exclusion of the present Royal family of France.' She at the same time formed the project of defeating this plan, by engaging the Princess to write to the King, her Uncle, and give him her solemn Assurance that she would never marry any person whatever, without his consent.

She communicated this project to Clery, the old Valet de Chambre of Louis the XVI[th]., who promised his assistance towards its execution. M. Hué, also, who was named to accompany the Princess, was admitted into the Secret, and amongst them, they contrived to give effect to it in this manner.

On their arrival at Lauffenbourg (one of the four Forest Towns, at the distance of 8 Leagues from Basle), where the Princess passed a whole day, permission was demanded, and obtained of the Prince de Gaires, that a French Emigrant Priest (of whose principles, and of whose attachment to the House of Bourbon, Mad. de

Soucy had been previously assured), should be permitted to confess the Princess. Mad. de Soucy, who had found frequent opportunities on the road to speak to the Princess upon the subject, and had actually engaged her to take the step above alluded to, whenever a proper opportunity should offer, now encouraged her to write a few Lines to the King, whilst she should be alone with the Confessor, who, she said, had undertaken to procure her the necessary means. This was accordingly done. The Letter was very short,* and contained the formal promise, that she would never marry any other than the Duke of Angoulême,† without the King's Consent.

Whether this letter remained in the hands of the Priest or with Mad. de Soucy I am not certain, but it was forwarded to Verona in the following manner.

Clery, who had found means to come away from Paris, arrived at Basle two days after the Princess, and obtained from the Baron de Degelmann a passport for Verona. With this passport he followed and actually overtook the Princess, before her arrival at Inspruck.

Having received the Letter, either from Mad. de Soucy or the Priest, and his Instructions from the former, he immediately continued his Journey to Verona, where he delivered the Letter, received the King's Answer, and conveyed it to Vienna.

On the very day of his arrival at Vienna, Mad. de Soucy received a peremptory order to leave that place in 24 Hours. It had already been intimated to her that neither she, nor M. Hué, would have permission to remain much longer there.

This peremptory order was accompanied by a very remarkable note from the Princess, nearly in the following words: 'Je vous engage, Madame, très serieusement de

* *Note at the side.*—I was mistaken in this point. The letter contained three pages closely written. The Count d'Avaray showed it to Bayard.

† *Note at the side.*—The promise was general. The Duke of Angoulême was not mentioned.

ne plus différer votre depart. *Il est tems que cela finisse*, demain après la Messe, vous pouvez partir, si aujourd'hui, cela ne se peut pas.' (Signé) *Marie Charlotte de France.*

It is remarkable, that upon Mad. de Soucy's departure, Clery, and Hué, were suffered to remain at Vienna. Mad. de Soucy supposes, that this was done in the double view of obtaining further information from those persons, and of preventing them from communicating with her, and confirming the report she might make of what had passed on the road to, and at Vienna.

Your Lordship will observe, that whatever is stated as a fact in the above account is given upon the Authority of Mad. de Soucy herself, communicated by her to the Person whom she sent for to meet her, on her return through Rhinfelden, and who was charged to convey it to the King and the Prince of Condé.

In addition to the above, Mad. de Soucy desired that Person to inform the King, that when they left Inspruck, the Princess told her, 'that the Arch-Duchess, who had been uncommonly civil and attentive to them, during their stay, had communicated to her privately, that she was to marry the Arch-duke Charles, and to become Queen of France;' that afterwards, when she (Mad. de Soucy) was presented to the Emperor, that Prince asked her if his aunt had not said to her at Inspruck, that the Princess was to marry the Arch-duke Charles; to which, she answered—*No*; and that she had never heard the Thing mentioned before; that two days after their arrival at Vienna, the Princess informed her, that the Duchess of Saxe Teschin had told her that she must not be alarmed, for it was not the Arch-duke Charles that she was to marry, but the Arch-duke Joseph, and that she would leave them all her fortune; that what gave rise to this observation of the Princess of Saxe Teschin, was a report, generally believed, that the Arch-duke Charles had the falling sickness—it seems that the Princess mentioned this report to the Duchess. Mad. de Soucy added, that

upon leaving the Princess, she had told her, 'that she would be dishonoured for ever, if she broke her word with the King.'

Your Lordship will observe that the above detail is in many respects very imperfect, and that it were much to be wished that further Information could be obtained about many of the points therein mentioned. I have not been able to learn exactly, whether Clery had an opportunity of delivering the Letter of the King to Mad. de Soucy, or if he saw her at all before he left Vienna.* I should rather think not—because, she had first attributed her being sent away, to her having, extorted from the Princess the history of her Conversations with her Aunts respecting her intended Marriage, and I know she has since received a Letter from Hué, informing her, *that since her departure*, He had discovered that Clery *had sold them*, for that he had been with M. Thugut immediately upon his arrival from Verona, and passed several Hours with that Minister. All further enquiry is become extremely difficult, if not impossible. Mad. de Soucy since her return, remains at Basle, where she is strictly watched by the Patriots; and has two Servants placed about her who are spies upon her conduct.

It has, indeed, been intimated to her, by M. Bacher, that any communication with the Princess or the Emigrants, might be fatal to her, upon her return to France.

The Prince of Condé has written to her since her arrival at Basle, by the medium of the Marquis de Rhumilly, her relation; but she has returned the Letter to the Prince with a few lines of her own, saying that she was under the necessity of taking that step lest the letter should be found in her possession. She intreated his Serene Highness at the same time not to write to her any more, and above all things not to suffer the Marquis

* *Note at the side.*—I should rather think that the letter was delivered, because the Princess has had a subsequent communication with Verona.

de Rhumilly to appear again at Basle. She has however, I know, sent some letters secretly to her sister, Madame de Bombelles, now at Ratisbonne.

She now sees a great deal of Bacher and some other persons belonging to the French Mission. On her first arrival at Basle she told Bacher that she had been sent away from Vienna as a suspicious person on account of her supposed connections with Madame Benezech and other Republicans at Paris. A few days after Bacher told her that he had learnt the real truth, and *that he knew* she had written to the King. From that time she has kept nothing secret from the Republicans.

How much of the above account be correctly true I cannot take upon me to say. There is no doubt of the History of the letter to Verona, the rest must depend on the testimony of Mad^{e}. de Soucy alone. It must, however, be admitted that there exists a very strong mass of presumptive evidence, internal as well as external, in favour of the story she has given; and if the facts be really such as she has already stated them to be, they certainly give rise to many serious and important reflexions, too obvious for me to attempt to point out to your Lordship.

Right Hon. Lord GRENVILLE.

Colonel Craufurd to Mr. Wickham.

Manheim: 17th March, 1796.

My dear Wickham,—I have carefully considered your late correspondence respecting Baptiste [Pichegru], and without taking up more of your time than is necessary, I will now give you the result of my reflections on this delicate subject, repeating however, what I have often said before, that I do it with all possible diffidence in my own judgement, more especially when put in competition with Yours, who have so many more means of correspondance with the interior of France than I have.

First, I must tell you that, after reading the Basle Bulletin which you sent me, I burnt it, not having the least idea that any thing was interlined in sympathetick ink—so I am in the dark as to what you communicated to me in that manner.

In a former letter I mentioned to you that Furet [Demougé] certainly had the meeting in November with General Klingling which Louis [Fauche Borel] mentioned —and that Major Vincent, one of Marshal Wurmser's Aides de Camps, had also conversed a few minutes with Baptiste [Pichegru] upon the subject in question, at the time that he was sent to him to conclude the suspension of hostilities—in which conversation he received a very short and general answer, expressive of his, Baptiste's, good will to the cause, but equally so of his inability to act at that time, not being sufficiently sure of the disposition of his Army. These two points therefore are cleared up to your satisfaction. But the circumstance of the meeting between Baptiste and Jourdan as described by Louis to have taken place in the latter end of October, is utterly impossible—And the departure of Louis from Manheim in November is, I can assure you, no proof whatever of the favour or protection of Baptiste, because the place was not invested on the left bank of the Rhine at the period in question, and every body went away who chose.

His release from arrest at Strasbourg, as he explains it to me, was owing to their not being able to prove any thing against him—and not to the intervention of Baptiste.

I merely mention these circumstances in answer to Your Observations and not with a view of absolutely criminating Louis. But I cannot help being persuaded that both he and Furet exaggerate very much. In their reports they discover themselves I think, by attempting to prove more than can be true. Therefore one is inclined

to make great deductions from all that they say and write —For instance in Furet's [Demougé's] last Report he says that Baptiste [Pichegru] was with him in private *three hours* —Is it possible that the Commander in Chief of that Army, watched so closely as he must be, and as he is by his own avowal, could be so imprudent, and so very unwise as to commit himself in such a manner?— rather would he not (if he wished to discuss so fully an important subject with an Agent of the Royalists) employ a third Person of confidence to go between him and that Agent? Supposing that Marshal Wurmser left his Head Quarter to meet an Agent of the enemy, and remained with him a considerable time, would it not very soon be known to all his staff— especially if his Government, like that of France, employed persons about their Generals on purpose to watch them?

No—I assure you that though I cannot well doubt *the existence* of the Correspondence with Baptiste, by the means of Louis [Fauche Borel] and Furet [Demougé], Yet I never can believe that their reports are not very much overstrained, otherwise—B[aptiste] is not that cautious, wise, prudent man that we have always supposed him to be.

In the last Report of Furet, viz. 10th March, where he details the three hours' conversation upon the subject of Baptiste's departure, he talks of great projects that B[aptiste] has, but he gives us no detail of them, and in fact upon reading his report, one is extremely at a loss to conjecture how they could have conversed so much, and he have so little to relate.

I never for a moment suspected the good faith of Baptiste—but only the extent of his power to execute what he wishes, and probably intends, should an opportunity offer—His army has never yet been decidedly at his disposal. He has been, I conclude, most narrowly watched by his Government, and it appears to me very possible that if he has not hitherto been obliged to play a double Game, he may be so now—not with the intention of deceiving us—but merely considering it as the only means

of remaining at the Head of his Army, where alone he is of consequence.

The step that he is now about to take is to me extremely misterious.

Several reasons lead one to conclude that his Government must have some knowledge of his correspondence with us, or if he has concealed it from them, at least some suspicion. Amongst others, the discovery of the nature of Louis [Fauclie Borel's] business in the Country, which now seems as certain, as his appearance about the Head Quarters of B[aptiste] was publick. Under these circumstances then he B[aptiste] projects a *secret journey* to Paris—with the general view of concerting measures there for the overthrow of his Government—and he sends a confidential Adjutant General before him, who is to give him intelligence as to the possibility of his remaining there without being discovered. The Adjutant General writes him for answer, that his project is impracticable, because his Person is too well known—&c.—and he then decides to go to Paris openly. Now is it probable that He, B[aptist]e, should ever really have conceived the possibility of being able to quit his command, and go to Paris or any where else, without being constantly watched by the spies of his Government? He knew too as well then as he can know now, that his Person would be easily recognized by the Parisians, amongst whom he had acted so conspicuous a part. And if his Adjutant General shared his confidence sufficiently to be intrusted with the secret at all, why could not he negociate the business at Paris, as well as B[aptist]e himself? Add to all this, the evident danger of a chief's leaving an Army whose conduct he wishes to influence in the most positive and decided manner, in the hands of another of whom he cannot be certain—who is young and ambitious—and who has the character of being a staunch republican—abandoning thus, in a time of great popular commotion, the only situation in which he is really powerful. After making

all these reflections one is really at a loss to form a positive conclusion.

If we had not such an idea of his probity and honour, we should say that he was certainly playing a double Game from the urgency of the existing circumstances, but that he felt a reluctance in owning it to us.

Upon what his hopes of influencing Paris are founded we have not yet heard. But since the affair of the Sections, I conceive the Government have made such arrangements and taken such precautions that any attempt in that Capital must prove abortive unless the Army immediately in its neighbourhood should join the insurgents in consequence of a previous stipulation, or be influenced to do so by the conduct of the other Armies. So that I must own to you I have no hopes of any decisive blow being struck at this moment in Paris itself. But if B[aptist]e could bring his army to declare in our favour, to let the Austrians enter Alsace, and the Prince of Condé join him, then all France must necessarily follow the impulsion; because Jourdan's army, with two hundred thousand Austrians and French Royalist Troops already in the Country, and another very large Austrian Army opposite to them, could not do otherwise than join this force, let their principles be what they may. This, in my opinion, was the real event to look to. But if B[aptist]e quits his command according to his present intention, the chance is extremely diminished indeed, because 1st. Desaix who succeeds him is popular. 2nd. The Government may possibly be able to give the Army a large part of their pay in specie immediately upon the Commanders being changed.

3rd. The natural inconstancy of that nation is such, that little dependence is to be placed upon their adherence to an absent chief.

Moreover, I do not think that it is the intention of the Government to send B[aptist]e back to the Army at all, because if you observe the Papers constantly mention his

journey to Paris, and the intention of the Government to appoint him Inspector General of all their Troops—which seems to me to be done with a view of preparing the Troops for his removal from their command. Should it prove otherwise, and should he return to the Army, it will be to me an incontestable proof that he is playing a double Game.

Under all these circumstances then, I would not take upon me to send any more money to Furet [Demougé] at present—because none can be wanted, till the cloud is dispelled through which it is impossible at this moment for the view to penetrate. With respect to the thousand Louis which you have ordered Merian to give Louis [Fauche Borel], and for which you desire me to send Merian an order on the Treasury, I will most certainly, as it is your wish, take that payment on myself—or any others that you may desire in the course of the Transaction—Not being I assure you, in the least anxious to shrink from any part of the responsibility. But I have told Louis that they cannot expect any more advances till we receive from Baptiste [Pichegru] a regular fixed plan of action, stating decidedly all his arrangements for delivering the frontier places to the Austrians as the momentary Possessors at least—for receiving the Prince of Condé &c., with the detail of execution. Upon the receipt of which I will endeavour to bring about an immediate meeting between B[aptist]e and Major Vincent, in order to ascertain the authenticity of the Report. I added to Louis, that in such a case as I have just stated, B[aptist]e should be seconded with every pecuniary support that he could possibly require —and I represented to him strongly that no reasonable well intentioned person could desire more; because it was impossible to suppose that a few thousand Louis distributed by two or three agents in that Army, could cause such a general movement as was projected, and from which alone we could expect success.

All this conversation was accompanied by the strongest

assurances on my part, that B[aptist]e might depend upon the utmost exertions from us as soon as we should see our way clearly. That we were most ardently anxious for his success. But that we left the whole to his management, without pressing him, or dictating to him any mode of execution—being convinced that he alone could form a sure judgment on the subject. However, that after so many months of General professions, without his ever having come really to the point, He as a sensible, Prudent man, could not be surprised if we held back a little on the score of money, 'till the event appeared more certain. But if he really, in the course of his efforts to serve the Royal cause, should require a sum to gain any particular Person, I desired he would apply for it without reserve.

As to the affair of prolonging the suspension of hostilities, the reasons given in Furet's [Demougé's] report of the 10th are ingenious enough, but I must own to you that it is my most decided opinion, that we ought to open the Campaign the moment that we can, forming our operations upon real military calculation, just as if this negotiation had never existed. And in doing so I have little doubt of brilliant success.

De Preçy will come here from Bühl immediately—and he shall see the Austrian Generals. But I can say nothing on the subject of the Plan of Campaign being influenced by his information or reasonings, because I do not know what that plan is, nor will it be fixed by those who are at present here. I conclude that it will be determined at Vienna, before the Arch Duke's* departure from thence.

I remain ever, my dear Wickham, most affectionately Yours,

C. CRAUFURD.

P.S.—I cannot leave this just now. The Arch Duke arrives the 27th.

W. WICKHAM, Esq.

* The Archduke Charles.

(No. 24.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Extract from Draft.) Bern: 17 March, 1796.

My Lord,—. . . . I should add, however, from Fauche's verbal statement that Baptiste's [Pichegru's] present plan was entirely directed to the disgusting his soldiers with the war, and to making them feel and enjoy as much as possible the difference of their situation during the truce, meaning to make use of the order for recommencing Hostilities (which he wished to come *first* from his own government), as the principal means of exasperating them against their rulers, and as the motive and the signal for engaging them to adopt another Party.

I much fear that these means will be found very inadequate to the great end proposed, but being intimately persuaded of the existence of the correspondance as stated by our agents, and at the same time of the good faith and good intentions of Baptiste, I think that every assistance and encouragement possible should be given to him, and that every preparation should be made to give full effect to his efforts, in case he should find himself in a situation to attempt to put them in execution.

I have written to Colonel Craufurd to persuade and encourage him to act on this principle, taking the responsability upon myself. I inclose a copy of my letter, and that nothing might be left undone, I wrote myself to Baptiste the inclosed note. It was in a feigned name, and feigned Hand, and I sincerely hope that his Majesty will not disapprove the step I have taken: this seems to be one of those occasions (if any), that ought to justify a departure from common forms, and the established rules of Business. The answer is contained in No. 13.

I inclose at the same time a copy of Craufurd's letter to me of the 22d Jan., to which mine of the 13th Feb. is an answer. It contains some suspicions of the good

faith of Fauche, which were justified by the circumstances, but which are now entirely cleared up.

Your Lordship will observe that my whole attention was directed to two points:—

1st. The ascertaining and establishing the fact of the existence of the correspondance in a way that might satisfy the mind of any reasonable and impartial person.

2ndly. The making the Austrian Generals and Agents themselves a party to it.

Both these points are now completely established, to the satisfaction of every one, as appears by the inclosed extract of a letter from Col. Craufurd of the 7th Inst., and your Lordship may be assured that nothing shall be left undone that may in any way depend on my personal vigilance and exertions to bring this matter to a happy conclusion, and to foresee and prevent, if possible, any of the evils which I have pointed out as a subject for apprehension, in my correspondance with Col. Craufurd. Inclosed I send several letters relating to the subject that I had received previous to Fauche's arrival. I add several others that I have received since his departure from hence. Your Lordship will learn from them that Baptiste has determined to go to Paris, notwithstanding the strong remonstrances that have been made to him against such a measure.

(No. 33.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Extract from Draft.) Berne: 17 March, 1796.

My Lord,—Your Lordship's most important dispatch of the 9th of Feb. (No. 3) was delivered to me on the 7th Instant by the Messenger Basset, together with a letter from Sir Morton Eden, of which I send a copy inclosed. I immediately applyd myself to the executing His Majesty's commands in the manner that I conceived under all the circumstances to be the most conformable

to the instructions your Lordship had been pleased to convey to me.

After a diligent perusal of your Lordship's dispatches, which I compared most attentively with that of Sir Morton Eden, it appeared to me upon the whole, considering the very decided opinion given by the Court of Vienna, and communicated to me officially by Sir Morton Eden, that I ought to do no more than merely communicate the affair to the Baron de Degelmann; and that I should do wrong were I to invite him to sign a paper, to which I knew *officially* that he could not assent. I therefore wrote to him the inclosed letter, and received by the following Post the answer, which I also inclose. I should have found much difficulty in reconciling His Majesty's commands for the regulation of my conduct towards the Minister of His Sardinian Majesty with the wish expressed by the Court of Vienna, that none of the less powerful members of the Alliance should be authorized to sign the note, but fortunately I had an opportunity of knowing beforehand from the Baron de Vignet himself, that having no instructions to that effect, he would certainly refuse my offer. Finding therefore that I could adhere to my instructions without any possible evil arising from such conduct, I adopted that method, and after having communicated to the Baron His Majesty's most gracious intention I invited him to sign the note, which he declined with the strongest expressions of respect for His Majesty, and the assurance that the measure he had been pleased to adopt could not fail of giving the highest satisfaction to his Court

His Majesty having been pleased to leave to my discretion the choice of the magistrate by whom the note should be transmitted to Mr. Barthelemy, I fixed upon M. Syndic Rigaud, formerly Syndic of Geneva.

I made this choice from my entire confidence in his secrecy and discretion, as well as from my knowledge of his personal attachment to me, and the services he had

actually rendered to the cause of His Majesty since I have been in this country.

I observed that in the Instructions conveyed to me upon this point, the expression 'Magistrate of any of the Cantons' is made use of, but as this expression is very commonly applyd in this country to the whole confederacy and their allies, I humbly conceived that it would in this case admit of the same extension. I accordingly wrote to M. Rigaud, who is now at Lausanne, the inclosed note, and the following day I received his answer, of which I send a copy inclosed. He sent me at the same time his letter to Mr. Barthelemy under a flying seal, to be forwarded by me together with the note. I took a copy of his letter, which I also send inclosed, I hope His Majesty will not disapprove the permission I gave to M. Rigaud to intimate to Mr. Barthelemy that this measure had not been taken by His Majesty without a previous communication with his allies. I forwarded the Note to M. Barthelemy on the 10th, and by a short note that I yesterday received from M. Rigaud I learn that he had received a few lines from that gentleman by return of Post, expressing much surprise and satisfaction, and saying that he had forwarded the note to Paris immediately on receiving it.*

Colonel Craufurd to Mr. Wickham.

Manheim: 18th March, 1796.

My dear Wickham,—Monsieur d'Erlach will deliver to you the articles of agreement as drawn out by me, at your desire, for the raising of his Regiment—I think they are calculated as much as possible to insure the embarka-

* Mr. Wickham's note, and Mr. Barthelemy's reply, dated 6th Germinal (March 26), will be found in the Annual Register for 1796, amongst the State Papers, p. 125-6. These notes were discussed in the debates of both houses of Parliament on the 10th of May on a motion made in each House against the continuance of the war. In each the Government obtained a large majority.

tion of 1000 men in a short time, which appears to me the Grand Object; and as he is to stand to the loss of all desertion up to the day of embarkation, and to have no pay for the recruits till they join the Depot, I conceive the 15*l.* per man will not be too much, considering that the recruiting in Switzerland, as you inform me in your last, is far more expensive than in other countries. You will observe that unless they embark complete, he forfeits a quarter of the Levy money. I agreed to the advance he requires upon the principle of giving him every facility that may tend to insure the speedy execution of his agreement—and indeed, from his connections, and from the character you give of him, we may safely act towards him, I should suppose, with that degree of confidence in this respect which tends to the immediate and certain completion of our object, full as much as it can possibly answer the purposes of his private interest.

I was against engaging the men for so short a term as four years, but he assures me that without this stipulation he cannot raise a man in Switzerland. You must be able to judge of this fact better than I can.

Should it be the intention of Government to keep this Regiment in our service, it will be necessary to make an arrangement for recruiting it annually—which will consist in nothing more than allowing Monsieur D'Erlach a small proportion of Officers and non-Commissioned Officers exclusive of his establishment, who would always remain in Switzerland. They should have a Depot where his recruits should assemble and be exercised, and at a stated Period in the year, a fixed number, calculated upon probable consumption, should be delivered by him at a Port in the Mediterranean, for each of whom he should receive a certain sum to cover all expences—including the subsistence from the date of inlistment, and every charge whatever: These sums, and the pay of his recruiting establishment, being regularly drawn by his Agent in London, upon a certificate produced by Monsieur D'Erlach

from the Officer on board whose Vessel the said recruits may have embarked—I conclude that this Vessel would be a Frigate on the Mediterranean Station, which could convey them to Gibraltar. Of course he would always send with them one or more of his recruiting Officers—and upon their arrival, these could relieve other Officers whose health made it necessary to return home.

You have now the principal outlines of the Plan on which I think this affair may be best conducted,—and I shall be extremely happy to give every further assistance in my power.

You ask me if I have authority to sign the Agreement myself. I have none whatever, not having received any orders upon the subject. You ask me also if I think that the Government are still in want of such Troops. As I am not now acquainted with the detail of our Army, it is difficult for me to answer this query. But if I was to hazard an opinion I should say, that in the present and probable future state and extension of our Colonies, a good Swiss Battalion of a thousand men strong, well commanded, and capable of being kept regularly up to its establishment, must, I should presume, be considered as an acquisition.

In your letter you say that the delivery of the men should be made in Corsica or Gibraltar, where they should be cloathed, armed, &c., but I prefer the arrangement which you will find in the Heads of Agreement that I have drawn up. Because you may depend upon it that the recruiting will go on much better if the Regiment begins to take some form in proportion as the recruits arrive—it will have a more respectable appearance—and the formation of it will be much more expeditious. Besides I should think that it is impossible for a private individual to march a Regiment across Switzerland and Italy. He would meet with too many impediments. Your idea of preventing the expence of desertion falling upon the Government is extremely good, but your

will observe that I have provided for this effectually; and as effectually insured the embarkation of a thousand men complete, unless Monsieur D'Erlach absolutely fails in the execution of his agreement—which, from what you say of him, seems very unlikely.

The having a part of the Regiment of Wateville, formerly in so much repute, for the foundation of this Corps, is really a very great advantage, and it gives hopes of a much more speedy Levy than we could have otherwise. Monsieur d'Erlach wanted six months—but I have given him only four—because I believe the Troops for the West Indies ought to leave Europe, if possible, immediately after the Autumnal equinox—and if he marches from his Depot the 1st of August—he will not be at Gibraltar before the end of September, let the arrangements be made with all the exactness and promptitude possible.

I think that Monsieur d'Erlach, had better go to England without the loss of a moment—to settle his affair definitively—or should that appear to you unnecessary, an Inspector should be written for immediately. Till he comes, and establishes himself at the Depot, things will not go on as they ought to do. No Troops can be raised properly or expeditiously without an Inspector being on the spot, to regulate the whole detail, and superintend the execution.

I remain ever, my dear Wickham, most affectionately Yours, C. CRAUFURD.

WM. WICKHAM, Esq.

Lord Auckland to Mr. Wickham.*

Palace Yard: March 23rd, 1796.

Dear Sir,—This letter will be delivered or forwarded to you by my particular friend the Greffier Fagel, who proposes to pass a part of the ensuing summer in Switzerland.

* William, first Lord Auckland, the statesman and diplomatist; b. 1745, d. 1814.

If He is not already personally known to You, I can assure you with the strictest truth that He is a most amiable man, of a Honourable and friendly disposition, and possessed of much intelligence respecting the History and complicated Interest of the Times in which we live. His fine possessions in Holland are at present under sequestration, and his Misfortunes as well as the cause of them (his steady attachment to the principles of Civil society and religion), give him claims exclusive of his personal merit to every attention in our power. I suppose that he will be accompanied by his Brothers, who are also pleasing and accomplished young men.

Your Letter of January the 11th did not reach me till about a Fortnight ago. I felt greatly obliged to you for inclosing to me Mr. Mallet Dupan's remarks on my pamphlet respecting the Circumstances of the war in the last week of October. I find in these remarks many proofs of that singular acuteness and strong sense which distinguish the writer. I do not know how far it may be open to you to express in return my esteem and respect for his Character, and my concern that he has so much withdrawn himself from the great Bustle which must soon draw to its crisis. His sentiments on the strange Turns which it may still take would always be of great importance and utility.

We continue under great uncertainty as to every speculation of war or of peace. Our stock-jobbers are this week very deep in the latter speculation. In the meantime we are looking forward to the mode of facilitating a Loan to the Emperor.

The interior of this Country is prosperous and steadily attached both to the Constitution and the Government. I have occasionally felt great uneasiness as to the price of wheat; but though it is still very high (14*s*. per bushel), there is reason to believe that it is falling, and that the diminished consumption and increased importa-

tion will carry us into the new Harvest with less risk and inconvenience than were experienced last year.

I am, with truth and esteem, dear Sir, your faithful humble Servant,

AUCKLAND.

(No. 37.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.)
(To be deciphered by Mr. Canning.) Lausanne: 26th March, 1796.

My Lord,—I have received what I consider as certain intelligence, that the Court of Spain is about to enter into an offensive alliance with France and Holland. I can as yet bring no positive proof of any kind in support of this opinion, which is formed only on the certainty that the French Government look with confidence to this event taking place allmost immediately. If it does, the first object will be a joint attack on His Majesty's Possessions in both the Indies, the measures for the success of which will be taken before any appearance of hostilities takes place in Europe.

The ostensible reasons for the treaty, which will be explained at large, and with affectation in the preamble, are the rapid and alarming progress of his Majesty's arms in the East Indies. Your Lordship will remember that I do not venture to state this matter as a positive fact, nor do I mean to say that the project of the enemy may not yet be defeated, but only that the Directory are at this moment persuaded that they shall succeed in bringing about their designs, and that the treaty is actually in immediate contemplation, if not settled provisorily. I should not be surprized if a favourable answer were sent to the note delivered to Mr. B[arthelemy] for the express purpose of betraying the British Government into a momentary security on that side. In other respects, however, I have reason to believe that the Directory being not without serious alarms for its own existence, as well as that of the Republick, is not indisposed

at this time to accede to terms of accommodation of any kind. The journey of P[ichegru] to Paris, the sudden recall of Bacher from Basle, and of General Cartaux (?) from Lyons, who is replaced by Mont-Choisy, are the effects of a secret intrigue, contrived in the Department of the Jura, which, if not discovered, may have extensive and beneficial effects. Your Lordship must not be surprized if P[ichegru] should be received at Paris with greater honours than were shewn to Jourdan, or if the latter should fall into disgrace.

The Council of 200 of the Canton of Fribourg has given its opinion unanimously to defer the question of the acknowledgment of Mr. B[arthelemy] as ambassador of the Republick, to *a* Diet, leaving it open to determine whether an extraordinary one shall be called for the occasion. No answer has as yet been received to the Note of the — Instant.

(No. 38.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft. Most Secret.) Lausanne: 28th March, 1796, 7 o'clock, P.M.

My Lord,—I have this day at 4 o'clock received the note which I have the honour to send inclosed from Mr. Barthelemy. Though I am in hourly expectation of the return of the Messenger Magistri from Turin and Milan, yet in the uncertainty of his arrival during the present heavy fall of snow, I prefer sending an extraordinary Courier, which measure I hope your Lordship will not disapprove. I therefore dispatch my own Servant Henry Jaquerod, who has on former occasions performed the Journey with uncommon expedition. My other dispatches, some of which relate to the same subject, will be forwarded by Magistri.

I content myself now with merely forwarding the note without any reflexions of my own other than the following short observations.

By a reference to the new Constitution as published by

authority of the Convention before its dissolution, Your Lordship will find that Savoy, the county of Nice, and the Bishoprick of Basle are included in the territory of the Republic, but that the fate of the Low Countries, Luxembourg, and the Bishoprick of Liege is left undetermined.

It appears also by a reference to the same Constitution that Martinico, Tobago, and the whole of St. Domingo in the West Indies, and all the settlements in the East, formerly belonging to France, now in the possession of His Majesty, are also considered as making a part of the inalienable *territory* of the Republic, and Your Lordship will, no doubt, have observed that whatever is so considered, cannot be alienated according to the tenor of the Constitution, but *by a division* of the whole.

I inclose for Your Lordship's perusal some extracts of Letters (No. 1) which I very particularly request may be destroyed after they shall have been perused. No. 2 contains a copy of the Letter to M. Rigaud, by which M. Barthelemy acknowledged the receipt of the Note.

I ought to add that a Letter has just arrived in Savoy from the Minister of the Interior, addressed to the Administrator of the Department at Chambery, containing new Assurances of the determination of the Directory not to consent to any restitution of that Country. I shall send a Copy of M. Barthelemy's Note to Turin, Vienna, and Berlin immediately.

Sir Morton Eden to Mr. Wickham.

Vienna: April 2nd, 1796.

Sir,—It was not till yesterday that I received your letter of the 12th (transmitted through Turin and Milan) and its several interesting inclosures. Those of the latter which you wished to have returned, I shall take care to convey to you by the first safe opportunity.

(*Cypher.*) In my Letter of last month, I promised to

write to you relative to the views of this Court with regard to the Prince of Condé's Army. I however suspended my Intention in consequence of having then first learnt the negotiation with Baptiste [Pichegru], on the progress and success of which I was in daily expectation of hearing from you—but concluding from his departure from the Army that the hope from him had failed, I have renewed my Instances here to have the Army of Condé brought into effective Service, and have urged the Austrian Ministry to tell me, at least, the Emperor's precise Intention with regard to it; since receiving of your Letters, I have again employed my endeavours for the same purpose, insisting particularly upon the political Advantages which that Corps is calculated to offer, from the favorable disposition of the Interior of France, and from the communication which by your Letter you had succeeded in establishing with those who are inclined to the cause of the Royalists. It was his wish, he said, that it should be brought forward on the side of Savoy, from whence the Imperial Army reached the *Roya*, it might march into France supported by 25,000 Piedmontese Troops, and by a diversion by the Austrians on the side of Briançon, but if it be necessary to remain in Germany, which from Mr. Trevor's last letter there is too much room to apprehend, it is his fixed opinion that on account of its principles, its Imprudencies, and its want of discipline, it cannot, excepting in the event of the non-success of the Austrian Army on the Lower Rhine, be admitted to serve with them, as this of itself would be the occasion of such dissension as would be essentially hurtful to the operations of the Campaign; that it was too weak to attempt any Thing of itself in a Country where it must begin by reducing strong Fortresses; that if any success of the Austrians on the Lower Rhine should prove sufficiently decisive to enable it to proceed to the attack of Alsace, the Army of Condé should be allowed to enter that Province at the same time, preceded by

a declaration by His Serene Highness, in the name of the French King, signifying that the Austrian Ministry are engaged in the war by the unprovoked aggression of the Convention, and that they do not enter into France with any view of *envahissement* or dismemberment, but for the reestablishment of order, but that he would not be permitted to take any Place in the name of the French King; that if the operations of the Imperial Army were still attended with the necessary success, the Prince might then march forward with his Corps into Franche Compté, and there act as Circumstances might direct, but that if for the Chance of deriving political Advantages from the Corps of Condé, it was meant that the Austrian Army should act in subserviency to its views, H. I. M.'s distrust of the Principles and Professions of the Emigrants and Royalists was so great and irremovable, that he would never allow his Armies to engage in any operations which required any dependance on their part. Here this matter rests for the present; you will easily perceive that it is still in the same state as at the beginning, and it appears probable, as I observed to the Austrian Minister, that I shall soon receive Instructions to declare here His Majesty's determination immediately to withdraw His support from this Corps.

Be so good as to tell M. Degelmann the Magistrate that you have intrusted with your declaration, as he will be told to make use of the same channel in a similar declaration that the Emperor proposes to make on putting an end to the Armistice. (*Cypher ends*).

I have not heard of any French Agent having of late been here. About three Months ago there was one who came under pretext of some arrangements relative to the French Prisoners in Hungary, and if I mistake not, he went from hence to Italy. You will have heard of M. D'Engerstroöm having been refused by this Court.

The Archduke will set out in a few days for Merk (?)

I have the Honor to be, with great and unfeigned regard, ever your most obedient Humble Servant,

MORTON EDEN.

W. WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

(No. 42.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Bern: 8th April, 1796.

My Lord,—In my letter of the 17th March, No. 36, I had the Honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordship's dispatches by Magistri, and after conveying the feeble expressions of my Gratitude for the Indulgence with which His Majesty and His Ministers had been pleased to consider my humble efforts in the Public Service, I ventured to request that they would have the Goodness to allow me a little further time that I might be at liberty not to write till after very mature reflexion, upon the important and extensive matters that those dispatches contained, especially Nos. 4 and 8.

I now proceed to answer them, and in so doing, I shall endeavour to compress what I have to say into as short a compass as the nature of the subject in question, and the very various points into which it branches out, will possibly permit.

The discretionary powers that His Majesty is graciously pleased to repose in me must of necessity be entirely regulated in their exercise by the consideration of these four points.

First. The state of the Public opinion in the Interior, and the possibility and means of bringing it into action *with effect* in favour of a change of the present Government.

Secondly. The possibility of maintaining and supporting the efforts of the enemies of the present Government when brought into action, either with or without *more or less* of foreign Assistance.

Thirdly. The Hopes that may reasonably be entertained of assistance from the Austrians, either in the way of a direct Co-operation, or of an active and powerful diversion.

Fourthly. The possibility of peace, either general or partial, at a period more or less remote.

In considering the first question, I need say little of the present state of the public opinion; the mass of Information I have already communicated to Your Lordship on that subject, will no doubt be thought sufficient to warrant me in saying that the great body of the people is now decidedly adverse to the present rulers, as well as to the present form of Government and the principles on which it is founded; that this opinion is gradually but daily gaining ground, and that it will go on increasing, as long as the Members of the Directory are obliged to have recourse to those extraordinary and violent measures by which alone they can exist and maintain themselves, as long as the present most extravagant and destructive war shall be persevered in by them with such obstinacy.*

I have also on various occasions laid before Your Lordship in much detail the several insurmountable obstacles that appeared to me to oppose themselves to the possibility of bringing this opinion into action, without the assistance and co-operation, *more or less direct*, of a powerful foreign force. I shall forbear, therefore, to enlarge upon that point, the more so, as his Majesty's Ministers appear to have seen the thing precisely in the same light.

These obstacles, as it seems to me, cannot be overpowered till the aversion to the present Government, grown into absolute hatred, shall have become so universal as that a sudden explosion, in the nature of that

* *Note at the side.*—The whole of what I have here said is confirmed to me by the reports of the Swiss officers lately returned from Holland through France, particularly of the *Zuricois*, whose political prejudices cannot have influenced their opinion on this occasion.

which occasioned the first Revolution, shall take place throughout the whole Kingdom at the same instant. For myself, I believe that the whole Country is nearly ripe for a something of the kind at this very moment—but it must be remembered that the Directory are in possession of a regular, established Government, that they have the direction of a powerful machine, most skilfully framed and put together, to which they have added by violence every thing that was wanting to render it capable of answering all their own purposes, and, above all, that they are in possession of a numerous army commanded in all its branches by men who have no other means of subsistence but what their profession affords them, and who are consequently, *until some fair prospect can be holden out to them*, most entirely at the devotion of the power by whom they are employed.

Till that Army can be destroyed or gained, I ever have been and still am most intimately persuaded that nothing can be done in the way above alluded to. It is for that reason that I have always considered the Affair of Baptiste [Pichegru] as of such Importance, that I have been disposed myself to make and to advise His Majesty's Ministers to authorize almost any pecuniary sacrifice that might be *likely* to give it effect, and this even in the uncertainty, not only of ultimate success, but of the possibility of his being able to make the attempt required.

Indeed, had there been an abler Man at the Head of the Austrian Armies, and any thing like concert, union, or mutual good opinions between that Chief, or his Court, and the Prince of Condé, the business must long since have been concluded, or at least in such a Train as that a clear, frank, and explicit explanation of the views, Projects, and means of each Party might have taken place, and a general opinion of their mutual honour and good faith been established, mutual promises of Assistance and Co-operation might also have been given, and a plan of

operations might have been already sketched out, at least, if not finally concluded.

Above Three Months have now gone by since the Austrian Adjutant General, Mr. Vincent, delivered the Prince of Condé's note into Baptiste's [Pichegru's] *own hands*, and received from him a favourable answer, with the Assurance of his disposition to render service to the Cause, whenever an opportunity should offer. And yet, since that Epoch, no one step has been taken *on their part* to hasten or to facilitate the Conclusion of a business of such obvious and extensive Importance. Every thing that has yet been done has been done from Lausanne.

A large and rapid extension of the Insurrection of the western Provinces seemed, at one moment, likely to have been carried into effect, and notwithstanding the melancholy fate of the two great Chiefs of the Insurgents, I am inclined to believe such an event not impossible, if the dissensions, Intrigues, and Jealousies of the different Leaders, which will probably increase with their numbers, do not place an insurmountable obstacle in the way.

If Mr. Teissonet had shewn but half the Talents, Prudence, Zeal and economy in the Foret that he has manifested in the Jura, the insurrection would have been established in the former Country, in the course of the last summer, in the most formidable and extensive manner, but unfortunately he fell into the hands of the Chevalier de Guer, who persuaded him that such an Enterprize was beneath his means and his Talents, and he squandered away the money entrusted to him, in idle efforts to coalesce all the Southern Departments which were totally destitute of the material means (I mean arms and provisions) necessary to support a general rising. But the whole of this scheme is in its very nature slow and at the best imperfect, and it would be extremely unwise to form any military enterprize, much more so

any great political speculation, that must depend either on the speedy or on the ultimate success of so uncertain an operation.

I therefore return to my original and constant conclusion, that, excepting a general rising should take place, or a material portion of the Army under the direction of an able General could be gained, nothing can be expected from the efforts of the enemies of the present Government in the Interior, and consequently, that no encouragement or assistance ought to be given them, further than what may be necessary to maintain them in their present good dispositions, and to enable the leading men to keep up an active Correspondance with each other and with foreign powers, and to gain the Agents of the Government whenever such a measure may be necessary. The expence required to obtain this object is, however, as I find by experience, very considerable. It is, notwithstanding, absolutely necessary, as without it, I could not execute that part of Your Lordship's Instructions contained in No. 4, in which you direct me to suffer none of my plans to be deranged, or my agents to be disheartened, and to keep up such a spirit as shall be ripe and ready for exertion.

As to the second question, viz., the possibility of maintaining the efforts of the Royalists when brought into action, it has also been so thoroughly discussed in all its different branches, in the course of my Correspondance with Your Lordship, that I shall content myself here again with repeating the conclusion I have before drawn, to which Your Lordship refers in your Dispatch No. 8, viz., that though I still believe that any effort made without the Co-operation of a foreign force, *more or less direct*, must fail of success, yet that I am now fairly persuaded that matters are so well prepared and combined in the Interior, that it would be sufficient if the Austrians would engage to keep the full force of the enemy employed by an extensive and vigorous attack, without either covering

or marching directly to the Assistance of the Province where the Insurrection should take place.

As a proof of this assertion, I have only to recall to Your Lordship's recollection what has passed at Besançon, the present situation of the Department of the Jura, and the habitual residence of M. Teissonet at Lons le Saulnier, in daily communication with the Administrators of that Department.

I will add a specimen, No. 1, of the manner in which all the Jura has been surveyed by active and well disposed Agents, and under the immediate direction of M. Teissonet, the whole corrected by the official reports given into the Department from the respective Cantons and Municipalities, and called for under various pretexts and on different occasions. It is next to a miracle that this plan should have been carried on so far without any discovery.

I should not, at the same time, disguise from Your Lordship that both M. Imbert and M. Teissonet (who has again been with me to permit him to act), are decidedly of opinion, that with money alone, they would be able to maintain themselves, and I do not mean to say that the moment may not arrive when their reasoning may be true. But at present, I am persuaded that that moment is not come, and I shall therefore, in compliance with the spirit of Your Lordship's Instructions, withhold such pecuniary supplies as might enable them to act till I can be assured that they will be more effectually supported.

As to the third and most important Point of all, viz., 'the Assistance that may be expected from the Austrians,' I wish I may be mistaken in my opinion, but I am strongly inclined to fear that no reliance whatever ought, *at this moment*, to be placed on any efforts of theirs, and I shall beg Your Lordship to attend to me with your usual Indulgence, whilst I explain my reasons for thinking so somewhat more at length than I have hitherto done

in any of my former dispatches in which I have ventured to touch upon the same subject.

I have long been intimately persuaded of two facts—the first, that the Court of Vienna has been tampering, not directly with the French Government, but with some one or other of its leading Members individually, for these 12 or 15 months last past, and that Mr. Pelin has been the principal Agent in these negotiations; the second, that for some time past, and particularly since the death of the unfortunate Louis XVII., that Court has been constantly meditating some secret project or projects of its own, tending directly to its own aggrandizement, and of a nature not to be communicated to its Allies. I can bring no direct positive proof of either of these facts; I own, also, that I have never been able to discover, with certainty, how the first was carried on, still less to what point it directly tended, nor could I ever learn what was the precise object of the *other*. Indeed, I very much doubt whether the Court of Vienna ever knew distinctly what they meant themselves, and that amidst a number of successive speculations, none were ever brought to any maturity, even of design, excepting the Affair of Poland, in the execution of which they were powerfully aided by the interested activity of others. I intreat Your Lordship, however, to remember that I have communicated to you, at different times, several detached facts and circumstances, which, combined and compared with each other, seem to make a strong mass of circumstantial evidence, tending immediately to justify all my fears and suspicions. Had any doubt remained on my mind of the existence of the sort of *tampering* I have above alluded to, the Letters of M. Pelin, which I saw and read myself, in the course of last summer, would alone have entirely convinced me of it. And as to the other fact, setting aside the Affair of Poland, and the supposed views of the House of Austria on Bavaria, on Lorraine, Alsace, and Franche Compté, or in Italy, I ask Your Lordship, even

supposing no credit should be given to the report of Madame de Soucy, can there be any doubt, judging only from what is notorious to every body, that the Cabinet of Vienna had some secret object in contemplation, when the exchange of the Princess was pressed with so much earnestness?

For myself I am perfectly satisfied, from a number of little circumstances that have come to my knowledge, each too trifling to be mentioned apart, that the possibility of obtaining the Crown of France for an Arch-duke, by a marriage with the Princess, was considered as by no means remote. I am *sure* that this idea was considered as practicable by many leading men among the different *popular* factions, both in and out of France, *and I have little doubt* but that memoires and notes partly to this direct effect, partly tending to shew the improbability that the lawful successor of the Crown should ever be received again in France, were sent in numbers to Vienna.

The prevalence of an idea and a hope of this kind will alone explain many things that would otherwise appear mysterious in the Conduct of that Court towards the King of France, the Prince of Condé, and the Royalists in general, notwithstanding the repeated extravagances of which these latter have so constantly been guilty. It will also give the key of much that passed last year, both on the Rhine and in Italy, that stands in real need of serious explanation. If I am not mistaken in the whole, or any material part of these conjectures, is it not seriously to be apprehended that a line of Conduct similar to that which proved so disastrous to the Interests of His Majesty and the Common Cause last year, will again be adopted by the Court of Vienna in the course of the present Campaign? Would it not, at least, be highly imprudent to form any practical speculations, either military or political on any other principle?

I am the more persuaded that such will be the Case, because, though the same precise plans, projects, or

expectations may no longer exist, yet there can be no certainty that these will not be replaced by others equally weak and extravagant, and equally dangerous to the Interests of His Majesty—at least untill the Court and Cabinet of Vienna shall be differently composed, I never can entertain any Hope of a material Change; for untill that event take place, the radical cause of the evil will, I am sure, remain, and I fear we must look for nothing but feeble, incomplete, and irresolute Councils, and even those, such as they are, will be liable at every moment to be modified, rejected, changed, and perhaps resumed again on the menaces, as well as the perfidious offers and suggestions of the enemy, none of which, we may be well assured, will be wanting. At least, till that event take place, we can never hope to see a system of Politics adopted, either worthy of the dignity and political Importance of the House of Austria, and the great and powerful alliances by which she is now strengthened, or at all conformable to the open, manly, and generous Conduct, and the plain good faith by which the Councils of His Majesty are now, and, I believe, have constantly been directed, in all their dealings and Communications with that Cabinet.

I beg Your Lordship to observe that in expressing myself thus strongly I by no means would presume to throw unjust reflexions on the person who is now considered as at the Head of the Austrian Administration, or by any means to depreciate the talents he may possess; all that I mean to say is this, that he has not the sort of Talents that are adapted to the present occasion, or, what is perhaps more likely, it is not so much Talents that are wanting, as the mind—I mean a mind capable of embracing and directing such new, extensive, and combined Objects and Interests, as the Situation of Europe now presents on every side, and of silencing and overpowering all opposition in a Cabinet, fundamentally

vicious in its formation, of the composition of which, if I am rightly informed, neither that Minister nor the Emperor himself have been, or can be, entirely the Masters.

I trust, also, that Your Lordship will not have supposed for a moment, that in any thing I have here said I have in any way presumed to call in question the policy and wisdom of His Majesty's present Alliance with the Court of Vienna; so far, indeed, am I from entertaining such an idea, that were the Austrians to do nothing the whole Campaign but march backwards and forwards from Dusseldorff to Basle, and from Basle to Dusseldorff, I should say that enough were done to justify very considerable sacrifices on the part of His Majesty. The mere existence of this formidable Army on the frontiers of France certainly contributes more than any other thing to the daily and rapid waste of all the natural strength and resources of that Country, and renders it from day to day less capable of making any formidable efforts against Great Britain, her Colonies, and her other Allies. I am only anxious that the advantages to be derived from that Alliance should be estimated at their real value, and that hopes and expectations may not be raised, which, in all probability, will never be realised.

There are many other reasons which, especially when joined to those I have above enumerated, contribute very materially to increase my fears, as tending to augment the embarrassment, and consequently the timidity and indecision, of the Austrian Cabinet. I would particularly allude to the Affairs of Poland, not yet I believe finally determined; to the Jealousy and uneasiness that the House of Austria cannot help entertaining of the designs of the Court of Berlin; to the very equivocal Conduct of some of the Princes of the Empire, where the French are still carrying on their Intrigues, not to mention the untoward and injudicious Conduct of the French Princes, and the Emigrants, whose indecent Violence and notorious

indiscretion would render all Concert between them and the Court of Vienna, supposing no other cause for such a separation to exist, absolutely impracticable.

It seems to me, however, scarcely possible to suppose if the Affair of Baptiste [Pichegru] should promise any thing like a fortunate Conclusion, that the House of Austria should not be immediately determined in its Conduct by the immense Advantages it would present to that Court in particular, as well as to the Common Cause; I have hinted very plainly at some of them in a Letter to Sir Morton Eden, of the month of Nov^r last, of which I had the Honour to send Your Lordship a Copy, and which Sir Morton has, no doubt, communicated to M. Thugut. They are, however, much too important and too obvious to have escaped the penetration and the close Attention of that Minister.

A necessary Consequence of the above observations on the Conduct and situation of the House of Austria is this:—that I shall make no advances, nor give any encouragement to the Royalists *that may enable them to take up Arms*, untill my fears and suspicions shall have been entirely removed by the most unequivocal proofs of an Intention to commence Hostilities, and to pursue them with vigour.

As to the fourth Point, viz., the possibility of a Peace, general or partial, Your Lordship will find some observations upon it in a dispatch that will accompany this, No. 44.

I should hope, by the next occasion—provided, that is, that I am not too much hurried in the interval—to send Your Lordship a clear and accurate account of all the Money that has been hitherto expended, with the necessary Vouchers, together with an Estimate of what may be wanted in every possible case.

I propose advancing, now, the Sum of 6,000 Louis for the purchase of the same number of fusils in Germany, which will be lodged on the frontiers of Switzerland, and

not suffered to pass but in the certainty that an insurrection will take place, consequently may be sold again in case they should not be used—the further Sum of 12,000 Louis to Messrs. Preçy and Imbert, to be also employed in the purchase of Arms and Ammunition, in a way agreed upon between us. Neither of these Sums will, however, be drawn for in any case in less than a fortnight, and I shall put it off much longer if it be possible. I shall immediately make a further provision for the affair of Baptiste [Pichegru] of from 3 to 4,000 Louis d'or, i.e. provided my first letters from Paris be satisfactory. It is possible also, but I am not yet determined, that I may make an advance of 5,000*l.* to M. Leveneur. Your Lordship will have learnt from the papers that he has two parties already in movement, one on the side of Pallau, the other in the Forêt of Orleans. M. Mallet, his Swiss Lieutenant, writes me word that they are both conducted with great Prudence and Address. I expect, however, some further Information before I shall make up my mind upon that subject. Upon this and every other occasion Your Lordship may rely upon my using the strictest Caution and the most exact economy that the Service of His Majesty, and the general tenor of Your Lordship's Instructions, to which I shall always endeavour most scrupulously to adhere, will possibly permit.

(No. 43.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft. Most Secret.) Bern: 8th April, 1796.

My Lord,—Notwithstanding the strange tenor of Mr. Barthelemy's Note of the 26th March, which I had the honour of forwarding to Your Lordship, and of the new principles therein laid down and avowed, I am more than ever persuaded that the Directory are now convinced of the absolute necessity in which they are either of making a speedy peace, or of perishing together with the Republick. Your Lordship will naturally suppose that I have of late

neglected nothing that could tend to give me any insight into their real opinion upon that important point, and every thing that I have been able to learn of the conversation of persons closely connected with them, and of others who knew the extent of their real means and resources, tend more and more to convince me that I am not mistaken in what I have above asserted. Besides several other persons whose sentiments I have had the means of knowing, I will mention to Your Lordship Rizbaz, the Genevese Minister at Paris, who has made no scruple of writing home to that effect in a public dispatch. I know besides that Mr. Barthelemy was quite astonished at the complexion of the note, and that he had no doubt or uneasiness about its contents which he considered as likely to be decidedly favourable, he was only anxious about the far less important point, whether he himself should be employed as negotiator.

The assertion may perhaps appear a strange one at first sight, I am, however, myself satisfied *that under all the circumstances of the moment*, such an opinion on the part of the Directory was perfectly consistent with the tenor of the note, it being most clear that they would never try to give effect to that opinion but at the very last extremity, nor till every other resource had completely failed. In the first place, I am by no means sure that they may not consider themselves as really bound by the Article of the Constitution that declares and describes the extent and limits of the Republic, or at least that they do not take upon themselves to act in derogation of it. I admit, however, that they might easily have avoided committing themselves so openly and directly in the very outset. It is possible also that the difficulty arising from that particular clause might have been and still may be gotten over, if all parties are seriously disposed to peace, by a decree passed on the demand of the Directory, explaining the nature and meaning of the clause according to the wishes of the Public, which on that occasion would

be most clearly pronounced. This might be done the more easily and with a better pretext as the clause in question was debated and passed.

In the second place, precisely at the moment of the arrival of my note at Paris, the most sanguine hopes were entertained of the success of the projected invasion in Italy, which would certainly have occasioned at least a temporary change in the situation of their affairs greatly to their advantage.

Thirdly—About the same time the Directory had flattered themselves with the success of their negotiations in Spain, concerning which I wrote to your Lordship in my No. 37.*

Fourthly—They had not lost all hopes of the effect of their negotiations in Germany, particularly of a separate peace with Vienna, as Your Lordship will perceive from the inclosed note, No. 1, which comes to me from good authority. That a resolution to dispatch M. Poterat there again must have been taken as soon or almost immediately after their orders to M. Barthelemy to deliver his note of 26th March were sent from Paris.†

Lastly, after all there is nothing in the note that shews an aversion to Peace, as it holds out a direct offer to England to enter into a separate Negotiation on the principle of each party sacrificing its Allies, and shews no objection to treat with them all, on the condition that the King of Sardinia and the Bishop of Basle may be abandoned. Should their hopes of success in Italy and of a separate negotiation at Vienna completely fail (both of which seem to me more than probable), I have so little doubt not only that their language will entirely change, but if Peace be really the object of the King's Ministers, that it may be obtained on terms neither dishonourable

* *Note at the side.*—I have received no further information as to that very important matter excepting that about a week after the date of my first intelligence less sanguine hopes of success were entertained by the Directory.

† *Note at the side.*—*Poterat's arrival at Basle is announced for to-morrow.*

nor *disadvantageous* to His Majesty nor his Allies, provided, i. e., that it be not pressed for too eagerly, that no military preparations be laid aside, and more particularly that great pains, industry, and address be used to familiarise the members of the Government with the idea that the thing is possible, and to encourage the nation, and still more a strong party in the Two Assemblies, to demand it loudly of the Directory, and if necessary, with an appearance of compulsion.

As I have said before, I am not very apprehensive of the success of any separate negotiation for Peace. Whatever was the object of Poterat's mission, which I presume of course will have been communicated to Sir M. Eden, it is evident that his offers were rejected. It will however be very necessary to watch him most closely, as if I am right in my opinion of the present sentiments of the Directory, they will constantly hold out the most advantageous offers possible to the Court of Vienna. I shall write immediately to Sir M. Eden upon the subject. Fortunately I am personally acquainted with an Emigrant now at Vienna, for whom Poterat has undertaken to negotiate the restitution of his property in France, through whose means Sir Morton may always be acquainted with the motions of that Gentleman. I have some slight reasons for believing that on his last visit something was said about Bavaria; I am the more disposed to give way to this suspicion from the perusal of the inclosed Letter from M. Poterat to the Duke of Deux Ponts, though I am aware an opposite construction may be put upon it. *The original of this Letter was some days in my possession.* I had determined at first to destroy it, as likely in the present situation of things to have some dangerous consequences; upon better reflection, however, I determined to let it go on, having almost the certainty of being able to intercept the answer. The singular contents of this Letter having induced me to make further inquiries into the connexions of His Serene Highness at

Basle, particularly during the time of the late negotiations, the inclosed very curious order has also fallen into my hands. I have also met with some very curious instructions sent to M. Barthelemy, with which I shall have occasion to trouble Your Lordship hereafter. It appears from them that the affair of Manheim cost altogether 2 millions of French livres, and I learn also from the same that M. de Hardenberg had not only promised his services to M. Barthelemy, but that he had employed himself actively in displaying the advantages of Peace and friendship with the Republic to the Ministers of other powers.

I shall follow up both those matters very closely, but every day's experience makes me now repent, having His Majesty's permission to that effect, that I did not take up my residence at Basle whilst the negotiations were carrying on there. I am convinced that my time might have been much more usefully employed.

M. Poterat when at Basle engaged an Emigrant, a considerable Proprietor in Guadeloupe, to go over to England for the purpose of procuring intelligence for the French Government, who, as he said, are extremely ill-served *by their agents there, all of whom being mere subalterns.* The person will not go without my knowledge and consent, and not in any case without having received M. Poterat's final instructions, particularly as to the names of the subaltern agents in question. Your Lordship will learn from one of the Letters from Basle contained in my No. 46, that the Passports of the agents of the Directory are countersigned.—Poterat.

Lord Auckland to Mr. Wickham.

Palace Yard: April 12th, 1796.

Dear Sir,—The inclosed packet contains some Parliamentary Registers and some newspapers; if you have any curiosity to look at them, I beg the favour of you to open them without scruple, and if my Friend the Greffier

Fagel is in your neighbourhood or within your reach, to inform Him that I have not written on this Occasion, because I am not certain that my Letter would find Him. I had directed the Packet to Mr. Fraser at Hamburgh; but on recollecting that He meant to go about this time to Switzerland, I think it better to dispatch it to you by the messenger who is to be sent to you to-night.

The *stupid*, ill-conceived, and insolent answer given by the French Directoire to your note has given a very wholesome electrical stroke to our Countrymen, and certainly tends essentially to facilitate to us the means of carrying on the war to a good end. The French Government seems to have supposed that we were in the Jaws of famine; they will learn that the price of wheat is actually fallen from 15*s.* to 8*s.* per Bushel, and is expected to fall still lower. They seemed also to have supposed that our resources were nearly exhausted: when they learn the Measures which Mr. Pitt is to propose on Monday next, they will see that without any difficulty we produce new Taxes of 800,000*l.* a year, and provide for the floating Debt, for the paper in the Market, and even for the expected war expenses to the end of the present Year; leaving *to the knowledge of all mankind* Taxes and resources sufficient without even an effort for another Campaign if necessary.

Notwithstanding all this (in which really there is no vaunting) I shall look with earnestness to the future pourparlers at Basle, and with anxiety to the military exertions on the Rhine, and to the opening of the Campaign.

Believe me, dear Sir, very sincerely Yours,

AUCKLAND.

If any material political publications take place within your Circle of observation, I shall be very glad to have them.

Mr. Wickham to Sir Morton Eden.

(Extract from Draft.) Bern: 13th April, 1796.

Sir,—I beg you will accept my best thanks for your letter of the 2nd Instant, which I received yesterday.

I have learnt with infinite pain the resolution of the Court of Vienna respecting the employment of the army of Condé, though it has in no way surprized me, having been persuaded from my first conversation with the Austrian Generals in August last, that his Imperial Majesty never intended either to employ that army actively (except in a case of urgent necessity), or to give to the Prince of Condé that sort of character and political existence which his Majesty's Ministers seemed to desire and expect. It were to be wished that the Austrian Minister had spoken thus plainly at that time; a large expense might have been saved to his Majesty, and many painfull moments to the persons who have been charged by Government with the different negotiations and communications that have taken place with His Serene Highness. You must feel that the situation of Colonel Craufurd and myself will be to the last degree unpleasant whenever the time shall come that his Majesty shall feel himself under the necessity of withdrawing his support from that corps, a measure, however, that under the present circumstances I shall be the first to advise. I heartily pray that the Austrian army alone may be found equal to the projects they meditate, but, on the principle on which they are acting, they may rely on their meeting with a strong resistance, and that even the best disposed young men of the Requisition who have joined the armies will fight against them as stoutly as they would, if well managed, against the Republicans.

With respect to Baptiste [Pichegru], the Austrian Ministry having received precisely the same intelligence as myself, I never doubted but that they would have

communicated it to you. You know that that person is gone to Paris, where a material change has taken place in his situation. I believe that he himself had calculated that this change would have produced a more serious effect upon the minds of his adherents than it appears to have yet done.

. . . . . .

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

(Private.) Cleveland Row: April 15, 1796.
(Received 28th, at night, at Fribourg.)

My dear Sir,—I write this for the purpose of acknowledging your different private letters.

In the first place let me thank you for your seeds, which I believe are arrived quite in time, and for the miniature of the Princess, who has I think in her countenance strong traits of both her unfortunate Parents.

I have faithfully burnt all the letters which you desired me to destroy; but I believe it will be more regular that in future papers of that description should come to me only in private letters; as I doubt whether I am, strictly speaking, authorized to destroy inclosures in public letters, though desired to do so. It was, however, better that I should expose myself to the remote possibility of some blame in this respect, than that any confidence reposed in you should be abused.

I hardly know what to think about Baptiste [Pichegru]. If there is not some dessous des cartes, with which we are unacquainted, he has proceeded on very slight grounds, or has very lightly given up the footing on which he rested. He now seems to rank with his two predecessors except that his failure is not so public and notorious as theirs. The present times, and the general dispositions which the prevalent notions inspire, are not calculated to give to such persons the same means which similar situations, (or rather, which situations apparently similar,) have formerly given to others.

I have been greatly surprized at the turn of the answer sent through Barthélémi. Even if they resolved not to treat, which I wonder at, considering their distresses, I think they have done their business coarsely and clumsily, and have in fact played our Game for us better than we could have hoped.

The principal expectations of success which I form are from the interior. Not from what is called a counter-revolution, or the decided prevalence of a Royalist party, but from the difficulties which all these partial insurrections will produce, multiplied as one is sure they must be by the nature of the measures to which the Government must now have recourse, in order to live from day to day.

Our Paris papers of the 10th announce a revolt in the Department of the Cher. This event would be one of great importance, as it would connect and extend the chain of insurrection. I earnestly hope you will employ with a liberal hand the means and powers given you, whenever you can obtain a reasonable security that they will be applied to the real objects which are in view. The difficulties of conveying money from hence are so great, (notwithstanding all the trash you read in the newspapers, both French and English) that what you can do in that respect will be by no means superfluous: And you have, I trust, experience enough of the confidence and support on which you may rely here, to fear even risking something where much good is to be done, and in this case more good is feasible, as I believe by the mode here mentioned than by any other.

I cannot conclude without repeating to you in this form what I have so often occasion to say in my public letters, of the great satisfaction which your conduct gives, and of the pleasure with which I reflect on the choice made for filling the most laborious and one of the most difficult situations in the King's foreign service.

Ever, my dear Sir, most truly and sincerely yours,

G.

Comte d'Avaray to Mr. Wickham.

Véronne, le 20 avril.

Je croirois manquer à la confiance et à l'amitié que vous avez daigné me montrer, my dear Sir, si je ne vous prévenois pas que le roi quitte Véronne pour se rendre, comme gentilhomme françois, à l'armée de M^gr^ le P^ce^ de Condé. Vous m'avez montré trop d'attachement pour sa personne et sa cause pour que je ne me croye pas en droit (n'ayant d'ailleurs aucun caractère embarrassant pour vous) de réclamer vos bons offices dans cette circonstance délicate. Prenez ce mot sous toutes ses acceptions.

Le motif qui a déterminé le roi vous surprendra. Sans doute rien ne pouvoit être plus inatendu. Le M. Carlotti, gentilhomme véronnois, se présente chez moi et me dit qu'il a quelque chose d'importance à communiquer directement au roi ; il est introduit et signifie au roi de la part de son gouvernement que l'asile qui lui étoit accordé cessoit, et qu'il devoit se retirer du territoire de la république dans le plus bref délai possible. Mon maître a répondu, 'Je partirai ; mais j'exige deux conditions— la première, qu'on me présente le livre d'or, où ma famille est inscrite, afin d'en rayer le nom de ma main ; la seconde, qu'on me rende l'armure dont l'amitié de mon ayeul, Henri IV, a fait présent à la république.' Le lendemain le même gentilhomme est revenu de la part du noble Priuli, podestà de Véronne, déclarer au roi qu'il protestoit contre sa réponse. S. M. lui a répondu, 'Hier j'ai parlé à votre gouvernement, aujourd'hui vous m'apportez une protestation de la part du Podestà. Je ne la reçois ; je ne recevrai pas davantage celle du Sénat. J'ai dit que je partirois ; je partirai en effet dès que j'aurai les passeports dont j'ai besoin, mais je persiste dans ma réponse ; je me la devois, et je ne puis pas oublier que je suis roi de France.'

Le B^on^ de Rolle, que vous aurez plaisir à connoître personnellement, vous remettra ma lettre, my dear Sir, je ne la prolonge donc pas ; il vous en dira beaucoup plus que je n'ai le tems de vous en dire.

Recevez, je vous prie, mon sincère hommage pour vous et M^dme^ Wickam.

LE CTE. D'AVARAY.

The Comte de Maistre * *to Mr. Wickham.*

Lausanne, le 25 avril 96.

Monsieur,—Je vous remercie infiniment de l'attention obligeante que vous avez eue de m'adresser un exemplaire de votre correspondance diplomatique avec M. Barthélémi : il faut que votre cour soit bien servie à Paris, puisque ces pièces ont déjà paru dans la dernière feuille du *Véridique*. Dans d'autres circonstances la publication d'une telle correspondance suffiroit pour soulever la nation contre le gouvernement ; mais dans ce moment, elle ne produira aucun effet ; ou, du moins, elle ne produira qu'un mécontentement stérile pour la bonne cause ; car l'armée est au Directoire, du moins par le fait, et il se moque d'une nation désarmée et impuissante. Il n'en faut pas moins admirer la Politique grande, humaine et loyale de S. M. Britannique, qui se met ainsi parfaitement en règle aux yeux de l'Europe entière, et particulièrement à l'égard de l'opposition parlementaire.

Vous avez pu voir souvent, Monsieur, que je n'ai pas des idées couleur-de-rose sur les suites de cette malheureuse révolution : les funestes nouvelles que vous recevrez par ce Courier ne justifient que trop mes allarmes. Je vous répéterois inutilement ce que vous diront les dépêches de M. de Trevor. M. d'Argenteau vient de

* Joseph Comte de Maistre, born at Chambery 1754, a diplomatist, but much more celebrated as a religious and political writer. He was entirely opposed to the principles of the French Revolution, and was at this time living in exile at Lausanne. He died in 1821.

nous perdre une seconde fois: on le renvoit, mais c'est trop tard.

Agréez, Monsieur, les assurances de mon attachement, et de la respectueuse considération avec laquelle je suis, Monsieur, votre très-humble et très-obéissant Serviteur,

LE CTE. MAISTRE.

(No. 47.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Fribourg en Brisgau: 29 April, 1796.

My Lord,—In consequence of an appointment with Colonel Craufurd, I came here on the evening of the 27th Instant, where I found that gentleman arrived here before me. On the following morning we received a note from the Prince of Condé, requesting that we would immediately repair to his head Quarters at Riegel,* as he had something of the utmost importance to communicate to us. On our arrival there, his Serene Highness informed us, to our infinite surprize, that the King, who had suddenly desired to leave the territory of the Republick of Venice, was expected at Riegel in the course of the day, and he desired us, in the presence of the Bishop of Arras, to give him our opinions as to the manner in which he ought to act on so delicate an occasion.

Though the question was certainly embarrassing, we did not hesitate to say that, as his Serene Highness had done us the Honour to ask our advice, we should humbly represent to him that it would be on every account adviseable that he should immediately communicate the whole affair to the Austrian Generals, as well as to the Emperor, to whom it appeared that the King had allready written, stating at the same time, conformably to the King's own letter, that his Majesty came there merely as

* Riegel, a small town in the Brisgau about fourteen miles from Fribourg, at this time the Prince of Condé's head quarters. The King took up his abode at a house belonging to Prince Schwartzenburg.

a private gentleman, and that he wished to be considered only as the Count de Lisle.

It was easy to be perceived that this advice was not approved of, and the Prince of Condé stated, among other objections to it, that the Imperial Generals, having formerly received orders to prevent the arrival of any of the French Princes at his Serene Highness's army, would perhaps find themselves in duty bound to stop the King on his road, untill they should have received orders from Vienna. To this I answered that, considering the time that would necessarily elapse before his Serene Highness's letter could reach either the Arch-Duke or General Wurmser, it was more than probable that the King would arrive before any such measures could be taken, but that at all events, as Minister of a Sovereign now in close alliance with the Emperor, I felt it my duty to adhere to the advice I had given, which I certainly should not have offered at all, if his Serene Highness had not called for it. To this Colonel Craufurd added, that he feared it would be inconsistent with his duty, were he not to communicate the fact himself to the Austrian Generals as soon as possible.

The Prince, as well as the Bishop of Arras, felt the force of this latter observation, and letters were immediately written, both by his Serene Highness and Colonel Craufurd, to the Arch-Duke, as well as to General Wurmser, to inform them of the event; but before they were sent off the King arrived, having taken the route of the St. Gothard and Switzerland, accompanyd only by the Comte D'Avaray, and the Viscomte D'Agoult, whilst the rest of his suite had gone round by the Tyrol. Colonel Craufurd and myself were immediately presented to him, and were received in the most distinguished and flattering manner. He expressed to us repeatedly, and in the strongest terms, his gratitude to his Britannic Majesty, for the generosity and munificence that he had displayed in his conduct to the unfortunate emigrants.

and particularly to that army, as well as for the marks of personal attention and consideration that he had shewn to the King himself and the rest of the Royal family of France. He spoke also in the highest terms of the Earl of Macartney, and of the manner in which his Lordship had conducted himself at Verona, particularly on this last unpleasant occasion.

Our conversation was in other respects entirely general, and the whole of it public before the Prince of Condé and several of his officers. We left the place about an hour after the King's arrival.

I am well aware that this rencontre will be attributed to something more than mere accident. The more so as I left Bern at a day's notice, and but for an irregularity of the Post I might actually have received there the intelligence of the King's intended departure. My conduct here will, of course, become extremely difficult, and will require the most scrupulous attention on my part to avoid every thing that may merit either censure or observation. Were it not for the expected arrival of Pichegru, I should certainly return to Bern immediately, but that affair is of infinitely too great importance to be sacrificed at the present moment to a point of mere delicacy only.

I shall therefore remain here with Colonel Craufurd, at least till we can see our way somewhat more clearly. In the mean time, were we only to judge from the circumstance that his Majesty has thought right to continue the residence of Lord Macartney at Verona, Colonel Craufurd and myself should presume that we ought to pay to this unfortunate Monarch every possible mark of attention and respect; we shall endeavour, at the same time, to make our visits at Riegel as rare and as short as possible, and we shall avoid giving our advice on all occasions where it can be *decently* avoided. This is the line of conduct that, upon full consideration, we have determined to adopt, untill your Lordship shall be pleased to convey to us his Majesty's commands for the future

regulation of our behaviour, which may be the more necessary for me, as I foresee that I may be obliged to wait upon the Prince of Condé more than once in the course of the summer.

Colonel Craufurd has written to Sir Morton Eden, and we have no doubt that that Minister will do his utmost, if not to obtain permission from the Court of Vienna for the King's residence in the neighbourhood of the army, at least to protect him from any open and humiliating insult. We have particularly recommended to Sir Morton, if it should not be thought right that his Majesty should remain with the army, that at least things might so be managed as that a decent time might be allowed for his removal, and that, if possible, it might appear to be his own act. I have even ventured to say that any open insult offered to the King would prove a material impediment in the way of the full execution of the commands I have lately received from his Majesty, inasmuch as it would tend directly to render every promise that I could give and every encouragement that I could hold out to the Royalists in the Interior, perfectly illusory. At the same time, I by no means think it is either to be expected or wished that the King should establish himself at the army with his whole Council. This would be as unpleasant to the Prince of Condé as to the Emperor and his Generals, and if his Majesty does me the honour to ask my advice upon that point, I shall venture to give it very fully and fairly.

I expect Mr. de Preçy and Mr. Imbert to-night: should Pichegru arrive to-morrow, the meeting may well be considered as more than natural. I shall not trouble your Lordship with any thing respecting the affair of General Pichegru, as Colonel Craufurd will have the honour of writing very fully upon that subject.

I have the Honour to be, &c. &c. &c.

(No. 48.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Fribourg en Brisgau: April 30th, 1796.

My Lord,—. . . Immediately on the receipt of your Lordship's dispatch No. 12, I executed the Instructions conveyed to me therein precisely in the manner which your Lordship had pointed out. But as from Mr. Rigaud's residence at Lausanne the note could not well have reached Mr. Barthelemy in less than 4 days from its date, I thought it but fair and right towards Mr. Barthelemy to communicate to him a copy of it immediately by another channel. I was the more induced to act in this manner because I was well assured that much advantage would arise from the whole correspondance being rendered as public as possible without a moment's delay, and the French Government as well as Mr. Barthelemy might have made it a ground of complaint and clamour had I *published* the note in Switzerland before its contents had been made known to that Minister. I therefore waited upon Mr. Frisching, the leader of the Popular Party at Bern, and, after stating all the circumstances of the case, I gave him a *written* copy of the note and told him that he had my full permission to communicate it immediately to Mr. Barthelemy, and even to say that my orders being direct to transmit the original through the medium of the person who had conveyed the former one, it was not in my power to disobey them; that I was at the same time particularly anxious that it should not first reach Mr. Barthelemy through the public voice; and that as my Court had not foreseen the delay that would necessarily be occasioned by the residence of *that person* at Lausanne, I had great hopes that my conduct in conveying a copy to him in this manner would not be disapproved of at home. I communicated what I had done to the Baron de Dégelmann, and I earnestly hope that his Majesty will be graciously pleased not to disapprove of my conduct on

this occasion though not conformable to the letter of my Instructions.

I made choice of Mr. Frisching to convey the copy as I had very particular reasons materially connected with his Majesty's service in Switzerland for wishing to find an opportunity of seeing that gentleman and conversing with him more frequently than I had hitherto done. I communicated the whole correspondance to the Helvetic Body as well as to the Canton of Bern, in a letter of which I have the honour to send your Lordship a copy inclosed.

I hope the expression at the end will not be disapproved of. I ventured to hold this language, which seemed in no way contradictory to that which I had been directed to make use of, because I was intimately persuaded that it will be of the greatest service to his Majesty's Interests if a firm belief can be established here upon the continent, particularly on the Borders of France, that his Majesty is sincere in his wishes to restore tranquillity to Europe, on terms just and honourable for himself and his allies.

I shall, in obedience to your Lordship's commands, endeavour to inform myself as accurately as I can of the impression which this correspondance may produce in the interior of France. I have no doubt that it will contribute very materially to encrease the general dissatisfaction that now prevails throughout the country, and that it will in the result be highly favourable to his Majesty's cause particularly so in this Quarter. Unfortunately, it is too much to be feared that the late melancholy events in Italy will *for the moment* more than counterbalance all the good we might have otherwise expected from it. In the mean time, I have much satisfaction in informing your Lordship that all the *reasonable* part of the Popular faction in Switzerland have seen the whole of this affair in its proper point of view, and some of them have, I know, expressed their opinion very openly and very ably to Mr. Barthelemy upon this occasion.

In my dispatch No. 43 I had the honour to inform your Lordship that I had the strongest reason to believe, notwithstanding the strange tenor of Mr. Barthelemy's note, that the Directory were themselves persuaded of the absolute necessity in which they were either of making a speedy peace, or of perishing together with the Republick. I can now venture to assure your Lordship that an opinion to this effect was avowed by two of their members about the very moment that my note of the 8th March was received by them from Mr. Barthelemy. This avowal too was made to a person from whom it would have been their interest to have concealed it, on the occasion of a question of finance which had caused them considerable difficulty and on which that person had been consulted as one who had often relieved the Republick before on similar occasions. From the manner in which this information comes to me, it is impossible for me to doubt of its truth; it was communicated confidentially and with repeated demands of the strictest promise of secrecy by the person last alluded to, to his partner, as a matter of serious consideration before they engaged in any further speculations on the account of the Republick.

Notwithstanding the strong and *apparently* explicit manner in which the note has been worded without any immediate necessity for so doing, I cannot yet, after all that has lately come to my knowledge, permit myself to doubt but that the Directory have reserved to themselves some subterfuge for avoiding its force hereafter. I am still strongly inclined to believe, and that not merely from my own conjecture, that they had in contemplation a something of the kind I have before alluded to, viz. that the term *existing Laws* may be construed to relate only to such laws as existed at the time that the Constitution was accepted by the people.

I am rather confirmed in that suspicion by the necessity under which his Majesty's Ministers seem to have felt themselves, in their answer of the 10th April, of adding

the word *actuellement* to the expression *Loix existantes*, which the French seem as cautiously to have avoided because without that word it remains to a certain degree equivocal and may (though certainly not by the most natural construction) be supposed to relate back to the moment of the passing of the Constitutional act.

The whole note has been evidently written under such great embarrassment, and the proposition at the end is introduced at last after such a long, awkward, and needless preamble, that I cannot help persuading myself either that the persons who penned it were determined to leave a certain degree of doubt as to their real sentiments, or that they had brought themselves very unwillingly and against their own opinion to the conclusion they have drawn.

If I am entirely mistaken in the above opinion, and if the Directory upon mature deliberation has really meant to lay down and finally to abide by the principle of retaining all the territory that has been united to the Republick as well since as before the passing of the Constitutional act, they must have been influenced in their opinion either by exaggerated accounts of the distress supposed to exist in England, and particularly of the present want of specie, or by the *immediate* hope of detaching some of the members of the coalition or of engaging some other powers of Europe in their alliance, or, what is equally possible, they have not dared to assert, *when assembled*, those sentiments by which they are animated when *alone*, and which they venture to communicate to their private and confidential friends. It may also be reasonably supposed that the fear of offending the whole body of the Jacobins, a majority of the *leaders* of the two Assemblies, and a large proportion of their most active and determined agents who are known to be decidedly favourable to the continuation of the war, may have influenced their decisions contrary to their own better Judgement and against the intimate knowledge they must now

have acquired of the real situation both of their own resources and of the state of the public opinion.

In the communication I have above alluded to one of the members of the Directory observed, that however strong their force might appear, *they were in reality not their own masters*; and another said, that if they did fall, they had yet resources enough left to bring their capital enemy to the ground before them. One of the members was Rewbell. I believe the other was Letourneur, but I am not certain.

In any of the above suppositions, however, it is most evident that the note of the Court of London, which is generally allowed to be as moderate and temperate as it is firm, manly, and explicit, cannot but produce a most excellent effect—whether upon the Directory itself, supposing them to have any *secret* disposition or wish for peace, or upon the public and the leaders of the opposition, who will be encouraged to new efforts and to a more explicit declaration of their opinions by the hope that is now holden out to them.

The assurance that it contains of the *continuation* of his Majesty's pacific sentiments is particularly calculated to make a deep and lasting impression, as your Lordship may be assured that that part of it at least meets the opinion, and will obtain the open and decided approbation, of nine-tenths of the People in France as well as of those upon the rest of the continent, and will be found to be a most powerful engine in the hands of all parties who (from whatever cause) may wish to attack or embarrass the present government. I believe, indeed, that even the better thinking part of the French Royalists are convinced that this is *now* the wisest opinion that can be propagated, and I found the Prince of Condé himself (influenced probably by the sentiments of Pichegru, which have allways been very explicit on this point) *not quite averse* to consider the thing in the same point of view.

In conformity to the above persuasion, and authorized

in some measure by your Lordship's instructions which direct me to conform my language to that of the Note of the Court of London, at the same time that I have spared no pains to circulate the whole of the correspondance both at Paris and in the Provinces, I have accompanyd it with such short reflexions as might tend to convince the public of the sincerity of his Majesty's intentions and at the same time point out the Directory as the only obstacle to their being realized.

I should not have adopted this measure if it had not appeared to me perfectly compatible with the most active execution of the other instructions that I have received from your Lordship, to which my whole attention will now be constantly and earnestly directed.

In my No. 43 I communicated to your Lordship a very curious letter from Mr. Poterat to the Duke of Deux Ponts. I now send enclosed the copy of the Duke's answer, which is perfectly insignificant. But I have good reason to believe that, mistrusting the person who was to deliver it, his Serene Highness has sent another by a different conveyance.

Mr. Poterat remains at Basle; he entertains some hopes of being able to go again to Vienna, but has expressed himself with much violence on the subject of Mr. de Thugut, whom he accuses of being sold to the English. I have little or rather no doubt but that new offers will be immediately made to the Court of Vienna in consequence of the late successes in Piedmont. Should that be the case, I should rather be disposed to conjecture that the Court of Vienna, if they mean to do the thing secretly, would decline receiving them from Mr. Poterat, as the fact that he has lately been there, and that he was the bearer of some propositions of a pacific nature, is now quite notorious. I have more reason than ever to believe that something was said about Bavaria on his former mission.

I find from some Instructions that were sent to Mr.

Barthelemy from the Committee of Public Safety on the 25th Oct. and from others that were sent to him by the Directory on the 15th Nov., that the Baron de Hardenberg had promised to that gentleman to use his influence with some minister of the King of Sardinia (I presume the Baron de Vignet) to engage the Court of Turin to enter into negotiation. Mr. Barthelemy is particularly required in the above instructions to be earnest in his instances to the Baron de Hardenberg to *perform his promise*, as no event could be more important to the Republick, *because it would immediately leave an army of* 60,000 *men at liberty to join that of Pichegru*; it seems also that the Directory place some confidence in the exertions of Mr. —— the Minister of the Prince of Hesse Cassel.

In the Instructions of the 15th Nov. the Directory state that the 2 millions given for Manheim have been nearly thrown away as the operation was executed too late and not supported; this delay is attributed to the troubles that had happened to Paris, which are imputed as usual to Mr. Pitt; they complain also of treasons in the army of Jourdan, and in that commanded by Constet before Mentz.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.

(Extract from Draft, Private.) Prince of Condé's Head Quarters [Chateau de Riegel]: May 4th, 1796.

My Lord,—I take the opportunity of Mr. Trevor's courier to inform your Lordship of Pichegru's arrival at Strasburgh, which we have learnt this evening, from the agent established at that place, by a most extraordinary note, of which I send an exact copy enclosed.

All that can be collected with any certainty from this communication seems to be this:—

1st. That Pichegru had not been able to obtain the confidence of his army to the point that he had hoped or expected; that his dismission had occasioned very little sensation there; and that he now sees no prospect whatever of employing it in favour of a counter-revolution.

2nd. That on his arrival at Paris, he there also found things in a very different situation from what he had expected.

3rd. That he now sees no hope for the Royal family but in the acceptance, at least for a time, of a limited or constitutional Monarchy; even his wish that the army should be soundly beaten, seems to have no other object.

4th. I believe we may also add that he repents seriously of the step he has taken in quitting the command of the army, and that he is most anxious to return to it.

I am not at all surprized at the disappointment of his hopes both at Paris and in the army; and the conclusion that he has drawn as to the necessity of passing through a constitutional monarchy, is also exactly what might have been expected, whether one considers the description of persons to whom he must *naturally* have addressed himself at Paris, or the real actual situation of the Kingdom and of Europe in general.

Besides that Pichegru's present connections must be necessarily of a very different colour, it is not to be supposed that a man of his sense and discernment would have contented himself at Paris with consulting the friends of the old Government alone, particularly when he had in contemplation the execution of a project that is evidently impracticable from the moment that the idea of acting through the army is abandoned, without the assistance of men in place and power. In addressing himself to such he could only chuse between the Jacobins, which is scarcely probable, the Directory itself and their friends, or that strange mass of persons and parties that forms the present feeble opposition to the Government at Paris, amongst which, though there may exist eight or ten persons (chosen as Deputies from the Southern Departments), who are really attached to the ancient Government, yet the rest, as your Lordship, I believe, well knows, however they may differ in other points, all agree in their dread of the insolence (more than the vengeance)

of the Emigrants, their aversion to the antient Government, and their wish to see a new one established in the administration of which they might hope to have a share more or less immediate and direct. Into whatever hands, therefore, he fell, he must have met with nothing but mistrust and jealousy of the present Royal family.

It seems to me more than probable, judging from Pichegru's character, habits, and occupation, as well as from his professions and conduct, that till this moment he had very little considered the causes and progress of the Revolution, or the real state of Parties and Factions in France, and that from the time he had taken this project into serious contemplation, he had never dreamt of the existence of more than two *great leading* parties, viz., the present *government* and *its enemies*, whom he naturally considered as looking chiefly to their Lawful Sovereign as the only point round which they could rally.

The opinion, therefore, that he found allmost universally established at Paris among those persons whom he had considered as the most decided enemies of the present government, must actually have made the deeper impression upon his mind in proportion to the surprize it must have occasioned; and it is by no means to be wondered at that he should have become an entire convert to it, and should have determined to act in future upon that principle only, as the only one capable of being carried into execution.

Be that however as it may, it is most clear that he has actually adopted that principle, and that he has renounced all hope of acting through his army.

Mr. Trevor to Mr. Wickham.

Turin: Sat., May 7th, 1796.

My dear Sir,—The enclosed papers will sufficiently describe to you the deplorable and hopeless Situation of this Country. It is completely at the mercy of the Enemy; how far the Directory *will* or *can* treat it with any mode-

ration or political *management*, will depend upon Events which do not altogether depend upon them!

I restore you through our usual Canal M. de Lazary the interesting and important papers sent to me by Mr. Drake. I saw with great Pleasure, but with no surprize the complete *Justice done by* H. M. and his Ministers to your most important, zealous and able labours; I agree very nearly with you in your reasoning upon the four Heads you have distinctly laid down, and could not help being struck with the coincidence of our Opinions, and almost of our Expressions upon the 3*rd* and most important Article, and we shall soon see whether the letter which I transmitted to you with my last dispatch ought materially and fundamentally to alter these opinions. If the Court of Vienna is really rouzed by these Events—if Beaulieu is vigorously and speedily reinforced—if the Archduke Charles is instantly ordered to make a most vigorous attack (*whether the Loan from England be garanteed or not*), I should then have hopes, that our suspicions are groundless, and that a field would be opened for your carrying into Execution the reasoning and conclusion upon the *second* head of your Discussion; i. e. upon the efficacy of the *Independent* action in the Interior, supported only indirectly by *Diversions*. I must add however that I fear this action will never be completely successfull, till it be the general and spontaneous movement of a sufficient Majority of the Nation to overcome the organized force in the hands of the present Government—at least it is evident to me that this action though independent in point of actual Co-operation, must be omogeneous in point of Principle with that of Austria—it is not enough to create an Insurrection to destroy the present Government, without settling beforehand what is to be put in its place. I conceive that the Insurrection alone might be a useful diversion to Great Britain—but M. de Preçy, and M. Imbert would never engage in such a contest, without knowing at the same time that the operations

of the arms of Austria were directed to the same view as his own, that is to the Restoration of the Legitimate Sovereign—nor can it be expected that the army of Condé if it is ever permitted to act as *Frenchmen* and not as *mere soldiers*, can ever do so with zeal in any other sense. But after all that has happened and all Sir Morton Eden tells you in his letter of the 2*nd April* how can ever any hearty co-operation, any effectual concert with respect to this great and essential point be expected? it results from the above letter that Austria will neither let that army act alone, or with her Troops; why then are we to continue to maintain it? In this equivocal Situation of things, what can Preçy and his party however considerable it may be supposed to be, be expected to do? It is only as *Royalists* that they hope to meet with Success, and till Baptiste's [Pichegru's] conduct or other Events convince the Cabinet of Vienna that it is their Interest to act in the same line, I can never indulge any sanguine hope from any partial efforts that can be made in the Interior. I suspect the Court of Vienna is far from entertaining any such opinion at present. What is to become of the poor King at the army of Condé? I have good reason to believe that even Austria has given up the point, and has left the fate of the Bourbons in the hand of Providence. I know that M. de St. Priest left Petersburg, perfectly despondent.

I am very sorry I had not the pleasure to see your reasonings upon the Probability, or Improbability of a general Peace alluded to in your No. 44. I cannot help thinking that what is now passing in Italy will oblige the Court of Vienna to hasten those *tatonnemens* for Peace, which we have so long suspected. Austrian Lombardy has sent a mournful Petition to H. I. M. demanding immediate and adequate Protection, or immediate Peace. I am affraid those rich Provinces and all Italy are now at the mercy of the Enemy—and if an Armistice was demanded to-morrow—Jugez, what a Ransom, or what Conditions a *triumphant*, and *starving* Enemy, will exact?

I send you Sir Morton's and Sir W. Hamilton's last letters—*hélas, moutarde après diner*, I add a letter from the brave Commodore Nelson—from Corsica I have no direct news—but I hear indirectly that a considerable Body of the people are in arms, and that the Troops were marching against them from *Bastia* and Ajaccio.

I am most exceedingly hurt to learn from M. de Lazary that the pacquet I alluded to in my last, including very important papers both from myself and Mr. Drake (my dispatch No. 32, 20th April), had not been received by him on the 5*th ult.* It must have met with foul play somewhere; I am going to the office to make a loud complaint upon the subject. *Tempora mutantur* and I can no more look for that Cordiality and Confidence to which I have so long been used in this Country. The Wind has already changed one quarter of the Compass—I will not answer for it's blowing directly *foul* in a few days.

Believe me ever, with Sincerest Esteem, My dear Sir, your most obedient faithful Servant,

JOHN TREVOR.

P.S.—I am convinced the *paquet* went safely from Turin, but was by the negligence of the Clerks put into the *Simplon*, or I rather fear *Milan* Bags. Ct. Hauteville is as much vexed as myself and no pains will be omitted to endeavour to trace it.

WM. WICKHAM, Esq.

(No. 52.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) May 14, 1796.

My Lord,—In my dispatch of the 29th April, No. 47, from Fribourg in Brisgau, I had the honour to communicate to your Lordship some particulars concerning the arrival of Louis the Eighteenth at Riegel. Colonel Craufurd and myself remained at Fribourg till the 8th Instant, during which interval we were several times at Riegel, and invited

by the King to assist at his councils, which were constantly attended by the Prince of Condé, the Duke de la Vauguyon, the Comte D'Avaray and Mr. de Jaucourt, the Bishop of Arras being excluded. Besides, we were present on three very important occasions: the first, the discussion on the subject of the note relating to Baptiste [Pichegru] transmitted by the agent at Strasburgh, and forwarded by me to your Lordship in a private letter of the 4th Instant.

The second on the business of Messrs. Preçy and Imbert.

The third on the subject of the answer that was to be sent to Mr. de St. Priest's * dispatches received from Vienna, containing the refusal of the Emperor to suffer his Majesty to remain at the army.

Upon the first point it was easy to perceive that the opinion of Baptiste as to the necessity of the King's passing through the hands of *some* at least of the persons now in power and place had given them more pain even than the certainty of his being unable to assist them with his army, and that they were still more sensibly affected at the idea that this opinion of his should be known to the Courts of Vienna and London. Very little was said upon the subject, and in general I declined as much as possible giving any advice as to what ought to be done, there appearing to be really no occasion whatever for coming to any early determination upon it, and my own opinion of the present nullity of Baptiste's means being very decided. I submitted to them, however, that it would be wise to say in *general terms* to Baptiste that he might assure his friends at Paris that the King's views were entirely moderate and conciliatory, and that he was ready at all times to make such personal sacrifices as should be found consistent with the real good of his people. Less objection was taken to

* François Emmanuel Guignard Comte de Saint Priest, b. 1735, d. 1821; a distinguished French diplomatist before the Revolution; at this time he was in the service of Louis XVIII. with the title of 'Ministre de sa Maison.'

this proposal than I had expected, the word *real* being considered by all the persons present as leaving them at full liberty to put their own constructions hereafter on whatever might be proposed as *really* advantageous to the people.

I am not sure, however, that this advice was *literally* complyd with, though I believe it was in *substance*, and fresh assurances were given to Baptiste [Pichegru] of the entire confidence reposed in him both by the King and the Prince of Condé. Upon the whole, Colonel Craufurd and myself had every reason to be satisfyd with the fairness and moderation that was manifested by every person on this occasion as well as on the affair of Messrs. Preçy and Imbert, which I shall make the subject of a separate dispatch. I am sorry to say that upon the third point, viz., the instructions to be sent to M. de St. Priest, we had every reason to lament that the King had not about him, on such very critical and delicate occasions, some person very superior in every way to those whom he has called to his councils. I feel it, however, a duty imposed upon me by the illustrious rank and character of the principal persons present as well as by their misfortunes to avoid entering into any detail on the subject of the conversation that passed, and the opinions that were given on that occasion. I do this the more readily because though the resolution taken that night was not such as would have done honour either to their prudence, their good-sense, or their moderation, yet it was afterwards retracted, and the Instructions finally sent to M. de St. Priest were perfectly reasonable, moderate, and becoming the King's situation in whatever point of view it be considered. It should be remembered also that the sense of their misfortune was at that moment most deeply aggravated by the consciousness of their having been insulted and of their entire inability either to avoid or resent the insult.

I will only say in general that the King had been advised to adopt a measure and use a language that would

have committed him most fatally with the Court of Vienna by putting him entirely in the wrong, and would most inevitably have brought on an open rupture with the Emperor personally; and that he was prevented from yielding to our remonstrances by the warmth and childish petulance of the Count D'Avaray, who, with not half the talents, learning, or good sense of the King has the most absolute dominion over his mind, as well as by the timidity and suppleness of the Duke de la Vauguyon, who durst not give his own fair opinion lest he should injure himself in the opinion of M. D'Avaray.

I believe it was very much owing to the good sense and moderate councils of the Baron de Roll that a different resolution was afterwards taken.

I beg your Lordship to observe that in what I have here said of the Count D'Avaray I am speaking of him only as a public man and a man of business; in his private character, I believe him to be perfectly honourable, gentlemanlike, and amiable; I believe also that he is capable of receiving the best impressions, and had I had an opportunity of seeing him in private before the Council, I am persuaded that much of the mischief might have been avoided.

It were earnestly to be wished that the King might be permitted to remain at the Army; his presence there will, under the present circumstances, be highly advantageous; his removal, to which his own people will never allow him to give the appearance of a voluntary act, may, on the contrary, produce infinite mischief. I have not, however, ventured to press that point in writing to Sir Morton Eden, because I am well persuaded that the Court of Vienna will not accede to it, and that my interference being considered as ill-timed and offensive, would produce more harm than good, and also because Sir Morton, in answer to a similar application that I made to him last year when the Prince of Condé was about to pass the Rhine, informed me that he had received instructions

from home not to press that point. I have, therefore, done no more than press for the permission to remain in the Neighbourhood of the army.

If, contrary to my expectation, the King should be permitted to remain at the Head Quarters, it were much to be wished that he might be advised to avoid every appearance of regal dignity as long as the corps of the Prince of Condé shall continue attached to the Austrian army. It was very visible to me that his presence had encreased that spirit of independence (to call it by no harsher name) by which the noble corps in the Prince's army have been distinguished, and which is so intolerable to the Austrian officers. It was too evident *besides*, that the Prince of Condé was no longer what *he used to be* in his army. His Serene Highness spoke to me with confidence on that subject the night that I left him, adding that he saw plainly that it would be no longer well taken if our correspondance were to continue on the same intimate footing, and complaining bitterly at the same time that the persons about the King would never suffer him to see his Majesty alone.

I purposely forbear enlarging on these unpleasant subjects because I firmly believe that no human remedy can be applyd to the evil.

I have ventured, however, since my return to write in the strongest, but at the same time the most respectfull, friendly, and conciliatory language, both to the Duke de le Vauguyon and the Comte D'Avaray, to exhort them to adopt a line of conduct suitable to their present situation and the real interests of their master. In all other points, much may be gained from them, but when the Court of Vienna is in question, I have ever found their animosity so decided and so deep rooted that it has been impossible to make the smallest impression. The affectation with which Mr. Thugut and the persons about the head Quarters of the Archduke have avoided giving the King his hereditary titles, has again deeply irritated them.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.

(Draft.) 16th May, 1696.

My Lord,—In my dispatch from Friburg en Brisgau, No. 47, I had the honour to inform your Lordship of the arrival of Messrs. de Preçy and Imbert, on the 4th of May. Colonel Craufurd and myself were present with those gentlemen at a council holden by the King at Riegel, together with his Serene Highness the Prince of Condé, the Duke de la Vauguyon, the Count D'Avaray, and M. de Jaucourt, where every point relating to the intended mission and operations of those gentlemen, was fully discussed. Without entering into the detail of a number of projects that were rejected as impracticable, I will shortly inform your Lordship that Mr. de Preçy being asked under what circumstances he would engage to enter into the country and put himself at the head of his adherents, declared distinctly that he would do so the instant the Austrians should attack the enemy with vigour, and obtain a first success of such importance as that a part at least of the troops now at Lyons and in the South Provinces should be withdrawn; that unless both those circumstances should happen, he considered any enterprize of the kind as dangerous and mischievous, if not altogether impracticable, at least to any extent. This opinion of his was discussed in all its bearings; every possible objection was made to it, and the advantages of beginning at the same moment with the Austrians were also pointed out to him in the strongest manner.

The result of the whole was, that Mr. Preçy demonstrated to the entire satisfaction of the King, as well as of Colonel Craufurd and myself, that his own opinion was the best, and indeed the only one that was practicable, and it was at last fully approved of (though somewhat unwillingly) by all.

Mr. Imbert and Mr. Preçy then gave in their pecuniary

demands, which were, as I had well foreseen, larger than what they had proposed. They amounted to nearer a hundred than fifty thousand Pounds for the preliminary expences, including the 14,000 Louis left in their hands, and the 2,500 I had advanced to them during the winter. That point was pressed upon me rather unfairly by the Duke de le Vauguyon and Mr. Jaucourt, but Messrs. de Preçy and Imbert declared immediately that they would be perfectly satisfyd with my general assurance that what should be found right and reasonable by us *three together* would be granted, and that their confidence in me as the representative of my government was such that they wished for no previous stipulation or promise of any kind, being assured that I should refuse nothing that was necessary to the success of the enterprize.

They allowed also the justice of my objection to making any *very considerable* advance untill I should myself be assured that the plans of the Austrians would not be changed by their ill success in Italy, and were perfectly satisfied with my promise to advance them immediately on my return to Bern 12,000 for the purpose of buying arms and ammunition at Geneva, and 6,000 to be employed in the same way in Germany.

Mr. Preçy declared that his measures were so taken that he could enter the country at a day's warning, and that the mountains near Lyons had been so well organized during the winter, that they wanted no preparation at all, excepting the necessary one of arms and ammunition, which must be obtained in large quantities before they could begin.

I shall not detain your Lordship any longer, or enter into any detail upon a subject that has been so often and so fully discussed in the course of my official correspondance. I will only add that the above plan having been thus approved of and adopted, Mr. Preçy, Mr. Imbert, and myself are at this moment diligently employed in preparing matters so as that its execution may be

rendered as safe, and at the same time as extensive, as possible.

Mr. Wickham to Sir Morton Eden.

(Draft.) Bern: 17th May, 1796.

Sir,—As Colonel Craufurd informed you very fully (by his Letter from Friburg of the 29th April), of all the circumstances attending the King of France's arrival at Riegel, and of our joint opinion as to the consequence by which that event might be followed, I did not think it necessary to trouble you then upon the subject.

We were very strongly pressed to write to you again, to request the utmost exertion of your influence with the Court of Vienna to prevent the removal of the King from the army of Condé; but we begged leave to decline this measure, being satisfied that we had allready done our duty, and that your entire knowledge of the whole subject, as well as of the particular views and objects of the Allied Courts at this particular moment, must make you an infinitely better Judge of what would be right and expedient on this occasion, than we could possibly be.

We only promised to state distinctly our own opinion that the removal would probably be attended with real inconvenience with respect to the Interior, but we would not take upon us to say that that inconvenience might not be counter-balanced by others of still greater consequence, in case he were suffered to remain at this moment, because we had not sufficient information upon the subject.

In my own opinion, a great point is allready gained in the permission that the Emperor has granted him to remain *in Germany*, and within a reasonable distance of the army, and we omitted nothing that could tend to make the King himself and the people about him sensible of this advantage. On my return here I mentioned to the Baron de Degelmann confidentially the greater part

of what had passed upon this occasion, and authorized him to communicate it immediately to Mr. de Thugut.

(*Cypher.*) You will probably have learnt that Baptiste [Pichegru] has been at Strasburg; the substance of his report is this.

1st. That he cannot gain his army unless the Austrians beat it most soundly, which can only be done by acting constantly on the offensive.

2ndly. That by his arrangements made at Paris, he considers himself, in that case, certain of being replaced at the head of the army *with full Powers.*

3rdly. That during his journey he has satisfyd himself that the general opinion of the Kingdom is against the present government and in favour of Royalty, but that all the *leaders* at Paris who are not Republicans are either for the Duke of Orleans or for a constitutional government, and that as they have all the power in their hands, the King must necessarily pass through some intermediate form of constitution, and treat with Persons with whom he would wish to decline having any correspondance, before he can hope to be restored to his full authority.

4thly. That the King must change his conduct very materially, and must hold out an *universal* amnisty, in which case, particularly if the Austrians should strike any decisive blow in the outset, he has the greatest hope of being able to accomplish his purpose.

The Austrian government has received the same report that I have, to the great dissatisfaction of the King and his Council. Baptiste [Pichegru] is now going into Franche Compté, where he has desired to see and converse with our agents. I have some reason, however, to hope that he is actually sent for to Paris, in consequence of the late Plot of the Jacobins; if so, it may prove the most fortunate circumstance possible for his views and the common cause.

Mr. Wickham to the Comte D'Avaray.

(Draft.) Bern: 30th May, 1796.

My dear Sir,—Though I have written a very long letter to the Duke de la Vauguyon, yet I cannot suffer this opportunity to pass by without sending you a few lines to say how much real pleasure the King's Instructions to M. de St. Priest have given me. I do not doubt, My dear Sir, that you have had the deepest Influence in accomplishing this wise and salutary measure, which will affix a character of prudence and moderation on His Majesty's Councils, that in the present critical moment may prove invaluable.

Let me earnestly intreat of you, My dear Sir, as you value your Master, your Country, and your unhappy Countrymen, whose calamities seem now to be approaching the utmost term of human sufferance, that you will let pass no opportunity of cultivating those humane and moderate sentiments by which the natural character of His Majesty seems to be particularly distinguished. It is in your power, My dear Sir, to do much for your own Country, much perhaps also for the rest of Europe. The King will have need to be supported on many occasions by the mild and temperate Councils of a *real friend*, who will advise him not to be apprehensive of following the dictates of his own excellent Judgement. As long as he takes *that* for his real guide, and does not suffer himself to be misled by the ill-timed fears and apprehensions of a class of persons whose understanding is infinitely beneath his own, I am sure that every thing will be done for the best, and that if his efforts to regain the place to which he was born do not succeed, it is only because a higher power has willed that it should not be so.

I am induced to speak to you thus earnestly, because, among other events of Importance, it is more than possible that the ideas holden out by Baptiste [Pichegru]

may soon be realized. Should that be the case, let me conjure you most earnestly to reflect, before any sudden resolution be taken, of what infinite consequence it might prove that an opportunity of that kind once offered, *though not precisely of the nature that could have been wished*, should not be suffered to slip by. I throw out this hint particularly to you, My dear Mr. D'Avaray, because you alarmed me the other day by advancing an opinion that in a private man would be excellent, but is, in my mind, replete with danger when professed by a person in your situation.

You seemed to me to say that *your mind was made up* to the duration of the Revolution for several years to come; and you seemed also, if I understood you right, to draw from that opinion *a practical conclusion* that no sacrifices should be made to *hasten* the moment of its termination, because that termination must inevitably happen at last, but not before the *period appointed*. When you and I are settled quietly at Alleman, my good friend, we will preach this doctrine and practice it day and night, but till then, and whilst it shall please God and our good masters to continue us in situations where we are called upon to think and act for others as well as for ourselves, we must, I conceive, lay aside all such notions, and recollect that whilst we are consoling ourselves with the maxims of our favorite creed, our friends, neighbours, and Countrymen are smarting under the most grievous afflictions and the most terrible calamities with which it ever pleased Providence to afflict the human race. We should recollect also, *whilst we hold that situation*, that if those afflictions and those calamities should be prolonged but one single day by any wilful act of Imprudence, or even negligence, on our part, we shall become responsible to God and to them for whatever evil they may suffer in the Interval. These reflections might easily be carried much further, but I have no inclination to dwell upon them any longer, being assured

that I shall have said enough for my own purpose, and that of the public, in merely awakening your attention to the miseries that it may be possibly in your power to prevent. I have been led to these reflections myself by the Intelligence I have received to-day, that a number of your unhappy Countrymen of every description will, in all probability, be immediately driven from Switzerland in a Body, to seek an asylum and succours no one knows where, and from God knows whom. The subject is really so melancholy and so painful, that I have not the force to talk or think upon it.

Sir Morton Eden to Mr. Wickham.

Vienna: Saturday evening, May 28th, 1796.

Dear Sir,—I have this moment received your very obliging and interesting letter of the 17th Inst. and avail myself of the short space of time that remains before the departure of the Post to thank you for it and to inform you that your letters for Mr. Smith, about which you express some uneasiness, were duly received and forwarded. I lately transmitted to you one from him, I fear that your enquiries after them convey a reproach for my silence, appearances may be against me but you may be assured that your Correspondence gives me real pleasure, and that I most earnestly desire to cultivate it: Your not hearing from me therefore of late must alone be attributed to my not having anything to say that could be new or interesting to you.

The arrival of the French King at Riegel was matter of no little surprize here and I thought as you do that the permission for His remaining in the Neighbourhood of the Condé Army (at Stockak or Rothenburg) was a great point gained, and that He might have made it appear a voluntary act to retire thither and there quietly to wait for events—but He has signified here that Honor will not admit of His following this advice and expressed

His determination to remain with His army. He has again through the Channel of Mr. de St. Priest been exhorted to withdraw, and His refusal, if persisted in, will I fear lead to extremities which would be felt equally disagreeable here as they would be disadvantageous to His most Christian Majesty. He is an ill advised and ill fated Prince.

It is painful to speak of the affairs of Italy, I will only therefore say that Mantua is sufficiently garrisoned and provided for several Months, and that Beaulieu will wait near to Roveredo, where He may cover the Tirol, with the remainder of His army [till] the arrival of His reinforcements. What say you to the conduct of the Court of Turin? I have letters of the 17th from Sir William Hamilton which give hopes that the Court of Naples will pursue a very different line of conduct.

Excuse the haste in which I write, and believe me to be ever with great truth and regard your faithful Humble Servant,

MORTON EDEN.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq.

King Louis XVIII. to Mr. Wickham.

A Mülheim, ce 9 Juin, 1796.

Vous sçavez, Monsieur, les circonstances où nous sommes, vous connoissez ma confiance en vous. D'après ces deux données, je n'ai plus rien à ajoûter à ce que M. de la Vauguyon vous dira de ma part si ce n'est que je suis bien sûr de vous faire plaisir en vous proposant un moyen de plus de servir la cause que vous servez bien. Je vous prie, Monsieur, de l'être également de vous mes sentimens pour vous.

LOUIS.

M. WICKHAM.

(No. 57.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.)
(Most Secret and Confidential.) June 15, 1796.

My Lord,—Notwithstanding the confidence I have been allways disposed to give to my agent Louis [Fauche Borel], yet I have been for some time past particularly anxious to obtain a communication with Pichegru through the medium of a person of more ability, steadiness, and knowledge. I particularly wished that he should be a military man, and one perfectly well acquainted with the frontier Provinces of France. A Swiss officer, Major Rousillon, the commander of the Cordon of the Canton of Bern on the side of Yverdun, having appeared to me to be a person who answered perfectly well the above description, who had also the best possible pretext for visiting Franche Compté, and who was besides wholly a man of the strictest honour and integrity, devoted to the cause, and personally attached to me, I wrote to that gentleman on my return from Friburg to come and see me at Bern; I then proposed the thing to him, which he accepted with the utmost pleasure, and having, during his short residence here, procured a commission to purchase on account of the Government a quantity of Salt at the famous salt-works at Salins, he returned to Yverdun with proper instructions for his conduct, to wait there the arrival of Baptiste [Pichegru] in Franche Compté. I gave him a short insignificant note to deliver to the General, signed Bluet (the name used in the original correspondance) and written in the hand-writing which I had used when I wrote to him before.

On the 9th, being informed of Baptiste's [Pichegru's] arrival in the country, Mr. Rousillon immediately set off and found him, not without much difficulty, on the evening of the 11th, in a convent near Vesoul, which he had chosen for his habitation because it was close to the house of a peasant who had married his sister. He had

a genteel young man with him, who appeared to act as his secretary, and a servant, a groom, and three or four horses. Mr. Rousillon (who was perfectly well known to Baptiste [Pichegru] by reputation) presented him with a letter of introduction from a common friend, adding that being in the country, and so near him, he could not resist the temptation of paying a visit to a person who had made so great a figure in Europe. Baptiste [Pichegru] immediately met him with the greatest civility, and insisted on his staying supper. After they had talked together for half an hour upon indifferent subjects, Mr. Rousillon observing a favourable opportunity said, 'General, I believe we are alone.' Baptiste [Pichegru] immediately expressed the strongest uneasiness and anxiety, rose from his chair, looked about the room, as if he thought it possible that some one might be concealed there. Mr. Rousillon then said, 'General, you need not be alarmed, since my character must be well known to you; it is only a letter that I have for a person of the name of Baptiste, which I thought might be for you.'

Upon this observation, Pichegru's countenance immediately changed, and he desired to see the letter. As soon as he had observed the hand writing and the signature, without reading the note, he desired Mr. Rousillon to go with him into his closet and smoke a pipe. As soon as they were within the door, he said without any hesitation that he had been so followed by spies, ever since he left Paris, even in that little village, that it was no wonder he should be afraid or at least suspicious of every body; 'and now,' added he, 'tell me, Major, what these gentlemen want, or what I can do for their service.' As soon as their pipes were lighted, Mr. Rousillon told him, that his first and main object was to know the General's own opinion as to the possibility of effecting any thing in that Province, or anywhere else, under the present circumstances; the second, to give him any information he might chuse to ask for; the third, to know

if he would have any objection to an interview with Mr. de Precy. To the first question he answered distinctly—'*Nothing at all* here or any where else, *except perhaps at Paris*, unless the Austrians beat our armies compleatly, *which they are fully able to do.* I know nothing as yet,' said he, 'of the state of my own Province, but I will suppose the Royalists masters even of Besançon, Befort, and Huningen, the Prince of Condé across the Rhine, and Lyons in insurrection: unless the Austrians push the armies so as that they cannot possibly make any detachments, you *must* be overpowered immediately. Besançon is considered of such importance that I know they would immediately attack the citadel by storm, and *carry it too*, though it should cost them ten thousand men. Nothing can be done, I repeat again, unless the armies are beaten, and then you may do every thing *provided you keep up the terror*, by following them without remission. My army was not beaten enough last year or I should have been compleatly the master of it. I *did*, and *suffered* to be done, every thing that could be done with prudence, and my army was certainly better disposed than any other, but I soon saw very plainly that unless we were compleatly beaten, I ought not to attempt to go any further. Tell those gentlemen,' said he, and he repeated it at least ten times, 'that this is my decided opinion, and that if they attempt any thing partial before the army be beaten they will ruin everything and sacrifice all their best friends.'

'I admit,' says he, 'that I have not yet seen my own country, nor have I had any communication with the inhabitants whilst at the army. But I will suppose their dispositions to be the most favourable, yet my opinion would remain the same. I admit also that last winter the case was somewhat different, but the circumstances have wonderfully changed.'

As to the third point, he said he had a very high opinion of Mr. de Precy, and that he should be very glad

to have an interview with him as soon as possible. As to the second, the supper being on the table, he deferred asking any questions till his interview with Mr. de Preçy. But on the major leaving the house he called him back, and said, 'You may tell those gentlemen (ces messieurs) that I really believe something might be done at Paris. Je crois que 2 ou 300 hommes bien resolus suffiroient pour exterminer tous ces Gueux.'

It would not have been prudent for the Major to have remained any longer, and many other questions concerning which he was instructed being matters of mere curiosity were very properly left unasked. All the measures are taken for bringing about the interview with Mr. de Preçy with due secrecy and safety immediately.

This interview has given me much satisfaction on many accounts, but principally because it has confirmed the good opinion I entertained both of my own agents and of Baptiste [Pichegru] himself—and because it has satisfyd me that the opinion I have allways maintained as to the circumstances under which an insurrection might be safely attempted in Franche Compté was the right one, and that I have acted wisely in resisting every attempt to encourage the inhabitants to take up arms, when those circumstances have not been favourable. I cannot omit this occasion of expressing to your Lordship, and the rest of the King's Ministers my most earnest thanks for the manner in which you have supported me in that opinion, and for the favourable manner in which you have had the goodness to represent my conduct to His Majesty, and to obtain for me his most gracious approbation.

It is strange that on the 11th Baptiste [Pichegru] should have been perfectly unacquainted with the retreat of the Austrians, and was wondering that he heard yet no account of their success, and complaining of their slowness.

The return of Mr. Rousillon here happened at a very fortunate moment. The Duke de la Vauguyon had

arrived with a project (conceived in a moment of despair) for gaining Besançon, and for engaging P[ichegru] to put himself at the head; this was connected with another, by which Kellerman, and even B[uona]Parte, in the midst of his victories, was to be gained through the influence of Pichegru and a bribe of 5000 louis.

The clearness and freshness with which Mr. Rousillon gave the account of his conversation with P[ichegru], and the decided opinion of the latter, put an end to all the Duke's speculations, which were really so idly conceived, so ill laid, and so hastily put together and adopted, that I could not but seriously lament that the cause in which the Royalists are engaged should be so ill supported by the talent of those who from their situation and character in life must necessarily continue to be its principal directors.

Mr. Rousillon was particularly pleased with the conversation of P[ichegru], which he described to me as being at the same time, plain, deliberate, and animated. He talked very little of himself, only lamented that he had not brought a waggon load of tobacco with him, out of Holland. Since my return from Friburg I have received several Bulletins from the other side of the Rhine, which I do not send because I know they will have been forwarded by Colonel Craufurd.

(No. 59.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Extract from Draft.) Bern: 15th June, 1796.

My Lord, . . . I learn from Paris to-day, and I believe the information perfectly good, that both the Prince of Peace and M. Cabarus have written directly to Tallien* to press him to come to Madrid, saying that no

* Jean Lambert Tallien, b. 1769, d. 1820, the revolutionist and regicide; his fascinating wife, b. 1775, was daughter of the Count of Cabarus, Finance Minister in Spain, and married, first, M. Devin de Fontenay, from whom she was divorced; secondly, Tallien, from whom she was also divorced; and thirdly, the Prince de Chimay, and died in 1835.

confidence will be given to Perignan. . The person who gives this information adds that he begins to think that the Court of Spain is playing a double game and trying to deceive the Directory, and that he is the more disposed to believe so, because he has lately observed some signs of remorse in Tallien, with which he thinks he has been inspired by the letter of his father in law. He adds his persuasion that Tallien might be gained if he were once out of France, that he knows and feels all his guilt, but will not avow it before his companions of blood. Tallien is now particularly connected with Barras,* both of them begin to drink and are uneasy, and rarely without a large potion of wine, which my correspondant considers as an infallible proof of their conscience being disturbed, neither of them having been given to drinking.

The Directory is again turning its attention to America since the late violent debates in the House of Assembly. I believe a new and more active Minister will be sent out. The offensive alliance with Piedmont now occupys their *immediate* attention. The irruption into Germany will be accompanyd by persons enpowered to treat with the lesser Princes, Hesse Darmstadt in particular. But the Porte, Berlin, Sweden, and Poland continue to be the real object of their efforts as much as England is of their speculative projects. There is not a soldier now in the army that is not persuaded that he is to have peace on the continent, and share in the plunder of London before the winter.

I am sorry to say that my correspondance with Mr. Barthelemy has made but little impression in the Interior. The Directory has succeeded pretty generally in causing it to be believed that the Propositions were illusory.

* Paul François Jean Nicolas, Comte de Barras, the well-known regicide and member of the Directory, b. 1755, d. 1829.

Mr. Wickham to Sir Morton Eden.

(Extract from Draft). Bern: 18th June, 1796.

Dear Sir,—I have received your letter of the 4th Instant, and shall pay all due Attention to its Contents. If the Austrian Government has the same opinion with yourself of the fatal effects that may be naturally expected from the Heats and the Climate in Italy, I hope (if it be yet time) that the detachments that have been sent from the Rhine will be ordered back again immediately; the consequences of that rash and ill-judged measure are felt every day more sensibly and cannot be sufficiently deplored by every man who has the Interests of our Common Cause and the reputation of the House of Austria at heart. It is difficult to say whether the discouragement that this measure has occasioned in Germany and in the Austrian Army, the ridicule that it has thrown upon the Austrian Government and Generals in consequence of their having first broken the truce, or the triumph that it has given to the French Government and to the factious partizans of French Principles in every Country be the greatest. I cannot but consider it as the Coup de Grace given to all our hopes at least for this Campaign.

I believe myself that there was really nothing to fear for the safety of the passage by the Tyrol. Indeed late events have proved that I am not mistaken in my opinion. I send you a part of my Correspondence with General la Tour on that subject, and a most correct Statement, which you may entirely rely on, of the real strength of the Army of the Alps, a copy of which I also sent to Colonel Graham.*

You ask me what I think of the Conduct of the King of Sardinia. I have no hesitation in saying that it has

* Thomas Graham, the celebrated general, created Lord Lynedoch in 1814; he was at this time with the Austrian army; d. 1843, aged 94.

been such as the circumstances, hard as they were, could by no means justify, but I think that the Court of Vienna has no rights whatever to complain.

To say nothing of the inexplicable history of last year's Campaign, it is now manifest that the reinforcements sent to the Army in Piedmont were neither sufficient for the protection of the Country nor by any means what had been promised.

Mr. Wickham to the Baron de Degelmann.

(Extract from Draft.) Le 18 Juin 1796.

V. E. apprendra sans doute avec peine, ou plutôt avec indignation, que ce Canton, autrefois si fier de son indépendance, a pris le parti hier, en plein Conseil, à la demande de M. Barthélemy, de renvoyer tous les Emigrés. Je ne sçais pas ce que Votre Ex. trouvera convenable de faire à cette occasion, mais pour moi, je ne leur accorderai sûrement pas des passeports pour aller en Angleterre, à moins de quelque cas extraordinaire. Je peux me tromper, mais il me semble que c'est là la conduite que l'humanité doit dicter à leur égard. Le déménagement seul, et le voyage, feroit dépenser à plusieurs de ces malheureux leur dernier sol.

Un certain Monsr. de Panis, Chev. de Malte, demeurant avec Mad. sa mère à Rolle, vient de recevoir l'ordre non motivé de quitter ce Pays. Il s'adressera à V. E. pour un Passeport pour aller habiter l'Allemagne, mais je crois qu'il ne seroit pas fâché de recevoir un refus honnête. C'est un jeune homme d'une des premières familles du Languedoc, dont le seul Crime est, je crois, d'avoir été lié avec moi, ou plutôt avec mes amis. Je ne veux cependant absolument pas lui donner ni Passeport ni Protection quelconque.

Mr. Wickham to Mr. Trevor.

(Draft.) Bern: 25th June, 1796.

My dear Sir,—I have deferred writing to you this last fortnight in the daily or rather hourly expectation of the return of your Courier.

I am very sorry to inform you that there is but too much reason to fear that he has been taken in the Prince of Orange Packet Boat that sailed from Yarmouth on the 5th with the letters of the 3rd which have never reached us. At least, I can account for the loss of my Letters and Newspapers of that Post in no other way. Some private Letters that I have received of a later date allude to others of that period which I have never received. The Capture of the Packet Boat appears quite certain.

I have received and *forwarded* all your late dispatches except No. 51, which is still in my hands. The English of the cyphered Paper is shortly this—that the Intelligence transmitted was correctly true *at the time*, but that the principal person supposed to direct the Intrigue at Paris had lost all his Influence *since*, and was not now attended, consequently *his relation* was no longer holden in the same Estimation. The paper then states that the Affair in Question is certainly pressed in the strongest Manner, and that though there be no disposition to listen to the Demands made, yet that fear may certainly do as much or more than Inclination. That, on the other hand, the fear is nearly as strong *of another Nation*, and that *for the moment* the most exact Neutrality is certainly observed. That, however, the late Successes in Italy may produce much effect, and that their consequences in that respect are seriously to be apprehended. He adds a matter now of no importance, viz., that there was no Intention to accept the mediation of Spain for a peace between France and Piedmont.

On the Rhine, I firmly believe that the most splendid

Things would have been done, had not the Court of Vienna been compelled to adopt the fatal Measure of withdrawing its Troops from that Quarter to preserve itself from the great Calamity of an Invasion by the Tyrol. I always represented this Measure as unnecessary, and experience has justified me in my opinion, the Tyrol being now preserved from danger without the Assistance of a Man from the Rhine. But I cannot blame the Court of Vienna, however fatal this measure has proved. The Alarm was necessarily so great in the first Moment that the Piedmontese truce and the delivery of Tortona and Alexandria (at so short a notice) was made public, that I do not wonder they should have considered the existence of the Empire itself to have depended as well on the *rapidity* with which Succours could be conveyed to that Side as on the real Strength of the force they intended to employ. I have distinctly stated to Sir Morton Eden, who is furious against the Court of Turin, that the Austrian Government has no right whatever to complain. But I cannot agree with you that the Situation of Things was in any way such as could justify either the Truce itself that was made, or the precipitation with which it was concluded. The stipulation to deliver Alexandria or Tortona in the space of 4 short days, appears to me, *under all the Circumstances* of the Moment, to be an event wholly unjustifiable as it is unexampled in History. Sir Morton has sent me nothing for you, and his observations upon that point to me are extremely Short. He assures me that the Troops sent from the Rhine will be immediately replaced. In the mean time the French have crossed the Rhine near Strasburg and surprized the Austrians. We have as yet few or no particulars of that event. On the Lower Rhine the French are *turned* and driven away shamefully by the Arch Duke just as they were last year by Clerfayt. General de la Tour takes the Command of the Army of the Upper Rhine in the place of M. de Wurmser.

A General Election never passed so peaceably in England since the memory of man. Ministry I believe will gain a few votes in the new Parliament, which is to meet in July and sit for six weeks or two months.

I have good Authority for thinking that Gibraltar is the object holden out by Tallien, and Portugal is not forgotten.

Mr. Wickham to the English Resident at Bassorah.

(Copy.) Bern: 30th June, 1796.

Sir,—In consequence of a representation made by the Chairman of the East India Company, I have been desired by Lord Grenville to correspond directly with you in all cases where any such material article of information shall come to my knowledge as may appear to me necessary to be made known to any of the several Presidencies in India.

In compliance with his Lordship's commands I now inform you, that I have the strongest reason to believe that the Dutch are preparing to send out a second fleet to the East Indies, but that I have not been able to learn anything either of its real force or precise destination. I have also to inform you that the French Government expresses, at this moment, the utmost confidence in the Zeal, activity, and talents of the different agents they have sent out to the native Princes in the East Indies, particularly to Tippoo Saib, and that they are receiving the offers, and accepting the services, of every adventurer of talents who has formerly had any connection, either with the native Princes or their Officers in India, in Persia, or in Arabia. It seems that they rely particularly on the efforts of a Mr. Olivier, concerning whom I have written much at large to Mr. Smith; they have also much confidence in a certain Achmet Kan, who, as I am informed by Mr. Smith, was presented to the Sultan at the same time with the French Ambassador, and after-

wards forwarded to India by way of Bagdad accompanyed by two couriers belonging to the Sulnman Basha.

I have observed with infinite pain that the French mission has succeeded in establishing this mode of communication through the medium and under the protection of one of the native Princes, as I have every reason to believe that it made one of the most special points of Mr. Beauchamp's Instructions, not so much on account of its own intrinsic importance, as because it seemed a material step gained towards the completion of one of their great objects, viz., the interrupting the correspondance over land with the Company's Settlements in the East Indies.

I communicated all the circumstances relating to Mr. Beauchamp's mission to Mr. Liston and Mr. Baldwin on the 22nd January. I had written to Sir Richard Worsely on the subject long before, so that I have no doubt but that the different Presidencies in India, as well as all the Company's Residents in Asia, will have been long since informed of it. But I think it right to repeat to you here, as a matter of the very last importance and a fact that you may entirely rely on, that he was particularly instructed to gain the friendship and *Alliance* of the princes through whose dominions the Company's dispatches *over* land pass, and of several of the native Princes and Chiefs on the Eastern tract, with the express purpose of either totally interrupting the communication by land, or at least rendering it so insecure as that no reliance could be placed on it in matters of great importance. Whether these instructions were actually delivered to him, or whether they were only intended to be sent out after him, I cannot say, but I know that such was the intention at Paris, and I have little doubt myself but that he was actually instructed to that effect.

Mr. Beauchamp, when at Venice, learnt that I was acquainted with the object of his Mission, and that I had

given intelligence respecting it to His Majesty's Ministers at Venice and Constantinople, who had corresponded on the subject with the Company's Residents on the Eastern tract, and agents in the Turkish and Arabian Territories, in consequence of which he wrote home for new Instructions. I lost sight of him at Venice about the end of February and have never been able to learn any thing further concerning him, but I strongly suspect that he is gone into Persia, from whence he is to penetrate to Mascate.

With respect to Achmet Kan it may perhaps be usefull to you to know the following particulars concerning him.

He was employed by *Peter* Monneron at Pondicherry in the year 1787 to teach him the Oriental languages. He then took him with him to France when he accompanyed Tippoo Saib's Ambassadors as his Interpreter. Till then, Achmet had played the part of an Adventurer, having lived upon his wits at different times, in almost all of the different Eastern Courts as well as in several of the European Factories. He is, I am told, a man of very extraordinary talents with a remarkably cool head—uncommonly false and deceitfull, so much so, that Monneron himself never dared to place an intire confidence in him, and the Ambassadors of Tippoo were always afraid of him. He is particularly skillfull in the Oriental languages and speaks some of the European with tolerable fluency. He is well qualifyed in one respect to serve the present French Government as he is not troubled with any of the religious prejudices or scruples of his Countrymen, so little so that he was received a free-mason at Pondicherry. I have not been able to learn of what Country he is a native, but I know that he is a Muselman. He left France together with Tippoo's Ambassadors, but went with them no further than the Isle of France, where he remained till the beginning of the Revolution. It is the opinion of the best informed Persons

at Paris, who are not directly in the secret, that his mission is to Tippoo Saib; it has only been suggested to me that he has particular connections at the Court of the Nizam.

I have not the smallest doubt myself, and the different Presidencies in India cannot be too strongly impressed with that idea, that all the plans of the French Government with respect to India tend at this moment to the one object of encouraging the native Princes to enter into a coalition against England, not with the view of favouring France, but with the direct intention of driving out all the Europeans entirely from the Continent, and only permitting them to appear there in future as Traders; that is, despairing of injuring us in any other way, they are preparing to follow the same measures with respect to the Natives in the East, that they have adopted so successfully with respect to the Slaves in the West, and they appear not to have the smallest doubt of bringing the thing ultimately to the same happy issue. The nature of the force sent out by them, as well as the number and character of their Missionaries and Emissaries, makes it evident that such is their real project. They have nothing, even when united with the Dutch, with which they can hope to make any serious impressions on the Continent, but they have enough to protect their own Islands from Invasion, although perhaps not from the effects of famine, and to give some little assistance, by way of diversion, in case any thing serious should take place between the Native Princes and the Europeans. They have besides, as I am well informed, a number of excellent Officers, particularly of Artillery, and a very large proportion of Serjeants and Corporals, who are intended for the purpose of disciplining the Natives. Hence the strong necessity of reducing Bourbon and L'isle-de-France.

It seems very desireable, (but I submit that idea with the utmost deference to those who are infinitely better

Judges of its propriety (that the different Princes in India should have timely notice of those infernal intentions, that the views and plans of the Anarchists in France, should be insinuated with political address to those Princes in India, couched in such terms as to create Jealousy, distrust, and suspicion of danger, in having such republican principles transfused into the minds of their people, to whom they are intended to convey a contagious infection, and that they should be well instructed in the nature and tendency of the French Principles and Government, and above all, that they should be made to comprehend, that, in adopting either the principles or the projects of that People, they must necessarily bring on their own inevitable destruction, together with that of their antient religion, laws, and Government.

The Abbé Beauchamp declared to a confidential friend, before his departure from France, that he was instructed to speak a language, and to hold out ideas to the Imen of Mascaté, that that Prince, fortunately for the Ambassador could not possibly understand, and that he himself should take care not to make them too clear, as if the Prince should discover the nature and purport of the speech, he might probably answer it by cutting off the Orator's head.

This is a hint, though coming from an Enemy, that may perhaps be applied to good purpose, should these Missions continue much longer.

(No. 63.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Bern: 30th June, 1796.

My Lord,—In my dispatch No. 59 I informed Your Lordship that Tallien had been in correspondence with his Father-in-Law, Mr. Cabarus, on the subject of the negotiation supposed to be then carrying on between France and Spain, and that he had also received one, if not more letters, from the Prince of Peace on the same

subject. I now learn that the letter or letters of the Prince of Peace were written and received before the discovery of the late intended insurrection of the Jacobins, since which time the influence of Tallien with the Majority of the Directory has entirely declined. I wrote to Paris on purpose to have this fact ascertained as appearing to me of some Importance.

It appears that some time previous to the last-mentioned event Tallien had very strongly pressed to be sent as *Consul General* into Spain, and I suspect that the Letter of the Prince of Peace had been written at Tallien's own request, in the hope that it would influence, if not determine, the Decision of the Directory in his favour, and that it was obtained on the immediate suggestion of Mr. Cabarus, who had made a pompous display of the intended Consul's Influence at Paris, as well as of his great personal merit and of his *affection* for, and good intentions towards Spain. Be that as it may, Tallien had certainly, in his reports to the Directory, very much exaggerated his own personal influence at Madrid, as well as the disposition of that Court to enter immediately into an offensive Alliance against England, and the Directory had been to a certain degree the Dupe of his assertions and insinuations, for I am assured from good Authority that the Hopes entertained by them upon that point in the Month of February last were certainly created by Tallien. I am the more induced to believe this as the information that I° then communicated to Your Lordship upon the subject came from Barras, Tallien's sworn friend. It is possible that the coolness that has since taken place between Carnot and Tallien may have been in part occasioned, or at least increased, by the disappointment that the exaggerated reports of the latter had given rise to, and by the discovery of the interested motives that had occasioned them.

Tallien had been very much pushed to make this Demand by his Wife, who wishes anxiously for a new

Theatre whereupon to display her charms, which (besides that they have no longer the advantage of novelty) are, I understand, very much on the decline, as well as her Influence both in the Government and with the Public at Paris. I am willing to believe, also, that she was influenced by a far better motive, because the Opinion mentioned in my Dispatch No. 59, that Tallien might be converted, if removed into another Country and out of the reach of the Companions of his guilt, came originally from her. It was she also who suggested the suspicion that the Court of Spain, in the whole negotiation with Tallien, was playing a double Game and trying to overreach the Directory.

Whether there be any thing in that idea or no, I cannot pretend to say, but it seems very probable that Mr. Cabarus (whatever were his ultimate views or intentions) might have holden out the hope of Tallien's conversion, and the possibility of his bringing over many of his old Associates, as an argument to induce the Prince of Peace to write the Letter above alluded to.

The above is all that I have been able to collect with respect to the Spanish Negotiation as far as Tallien is, or has been concerned. I believe the information as far as it goes to be accurate, but I have not been able to penetrate much further. Two facts, however, appear to me pretty certain: the one that all direct Communication with the Spanish Minister through the medium of Tallien has ceased at least for the moment, though I believe that he still communicates to the Directory letters that he receives from Mr. Cabarus—*the other*, that the negotiation has been lately renewed, and is now carried on by some private hand with great activity. I am inclined to believe that Mr. Roxante, who has been appointed Consul-General in Spain in prejudice of Tallien, is the Agent in this Business. He is a man of considerable Abilities, knowledge, and dexterity; he is a Lieutenant in the Navy, and was born (I believe) in the Spanish West Indies of a

Spanish Mother. He is, *besides*, the confidential friend of Carnot, who, as I am informed, had resisted Tallien's Demand from the very first, in the hope of being able to place his own friend there.

Besides the old question of the Colonies, the Jealousy of the British navy, the necessity of setting the Mediterranean free, &c. &c. &c, I am assured that two new objects of temptation have been holden out to Spain; or rather two old ones have been placed before her in a totally new light since the Invasion of Italy, both of which merit the most serious attention: the first is an Assurance that, in consequence of the general pacification which they say *must* now of necessity take place on the Continent, and which will leave an Army on the hands of the Directory so immense that they neither dare nor can disband it at once, a very large force shall immediately march into Spain to act in the reduction of Gibraltar.

Many of the Arguments by which this offer will be supported, and the probability of its success maintained, are extremely obvious. Among others that are less so, I am assured that the certainty of their succeeding in an Invasion of England is one; the whole of their two Northern Armies being destined to that object immediately on the conclusion of the Peace. It is also to convince the Spaniards of the certainty of a continental Peace (as well as to make an Impression on the Court of Vienna itself), that the Directory is now endeavouring to depretiate the power and remaining resources of the Emperor, and to represent his actual position as imminently dangerous. The inclosed extract from the avowed Gazette of the Directory may serve as a specimen of their Intention, as well as of their Ability in making Insinuations of this kind.

I am also assured that they have engaged to relax somewhat of the extravagance of the demands they have hitherto made upon the House of Austria (on the side of the Milanese

i.e. only), and even to appoint Doulcet Ponticoulon to the place of Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the Ministers of the Court of Vienna may have a person agreable to themselves to treat with. I learn also that the Coalition between Carnot and Dumas (of which I shall speak in a separate Dispatch) is to be attributed to the same Cause, which I am induced to believe is more than probable, when I recollect the two Memoires delivered by that same Dumas, the one to the Court of Madrid through the Chevalier de Caemano, the other to the Court of Vienna through the Prince of Saxe Cobourg, both of which had nearly, if not quite, the same object in view, viz., Peace with France, founded on a Jealousy of the Power, Influence, and supposed designs and ambitious views of the Court of London. I have no doubt at all but that the *same* person, after having tried in vain all the Courts of Europe, will have presented a memoire to the same effect to the Directory, only somewhat new modelled according to the new existing circumstances and the Character, situation, and principles of the persons into whose Hands it will be given, and I therefore venture to recommend those pieces to Your Lordship's attentive perusal. You will find one of them inclosed in my No. 48, and an abstract of the other in my No. ——,* both of last year. Your Lordship will perhaps find in my No. 66 some additional reasons for paying attention to this request.

The second is an offer to assist in the Conquest of Portugal, though I question much whether this has been ever made directly, yet I have no doubt but that it has been and is now actually in contemplation, and even that indirect hints have been already given. I am assured also that it has been a question whether a similar intimation should not be now given *in the form of a threat* to the Court of Lisbon, to induce that Government to shut

* *Note at the side.*—N.B.—Somewhere between No. 8 and 16.

its Ports against the English, but that a doubt had been started whether it would not be more wise to wait till the negotiation with Spain should be so far advanced as that its ultimate success or failure might be calculated on with some sort of Probability, it being observed that an intimation of this kind given unseasonably to the Court of Lisbon might take away one of the strongest temptations holden out to Spain. I have, however, strong reason to believe that something of the kind was thrown out to Portugal last year, about the Time of the Spanish Peace.

I ought also to mention, *as a fact*, from which I should wish Your Lordship to draw your own conclusion, that I have been warned of the hostile Intentions of Spain by several well-disposed mercantile Houses of Geneva and Basle, and that in general that opinion is universally received and acted upon by the most respectable Bankers and Merchants in this part of the Continent. But I do not find that they have, any of them, any better authority for the opinion than general rumour and the information given from one mercantile House to another; *besides*, wherever I have been able to discover the origin of such a report, I have always traced it up to a Banker at Paris.

Were I to venture to hazard my own opinion upon the weight that ought to be given to this prevalent idea *when taken alone* and independent of all other Grounds of Suspicion, I should say that it ought certainly not to be neglected, because in the attainment of an object of this kind, when a feeble Government is concerned, it is a great point gained to have established a current and general persuasion in the public that the thing is not only possible but even probable; and because it seems to impose a duty upon the Court particularly affected by it to give a more explicit and unequivocal explanation of its present Conduct, as well as of its future views and intentions, than it would otherwise be bound to do.

But, in other respects, I am not disposed to consider it

as meriting *very serious* attention, principally for the reason above mentioned, viz. that I have traced its origin back to Paris. It is, besides, most evidently the interest, as well as we know it is the actual intention, of the Directory at this particular moment to establish such a belief universally upon the Continent, particularly with the Powers bordering on the Mediterranean and the Levant, as well Europeans as others.

I should also add that though I have spared no pains to inform myself on that point, and have written again and again to Paris, to direct inquiries to be made and questions to be asked that might tend to elucidate it, I have yet learnt no one fact that could induce me to suppose that the Court of Madrid had *as yet* given any *direct* encouragement to the Demands of the Directory. On the contrary, though the people in place have spoken of this business as not doubting of its success, and with that sort of impudent Confidence which they assume whenever they have avowedly an object in view, yet upon attentively considering every thing that has been reported to me, and on comparing their language on this occasion with that which they have holden on many others where they have ultimately failed, I am rather disposed to believe that their Hopes are founded on the avowed weakness of the Spanish Government considered with respect to the strength of their own, and on the nature of the offers and Arguments they were about to use, and the Ability and force with which they would be presented and supported.

I beg, however, that it may be clearly understood that I am only speaking of the result of my own inquiries and observations, which are necessarily very limited.

Since writing the above I have a letter from the Abbé Brottier, assuring me that Spain is determined to take advantage of the present Circumstances of Europe to recover Gibraltar. He assures me, in the most positive manner, that he has certain Intelligence that they will

attack it immediately. I have also an anonymous Letter from Paris, written in a feigned Hand, professing much attachment to the Cause, and assuring me that Spain has a project in contemplation for *surprizing* Gibraltar. I should also mention here, though perhaps of no importance, that an acquaintance of mine from Geneva, now at Paris, has written me word that he had dined with Captain Bergeret just returned from England, who spoke in very handsome terms of the manner in which he had been treated there, and added that the people were terribly afraid of a War with Spain; that the Government had already obtained information *of the intended sailing of the fleet of Richery* and Solano together; and that this was a real misfortune, *as it might induce England to strike the first Blow*, and play the part she acted with respect to the French in 1755. Whether there be any Intention *on the part of Spain* that the two fleets should sail together, or whether, if there were, Mr. Bergeret would be in the Secret, is more than I can pretend to say. But I think it more than probable that the same sort of language will be used with great effect to the Court of Madrid, and in truth I should be much more afraid of the force of the above Argument than of any other that the French could make use of.

I have also received a repetition of the same assurances of the hostile intentions of Spain from the same mercantile houses, and it is very visible that the persuasion that a declaration of War on her part will soon take place, gains ground every day. I must, however, accompany this fact with the same observation as before, viz. that I have nothing (excepting the assurance of the Abbé Brottier) that induces me to believe that Spain has yet given any direct promise to that effect. I allow, at the same time, that it is extremely difficult, even with the best general Information, to know the real truth of a negotiation carried on in the way that this has been, and that it is also possible that the Directory, suspecting the

source of my Intelligence, may have taken measures calculated expressly to deceive me.

I am well aware, also, that with a Court constituted as that of Madrid is said now to be, too much reliance ought not to be placed on any of its promises or assurances, to whomsoever they may be given, nor even on the Certainty of its having given as yet none of any kind to the Enemy.

Since writing the above I am informed from a very good source, that the present Conduct of the Court of Stockholm has given infinite pain to the Directory, principally on the Ground that it has very much weakened the offers they were making to Spain, which were chiefly founded on the Certainty of an Alliance of all the Maritime Powers of Europe against England, Russia alone excepted. The same person informs me, that, Duverrier and Cartera, two Agents who have been employed at Copenhagen ever since the year 1792, are just returned, that he has not yet seen them, but that he is assured that the account they bring is by no means satisfactory, and that the Directory is very much out of humour upon the occasion.

In my dispatch No. 59 I informed Your Lordship that Tallien had lately shewn some signs of uneasiness, if not of repentance, upon which some slight Hopes had been formed of separating him from his companions in Guilt. A direct offer has since been made to him, and as peremptorily refused. It was not made directly in the King's name, but he could not mistake from whence it came. The person who spoke to him afterwards addressed himself to his wife, stating to her what had passed with her Husband, and desiring her to renew the offer; but she declined it, saying that she had not only lost his confidence, but that she considered him now as quite abandoned, and plunging every day deeper and deeper in wickedness; that the offer itself would be extremely dangerous were it to lead to any thing further, for that

she was certain he would make use of it to establish a higher opinion of his own Patriotism, by betraying publicly, and in the body of the Assembly itself, all those who shall have trusted themselves to him. It seems that Tallien, Barras, Freron, and some few others, meet constantly at a small Country house at Croisy, where in large draughts of Champagne they concert together all their measures, admitting none but the few who are *initiated* to any of their assemblies—even Madame Tallien is now totally excluded. Barras generally sleeps there, being apprehensive of some design of his Colleagues, who I am assured had taken the resolution not long since to arrest him there with his whole Company, but that their courage was not equal to the execution of so extraordinary and violent a measure.

Louvet is of this party, and though I doubt whether he be admitted to the whole of their Councils, yet I believe their opinions, as well as something of their Projects, may always be collected from an attentive perusal of the Sentinelle.

I have just learnt that a certain Marchioness of St. Iago has been deeply concerned in Tallien's intrigues at Madrid, and, in particular, that Jean Bon St. Andé, who has been sent out to Algiers as Consul, on His passage through Madrid, was particularly well received by that Lady, and had several Conferences with her in consequence of an introduction from Tallien.

I inclose Your Lordship the extracts of three Letters from a Person at Paris deeply interested in the French Funds, who has been a great deal at Paris and paid the closest attention to matters of finance from the very beginning of the Revolution, and I recommend it to your perusal, as I have observed that person to have been uniformly right, both in his actual information, and his Conjectures, from the first moment of the fall of the Assignats; besides, he was particularly connected with Johannot, who is certainly much consulted in all their

speculations of Finance. It is not only at Paris that Specie is become abundant all at once. It is the same thing at Lyons and generally in the markets of the Country Towns. Notwithstanding all this, the demands for money are so extensive and various, that the Government is again very seriously embarrassed and *must* soon have recourse to some new expedient.

The national property is selling every where almost for nothing, and the Directory in the present crisis dare not take the decisive measures concerning which I wrote to Your Lordship in some of my late private Letters. I am assured (independant of the boldness of the measure itself) that the Directory are alarmed at the number of Members of the Two Assemblies, and of their own Ministers and Agents who are among the Purchasers. On the other hand, it is generally believed in the Provinces that the Directory and the Members of the Assembly are the purchasers of the whole in other Persons' names, and this idea increases wonderfully the hatred and unpopularity into which they are fallen.

(No. 65.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) 30th June, 1796.

My Lord,—In my dispatch No. —— I informed your Lordship of the demand made by Mr. Barthelemy to send away all the emigrants from this country, and of my belief that this demand would be complyd with. I have now the Honour to communicate to your Lordship the particulars of what has passed on that occasion subsequent to the date of that dispatch.* A few days previous to the discussion of Mr. Barthelemy's note, deputies from the Cantons of Berne, Soleure, and Fribourg met together and (according

* Mons. Barthelemy's note to the Canton of Basle, dated 20 Floreal (May 9), the answer of the Canton, dated May 11, and Mr. Wickham's official note to the Senate of Berne, dated the 26th June 1726, will be found in the Annual Register for 1796, State Papers, pp. 203, 4, 5, 6.

to their instructions) agreed on the several regulations that their respective Governments ought to adopt and on the form of an answer to be sent to Mr. Barthelemy. They were unanimously of opinion that in the present crisis it would be wise to remove all the Emigrants without distinction from the Frontiers, and that all the men under a certain age should be ordered to quit the country alltogether. But that any further compliance with the demands of the French Government would be as ungenerous and inhuman as it would be derogatory to their own dignity and even to their independence. This opinion was reported to the Senate of Bern, where it was unanimously approved of and submitted by them to the Council of 200 on the day that the note was taken into consideration.

I have infinite pain in informing your Lordship that this wise and moderate opinion was rejected by a considerable majority, and that the resolution was taken to send away before the first of August all these unfortunate people without distinction of age or sex, and that it was not without much difficulty that some humane members obtained an exception for the sick.

A copy of the decree was ordered to be sent to Mr. Barthelemy without a moment's delay, and the Senate was ordered to make a report on the first of September of the manner in which the law has been executed.

I am sorry to add, that the whole of the business on that day was conducted in a manner highly disgraceful to the character of the government, and that some of the scenes that took place in the Council of 200 were such as I had hoped could only have happened in a popular assembly at Paris.

Your Lordship knows that by the constitution of this state above 70 of its members are allways absent in their respective Governments or Baillages. These are allways persons who have been 6 or 7 years at least in the Government, and it seldom happens that any member has

an opportunity or is desirous of obtaining a Baillage after the middle age of life, so that in point of fact after a new election (which was the case last year) the majority of the Council of 200 is composed of the young men newly elected, and a great proportion of the other are too much advanced in years to resist them with spirit and energy. I have had occasion once before to lament that the principles of a great majority of the last election are by no means calculated either to do good to their own country or to give satisfaction and security to the other powers of Europe, should France hereafter think proper to call upon them for more important services.

They have entered deeply into the views and principles of Mr. Frisching, who is now most entirely devoted to the interests of the French Republick.

In consequence of this decree applications have been made to me in such numbers for passports to go to England, that except in some very extraordinary cases I have really felt it my duty to decline giving any, untill your Lordship shall have been pleased to transmit to me his Majesty's commands for the regulation of my conduct in this respect. There are about 5,000 Emigrants in all now in Switzerland, of which from about 800 to 1,000 might wish to go to England.

In the hope of obtaining a slight respite for some few of these unhappy sufferers, I have delivered the inclosed note to the Senate of Bern, which I trust his Majesty will be graciously pleased to approve of. I am happy to learn that it has been well received here, even by those who were most violent in favour of the decree, and that the tone of moderation in which it is written, more than the arguments it contains, will probably be productive of some little alleviation to the sufferings of the unfortunate persons who are the objects of it. Your Lordship will observe that this note has by no means committed me upon the question whether the decree be not a virtual sacrifice of the independance of the state that has passed it, by giving it

the form of a mere notification 'that in so extraordinary a case I dare not take upon myself to act at all without his Majesty's express commands.' The note is besides only addressed to the Senate, who are merely charged with the execution of the law. To prevent, however, any such constructions being put upon it, I have delivered at the same time the private letter No. 2 to the Avoyer de Mulinen as containing the avowal and explanation of my real sentiments, every one of which agrees entirely with those of the Avoyer himself.

What I there foretell as to the further demands of the French has been allready verified. Mr. Barthelemy has just delivered two more notes: the one to the Helvetic Body *demanding* that no person may be received as a Frenchman in Switzerland who does not wear the national cockade; the other to the Canton of Bern, *requesting* that the children of General La Harpe may be restored to their father's property, and that their father's attainder may be reversed.

(No. 66.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft. Most Secret.) Bern: 3rd July, 1796.

My Lord,—The greater part of the letters and Bulletins that I receive from Paris, being generally filled with long histories of the connections, jealousies, quarrels, and reconciliations of the members of the Directory and the leaders of the different popular factions, I have seldom or ever troubled your Lordship with them, because the whole scene would probably have been changed long before my intelligence could have reached London, and still more because, being a natural consequence of the manner in which the present government is constituted, they are in truth but of very little importance, unless they appear to lead directly to some change of parties and principles so total as that it might materially affect the actual form of their government within or their general political

system without. Some circumstances, however, have just come to my knowledge tending to a new coalition of parties, of a nature to require that I should immediately communicate them to your Lordship, and recommend them to the very serious consideration of his Majesty's Ministers.

Your Lordship will recollect that great pains were taken, in the course of last winter, to induce Mr. D'André, the famous member of the constituent assembly, to write to the King, and make an offer of his services, at the same time that nothing was left undone that might tend to secure him a favourable answer.

The whole of this ended in Mr. D'André's writing the letter required, and in the King's sending exactly the answer that could have been most wished for, of both of which I send copies in the inclosed paper No. 1. As soon as the answer was received, Mr. D'André sent copies of it to several members of both assemblies, particularly to Messrs. Portalis, Durand, Maillane, Simeon, and Dupont de Nemours. The answer that he received was nearly this: 'that all his friends were persuaded that nothing was to be done for the present; that the Directory at that moment was so powerfull that it could not possibly be attacked, and that in any case it could not now be attacked by his friends without danger to their own party.' Nothing remained therefore for all well-meaning people but to rally themselves round the new government, which was alone capable of saving them from the hands of the Jacobins.

This answer was given some short time before the late insurrection of the Jacobins, which I have allready had occasion to mention to your Lordship had been secretly promoted by the Directory, as a means of terrifying the Royalists and the *Modérés*. How justly that idea had been conceived, and how well it had succeeded, may be learnt from this answer of Mr. D'André's friends. But the Jacobins having carried the business much further than was ever intended by their Protectors, the Directory found

itself all at once in the most awkward situation possible, from which they have not yet been able to extricate themselves. Jacobins in their hearts, though they know that they are detested by the party, and firmly persuaded that if the Jacobins should be *entirely* destroyed they themselves must perish with them, they have yet been under the necessity of throwing themselves, in some measure, into the arms of the opposite faction, and even of flattering and cajoling in private some of their principal leaders, who I am confidently assured have become so far the Dupes of this new manœuvre that they conceive the Directory to be acting towards them with perfect good faith, and flatter themselves that they shall gain an influence over some of its members, so decided as to be able to lead them, gradually, to their own destruction.

"The manner in which the *Redacteur* and the *Historien* are now saying handsome things of each other cannot have escaped your Lordship's attention. Many other public marks of this sort of political coquettery have taken place, even with an affectation of publicity on both sides; for instance, Dumas has been sent for by Carnot and consulted upon some important military operations, and in return Dumas makes the most pompous eulogium of the vigilance, the talents, and the indefatigable laboriousness of the Directory, in a speech in the Assembly.

The result of all this has been that the persons to whom Mr. D'André had written, after having communicated with some few others, have met in a small committee of 5 Persons only, have reconsidered Mr. D'André's letters, and have, after several meetings, drawn up the paper, of which No. 4 is a copy, which professes to contain a short but clear account of their present principles, views, and hopes, as well as a statement of the demands they have to make.

Mr. D'André is not *yet* at liberty to name any of the

five Persons. They have all of them, however, signed the paper they have transmitted; but he assures me that three out of the five are persons on whose capacity as well as prudence I may entirely rely. I have other reasons for believing that the five are Gilbert Desmolieres, Pastoret, Dumolard, Dumas, and Portalis.

Whoever they be, their propositions, though they do not amount to a great deal, certainly contain nothing but what is perfectly sensible and rational, and in my own opinion entirely conformable to the real situation of things at this moment; and I do not hesitate to say that it would be wise to encourage and support them, though I do not flatter myself with the hope that the Directory will be the Dupe of this manœuvre to the extent that is expected.

I have forwarded these Propositions to Riegel, but I shall say nothing in answer to them myself, untill I shall have seen Mr. D'André, whom I have sent for to come over and talk with me upon the subject.

It is singular enough that Propositions allmost exactly similar should have been sent about the same time through the Abbé Brottier, who presses the King with the utmost earnestness to accept them. He states positively that he has himself been introduced to the principal persons concerned; that they are really leading men in the two assemblies; and though he refuses to name them till he shall know whether their propositions will be accepted, I have learnt through another channel that Dupont de Nemours is one of those whom he has seen, and that he has expressed a wish to enter into Correspondance with the Duke de la Vauguyon.

But what is still more extraordinary is that the inclosed note No. 5, which has also been transmitted to the King, was (as I have the strongest reason to believe) actually drawn up by the club of Tallien and Barras; at least I know that it passed through the hands of one of their leading members. It is in many respects extremely curious, and worthy much attention.

(No. 67.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Bern: July 3rd, 1795.

My Lord,—I feel it my duty to send off a messenger immediately, to inform your Lordship that I have received repeated intelligence, that the Directory is meditating an immediate descent in England or Ireland, from the Ports of Holland or Flanders. For above three weeks past, I have been assured that such a project was in contemplation, but till within these few days I paid but little attention to the information I received, because it was always made to depend, either on the supposed pacification that was to take place on the Continent, or on an offensive Alliance with Spain, as well as Sweden. The reports I received were, besides, so extremely exaggerated as to the forces, both by sea and land—not less than 500,000 Men, and 40 Ships of the Line—that were intended to be employed, and the talk of such an attempt was so general, that I could not but consider the whole as a contrivance of the enemy, either to create an alarm in England, and prevent any additional force from being sent to the East or West Indies; or to terrify her friends and Allies on the Continent, and to serve some particular purpose in some one or other of the Negotiations now carrying on with almost all the Powers in Europe.

I am now, however, informed, 1st. from the King's Agent at Paris, that the thing is certainly in contemplation, and that Contracts have been actually made for building 2,000 Gun-boats on a new construction, capable of carrying two Guns each and 50 Men; that they will be chiefly built in the Rivers, and that some of them are actually finished at Paris.

2nd. From Mr. Mallet du Pan, that he has received intelligence from a Correspondent on whom he entirely relies, that the project is in *immediate* contemplation.

3rd. From the person who has given me my intelligence

respecting Holland, that I may be assured that the thing will be attempted, *sooner or later*, from the Dutch Ports, and that it is particularly important to have an Eye upon Flushing ; that Admiral Winter's fleet is destined to cover this expedition, and that a number of Gun-boats, light vessels, and Frigates are collecting in the Northern ports of France. I should add, that he still persists in thinking that it will not take place till the conclusion of a Peace with Austria, which he considers as near at hand.

4th. The person from whom I have received the intelligence respecting Spain and the East Indies assures me that it is in immediate contemplation, and that the force to be employed in it will consist of the Troops that were intended to have been sent against Hanover, that Expedition being now to be laid aside, in consequence of some new arrangement with Prussia. That the Government had but little hope of ultimate success, but that they were determined to make the experiment, in the hope of striking a blow at the Credit of the Bank, being perfectly indifferent as to the number of men they should sacrifice.

By a second letter received this morning, he adds—' All project of Invasion *is adjourned*, in consequence of the success of the Arch-duke Charles, which has thrown a general consternation here, and a large body of Troops has been ordered to march, with all possible expedition, from the Army of Bournonville, to reinforce General Jourdan.' I should add, that all the private Letters from Paris received this week speak of the Invasion as certain ; and that I have been informed by my Correspondents, both at Geneva, Basle and Lausanne, that it is the report of every person who comes to any of those places from Paris.

I send Your Lordship this information exactly as I have received it, without presuming to form any opinion of my own as to the probability, or even practicability, of such a project. I shall spare no pains to procure further intelligence, and will forward it to Your Lord-

ship with all possible expedition, but I am seriously apprehensive, since the last passage of the Rhine, lest the communication should soon be entirely cut off.

Under the above circumstances, I cannot avoid calling Your Lordship's attention to the famous memoire of the Count de Broglio, which I had the honor of transmitting to you in February 1795. Your Lordship knows the very high estimation in which it is holden, and you will recollect, that when I transmitted it to England, I added an assurance that it was the plan on which the Enemy then intended to act. It appears from the printed Account of the Count de Broglio's Correspondence in the work entitled *Politique de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe pendant les Regnes de Louis XV et Louis XVI*, which was put together by Gorani, that this piece was wanting from the Foreign Office, at the time that all the publick records were seized by the Convention; and I have never been able to learn whether they have a copy of it or not. I am told that the maps are still there. In page 109 of that work, speaking of this piece, there is the following note:—'La Memoire sur les Moyens de reussir dans une descente en Angleterre, ne se trouve pas dans le Dépôt, et quand il s'y serait trouvé, nous ne l'aurions pas publié; *Il est essentiel que les Anglais n'en aient pas connoissance.*' It is possible that this note may have been inserted on purpose to deceive. In that supposition I have desired that every possible enquiry be made into the truth of the fact—hitherto without success. When I saw Mr. Dumas on my first arrival here, he spoke to me of this work of the Count de Broglio (which he pretended to have seen) in terms of the warmest admiration, adding that the plan was perfectly practicable, if executed by men of talents. I mention this to your Lordship, in consequence of what is stated in my dispatch, No. 66, of the interview between Dumas and Carnot. It is even possible also that the last article of Mr. D'André's propositions, inclosed in the same dispatch, may have been

added in consequence of this interview. In page 25 of the same work, is the following observation of the Count de Broglio, in a Letter addressed to the King :—'J'ignore si sa Majesté a gardé dans ses armoires tous les papiers, mémoires, cartes et plans que je lui ai fait passer. Il y en a de l'année 1765, ou 1766, sur l'Angleterre, avec des cartes renfermées dans des longues Boêtes de fer blanc. Ces objets devroient être renfermés très-précieusement. Si M. le Duc d'Aiguillon pourroit les avoir, il les communiquera, peut-être, à Mi-Lord Stormont, pour gagner toutes les Cours étrangères,—ce dont il est fort occupé.'

Your Lordship is aware that Mr. de Rozière was the person principally employed by Mr. de Broglio in composing this Memoire. He will, therefore, be able to inform your Lordship (if it should be thought right to let him know that you have a knowledge of the piece), whether the one that I have sent be the Original, or only a Copy, and if it be a Copy, whether it be perfectly exact. A fact that it would be important for me as well as your Lordship to know—I myself have no doubt about it.

Your Lordship will have observed in the first part of this dispatch, that an Arrangement with the Court of Berlin is given as a reason for abandoning the expedition into Hanover. Upon that point I am assured, that the Directory are as suspicious and as Jealous of the Conduct of that Cabinet as the Court of Vienna can be, yet that they are now pursuing their Negotiations there with the utmost activity, and holding out every thing that can tempt and flatter their ambition and their Cupidity. As I am, myself, full of apprehensions on that side, I cannot refrain from sending to your Lordship an extract from my Correspondence of last Year, and recommending it to the very Serious attention and consideration of His Majesty's Ministers. It may possibly have escaped their attention, or their recollection, in the quantity of papers that Ihave had occasion at different times to communicate. It was delivered to my Agent by a person who was at

the time member of the Committee of Publick Safety. Its truth was in a great measure verified by a person whom I sent to Paris in July 1795, concerning which I have written to your Lordship on a late occasion. And I am, myself, most intirely persuaded that it contains, as far as it goes, an exact and faithful statement of the projects that were then concerted, and the propositions that were intended to have been made. His Majesty's Ministers will immediately perceive that it does not contain an Article that is not perfectly conformable to the Secret interests and views of France, under whatever form of Government she may be, and that they are such as would have been avowed by any one of her Ministers, from Cardinal Mazarin down to Mr. de Vergennes, if he had felt himself strong enough to put them in execution.

I take this opportunity of mentioning that Mr. Gervinus is lately returned to Basle, avowedly *somewhat* out of humour with the insolence of the Directory. But I cannot too often repeat to your Lordship that the Resolution is taken at Paris to treat as little as possible through the medium of avowed Agents, particularly those who have any of the old principles, habits, or manners of the ancient diplomatic system remaining. Mr. Gervinus told a person of my acquaintance that the Court of Vienna was running headlong to its ruin, by the numberless false steps it was taking every day. That the Directory was alarmed at the arrival of every Courier through the whole Months of March and April, lest they should learn the news of the truce being broken, and that they could not help expressing their Astonishment that the Austrians should give them the time to complete and organise their Army; that they were still more astonished at the Austrian Generals' breaking it at last, when they had the certainty that the successes in Italy would oblige them to send large detachments into that Country; and they were really and seriously alarmed on that occasion, conceiving the Cabinet of Vienna to have

some great and extensive plan in view combined with the interior; but that when the detachments in question were really made a few days afterwards, and the defensive system resumed, they turned the whole into Ridicule, and became more insolent and audacious than ever.

The Right Honourable Lord GRENVILLE, &c., &c., &c.

(No. 68.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Bern: July 13th, 1796.

My Lord,—In my dispatch No. 67, of the 3rd instant, I forwarded to Your Lordship an extract from my Correspondance of last year, containing the plan of the Committee of Publick Safety for humbling the house of Austria, raising that of Prussia, and extending the limits of France to the Rhine.

I am now assured in the most positive manner, that the same plan, somewhat new-modelled according to the now existing circumstances, and rendered more extensive in consequence of their late successes, is still in Contemplation; and that the Court of Berlin has been again, and very lately, pressed to accede to it.

Upon looking over my notes of last year, I find, towards the end of the month of August, a memorandum of another Letter from Paris, assuring me that the above was really the plan of the Committee of Publick Safety; that the projected passage of the Rhine was intended to give effect to it; and particularly, that the taking of Mentz (for the siege of which place positive orders had then been given) was the event that was to determine the part that the King of Prussia would take in its final execution. I sent your Lordship, either the original or an exact Copy of this Letter, at the time. His Majesty's Ministers will probably have many means of knowing how far that Monarch had really entered into the views of the Committee of Publick Safety. It is certain that his whole conduct about that time seemed to indicate that

he was, at least, disposed to take advantage of any favourable opportunity that their success (had it been decided) might have offered him, of increasing his own power and diminishing that of the House of Austria. I am assured that the Bishop of Autun had some such project (though not quite so extensive) in view, when he first went over into England, but that he was instructed only to Sound the British Government at a distance, and at all events to talk only of the Bishoprick of Liege as a Consideration to be given to the King of Prussia, in case he prevented the Austrians from attacking France; and that the whole of this Secret was not entrusted either to the Diplomatic Committee or to Mr. Montmorin himself. Your Lordship will best know whether there is any foundation for this Story. I am further assured, that it was a Knowledge of this intended Mission that induced the Emperor to propose to the King of Prussia the treaty of Pilnitz. I know that at this moment the Court of Vienna either is, or affects to be, very seriously alarmed at the conduct of the Prussian Cabinet, and says, that the question of the new Line of demarcation is a mere pretext. Mr. Gervinus is returned to Basle, avowedly as an Observer only, but really for the purpose of holding out the protection of his Court to such of the German Princes as may send their ministers or Secret Agents there, to treat with the Republick. So that if the Directory had any confidence in Mr. Barthelemy, we should see the scene of last year acted over again. This conduct causes infinite pain to the Austrians, who cannot at all disguise their feelings on the occasion.

Mr. de Woolwarth, minister of the finances of His Serene Highness the Duke of Wurtemburg, and Mr. Abel, Councillor of the States of the Dutchy, arrived at Basle on Saturday last, charged with powers to treat for peace with the French Republick. Mr. Barthelemy having declared that he was not authorised to enter into any negotiation with them, they continued their Journey to Strasburg,

to endeavour to obtain from General Moreau an Armistice at any price. I have no occasion to point out to Your Lordship the consequence of this measure. It is sufficient to cast one's Eye on the Map of Swabia to be satisfied of its vast importance. It must necessarily put an end to all possibility, on the part of the Austrians, of carrying on the war on the Upper Rhine; and all the fine possessions of the Emperor in the Brisgau must of necessity be sacrificed. I have the strongest reason to believe that this affair had been concerted beforehand; that the Margrave of Baden* is concerned some way or other in the Negotiation; and that the Elector Palatine,† or at least some of his Ministers, still keep up a Correspondence with the French. This situation of things certainly renders the position of the Austrians extremely difficult and distressing; so much so, that unless the Arch-duke should already have gained a battle on the Upper Rhine, so decisive as at least to have driven the Enemy back again into Kell, I cannot help considering the Campaign on the Rhine, Lower as well as Upper, as at an end, and the Imperialists obliged to retire to the Danube. God alone knows whether such an event is not now seriously to be desired, by all real friends of the House of Austria.

The Prince of Belmonte is arrived at Basle, from whence he is to proceed, as it is said, immediately to Paris. The Directory mean to insist with this Court, that all persons banished for State Crimes shall receive a full pardon, and be restored to the enjoyment of their property, as well as their Liberty, in their own Country. Your Lordship is no doubt aware that an immense number of persons are in this situation at Naples, and that the almost inevitable consequence of a compliance with this demand will be a revolution in the Government.

The Expedition to Leghorn has been undertaken by

* Charles Frederick, Margrave, afterwards Grand Duke, of Baden, b. 1728, d. 1811.

† Charles Theodore, Elector Palatine and Elector of Bavaria, d. 1799.

Buonaparté, rather against his own inclinations, after the positive and repeated Commands of the Directory. The Grand-duke will be obliged to pay a large contribution, either in money, stores, or provisions, notwithstanding his Neutrality.

The Genoese are treated no better. The delivery of the gulph of Spezzia, and the two moles of the harbour of Genoa itself, have been required and I believe granted; as well as the return of all their subjects who had been banished for their political principles, or for offences any way relating to the Revolution, one of whom the Directory has appointed to the place of Consul at Spezzia; it cannot be denied but that this mode of proceeding is both more effective and more expeditious, and answers their purpose infinitely better, than that slow and imperfect system of propagating their doctrines, that they had originally adopted by the means of hired Agents.

There appears to be but one Opinion and one Voice in Italy, any more than in this part of the Continent, on the subject of all these Calamities. The Court of Vienna is openly accused as being the cause of them; the only doubt seems to be, whether they are to be imputed to the weakness or to the corruption of her Ministers, or to some old views, pretensions, and projects of that Court, which those who direct her Councils consider as difficult to be obtained, under the established system by which Europe has been governed for these last 40 years, but extremely easy, whenever they find a pretext for entering into Italy as Conquerors.* I intreat your Lordship, however, to understand that I am here merely stating what is universally believed in the publick, without presuming at all to offer my own Opinion on the Subject, being in truth unable to form one from the want of sufficient information.

* *Note at the side.*—That this latter supposition is really the case appears now evident to me from the secret letter communicated in Mr. Trevor's No. —— of this year.—W. W., 24 July, 96.

Great preparations are making by the Enemy to pass the Rhine at Brisach. If they should succeed in this enterprize the fate of the Austrian army on the Upper Rhine will become extremely precarious.

The Directory is to the last degree Jealous of the Court of Prussia, and suspects her Ministers of having formed some new Connection with England, independant of the House of Austria.

Madame Tallien has received a Letter from the Prince of Peace, avowedly intended to be shown to some members of the Directory, containing an apology of the present Conduct of the Court of Spain.

(No. 69.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Extract from Draft.) July 14th, 1796.

The Swiss Diet is now assembled at Frawenfeld. The Deputies are instructed to treat of no matter of any real importance if they can possibly avoid it. This, however, will be extremely difficult, as Mr. Lequeant, one of the Secretaries of Legation belonging to the French Mission, is just gone there; authorized, as is generally believed, to make some new and extravagant demands in the name of the Republic. I have not yet been able to learn any thing of the nature of his instructions, nor am I able to form any reasonable conjecture concerning them. I shall forbear to trouble your Lordship with the many idle stories that are circulated on that subject, because I am sure that they none of them rest on any real foundation. (*Cypher.*) I have, however, good reason for believing that an attempt will be made to induce the Cantons to address His Majesty for the purpose of obtaining *my recall.* (*Cypher ends.*)

The Canton of Zurich has ordered all such of its officers now on duty at Basle as had obtained the order of merit in France to desist from wearing either the ribband or the cross belonging to the order. This

disgraceful ordonnance has been represented here by Mr. Frisching, the Deputy from this Canton to the Diet, as a wise and prudent measure very worthy to be imitated, and he has written a very strong letter to the government, exhorting them to give a similar order to their own officers. This advice, however, has not been *exactly* followed on this occasion, the government having contented itself with adopting a kind of half measure; i.e. they have merely communicated to their own officers the ordonnance of the Canton of Zurich, leaving it to their discretion to continue to wear the signs of the order or no, *according as circumstances may render it more or less prudent.*

The wanton decree of this state against the Emigrants has produced a degree of misery and distress amongst that unhappy people as difficult to describe as it is painful to witness. Independent of the measure itself, which God knows was sufficiently severe, the indecent and insulting language in which the ordonnance is worded, has caused them to be considered by the lower classes of the people (even those who are well diposed) as disturbers of the public peace and enemies to the government, and has actually excited the Inhabitants of several villages, particularly those of the Pays de Vaud, to threaten and insult them in their houses as well as on their passage along the high road. God alone knows where they can betake themselves, or what must become of them. There are many whole families within my own observation, who lived entirely by their industry and the trifling assistance they received from their friends in France, that will be turned out upon the wide world with no other means than what the sale of their miserable household furniture and a part of their wearing apparel will furnish them. Mr. Barthelemy himself has declared, and even *written*, to several persons that the Canton of Bern had gone much further than the Directory either expected or desired.

This Declaration, however, has produced no effect, and

the publication of the decree has been made throughout the Canton since this language of Mr. Barthelemy has been made known to every member of the Government.

(No. 70.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Bern: the 16th July, 1796.

My Lord,—Your Lordship will observe, in the inclosed extract from the *Redacteur*, a new proof of what I stated in No. 61. to be the present views and projects of the Enemy in the East Indies. I should observe, however, that the above Article is marked—*not official.*

(*In Cypher. Most secret and confidential.*)—It is with infinite pain that I inform Your Lordship that the propositions sent to the King by the Abbé Brottier from Paris have been declared wholly inadmissible; and that it has been laid down as a fundamental principle, that the declaration of Verona cannot be departed from in any respect.

It was a leading point of the Abbé's propositions, that the Monarchy should be Limited in some shape or other; leaving the quantity and the nature of the Limitations that should be adopted, to future discussion. This is the article that is considered as vitiating the whole. The principal person concerned in this project was Mr. Lemerer. General Moreau, before his departure from Paris, was made privy to the intention of Lemerer's friends to open themselves to the King, and had promised to support them, *as far as he could*, with his Army. Mr. Brottier is so persuaded that there is no other hope for the king, but in a Constitutional Monarchy, that he has declared positively that he will quit Paris in case the propositions be not accepted; yet that Gentleman has been hitherto one of the stoutest Supporters of the Ancient Government in all its purity. Mr. Duvergne is desirous of retiring also, being satisfied that nothing can now be done, in the Interior, in any other way.

Your Lordship will learn this resolution of the King

with still more regret, when I shall inform you that similar propositions have been made by Boissy d'Anglas and his friends through Mr. de Preçy, and that they have also been rejected. Mr. d'André's Offers will of course meet with a similar fate. I have most earnestly to intreat of your Lordship the strictest Secrecy with respect to the whole of the above mentioned Offers, and particularly the Names of the persons concerned. I shall send immediately a very confidential person to explain the whole to your Lordship in a way that I cannot do by letter. I consider the unfortunate manner in which these negociations have terminated as the coup-de-grace given to the Reigning family. I never had, till now, any serious alarm about the Duke of Orleans; but unless His Majesty have sufficient influence with the French King and Princes to induce them to relax somewhat of their pretensions—and particularly to recede from the declaration of Verona—I am persuaded that every thing is to be apprehended. This is also the opinion of every thinking and well-informed man who is at all acquainted with the real opinion of the Interior, and particularly of Paris. Things are mightily changed since the destruction of the Vendée—an epoch which has been clearly marked by a determination on the part of all the Royalists in the interior, of every description, to rally round the existing Government, untill it shall please Providence to send them a better.

The Prince of Condé was at Villingin on the 13th, the Duke of Enghien* still with General Frelich in the plain. We have no intelligence yet of any decisive action having taken place. The Enemy are sending reinforcements of every kind, both to the Upper and Lower Rhine. A small Corps has actually entered the Valteline.

The Right Honourable Lord GRENVILLE, &c. &c. &c.

* Louis Antoine Henri Duc d'Enghien, grandson of the Prince de Condé and son of the Duc de Bourbon, b. 1772, put to death by Napoleon 1804.

(No. 35.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft. Private.) 18th July, 1796.

My Lord,—Whatever confidence your Lordship has reposed in my opinion of the situation of the interior of France may be very safely transferred to Mr. Preçy. I recommend him therefore most earnestly to your Lordship as a faithfull reporter of allmost all that I have to say upon the subject. I am sure you will find him in every way worthy of your protection and good offices.

The season of partial insurrections is over. I am persuaded that they can no longer be attempted without certain destruction to their authors and great mischief to the common cause. Nothing is now to be expected from that quarter, but from a return of the whole Body of the people to their senses, and, above all, an union of all parties against the Jacobins. When that great event may reasonably be expected to take place, God only knows; certainly not whilst the Directory can find such immense sums by stock jobbing and by the plunder of their neighbours.

The conduct of the French Princes and their ministers and agents affects and afflicts me more than all the rest. When one has seen them so nearly and so much *behind the curtain* as I have done, one is tempted to believe that God has willed this tremendous revolution, among other purposes, for *their* particular correction, and that it will not terminate untill they and their wretched systems shall have in great measure disappeared. I am tempted to make this exclamation (among other reasons) because I have very lately had communication of instructions given to the Royalists in Britany, to Mr. de Preçy, and to Paris, to beware more than ever of the intentions of the British Government, and, above all things, not to give an *implicit* confidence to their agents; and of the certain knowledge I have, that the Prince of Condé has

been very lately reproached in the severest manner on account of the extreme confidence that he places in me. I did not learn this directly from the Prince himself, but from a private letter of his to another friend, with whom he is in habits of *the closest* intimacy. All this looks so like a preternatural infatuation that I tremble whenever I think on it.

It is neither sense, abilities, nor knowledge that is wanted, and yet they do every thing that they ought not to do. I am not conscious of having ever deceived your Lordship in my reports of the situation of the interior, however favourable they may have sometimes been. Perhaps I have not dwelt with sufficient energy upon the force and the number of the different obstacles that constantly opposed themselves to the calling the good opinion of the Inhabitants into activity with effect. I fear, indeed, I have something to reproach myself with on that head; but the dread of tiring you by frequent repetitions of the same thing, joined to the immense detail with which I have been charged, that really seldom left me the time to digest my reflexions and reduce them to any order, and the rapidity with which the most important events have succeeded each other, rendered it often impossible for me either to say what I wished, or to know exactly what I wished to say.

My situation here has become extremely critical. I shall not stir, however, unless the Senate should intimate to me a friendly wish that I should retire; which I think not unlikely. In that case, I do not foresee any great inconveniences that would follow my removal, on the contrary it might be most usefull, as the regular communication from this country will probably soon be interrupted, and my correspondance with Paris might now be transferred with great use, as well as advantage, to Hamburgh.

I send many of my papers by Mr. de Preçy, and I am taking measures to secure such of the remainder as I do not find it absolutely necessary to destroy. I shall

endeavour to prepare matters in case of my departure in such a manner as that I may keep a correspondance open with this country.

(No. 71.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Bern: 18 July, 1796.

My Lord,— Mr. de Preçy will have the honour of conveying this dispatch to your Lordship. Many reasons have concurred to induce me to send that gentleman immediately to London.

1st. The same unfortunate circumstances that render his services in the interior of France entirely useless, make it impossible that he should remain any longer in this country, without great personal danger to himself, and without committing all his friends and Protectors here; and unfortunately there is now scarce any other place in Europe where he could seek a refuge but in his Majesty's dominions.

2nd. The Prince of Condé having represented to me in the strongest manner the imminent danger in which he finds himself of having his army suddenly disbanded, and his Serene Highness having at the same time most earnestly requested that I would set his mind at ease by assuring him that his Majesty, in such case, would not wholly abandon them to their fate, I find myself under the necessity of entreating your Lordship to convey to me his Majesty's commands for the regulation of my conduct in that respect as speedily as possible, observing at the same time that all communication by the common Post will, for a time at least, be entirely suspended.

The instructions which your Lordship transmitted to me at the end of your dispatch of the 8th of June 1795 (No. 15) seem to warrant me in giving such assurance, untill I shall have received his Majesty's final commands, and even in taking provisionary measures to give it effect; the more so as *that dispatch* was written subsequent to the powers given to Colonel Craufurd, and even to the departure of that gentleman from England.

On the other hand, the length of time that has since elapsed, the many unforeseen events that have happened in the interval, and the present most extraordinary position of public affairs, give me room to doubt whether the powers then given to me be not virtually annulled; and make me particularly desirous (if possible) of avoiding any thing that might in any way tend to commit his Majesty or his Ministers upon a point of such importance.

At the time that a similar event was apprehended in consequence of the King's persisting in his intention to remain at Riegel, Colonel Craufurd, after having consulted with me, did not hesitate to assure the Prince that if such a measure should be threatened he would immediately remonstrate against it, and use his utmost efforts to prevent its being carried into execution untill he should have had time to have received new Instructions from home; and indeed it seems that in all cases it would be more natural, and have a much better appearance, that any steps of the kind in question (if taken at all) should proceed from Colonel Craufurd rather than from myself. But your Lordship, will observe, that the Colonel is at this moment entirely separated from his Serene Highness, and that circumstances may easily become such as that a communication with him would be impossible.

3rd. The situation of things both *within* and *without* seems to me, now, to be such as that I cannot make any further pecuniary advances to the Royalists on this side of the country, consistently either with the instructions I have received from your Lordship or with my own private opinion as to the utility of which such a measure might be productive.

It would be difficult if not impossible for me, at this moment, to give to your Lordship a *detailed* explanation in writing of the motives that have induced me to form this resolution. It is, however, of importance that they should be thoroughly understood, the more so as my conduct in this respect may appear in some measure contrary to that which I was instructed to observe in

your Lordship's No. —. I beg leave therefore to refer your Lordship to Mr. de Preçy for every information upon that point that his Majesty's Ministers may wish to be acquainted with. He has long had my intire confidence; we see the whole business precisely in the same point of view, and he is intimately acquainted with all the reasons upon which my present opinion is founded.

This and the business of the Condé army are the *ostensible* reasons that we have given to the Duke de la Vauguyon for his journey; and I shall venture to request, with great deference, that he may be permitted to hold a similar language in England to the persons who are employed by the French Princes, to most of whom, on account of the extreme moderation of his principles, the very conciliatory language that he has persisted in using in all his communications with the interior, the open and avowed confidence that he has placed in the generous exertions of the British Government, and particularly because the white cockade was not mounted during the siege of Lyons, he has been often an object of jealousy and suspicion, and I fear that this journey may materially contribute to encrease rather than allay those sentiments unless great discretion be observed on his part.

4th. The last and *real* reason why I have determined upon sending him is, that he may explain to your Lordship many particulars relating to the important matters contained in my dispatch of the 16th Instant, No. 70. He will at the same time, with your Lordship's permission, enter more at large into the consequences that I fear may be expected to follow from the conduct that has been adopted on that occasion; and will state the reasons why I am persuaded that that conduct must necessarily be productive of infinite mischief in the present situation of France and of Europe.

It is more than possible that from motives of delicacy to the persons concerned, which your Lordship, I am sure, cannot but approve of, Mr. de Preçy may be unwilling to name the persons who had offered to enter into a

negotiation with the King through his means, but he will explain very fully the nature of their propositions, and of the answer that he received from one of the persons now in the King's Council. The others are allready sufficiently known to your Lordship.

I could much wish to enter at large into the subject myself but it is so extremely extensive and various, that without writing a long and fatiguing memoire, or without knowing precisely to what point your Lordship would wish me particularly to direct my attention, it would not be possible for me to attempt such a thing in the hurry of a moment like this.

I have procured for your Lordship's perusal a copy of the King's answer sent to his agent at Paris, as well as of Mr. de la Vauguyon's instructions that accompanyd it. It is there peremptorily laid down that the Propositions sent from Paris are *inadmissible*, and the agent is referred to his original instructions, and censured for having departed from them. The leading feature of those instructions here alluded to is this, 'that the King is disposed to make any reasonable sacrifice, that can be grafted on what is called the *antient constitution*, but that nothing should be accepted or *listened to* that might tend to establish a PERMANENT *representation*'—that is, that the King will listen to no terms of accommodation whatever with his people that shall not have the *principles* of the antient Government for their Basis. Mr. Duvergne was so penetrated with the danger of sending such an answer to Paris at this moment, that he wrote a very strong though decent remonstrance to the King and to the Duke de la Vauguyon upon the subject.

At the very moment that it was about to be sent off, the Duke himself arrived, and Mr. Duvergne immediately repeated to him the whole of what he had written, but was not able to make any impression whatever. My observations and remonstrances had for a time the same effect.

It is difficult to understand exactly what is the precise

nature and extent of the above mentioned Propositions. The King's agent only states that the persons who have made them—one of whom I have allready named to your Lordship — are *Constitutionalists* and *Bicamerists*, and that they demand that the King should promise to the Nation what they call a *Constitutional Government.*

Upon this ground I ventured to ask the Duke de la Vauguyon, whether it would not be as well to exclude the Propositions as *inadmissible* on account of their *obscurity* only, and in that case, whether the King's letter and his own instructions might not be so altered as that the thing might at least appear doubtfull. But I soon found that he would not, or rather durst not, accede even to this proposal, for upon my pressing him further upon the point, he stated distinctly, what I never could learn before, that the King's mind was entirely made up upon the subject; that he would do nothing that might have in the smallest degree the appearance of encouraging or even listening to a proposal of the kind; and that, should the matter ever come to a point, he would rather relinquish his crown than accept of any conditions that were not grafted on the basis of the antient Government.

I have at last, however, obtained (though the original answer *must* be sent to Paris), yet that the agent shall be authorized by a private note from the Duke to conceal it from the principal persons concerned, and merely to say to them that the King would be glad to discuss the matter contained in their propositions with any person that they shall think proper to send to him. By this measure time at least will be gained, no unfavourable impression will be given of the views and intentions of the King, and the correspondance will be kept open. The Duke, however, persists in assuring me that the King is not to be shaken in his resolution.

Your Lordship will have the goodness to observe that I have, in compliance with my original instructions, most carefully avoided expressing any opinion whatever as to

the advantages or disadvantages of any particular form of constitution, much less have I ventured to advise the accepting *definitively* any of the propositions that have been lately offered. I have only submitted the necessity, in the present situation of affairs, of *not rejecting*, directly and definitively, *any* offer whatever that should have an hereditary monarchical government for its Basis, particularly when made by persons who to a certain degree enjoy both consideration and influence in the present legislature.

With respect to M. de Preçy, I should wish myself that your Lordship would be pleased to retain him in England. It is, in my mind, of great importance at this moment that not only every operation in the interior should be really suspended, but that every appearance of an intention or a wish to excite troubles or insurrections in France should be carefully avoided. Should his Majesty's Ministers see the thing in the same point of view, the extraordinary merits of M. de Preçy will, I hope, entitle him to their protection. Your Lordship knows that he was attached to the service of his Sardinian Majesty: that situation is now lost, and he remains without retreat or resources. I believe he has no enemies but those which the Jealousy of his good sense and moderation, as well as of his distinguished talents and services, has occasioned him. Your Lordship knows that I have sometimes differed with him myself, as well in my opinion of the situation of public affairs, as in the nature of the measures that ought to have been adopted. Experience, however, has now taught me that he was in these cases (with one only exception) as uniformly right as I was wrong; and I am happy to pay this public testimony to the superiority of his Judgement and discernment, and above all of his intimate knowledge of the state of the interior and of the opinions, prejudices, weaknesses, as well as of the virtues, of his countrymen.

I particularly recommend to your Lordship's perusal a short memoire on the present state of the interior in

the Eastern frontier of France of which M. Preçy is the Bearer.

The unfortunate situation of affairs on the Rhine have obliged the Prince of Condé to a sudden retreat, the King has been obliged to leave the army and to return to Ulm. Both himself and the army appear to be in the utmost want, and the object of the Duke de la Vauguyon's journey here was to obtain from me some pecuniary supplies. As to the army, I have undertaken to indorse and negotiate all Colonel Craufurd's Bills. And as to the King, in a case so unforeseen and so extraordinary, I have ventured to advance him a thousand Pounds, which Measure I hope will not be disapproved of under all the circumstances. The situation of that unfortunate Prince is at this moment to the last degree wretched and distressing. I have, on the other hand, received back from the sums last advanced by M. Preçy and Imbert 5000*l.* sterling, which I shall remit to your Lordship by good Bills on London, as soon as I can find any. I am in hopes of saving a thousand or 1500 more.

M. de Preçy will give your Lordship a particular account of the situation of the armies, and the probable consequences of the disastrous events that have taken place, both on the Rhine and in Italy.

(No. 72.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) 18th July, 1796.

My Lord,—I am assured that the negotiations with Spain and Prussia, particularly with the latter, are going on with redoubled activity. The Prussian Minister at Paris is said to be intirely devoted to the Directory. I am assured that he sends home the most favourable and even exaggerated reports of the power, influence, good intentions and stability of the present Government in France, and that he takes great pains to bring over the other Foreign Ministers, and strangers in general whom he sees at Paris, to his own way of thinking. It seems

to be the general opinion among well informed persons at Paris, that Prussia will now speak very openly to the Court of Vienna and insist on sacrifices being made both to herself and France. Tallien certainly continues his correspondance with Spain, and, though detested by the Directory, yet he is listened to on that point. The Directory is particularly jealous of the Marquis de las Casas, and has insinuated to the Court of Madrid that that Minister is devoted to the British Government, and that he sends home very false reports of the situation of things in England.

Hoche is expected on the Rhine to take the command of a third army. He only waits for the submission of Mr. de Frotté and the Chouans in Normandy, which is now daily expected. The plan of the enemy is if possible to push on to Vienna, after having cut off the communications of Mr. de Wurmser by the Tyrol, to which object I suspect Mr. Hoche to be destined. The danger of leaving an enemy or a doubtful friend behind them has, I believe, determined the Directory to become more guarded in its conduct to this country, and to adjourn, *for a time at least*, all their extravagant demands and pretentions. This conduct is to the last degree wise and judicious. I consider this country therefore as secure against all hostile attempts or menaces of the enemy till he shall have been *compleatly* successfull in Germany; but I am by no means so easy with respect to the danger that may be apprehended from the Inhabitants themselves, particularly those of the Pays de Vaud and the States bordering on the Lake of Constance. Much as the Directory may wish, in the present situation of things, to avoid open hostilities, an insurrection of the people in which the French should appear to take no part could not but be highly favourable to their operation. I have received not a syllable from Paris respecting naval affairs or the Colonies. I observe that one letter out of three generally miscarrys. The inclosed paper circulated by Mr. Barthelemy is worth attention.

Sir Sidney Smith to Mr. Wickham.*

Tower of the Temple, Paris: 20th July, 1796.

Sir,—I was agreeably surprized to-day by your very kind letter of the 6th inst. enclosing an extract of one from my brother of the 7th June, for both which I beg you will accept my sincere and grateful acknowledgements.

The receipt of a letter of any kind cannot fail to be a pleasing event to a prisoner secluded from all society as I am, but one containing such proofs of the kind interest which is taken in my situation, by a person to whom I have not the honour of being particularly known, gave me more than ordinary Satisfaction. My gratitude is more particularly called for by your kind and considerate anticipation of my brother's anxiety and my necessities, which has so effectually and opportunely afforded the desired relief to both. I presume, in consequence of your kind offer, to trouble you with the enclosed letter, to be forwarded to my brother for his further satisfaction.

I trust it is unnecessary to add assurances of the readiness with which I shall embrace any future opportunity of proving my sense of the obligation you have laid me under, and the respect and esteem with which I have the honour to be, Sir, your most faithful, humble Servant,

W. SIDNEY SMITH.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c., at Berne.

(No. 76.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Bern: 21 July, 1796.

(*Cypher.*) My Lord,—The King's Agent in a letter of the 13th Instant assures [me] again that Prussia and Spain are about to enter into an alliance against England. He con-

* Sir William Sidney Smith, the famous admiral and gallant defender of Acre against Napoleon, who said of him, 'Cet homme m'a fait manquer ma fortune;' b. 1764, d. 1740; at this time prisoner of war in the Temple at Paris. His Life and Correspondence, edited by Sir John Barrow, in two vols. 1848.

firms to me also, what I have before learnt from another quarter, viz. that Tallien still keeps up a certain influence in Spain, and that he is on that account still listened to by the Directory. He adds that he also begins to acquire an ascendancy over the Prussian Minister. He confirms to me what I have mentioned in my No. 71 respecting Mr. Las Casas, (*Cypher ends*) and also what I have before stated, that the want of money is again beginning to be felt by the Directory, and that they will soon be under the necessity of having recourse to some expedient of the nature of the mandats. I have some reason to believe that a forced loan is intended. Another person, who is intimately connected with *Johannot*, persists in assuring me that between stock-jobbing and plunder they will find sufficient for all their purposes for some time to come. I know, however, that their distress has been intimated to the 2 Assemblies in a secret committee. (*Cypher.*) Mr. Brottier assures me that the project of the descent is not laid aside, and that the persons who are to take a part in it are now at Paris. I am assured from another person that has never yet deceived me that it is certainly suspended. An American of the name of Gregory is either concerned in it or engaged in procuring intelligence from England tending to facilitate its execution. I am now strongly inclined to believe that Hoche is to command the expedition notwithstanding what I have said in my dispatch of yesterday No. 75. If so, I should rather suspect that it was in immediate contemplation, as Hoche has been at Paris ever since the 9th or 10th instant, though he never shews himself. Mr. Bourmont was assured by some of Hoche's officers that Boats for the expedition against England were building in Spain. (*Cypher ends.*) This is also stated to me from another quarter. It is a fact that I should think might be easily ascertained.

The internal situation of Holland is said at Paris to be most deplorable, and the whole Country running so rapidly towards compleat ruin, that it will probably be under

water in 31 years. I know this is the language of Persons well acquainted with the real truth in every thing that concerns that unhappy country. The Dutch have as yet only paid 33 millions of the immense sum they were bound to advance to their new ally.

In consequence of the demands of Mr. Serbelloni and his companions, two famous Jacobins of the names of Robineau and Serizy have been sent to see with their own eyes and report accordingly whether the Dutchy of Milan is really worthy of being received into the fraternity of the French Republick. The Directory affect very much to doubt the truth of the accounts given them by the Milanese Deputies, and say that the country is good for nothing but to be pillaged.

(*Cypher.*) Baptiste [Pichegru] has sent a message again to the King to desire he would not be discouraged notwithstanding the defeat of the Austrians. He says that this unfortunate circumstance will only occasion a delay, but that he will certainly succeed *at last* provided he will consent to *enter* France under some form of constitutional government. His presence in Franche Compté, where he has been carried about by the young men in a sort of triumph, has produced the happiest effect. The young men at Besançon really treated him rather as a General of Louis XVIII. than of the Republic. Your Lordship will probably have seen some paragraphs in the Jacobin papers to that effect. I am happy to say that his advice and opinion have had a strong effect on the Duke de la Vauguyon, and that I have passed these last three days with that Minister very much to my own satisfaction and I hope to the service of the common cause.

—

Mr. Wickham to Mr. Drake.

(Draft.) Bern: 21 July, 1796.

My dear Sir,—Your very obliging Letter of the 12th June was duly delivered to me by Mr. de Vellicrose.

I cannot sufficiently thank you for the pains you have taken to make me Master of the whole of the Business of the Southern Departments. I have read your Papers with the utmost attention; I have also fully considered Mr. Vellicrose's memoire, and I have questioned that Gentleman very minutely upon every point. The result of the whole has been that I think exactly as you do, that there is nothing to be done at this moment, and *I think so* exactly for the same reasons that you have laid down. It is indeed a great satisfaction to me to find my own opinion (which I have been sometimes afraid of giving at home, lest it should be in direct opposition with those of more distinguished persons) supported *in toto* by such clear and unequivocal declarations as I have seen you uniformly make whilst your Correspondance passed through my hands. It is indeed as rare as difficult, that two persons who know nothing of each other, who even never saw each other, should agree intirely in almost every point of a long, laborious, and complicated mission, carried on from different Countries, and through the medium of very different agents liable to receive at every moment the most erroneous and contradictory reports and impressions. If such a circumstance has taken place in our case, I can only attribute it to our having been animated by the same motives, and I shall ever regard it as an unequivocal proof that we have, both of us, seen the whole business in its true point of view.

The period you mention (the election of the new third part of the assembly) appears to me to be that, which we must all look to. It is unfortunately still very remote. I am also decidedly of opinion that some form of constitutional monarchy must be *passed through*. This can never be done but by a coalition of Partys, which partial insurrections tend more than any thing else to prevent. I have been labouring (hitherto in vain) to bring certain persons who formerly resided at Verona to the same way of thinking. It has been peremptorily

declared to me that the King would rather resign his Crown altogether than come to any agreement with his People, the conclusion of which should be what they call a permanent Representation. They are ready, they say, to make many sacrifices, but they must all be grafted on the basis of the antient Government. I do not, however, abandon on that account either my own opinion or my hopes, if not of bringing the others to think as I do, at least of making them act, to a certain degree, as I should wish them. Some offers well worth attending to have been lately made from Paris and rejected on the principle above laid down. I have, however, taken upon myself to stop the answer *in transitu*, and I have obtained another, which, if it does not *accept*, at least does not *reject*.

They see and feel that our Government will support its Ministers, and will not listen to any unfavourable prejudices that may be attempted to be given of their principles or conduct, and they find by experience that I am not to be shaken in my resolution of giving no funds for any partial purposes. A conduct of that kind persevered in with sufficient obstinacy cannot, I think, fail in *the end* of producing its effect.

Baptiste [Pichegru], with whom my correspondance is still both active and direct, is of the same opinion. He has repeated it several times to the principal Person concerned; and as great reliance is placed on his future services this opinion of his has not failed to make a serious impression. This extraordinary man still remains in our neighbourhood caressed and feasted and almost adored by the Inhabitants of Franche Comté. The Jacobin Papers have made loud complaints on this subject, but in vain. He laughs at the Directory, and says that they are incapable of hurting him, because they have not the courage. You may rely upon it, that he is endeavouring to form to himself a strong Party in France, where he begins now to be trusted under the name of the

General des honnetes gens. Bouvenot, who was arrested at Besançon in Ferrand's business, is his old and particular friend. Since Baptiste's return to Franche Compté Bouvenot has surrendered, and has been duly tried and acquitted by the tribunal of Lons le Saulnier.

F. DRAKE, Esq.

(No. 77.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Extract from Draft.) 23 July, 1796.

(*Cypher.*) My Lord,— . . . . I have heard nothing of Baptiste [Pichegru] since my last. The accounts we receive of the manner in which he conducted himself in Franche Compté are most extraordinary. It is a certain fact, that at a Ball given to him at Besançon, two Commissaires of the Directory, who have long tormented that place, having entered the room with a guard, to search for the young men of the Requisition, he took each of them by the arm, and turned them both out himself, amidst the plaudits of the Assembly. Bouvenot, the Priest who was concerned in the affair of General Ferrand, was seen with him openly at Besançon allmost every day. I have heard nothing of him since he went on his new mission. He has just given me the following information—the substance of which I have indeed before received by imperfect reports. (*Cypher ends.*)

The faction of the Duke of Orleans certainly gains ground at Paris. Carnot is undoubtedly devoted to the partisans of that Prince. But a number of persons who have, or fancy they have, the same reason for wishing to set aside the lawful Sovereign, are now turning their attention towards Prince Henry of Prussia, being persuaded, either that the Duke of Orleans himself would not accept the throne, or that the sole memory of his father would excite such a general indignation against the Son in the Provinces, that a civil war would be the

inevitable and immediate consequence of his nomination.

Neither, however, of these projects have as yet taken any shape; the leaders and favourers of each, fearful of committing themselves, even to each other, are contented with encouraging their partisans to make their favourite candidate the subject of general conversation, so as that the people may by degrees become familiarised with the idea, and that the public opinion may be pretty clearly collected, before the mask be openly thrown off by any of them. As yet, they dare not even touch upon the subject in the public Newspapers. It is only the opinion of Paris concerning which they are at all sollicitous, the rest being to them comparatively a matter of indifference, and the sentiments of the Provinces throughout all France being known, and avowed to be most decidedly against any of their projects. All parties, without exception, begin to acknowledge the necessity of a King.

If therefore, the lawful sovereign would but take some pains to gain the leaders of the different factions, if he would but authorize the persons whom he has employed or may hereafter employ in the Interior to give a solemn assurance in his name that he was ready to make every sacrifice (that would not carry with it the establishment of a weak and turbulent government) that the good of his people might require, and, above all, if he would cease to talk of the antient Régime in all its purity—there seems no doubt but that, a little sooner or a little later, all well-meaning people, of every description and party, would rally round his standard, and even that the most sensible and clear-sighted of the others, who are not entirely abandoned to the party of the Jacobins, would not only follow the torrent of the public opinion, but would probably be induced to go before it from motives of Interest if not of good Intention.

(*Cypher.*) The above was taken and written down from

Baptiste's [Pichegru's] own mouth. He desired very earnestly that I would press and enforce these considerations upon the King and all the persons around him, adding the assurance, that as soon as he had the reins of Government in his hand, he might, if he pleased, become the absolute master of his Kingdom. That when the cry of Vive le Roi was once heard, the torrent would become irresistible, and the Royal Prerogative would have no bounds but in his own wisdom and moderation. But that there was now a physical as well as a moral impossibility to his entering in any other way than the one above pointed out, the subversion of the antient government having been so total in all its parts and forms, that it would be impossible to go back to it but by slow degrees, and with the utmost circumspection, and that the experiment in any other way would be so dreadfully dangerous, that no real friend to his country could either advise or wish such a measure to be attempted. He added, what indeed he has before intimated to me, that an advantageous and an honourable peace for Europe could be established on no other basis, and by no other means, particularly for England, against which not only jealousy, hatred, and the desire of vengeance, but interest and necessity also, would oblige the Directory, and indeed any other government that was founded on Revolutionary principles, to exert every possible effort untill they had either brought about its utter destruction or perished themselves in the *attempt*. He further observed, that it might be of infinite service in many ways, if the British Government could make any new offer of peace, that should be at the same time moderate, fair, and open, and as far as possible specific, the effect of the last being entirely done away by the superior address and skill of the Directory, and by the prejudices still existing against the English, which it would be above all things material to remove by all possible means. (*Cypher ends.*)

It is now universally acknowleged, even by the Persons about the Directory, that the terror and the desertion were so great in the French armies last year, that if the Austrians had followed up their advantages, particularly after the affair of the lines of Mayence, they might have destroyed, or rather disbanded, the whole French army. Thus was an opportunity lost that may never again be recovered. (*Cypher.*) Baptiste [Pichegru] has holden this language openly at Besançon, and it is confirmed to me from Paris.

(No. 78.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Extract from Draft.) Bern: 30th July, 1796.

My Lord . . . . I have much satisfaction in informing your Lordship that the Decree which this state lately passed against the unfortunate French Emigrants has been so much modified by the Senate and by the Committee appointed to carry it into execution, that all its odious parts have been in effect allmost entirely done away. This is certainly owing in part to ——

(*Cypher.*) To whatever point the French armament now assembling on the coast be directed, and whatever be its force, it seems to me certain that something in the nature of a descent, more or less considerable, is now really meditated, and will be attempted should not the vigilance of his Majesty's fleets render the measure impracticable. A force of 8 or 10,000 men is assembling in Picardy formed and organized upon an entire new plan, and composed of all the most desperate and profligate wretches in their armies. This is a fact of which I have no doubt. This corps is now forming under the direction of Mr. Humbert, a General who has distinguished himself in the Vendée and is to be commanded by one Omoran [O'Meara], an Irishman. It is intended for the van-guard of the great expedition, where it will be considered as a forlorn hope. Should the great

expedition not take place this year, it will then be employed in some lesser attempt. My correspondant assures me that the Isles of St. Marcon will *certainly* be attacked, then Jersey and Guernsey, and lastly a descent somewhere near Cork, where the family of Omoran have many connexions. This descent near Cork is to be classed among the lesser expeditions, and its principal object will be to furnish arms, provisions, subaltern officers, and a small auxiliary corps of good determined regular troops, to the inhabitants, whom they suppose disposed to take up arms against the British Government. How they are to get from the mouth of the Somme to Cork is another question, but it seems certain that a number of Boats calculated for the purpose of effecting a descent are building in that river. It should seem that this point may easily be examined from England.

I have sent to have it examined myself, but the distance and loss of time is so immense that I fear his Majesty's ministers will derive but little advantage from this measure.

The same observation may indeed now be made of allmost all my communications; they may, however, be usefull as a means of trying and checking those which your Lordship may receive from other quarters.

Should the great expedition take place, it will be commanded by Hoche, who is still at Paris. Both Humbert and Omoran have served under his orders.

Mr. Drake to Mr. Wickham.

(Secret and Confidential.) Venice: August 3, 1796.

Dear Sir,—(*Cypher.*) I am anxious to hear that Mr. Villecrose has reached you, as well as to know your opinion with respect to the expediency of continuing the Correspondence in Provence. It is highly necessary to come to some decision—either to go on with the business or to drop it altogether, but as I have uniformly

been of opinion that nothing can be done in Provence *alone* and unsupported by other Provinces, I cannot come to any final resolution without previously consulting with you on the subject, and hearing from you, if you have still any hope of anything being done on the side of Lyons. I am well aware that the situation of affairs on the Rhine is not very favorable to any internal commotion, but I still think it right not to decide finally without your concurrence. One of my agents (Gabriel) is now at Genoa, and another (Vaquier) at Marseilles; both wait for instructions from me for them and their colleagues, but I confess that I see nothing for them to do at present further than to prepare the people's minds for the Election of the third of the two Councils; this election *ought* to take place in September next I believe, but I have good reason for thinking that means will be found of postponing it for some months.

I have lately succeeded in establishing an intercourse with one of the Generals of the French army in this Country, who has furnished me on many occasions with much useful and important information. I learn from him that there is a very considerable number of Officers in this Army, who are very well disposed, and I am in consequence endeavouring to extend my correspondence amongst them, but I have found that they are all extremely shy and distant, and one of them expressly told my agent that he would never have any connection with any person employed by England, alleging as his motive that Pichegru had been wilfully betrayed by us. And that the fact had been confirmed to him by one Nemoun, who was formerly Aide-de-Camp to Pichegru, but is now employed in this army.

He added that this affair was generally known throughout the French Army, and would be sufficient to determine any French officer from placing the smallest confidence in the English. As it appears to me highly expedient to do away a prejudice which has taken so deep

a root in the minds of French officers, I should be extremely obliged to you, if you would impart to me so much as you may think prudent of the *real* cause of Pichegru's being betrayed, and you may depend upon my making a discretionary use of it. It is particularly essential to ascertain precisely who this Nemoun is who has been disseminating these seeds of distrust, because if it can be made evident that he was not in the confidence of Pichegru, or if the credibility of his testimony can be in any way destroyed, a great point will be gained. As to his mystery, I am fully persuaded that the first intimation which the Directory received of Pichegru's being in correspondence with the Allies, came from Verona from some traitor to the King of France, and that the Directory obtained a copy of the Letter written from Hamburgh by the Bishop of Arras, who had a conference on that subject with M. Barthelemy's brother, who was sent to Hamburg by Carnot. You will set me right if I should be mistaken; but at all events I see no impropriety of giving this turn to the business, and of making use of it in clearing away the suspicion which has been so universally entertained of the duplicity. I earnestly request a speedy answer from you on these points.

I have been frequently questioned of late respecting your Bayard who was formerly employed by you, and strong insinuations have been made respecting his fidelity. I have affected to have no knowledge whatever of him, but though no specific grounds whatever were alleged in support of these insinuations I think it my duty to mention the Circumstance to you.

The French Emigrants in this Country are in a very wretched situation, but I have observed many (and those leading ones) that see with a secret satisfaction the rapid progress of the republicans. I can explain this phenomenon no otherwise than by supposing that, seeing that all hope is at an end of the monarchy being restored by the efforts of the Allies, they flatter themselves that the

natural course of events will one day carry them back to their native country, and under the impressions of that idea they exult at events which appear calculated to give such accessory power, and strength to their native Country.

I have the Honor to be, with real Esteem, Dear Sir, Your most obedient and faithful Humble Servant,

FRANCIS DRAKE.

(No. 80.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Extract from Draft.) Bern: 6th August, 1796.

(*Cypher.*) Baptiste [Pichegru] remains still at Besançon, holding the same language as before, and evidently forming a large party. The History of his campaigns has been published with that view, and his picture is now exposed at every window, and there is scarce a House in the Province without it.

Lord Auckland to Mr. Wickham.

Eden Farm, Kent: August 12th.

My dear Sir,—I write to thank you for your excellent translation of my speech of the 2nd May, in the House of Lords; to say that it is impossible for me not to feel gratified by the introductory Remarks: 'laudari a laudatis' being at all times a fair and honourable Gratification:—and to beg the further favour of you to take some occasion of a Messenger to send me two Copies with the leaves uncut, that they may be bound with my Collection of modern Pamphlets which has grown voluminous and curious, and will be valuable if the French successes can be interrupted before they have achieved the destruction of everything. But they will be so interrupted I still hope and trust and believe, notwithstanding their rapid and calamitous progress in Germany and in Italy: the Ways of Providence are unsearchable: but I do not believe that

the Cause of atheism and of murder will finally be triumphant. 'Multa dies variusque labor mutabilis ævi Rettulit in melius.'

Our Countrymen are stout and have great resources and great means of exertion: I do not think that they will be intimidated or discouraged when it is once made clear to their understandings that safe and honourable Conditions of Peace cannot be attained; and if they are steady, I believe that the enemy will sink under the weight and extent of the great Colossus of War which they are labouring to raise against us. They are reviving the inauspicious measure of a Coalition of all powers against one; but they found their Coalition in fear, which is to be the binding principle of all the coherent parts. From the instant that such a principle Ceases to operate, all the parts assembled by it, will recoil on the framers. In the mean time it is a serious speculation and doubt whether a great Court may not be inclined to countenance the Cause of those who have murdered all the elder Branches of the family. What a Chapter of infamy such an event would make in the page of History? I have not lately written to our friend the Greffier for I can say nothing cheerful or comfortable to Him: and though Mr. Canning is often here, I seldom hear of the Departure of Messengers which is so sudden in most cases that there is not time to apprize me.

I will find a better occasion to write to you more at leisure and more legibly.

Believe me, My dear Sir, very sincerely Yours,

AUCKLAND.

(No. 82.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft in white ink.) August 20, 1796.

The following intelligence being of considerable importance, I am determined to risk this letter by the common Post, though it will necessarily pass through the

hands of the enemy. The plan for a descent in England that is most approved of by Carnot is, *I am assured*, the following. Three armies and three flotillas of Frigates, Gun Boats, &c. &c. will be formed on the coast. The Head Quarters to be at Cherbourg, Dunkirk, and Flushing. The troops and the vessels will be so stationed in the neighbourhood of each of those respective places as that they may be got together in the space of 24 Hours. As soon as every thing shall be prepared for the expedition, a squadron will sail from Brest with the express intention of decoying his Majesty's grand fleet as far from Home as possible, and of risking a Battle, if it be necessary, even with the certainty of a total defeat. If the two should reach the Bay of Biscay, it is said with confidence that the descent could be effected and completed before the British fleet could possibly return upon its own coast.. The three flotillas would then immediately set sail. The one from Flushing (which is to be the real attack) will make for the mouth of the Humber, go up the River as far as the tide will permit; as soon as the troops shall be disembarked, they will march immediately towards Derby, along the Trent. Three reasons have been advanced for the preference given to this expedition above the others.

1st. That it will be protected by the Dutch fleet.

2nd. That there is no harbour for British Ships of the line on that part of the coast, and that the main Body of the troops will be kept together nearer London, for the protection of the capital from the other expeditions which will be made with more parade than the real one.

3rd. That if the army can once gain the Trent, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to beat it.

The expedition from Dunkirk will make for the mouth of the Thames; its main object, next to causing a diversion, will be to destroy Chatham. The one from Cherbourg will attempt a descent, according to circumstances, on the most favourable place between the Isle of Portland

and Start Point. This last is considered entirely as a forlorn hope; the descent, however, will be attempted and (if possible) made, though the loss of every man concerned in it is considered as certain, in the expectation of drawing a great force so far from the real point of attack. It is *certain* that the Directory has the utmost confidence in the success of this *triple* enterprize, that the persons who have been consulted on the subject have flattered their hopes and expectations, and that it will most undoubtedly be attempted. But they mean first to attack Jersey and Guernsey, as well because the great expedition cannot be undertaken before the continental peace, as because they hope that the success of this lesser enterprize will animate the nation, give the people a confidence in their rulers, and make them consider a maritime expedition as a matter of equal facility with the march of an army.

Should the expedition to the neighbourhood of Cork have been found impracticable before the great invasion in England, I then believe that the expedition from Cherbourg will be destined to that object, and will only make a feint on the coasts of Devonshire and Dorsetshire. Hoche left Paris the 10th of August.

The two negotiations, concerning which I have so often written lately, are going on with the utmost activity, particularly the Northern one, the effects of which will probably have manifested themselves before this letter shall have arrived at its destination.

Mr. Canning * *to Mr. Wickham.*

(Private.) Downing Street: August 26th, 1796.

Dear Sir,—I am directed by Lord Grenville to inform you that it was his intention to have answered your last

* Mr. Canning was Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1796 to 1799.

Dispatches by the return of your Messenger: but that the urgent and pressing business of the moment has prevented him from carrying his intention into effect this day and he does not think it right to detain your messenger, who proclaims loudly his impatience to be gone.

Lord Grenville hopes to be able by the next Post to send you a messenger from this office.

Your friend M. de Précy arrived here about ten days ago: as he will probably have told you in the letter which I have the pleasure of forwarding to you from him. I am much concerned that the incessant occupation of my time by the business of the Office has prevented me hitherto from deriving all the pleasure and instruction, which you promise me, and which I expect, from his conversation. It is not till this morning, that I have been able to find an opportunity of conversing with him at any length: but I have not failed to find in him, even in that one interview, enough to justify the character, that you give of his talents and his just way of thinking. I am indeed almost afraid that the season for that advantage, which might formerly have been expected from them, is nearly over.

I will not attempt to send you any news from this quarter; though we hear more than enough every day to surprize and perplex us. You are more near, than I am, to the scenes of our disasters in Italy and on the Rhine—or to speak more correctly—on the Danube:—and the near prospect of a war with Spain (now brought near indeed by the sailing of the French and Spanish fleets in conjunction) will not be worth the hearing of one, who has so long foreseen and foretold it.

The interior of the Country—we thank God—is perfectly quiet—and I think for the most part exceedingly well disposed:—and though somewhat wearied with the misfortunes of the war abroad, capable of being roused

into great exertions, if it should ever be brought home to our doors.

I know not what else I could tell you that would be important enough to repay you for the interesting intelligence, which we are in the habit of receiving from you—unless it were that our friend the Dean of Christ Church, is, I believe, well—though so lost to the eyes of all the world just at this moment in the intricacies of one of his usual Long Vacation tours, that I can say nothing else of him with certainty.

I may tell you also with great truth, that I am, Dear Sir, your sincere and obedient humble Servant,

GEO. CANNING.

(No. 39.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Extract from Draft. Private.) Bern: 2nd September, 1796.

My Lord,—In a private letter of the 6th Instant I sent your Lordship an imperfect and inaccurate account of the projects of a certain Mr. Ohier who had lately arrived at Basle.

I yesterday had an interview with the gentleman himself, who turns out to be the Count de Grandpré, the same officer who went out to the East Indies early in the war as Aide-de-Camp to Colonel Stuart. This gentleman, influenced *partly* by a principle of revenge against the East India Company, the Board of Controll, and in particular Mr. Secretary Dundass, all of whom he accuses of having treated him with neglect; *partly* by the temptations holden out to him by the Minister of the Marine at the time that the Condé army (where he then served) was apparently in derout, has offered his services to the Directory, and has given in a plan of which the inclosure, No. 1, is a copy for attacking and surprizing the East India fleets in the latitude of St. Helena. After some difficulty his offers have been accepted *in toto*, and he has received his passport to go immediately to Paris, where he is informed that

he will find his instructions; he is further assured that the vessels for the expedition will be ready to sail early in November *at the latest.*

After rejecting several of his proposals, I have at last signed, together with him, the articles contained in the inclosed paper No. 2 (in the French cypher), with the exception of the third and fourth, concerning which he has himself written to the Duke of Harcourt.

The circumstance, however, of Mr. de Grandpré's betraying his new employers cannot, I fear, be attributed to any principle of honour or conscience, but rather to his dread of falling into the hands of some of his Majesty's Naval commanders, and to his having good grounds of suspicion that I was acquainted with enough of his project to enable me to defeat the whole. His services, therefore, must be accepted with the utmost caution, and no more confidence placed in him than what is absolutely necessary to the execution of the present scheme, supposing him to act in it throughout with honour and good faith.

It appeared to me, however, to be an occasion that I should have been by no means authorised in rejecting, though I am far from entertaining any very sanguine hopes of its success.

His Majesty's Ministers are alone capable of judging how far the project of delivering the vessels be in itself practicable, and by what precautions it will be prudent and necessary to accompany its execution.

They are also, from their previous knowledge of Mr. Grandpré's character, much better judges than I can be of the personal credit that may be given to him. He has engaged to follow their orders and instructions in every point wherever they may think it *safe* to entrust him with any.

At all events, nothing is risked by the agreement I have signed (the whole being conditional), excepting the sum of 100*l.* which I have advanced him on his setting off for

Paris, and the further sum of 200*l.* which I have promised to pay him there, when I shall have the certainty that the expedition is to take place; and also on the farther condition, that during his residence there he furnish me with good intelligence on other points connected with the service of the Navy.

Enclosure in Mr. Wickham's Despatch to Lord Grenville.

PROJET DE CAPITULATION.

Art. 1.

Il est convenu que le Comte de Grandpré remettra aux mains du Gouvernement anglois les forces navalles dont il doit avoir le Commandement, consistant en deux vaisseaux de 74 canons et quatre frégattes de 40 canons montant du 18. ou telle autre force que le Gouvernement françois lui confiera pour l'expédition dont il est question dans la note par lui remise au ministre de la marine sous le nom d'Ohier, dont duplicata est déposé aujourd'hui entre les mains de Monsieur Wickham; plus les vaisseaux de transport et les trouppes qu'ils contiendront, à condition que l'amirauté d'Angleterres envera une force *suffisante* pour s'emparer de cette escadre, attendu que si elle n'est que médiocre, le Comte de Grandpré sera forcé de se deffendre. Pour que cette force soit censée suffisante, il demande qu'elle soit composée au moins de quatre vaisseaux de ligne et trois grandes frégattes.

Art. 2.

Les Equipages et Officiers seront prisonniers de Guerre, et les vaisseaux de Transport seront bonne prise; sa personne et celle de l'Adjudant-Général des Troupes sont exceptées.

Art. 3.

Les deux Vaisseaux de 74 et les 4 frégattes seront en dépôt aux mains du Gouvernement anglois, qui s'engagera à les remettre à Sa Majesté Louis 18, ou à ses successeurs à leur rétablissement sur le trône de France.

Art. 4.

Le Gouvernement anglois pourra se servir de ces vaisseaux et Frégates à la charge de les entretenir et de répondre des évènemens de la Guerre.

Art. 5.

Pour tenir lieu à Monsieur Le Comte de Grandpré des avantages qu'il retirerait d'un Commandement aussi avantageux, le Gouvernement ou la Compagnie angloise lui fera une rente annuelle, sa vie durante, de Trois Cent Livres sterling, payables à Londres, qu'il sera libre de dépenser partout où il voudrait sous la protection du Gouvernement anglois, se conformant en tout aux Lois et règlemens du Pays.

Art. 6.

Si par la suite le Roi de France, rentré dans ses droits, déclarait pour cause quelconque la Guerre à l'Angleterre, cela n'empêchera pas sa pension d'avoir lieu, même s'il servait contre l'Angleterre.

Art. 7.

A son arrivée en Angleterre il lui sera compté mille livres sterling, dont on déduira ce qu'il recevra à Berne attendu qu'il en a besoin pour se mettre en équipage.

Art. 8.

L'Adjudant-Général des Troupes sera employé jusqu'au rétablissement du Roi au service du Gouvernement anglois ou de la Compagnie des Indes, ou si l'un et l'autre ne pourra lui donner de l'emploi, il lui sera payé une pension de cent Livres sterling.

Art. 9.

Le Comte de Grandpré s'engage à livrer sa flotte sur la croisière au vent de St. Hélène, pourvu que cette station convient le plus au Gouvernement anglois, mais à l'aide des addresses et des chiffres qu'il donne. On lui fera passer les instructions ultérieures, et de son côté il informera des circonstances qui pourront apporter des changemens ou des difficultés à l'exécution de son projet en entier ou en parti.

Signé provisoirement et *sub spe rati* à l'exception des articles trois et quatre, qui seront soumis au Gouvernement anglois par Monsieur le Duc D'Harcourt.

WM. WICKHAM.
LE CTE. DE GRANDPRÉ.

(No. 85.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Cypher. Draft.) Bern: 7 Septr. 96.

My Lord,—I continue to be assured that the Basis of the treaty between the French Republick and the Court of Madrid is that which I communicated in my No. 83 of the 25th August. I have not yet seen the *ostensible* treaty that has been communicated to the two Assemblies, but I am inclined to believe that the most material articles are intended to be kept secret, and that Spain has insisted on this point with much earnestness.

Lemerer is one of the persons to whom the consideration of the treaty is referred. He has promised the King's agents to give them every information that he can collect when its different articles shall be discussed in the Committee.

The whole of the negotiation has been carried on at Madrid; the persons in the Foreign Department at Paris knowing little or nothing of the matter.

I am assured that Mr. Cabarus has had a principal part in bringing about the conclusion of the treaty, and that a notion still prevails in the Spanish Cabinet both of the influence of Tallien, and of his intention of reestablishing monarchy in *some branch* of the Bourbon family. Your Lordship may, I believe, be assured that some underplot of this kind has entered into the contemplation of the Spanish Ministry, and has very materially contributed to bring about their ultimate decision. I am assured that Tallien meditates great things in consequence of this new alliance, which he boasts of as entirely his own work, and that the real confidence of the Spanish government being in him alone, he means to make use of the consideration

it will give him to form a powerfull party, that shall bring the Directory to reason and place Tallien himself at the head of affairs. His success in this object is considered by some persons as the more probable, because the Abbé S—— is his principal adviser and directs the whole of his plan. In the mean time the moderate party certainly gains ground *for the moment.*

I received some time since a further communication from M. D'André's friends of the line of conduct they intended to adopt. The replacing Vaublanc in the Assembly, and the obtaining a resolution tending to facilitate the election of the new third part of the Legislature, made the leading parts of it. It is certain that both these points have been carried with much address, and much less difficulty than could have been supposed. It is to be observed, however, that the Directory is *at this moment* in absolute need of their assistance against the Jacobins, and that the very existence of the government depends on some new measures of finance, or rather of plunder, being adopted with facility and in their full extent. They will therefore be extremely careful not to attack, or *openly* offend a party, which by an union with their enemies *on any particular question* is at all times able to defeat the dearest and most important views and projects of the Government.

They are much blamed by many persons for not putting themselves more forward, on still more important questions, than any of those in which they have yet shewn themselves. But it would surely be unwise in them to attempt any thing of the kind untill the new elections are secured, however unfortunate and lamentable it may be that so great an interval must intervene before that event can take place.

Your Lordship will probably have remarked the observation of Cochon respecting the Duke de la Vauguyon's connections with the Jacobins, in his report to the Directory of the ——. I gave the Duke the strongest

cautions upon the subject. I warned him that a connexion of that kind would not only bring a well merited odium and disgrace upon the King, and make the breach between him and his people eternal and irreparable, I assured him also (of which I hope there is no doubt) that he was catching at a falling party, and that the very offer they were now making would only be considered as a signal of their distress. But it was all in vain; and though I declined taking any part in the Business, notwithstanding that the offer was brought by my own agent, yet the Duke insisted upon his following him to join the King, and has now written again to press the Journey, notwithstanding the difficulty of communication.

I have ever observed that the Royalists in general, and particularly those employed about the King, are far more disposed to a compromise with the Jacobins than with any other faction that has yet appeared in France.

It is indeed but too evident, that all views of humanity, of policy, of Justice, even of Interest, are but light in the scale when opposed to the desire of humbling and punishing the first authors of the Revolution.

This new project, for instance, was caught at with eagerness, whilst the more wise and reasonable ones, concerning which I have of late frequently written to your Lordship, were either wholly rejected, or received with coldness and indifference.

The inclosed paper, which has been certainly distributed (though secretly) by the Directory, and published in the Moniteur, which is devoted to them, may be considered as a proof of what I stated on the same subject in my No. 84. Whether Portugal enter into the Alliance with Spain or no, it seems of importance that the Governor of St. Helena should be put very early upon his guard, and his attention directed to the two Ports mentioned in M. Ohier's projects. I have therefore written on that subject to Bassorah without loss of time.

Mr. Wickham to the Baron de Degelmann.

(Draft.) Sept. 17th, 1796.

Mons. Barthélemy a eu la folie de leur envoyer dernièrement un de ces mandats Royaux dont il les honore de tems en tems, par lequel il les exhorte de ne rien croire du tout à ces bruits que *les malveillans se plaisent à répandre* sur de prétendus succès des Autrichiens en Allemagne. Comme tout ce qui sort de sa bouche est pour eux de l'Evangile tout pur, ils ont fait venir le brave Gazettier de Berne, Mons. D'Arnex, et l'ont rudement grondé de ce qu'il s'était permis dans sa dernière Gazette de dire la vérité *à leurs sujets* sur la situation des affaires en Allemagne; ils ont demandé à voir *l'épreuve* de celle qui devait être imprimée aujourd'hui, et l'ont corrigée de la manière que vous trouverez fidèlement représentée dans la Copie ci-jointe. V. E. verra que leur esprit haineux va jusqu'à vouloir priver S. A. R. du titre bien mérité du Sauveur de l'Allemagne, qu'on lui prodigue de tout côté dans ce malheureux pays, qu'il vient de tirer des mains des exécrables tyrans qui l'avaient envahi. Non contents d'avoir ainsi corrigé l'*épreuve*, ils ont ordonné au Gazettier d'insérer l'article (manuscrit) ci-joint dans son supplément, à l'exception des mots souslignés, que le Gazettier lui-même a très-adroitement insinués.

Si V. E. croit qu'il vaut la peine de conserver dans ses Archives cette *précieuse marque* de la partialité notoire et de l'abaissement d'un Etat autrefois célèbre pour sa fierté et son courage, elle en est le maître. Je crois même que l'original serait à son service, car le Gazettier ne soupire que de quitter son pays, et témoigne la plus parfaite indifférence sur les suites de leur colère.

L'Espagne paraît enfin bien résolue d'essayer ses forces contre nous. Il faut ou qu'elle nous méprise profondément, ou qu'elle se croit plus fait pour briller sur mer que sur terre. Malheureusement, nos marins, qui n'en-

tendent point raillerie sur leur propre élément, ont été élevés dans des préjugés contraires, de manière que la lutte pourrait bien être sérieuse.

V. E. sçait peut-être que cet Etat-ci expédie une espèce de demi-négotiateur à Paris, et qu'il a fait choix d'un certain illustre personnage, bien connu sous le nom du Colonel Weiss, pour y veiller à ses intérêts. Sous deux ou trois jours je saurai tout le fil de cette intrigue, et, d'après mes instructions, j'aurai soin de communiquer à V. E. tout ce qui peut avoir rapport à l'histoire de cette fameuse Ambassade qui n'aurait sûrement pas eu lieu quelques jours plus tard, vu qu'il y est question des Affaires importantes qui touchent de très près l'Empire Germanique et ses droits les plus chers et les plus reconnus. V. E. devinera facilement que je veux parler du Porentrui, qu'on se plaît dans ce pays-ci (ce que Dieu défend) à regarder comme irrévocablement uni au territoire Français. Je n'ai pas besoin d'avertir V. E. en même tems que plusieurs personnes marquantes, nommément dans le cher (?) lieu de votre résidence, osent porter leurs vues sur certaine portion des domaines héréditaires de S. M. I., et qu'il en est souvent question dans les *colloquia de l'Hôtel français* à Basle. Je sais très-positivement qu'on en a dit quelque chose à Soleure, nommément à un certain Mr. Clootz, qui a été dernièrement de vos côtés, et qui a écouté assez favorablement, mais les gens sensés de ce canton (qui devait servir d'exemple aux autres) y ont prêté l'oreille sourde. Je suis cependant intimement persuadé que si les succès de S. A. R. avaient été retardés seulement quinze jours de plus, on aurait vu ce pays se jetter ouvertement entre les bras de l'ennemi, d'une manière à se compromettre *irrévocablement*. V. E. aura sûrement prévu le cas que l'Armée de Moreau, vivement poursuivie, ou même coupée, pourrait bien être forcée de jetter au moins une partie de son monde sur le territoire suisse, pour *de là* gagner plus facilement et plus sûrement son propre pays. Je vois bien que les bonnes têtes de ce

canton ne sont pas sans inquiétude à ce sujet. Il y en a même qui ont voulu me parler, ou plutôt me sonder là-dessus ; mais comme je ne sais rien de la façon de penser de V. E., ni sous quel point de vue un tel évènement pourrait être envisagé par elle et par sa Cour, j'ai toujours gardé le silence, ou au moins détourné le sujet, disant que je regardais une telle aventure comme si peu probable qu'il ne valait pas la peine d'y penser.

Du reste V. E. sait parfaitement quelles sont mes Instructions en tout ce qui peut intéresser l'auguste Allié de mon Souverain ; elle sait aussi tout mon dévouement personnel pour sa Cour et pour sa personne. Je n'ai pas besoin de dire que je suis toujours au service de l'une et de l'autre.

Mr. Wickham to the Baron de Degelmann.

(Copy.) 1 8^{bre} 1796.

Monsieur Le Baron,—Dans ma lettre de Jeudi, j'eus l'honneur de dire à Votre Excellence que je lui ferais part aujourd'hui d'une conversation que j'avais eue avec Mr. l'Avoyer de Steiguer au sujet du passage des Français sur territoire Suisse. Des événements subséquents et très majeurs ont rendu cette conversation (d'ailleurs peu intéressante) absolument inutile à mander à V. E. Elle se borna à des rémontrances et à des observations de ma part sur la conduite que certains Cantons me paraissaient vouloir adopter, et à des assurances de la part de l'Avoyer qu'on prendrait, en cas de besoin, les mesures propres à satisfaire Sa Majesté Impériale.

Avant-hier, sur la nouvelle arrivée de Schaffouse que 700 Français demandaïent encore à passer, et sur la communication faite par le Canton de Zurich de la dernière note de V. E. avec la réponse qu'on avait cru convenable d'y faire, on a ordonné sur le champ un Conseil des Deux-Cents, qui s'assembla, hier, en toute hâte. Je fis un effort inutile, avant-hier au soir, pour voir les deux

Avoyers chez eux, avant le Conseil, dans l'espérance de pouvoir leur fournir quelques observations qu'ils eussent peut-être pu mettre à profit dans les débats qui devaient nécessairement avoir lieu le Lendemain.

Enfin, le Conseil se tint. Voici, dans la pièce ci-incluse à peu près le résultat de la Séance, et de la manière dont les questions s'y traitèrent. . . .

Le Conseil fini, je me rendis, le soir, chez Mr. l'Avoyer de Steiguer, qui me parut se réjouir de la manière dont la Séance s'était passée, la regardant comme un triomphe pour le bon parti, et comme une preuve indubitable de l'ascendant qu'il allait bientôt reprendre, grâces aux armes de S. M. I.

Après une heure de conversation, qui roula toujours sur le même sujet, et qui me mit à portée de m'instruire sur quelques faits dont je n'avais qu'une connaissance très-imparfaite, je lui dis que je croyais de mon devoir de m'expliquer très-ouvertement et très-franchement avec lui sur tout ce qui arrivait, en ce moment, d'extraordinaire sur leurs frontières, et sur les suites qu'une conduite inconsidérée de la part des Suisses pourrait entraîner. Je lui fis sentir de la manière la plus forte que ce n'était plus le cas de quelques déserteurs ou fuyards arrivant par petits pelotons et demandant ces secours que la Charité Chrétienne ne permet pas de refuser; qu'il s'agissait, au contraire, de corps assez considérables pour mettre garnison dans les places frontières de France, pour former une petite armée prête à s'opposer de nouveau aux premiers détachements des victorieuses troupes intérieures de S. M. I., au moment de leur arrivée dans le Brisgau, et à prendre à dos les braves habitants de la Forêt Noire dont, dans ce cas, les Français ne manqueraient sûrement pas de tirer une vengeance sanglante. Je m'étendis sur ce chapitre, et je lui fis sentir que, si un pareil événement arrivait, chaque goutte de sang qui serait versée leur peserait sur la tête, et que la Suisse seule serait responsable devant Dieu, comme

devant l'Europe entière, de tous les malheurs que cette partie de l'Allemagne pourrait éprouver.

Je lui ajoutai que le danger était plus imminent qu'on ne pensait ; que je ne me permettais pas un instant de douter que les Armées de S. M. I. ne réalisassent la menace que V. E. avait si bien fait sentir à MM. de Zurich, et qu'en effet (ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise) il conviendrait mille fois mieux à S. M. I. d'avoir la Suisse pour ennemie déclarée, que de lui permettre de servir de passage ou de retraite assurée aux armées battues des Français, arrachant ainsi des mains des troupes de S. M. les fruits de leurs plus belles victoires, et rendant inutiles et de nul effet les plus savantes combinaisons et manœuvres de ses Généraux.

A ces réflexions et à plusieurs autres du même genre et de la même force, le bon Avoyer n'eut rien à répondre ; et en effet je ne doute pas qu'il n'ait tenu lui-même au Conseil (où l'on dit qu'il fit un discours admirable) à peu près le même langage. Il chercha seulement à justifier ou plutôt à excuser son Canton *par* sa position extraordinaire ; *par* la rapidité avec laquelle les événements se passaient, ce qui faisait qu'on n'avait pas eu le temps de préparer ni même de bien instruire les esprits ; *sur* leur position locale vis-à-vis de la France, ce qui les mettait dans l'impossibilité de refuser aux Français ce que deux Cantons éloignés de toute crainte de danger de la part de cette nation, leur avaient déjà accordé ; *par* le faible prétexte des secours accordés aux Déserteurs Autrichiens et *par* la nature de leur gouvernement fédératif, essentiellement lent dans toutes ses opérations et décisions.

Enfin il déploya vis-à-vis de moi, le soir, tous les arguments de ses adversaires qu'il avait lui-même réfutés très-victorieusement, le matin : ce que je ne manquai pas de lui faire sentir, en ajoutant que mes instructions m'obligeaient à lui déclarer de la manière la plus claire et la plus positive, que d'après l'alliance étroite qui existait

entre les deux Cours de Vienne et de Londres (dont j'avais fait part officiellement, dans son temps, à son Gouvernement), S. M. B. ne pourrait jamais voir avec indifférence une infraction quelconque de leur neutralité vis-à-vis de son Auguste Allié : je lui priai de faire usage de cette notification officielle, en temps et lieu, auprès de ceux de ses compatriotes sur lesquels elle pouvait faire sensation V. E. peut bien croire que je ne manquerai pas de faire connaître ces sentiments dans le public ici, de même qu'à Zurich ; et si elle pense que leur notoriété répandue d'une manière encore plus formelle pourrait servir la cause commune, je suis prêt à les notifier par écrit au Corps Helvétique. V. E. sait combien je suis pénétré de l'idée que l'alliance la plus étroite et la confiance la plus intime entre nos deux Cours peut seule tirer l'Europe de l'abyme où elle tombe, et lui assurer à jamais son bien-être et son existence. Je le suis tellement que je n'ai jamais cessé de regarder les intérêts de S. M. I. comme les nôtres, et vous pouvez être intimement persuadé, Monsieur le Baron, que je les suivrai toujours avec le même zèle que ceux de mon propre Souverain, partout où mes faibles services pourront être de quelque utilité.

Cette lettre étant déjà trop longue, je garde plusieurs autres observations pour un autre jour. Les nouvelles d'Italie prennent une bonne tournure : On commence à croire à Turin comme en Suisse que les armées de S. M. I. valent au moins celles de ses ennemis et son alliance un peu plus.

Certaine Cour du Nord joue, dans ce moment, un triste rôle. Il ne faut pas cependant que vos Généraux se reposent sur leurs lauriers, ni que Votre Cour se tranquillise trop sur les suites de ses derniers succès et sur l'impression qu'ils pourraient faire à Berlin. On épie le moment de frapper un coup dans le Nord, et V. E. ne pourra pas trop exciter l'attention de sa Cour, ni la mettre assez en garde contre les manœuvres qui se

pratiquent de ce côté-là. J'ai la certitude qu'on pousse et qu'on tente certain Souverain de toutes les manières.

Ne conviendrait-il pas que V. E. demandât restitution des effets, contributions, &c. &c. qui passent par la Suisse?

(No. 88.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.**

(Draft.) Bern: 5 Oct. 96.

My Lord,—I have received two letters from the King's agents at Paris, of the 24th and 26th Ultimo. By the first they say that a corps of 15,000 men is forming near Brest, under the immediate command of General Hoche. By the second they assert most positively that the long meditated project of a descent in England or Ireland is to take place on the 12th Instant, at least that that is the day fixed for the departure of the expedition. They say nothing of its force, or the Ports from which it is to sail, but they affirm that it is to be directed to 32 different Points in England or Ireland, on nine of which only the attacks will be real. This latter assertion appears so extravagant, that I should not trouble your Lordship with the communication of it, were not the subject to which it relates of such infinite importance. It is besides possible, as is often the case, that the intelligence may be true in part, though not to the extent here stated. I should, however, here observe that in their letter of the 24th ulto. they say positively that all the army called the army of the coasts of the Ocean, the 15,000 men above mentioned alone excepted, had received orders to march immediately to the Rhine; that in another letter of the 23rd ulto. they assured me that all the waggons of that army, and the commissariat to which they were annexed had been ordered to join the army of Sambre and Meuse; that in a preceding one

* This is one of the letters referred to by Mr. Windham in his Diary, October 30, 1796, pp. 343–4.

of the 8th ulto. they inform me positively that the project of a descent was wholly abandoned, and that the intelligence contained in those three last mentioned letters is in general conformable to what I receive from every other quarter. I am particularly anxious to know the real truth of the matter, because the correspondant on whom I most rely, and who, as well as the King's agents, has access to some of the Public offices, gives me so totally different and opposite an account that it is hardly possible that means should not have been taken to deceive and mislead either the one or the other of them, on the supposition that they conveyed intelligence to the British Government. I am the more inclined to believe this to be the case, because both of them act with perfect good faith, and yet both assert with the utmost confidence that their intelligence is from the best authority.

The person above alluded to writes to me on the 13th Sept. (among other things) what follows :—

'The Government here is as yet by no means free from apprehensions as to the consequences of Mr. Hammond's mission. Should the Austrians prove victorious on the Rhine, they say that the King of Prussia will be afraid of engaging himself in an affair that may have dangerous consequences. They tremble lest the offers of England should prevail against their own. The apathy of the Spaniards, the intolerable slowness of the Cabinet of Madrid, and a thousand other serious apprehensions that the Directory entertain respecting the consequences of their new Alliance, make them at this moment particularly uneasy. Their navy is so ill provided with seamen, and particularly with sails and cordage, that every day causes them to abate something of the confidence they have hitherto entertained in the success of their projected descent in England, which they still seem determined to venture at all risks, and for which their preparations are constantly continued. But their hopes of being at liberty to undertake it rest on their favourite plan of engaging

the King of Prussia in an open war with the Emperor, after which they mean to act on the continent as auxiliaries only. In what respects Spain, they rely more on their means of corruption, and their intrigues with the Grandees than on their influence in the Cabinet, or on the zeal and good faith of the Spanish Ministers.'

On the 19th Sept. he writes again as follows:—

'The Directory is expecting a negotiator from London. They consider this measure of the British Cabinet as perfidious and dangerous: perfidious as tending only to give them a pretext for continuing the war, *dangerous* as giving permission to a man of talents and observation to come and examine the true situation of their affairs on the spot. I now inform you that they still see things in the same point of view as in the month of March last, and that their answer will be the same as that given by Mr. Barthelemy to Mr. Wickham. They will not hear of a general Peace. An enemy of some kind is necessary to them. They would prefer a peace with the Emperor, because they say that England has more need of a diversion in Germany than Austria has of British Subsidies. They would not, however, be averse to a *separate* peace with England, only in that case they would not obtain what they consider as their *optimum*, and they are *at this moment* disposed to be satisfied with the *melius*, or even the *bene*. Be entirely persuaded, however, that they both *must* and *will* preserve an enemy of some kind. Should a continental peace take place, their project is, and allways has been, to attack England directly. As long as the war on the Continent shall continue, they will do no more than *threaten* the terra firma of England, whilst they turn their whole real intention *to destroy her islands and her commerce*. They are not yet ready for their attack on Portugal, they will only try to terrify her in the hope of shutting her Ports against England, but they boast of having an useful correspondance established either with the Prince

of Brazil, or some person immediately about his Royal Highness.'

Your Lordship will observe that at the date of the last of the above letters, the Directory could not have been informed of the defeat of the French upon the Lahn, which may possibly have rendered them more supple and less confident, though I know that on the 21st orders were sent to Moreau to maintain himself in Bavaria at all risks, and I have since been positively assured by the same correspondant, as well as by others, that the hopes of concluding an alliance with Prussia had ceased.

By a third letter from the same correspondant, dated the 23rd Sept., he informs me that an armament is actually preparing with all possible diligence in Brittany and Normandy, that in particular many flat-bottomed boats are collecting, and that from everything he can learn, they are destined for an immediate expedition against Guernsey and Jersey.

Lastly, in a letter of the 26th Ulto. he writes as follows. 'The Government is seriously occupyd at this moment with the Court of Madrid, about the means of passing 8,000 men to the West Indies, of which 4,000 are to be French, 4,000 Spaniards. Half of these are to be immediately employd in the Windward Islands, the rest at St. Domingo. This proportion, however, is subject to be varied according to circumstances. The Commissaries Girand le Blanc, Santhonax, and Raimond, who have the most unlimited powers, are charged to prepare the way for their arrival. This expedition is to be followed as soon as possible by a second of the same force, upon the arrival of which in the West Indies, in case things should have allready taken a favourable turn, the two first of these Commissaries are to proceed with as many troops as can be spared (8,000 if possible) to the Isle of Bourbon, or to the Philippines, according to circumstances and subsequent arrangements. The

ultimate modifications of this plan are subjected to the arrangements that may be made on the conclusion of the treaty with Holland and Prussia, to which event, since the return of Mr. Hammond, the Directory had begun again to look forward with confidence.

'*In the mean-time the appearance and threats of a descent in England are to be resumed and directed with great address, in the hope of detaining His Majesty's fleets and land forces in Europe.*

'This latter observation is to be considered as not at all affecting the projected expedition to Guernsey or Jersey, perhaps not even that to the South of Ireland. The same complaints continue against the slowness of the Spanish Cabinet.'

It is indeed no wonder, when such plans are submitted to its consideration, and a co-operation in their execution seriously proposed.

(No. 89.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft. Secret.) Bern: 5th Oct. 1796.

I have to communicate to your Lordship a very curious circumstance, requesting the strictest secrecy on the subject. I have had in my own hands and read a dispatch of Mr. La Croix to Mr. Barthelemy, dated about the 15th ulto., in which he informs that Minister that a Colonel Pellet, a Prussian Officer, is about to arrive at Basle, charged to open a secret negotiation with such of the Swiss Cantons as had formerly any troops in the service of Holland, intending to take those Regiments provisionally and avowedly into the pay of the King of Prussia, on condition, however, that they should be restored to the Stadtholder when a favourable opportunity should offer.

La Croix adds that the whole is a plan of Mr. Bischoffswerder, but that he has communicated it to Mr. Haugwitz, (making at the same time the strongest re-

presentations on the subject), and that the latter Minister had promised to defeat the plan. He concludes by directing Mr. Barthelemy to warn *certain magistrates* of this project, and to say that it would be considered as an infraction of the neutrality, and that it would draw upon them the immediate displeasure of the Directory, who would be obliged to have recourse to very disagreeable measures. Mr. Barthelemy sent the original dispatch (as an excuse for the note he was obliged to write on the subject) to the Magistrate, who communicated it to me, and who is evidently one of those alluded to by the Directory as favouring the project. This is Mr. Barthelemy's usual way of negotiating when he has anything disagreeable to say, and it is thus that he has gained the confidence of people here by betraying his own employer.

In point of fact, Colonel Pellet (under a false name) is actually arrived at Basle. He is the person who was formerly employed by the King of Prussia to receive French Deserters in the country of Neufchatel.

I have been informed of late that the Directory, and the persons in their confidence, allways speak of the Prussian Cabinet as if its members were extremely divided among themselves, and that what they gain from one is sure to be crossed by another, merely from personal pique or dislike to the Minister whose services they had gained.

I have just received a letter from Neufchatel, by which I learn that Colonel Pellet arrived there, and that among other things he had stated that, on passing through Alsace, he was surprized to find the most important places there guarded only by Boys and Invalids, and apparently wholly destitute of ammunition and provisions. He says that he found the commanders full of such a foolish confidence in the Bravery of the Republican troops on the other side of the Rhine (with whose disasters they were by no means acquainted), as must necessarily turn to their utter ruin, if the Imperial Generals should follow

up their victory in that Quarter. He added, that he did not doubt but that the Austrians might easily conquer the whole Province if they crossed the Rhine immediately, and that he was seriously apprehensive lest such an event should take place, as it would prove a fatal blow to the Projects of his Prussian Majesty.

I hope soon to be able to send your Lordship some further information concerning the mission of this person, who, if I am rightly informed, enjoys much of the personal confidence of his Master.

Mr. Wickham to the Baron de Degelmann.

(Draft. Bern: 8th Oct. 1796.

My dear Sir,—Since my last letter every Thing here has so entirely changed, that the place is no longer *reconnaissable.* The French faction is not only *subdued,* but it has actually *disappeared,* and every Thing now is entirely in the hands of that able and excellent Magistrate, The Avoyer de Steiguer. I always foresaw, though the Government here affected to adhere to the strange Principles of the Canton of Zurich respecting the protection that they considered themselves as entitled to give to the French Fugitives, yet that they would reserve to themselves the power of judging of the extent to which the Principle ought to be carried in practice, *and that as soon as they were once in force,* they would immediately speak strongly on that subject to the Canton of Zurich. This has been now the case, and I am well assured that strong hints have been given to that Canton not to suffer any *Corps* whatever to pass armed or unarmed, and I am confident that the persons entrusted with the direction and command of the forces sent to the Frontiers will act *in that respect* as we could most wish, supposing it not to be the interest of His Imperial Majesty to enter at this moment into an useless quarrel with the Swiss, at the same time that he would wish to do the most mischief possible to his

enemies. Those Gentlemen will, I am sure, do every Thing in their power to exterminate the very remains of the French Army, and will seek every occasion *to put them in the wrong*, so as that they may be justified in falling upon them. The Banneret Fischer has been appointed to accompany the Troops; he is the man of all others whom I should most have wished to have seen in that appointment, and I beg leave to recommend him very earnestly to Your Excellency's good offices, and to those of the Austrian Generals, should any communication or conference take place. He is my own very particular friend, and of a family that has ever been devoted to the good old cause, and which never meddled with French Politics *under any regime*. I find that M. Barthelemy begins already to perceive to what point all this is tending, and that he expresses himself in strong terms on the subject of the present Conduct of the Canton of Bern. Under these circumstances, it seems to me becoming us, as the Ministers of Great Sovereigns, to be disposed as far as possible to overlook what is past, and at the same time to endeavour to turn the same Circumstances to the immediate advantage of our Masters. The want of a cypher prevents me from writing to you more at large on this subject, but I will take the first safe opportunity of conveying to you my sentiments upon it very fully. In the meantime I do not doubt but that the known magnanimity and moderation of your Sovereign, will induce his Imperial Majesty to consider this state as having been led into the errors that it has committed (which certainly merit strong and severe reprehension) by the influence of a Faction by which for a time it was most entirely subjugated.

Mr. Wickham to Sir Morton Eden.

(Draft in white ink.) Bern: 16 Oct^r. 96.

My dear Sir,—In consequence of the late very sudden turn of affairs that has taken place in favour of the Austrians, and the hopes that have been for some time entertained of their being able to destroy the *whole army* of General Moreau, the Prince of Condé has written to me to desire that I would find means of pressing upon the attention of the Court of Vienna the renewal of the projects that were in contemplation last year on the side of Alsace and Franche Compté.

I have, in answer, earnestly requested that his Serene Highness would be extremely cautious as yet (as I shall be myself) in *suggesting* any thing of the kind, either to that Court or to the Austrian Generals, assuring him that they have their own plans ready formed, from which they certainly will not depart, and also, that they are most thoroughly masters of the one which his Serene Highness would propose to them, and that they have allready considered it in all its possible points and bearings. I have further assured his Serene Highness that I am myself still penetrated with the idea of its great importance, and that I will omit no *favourable* opportunity of giving it force and weight, but that if either he or I were to appear too sanguine in its support, or if we were to endeavour to hasten it on prematurely, we might be ourselves the means of suspending its execution, if not of totally preventing it from being adopted. I have added at the same time, that I by no means wished to discourage his Serene Highness from meditating on the subject, or from bringing it forward on a proper occasion; on the contrary, that it appeared to me, that he could not attend to it too closely, or have too many materials prepared for the moment when his Serene Highness may be called upon either to give his opinion or to act; and

that for myself, whenever I saw a fair and reasonable ground of hope, I would most assuredly assist him in carrying his project into effect, with all the vigour, promptitude, and extent that he could possibly wish or require, i. e., to the very utmost latitude of the discretion that my own government has been pleased to repose in me. This language, which I have ventured to hold to the Prince, seems to be a necessary consequence, as well of the present situation of affairs, which appear to me by no means as yet brought to a crisis, as more particularly of the determined resolution that the Court of Vienna appears to have taken with respect to the future destination of the Prince's army, communicated to me by you in your letter of the 2nd April last. The general outline of which resolution, as far as relates to the project in question, has, I believe, been communicated to His Serene Highness directly from Vienna by M. de St. Priest.

Could Moreau's army have been *intirely* cut off or destroyed, I should have had strong hopes even respecting Alsace, but that not being the case, I cannot look upon the fortifications of Strasburg, Landau, Bitche, Brisac, Huningue, at this late season of the year, without fear and trembling. The Directory is most undoubtedly in the greatest want of money, but I observe now with pain that the Jacobins are again acquiring the superiority at Paris, and you must very well know that those persons who are generally qualified with the name of Moderés, or Honnetes Gens, will, in that case, immediately hide themselves in their holes, and think themselves but too fortunate if they can escape with the loss only of their Purses. At least, I shall wait with patience a little longer before I begin to be too sanguine on any point and least of all on the assistance that may be expected, in such case, from Persons of that description.

It appears evident that the Directory is now perhaps for the first time *uneasy*, if not seriously alarmed. But no effort is omitted by them that may tend to restore

and maintain confidence, and oppose a powerful resistance to any attack that may be made on their own Frontiers.

In explanation of my meaning when I say that I consider the present situation of affairs as by no means yet brought to a crisis, I should observe to you that I am by no means so sanguine about the result of this campaign as most persons on this side of the country appear to me to be. Though the army of the Republicans has been certainly *well beaten*, yet to this moment it has never been what can properly be called routed or *broken*, and I am persuaded that it will to a certain degree be recruited in the interior, and that the Austrians will have some very hard blows to encounter whenever they shall arrive upon the frontiers of France. In my mind, next to the talents, the vigour, and present popularity of the Archduke, all will depend on the reinforcements that the Austrian army is about to receive. If they be really as considerable as is said, I think they must necessarily put his Royal Highness in a situation to maintain his superiority even on the other side of the Rhine (though perhaps not in Alsace), untill the lateness of the season and mutual fatigue shall bring about an armistice like that of last year. They have found means to conceal entirely from the Publick both their hopes and their real Danger; for notwithstanding that accounts of all the late events have been regularly transmitted to Paris through several Different Channels, yet no one dares to publish them, or place either the facts or their consequences in their true point of view.

They have renounced intirely and avowedly their old and *hitherto* successfull measure of the *Requisition*, which they are persuaded would be no longer endured; but they have adopted another that will, I am afraid, prove more than an equivalent. A fifth part of the *sedentary* national Guard is formed in every Department into what is called a *moveable column*. This Column is not only destined

like the rest for the protection of its own Department, but also to march from one to another in case of need; being considered as the proportion that each Department is mutually bound to furnish to another that is in danger. Under this pretext you will readily conceive that the *moveable* Columns from all parts of France may be made to march to any of the frontier Departments that are either actually invaded or only threatened with an invasion, though there might certainly be difficulty hereafter in making them march into the Territory of the Enemy. You will observe, however, that the execution of this measure, which has been only adopted very lately, must necessarily meet with much difficulty and obstruction in many Departments—it now meets, I know, with a great deal in the Jura; and I believe, myself, that it will, after all, be but very imperfectly executed. But supposing a fourth, a fifth, or even a tenth only of these moveable Columns to be actually put in motion, I need not say to you, who know the Population of France, that it will furnish a most powerful resource to the Directory. I believe, myself, that these Columns will carry away with them a great proportion of those wretches that under the name of Terrorists still infest more or less the greater part of the Departments; but I am not altogether without my apprehensions that the Directory will also be able to take advantage of the opinions and prejudices that are now so prevalent throughout the whole Nation against the allied powers, and that a number of the best thinking but misguided Inhabitants will on this occasion be induced to march with pleasure to the defence of their Frontiers. I have the greatest regret in assuring you that the number of Emigrants lately entered into France will have done in that respect most serious and incalculable mischief, the more so as their general discourse, their declamations, and their insinuations have been naturally addressed to the only description of persons from whom we could have hoped, in the present crisis, to have received co-operation

and assistance. In making this observation I by no means would be thought to say that the conduct of this unfortunate description of people is in this respect entirely without excuse; I only mean to speak of the fact as it really exists, and to point it out to you, as I have done to the Prince of Condé, in the light in which I see it myself, i.e. as a strong and allmost insurmountable obstacle to the effecting anything of importance in the way his Serene Highness would require, and as an evil which I am afraid our united and most earnest efforts will neither be able to remedy or materially to alleviate, unless that Prince, as well as the Court of Vienna, shall at length be disposed to sacrifice to their own interest and the good of the common cause the greater part of those principles, opinions, and prejudices by which they have so long been exclusively actuated to their own common detriment and to the advantage and satisfaction of their enemies.

It would be useless for me, now, to say anything of the means by which the Court of Vienna might contribute her part towards removing these difficulties, as I have allready written to you so much and so often upon the subject, and as the Ministers of the Emperor must necessarily have considered it in every possible point of view. I will content myself with observing that every additional appearance of *disinterestedness* you can bring them to assume, whenever they shall enter into Alsace, will be a material point gained for the common cause, and that the further they carry that appearance, the more certain they will be of obtaining the entire possession of the country. For myself, I do not know what they can wish for more, for if once they should be so fortunate as to *obtain* actual possession, they must manage matters very ill indeed if they do not contrive to *maintain* it.

In the mean time nothing shall be omitted on my part that may tend to induce the Prince of Condé to consider the measures of the Court of Vienna, *whatever they may be*, in as favourable a light as possible, and to make him

co-operate in them to the utmost of his means and ability. This can only be obtained by convincing his Serene Highness (what I am sensible will be no easy matter), that more *cannot* be done for him under the present circumstances, and that he can obtain nothing at *all* by any other measures but the ones adopted.

The negotiation with Baptiste [Pichegru] is about to be renewed immediately.

His right-hand man was taken Prisoner by General Froelich, and sent back on his parole to Strasburg, where he will find Baptiste [Pichegru] still established, the account of his having been sent for to Paris being premature.

(No. 91.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Bern: 22 Oct^{r}. 96.
(To be decyphered by Mr. Canning.)

My Lord,—Baptiste [Pichegru], after having several times declined an interview with the agent at Strasburg, at length called upon him on the evening of the 15th and informed him that he had just had an interview with General Moreau, who for a moment had left his position at Friburg, that he might examine the situation of things on the side of Kehl. He added that the circumstance of Moreau's having effected his retreat was most unfortunate as it would necessarily retard the execution of the measures proposed last spring; that, however, all was not yet over, as he had found that General embarrassed and uneasy, and that he was collecting all the Pontons possible with the intention of repassing the Rhine, an operation which the Austrians might yet render extremely dangerous; that he acknowledged that he had suffered very materially in his retreat, and that he foresaw the probability of his being yet intirely beaten and put to the rout on the Upper Rhine if the Austrians followed up their advantages, in which opinion Baptiste [Pichegru] intirely

agreed with him. He observed, on the other hand, that he had found Moreau very proud of his success, so much so that he thought it would be extremely dangerous either for Baptiste himself or the Austrians to make him any direct proposal untill things should have taken a turn more decidedly favourable, as he would probably at this moment be tempted to make a bad use of it.

Baptiste [Pichegru] expressed himself for this time highly satisfyd with the conduct of the Austrians; he blamed, however, the Archduke for not having pushed further forward, instead of remaining so long in the Palatinate and before Kehl. He attributed the escape of Moreau principally to General La Tour not having been sufficiently supported on his right by the other Austrian Generals.

He said that if some important event did not happen in a few days, it was his intention to return into Franche Compté and from thence to go to Paris, where he meant to procure himself to be chosen into the Législative Assembly at the new election, and to make himself the head of his party, and in particular the champion of the army. The agent is of opinion, notwithstanding Baptiste's [Pichegru's] language on this occasion, that the interview with Moreau had been concerted, and that these two persons have understood each other from the beginning. Two circumstances seem to render that opinion not entirely without foundation: *the first*, Baptiste's [Pichegru's] loitering so long about Strasburg, where he went upon hearing the first success of the Austrians. The *second*, the conversation alluded to in my No. 70, that took place between Moreau and Lemerer before the former left Paris. The language and conduct attributed to Moreau by Baptiste [Pichegru] on this occasion seems, however, perfectly natural and probable, when considered with respect to the circumstances in which he actually finds himself. I should here observe that Mr. Badouville, of whom I have formerly had occasion to speak to your Lordship as in the

confidence of Baptiste [Pichegru], has been taken Prisoner by the Austrians and sent back to Strasburg on his parole after having settled with them the means of his future correspondance. He passed through Basle a few days since, where he saw and conversed with my agent and expressed himself highly pleased with the manner in which he had been treated; from the certificates given him by the Austrian Generals it appears that they had been equally satisfied with him and the services he had rendered.

I communicate these facts to your Lordship, as I have hitherto done, without any observation or conjectures of my own. I shall content myself with promising (though I own my hopes are not very sanguine) that I will continue to watch the progress of this affair with the closest attention, and that nothing shall be omitted on my part that may tend to bring it to a favourable conclusion.

Your Lordship will probably have learnt from Mr. Drake that it was commonly said in the army of Italy that Baptiste [Pichegru] had been in correspondance with the English Government, who had betrayed him to the Directory, which was the cause of his disgrace. It is no wonder that suspicions should be entertained of what was going on, as I was informed of it myself in October 1795, as *a great secret* from Mr. Mounier, who had received it as such from Mr. Mallet du Pan, who had learnt it under the same precautions from Mr. Montgaillard, who was himself employed by the Prince of Condé to write private letters to Baptiste [Pichegru] which his Serene Highness had intended to have concealed from every body else, from my agent as well as from the Austrians.

The Duc d'Enghien to Mr. Wickham.

A Eilmedingen, ce 26 8^{bre} 1796.

J'aurois répondu sur le champ à l'aimable lettre que vous avez eu la bonté de m'écrire, Monsieur, si les Biwacqs

et les coups de fusils l'avoient permis; mais depuis quelques jours nous n'avons eu aucun repos, et je profitte de la tranquilité que nous donne la retraite des patriotes dans la tête de pont d'Hunningue pour vous témoigner ma vive reconnoissance de la manière pleine d'obligeance et de grâce avec laquelle vous voulez bien m'assurrer que j'ai fait mon devoir. Soyez persuadé, Monsieur, qu'il est impossible d'être plus sensible que je ne le suis, au suffrage que vous me donnez. Si ce que j'ai pu faire avoit répondu à ma bonne volonté et au désir que j'avois de bien faire, je mériterois plus d'éloges; trop heureux, si j'ai pu persuader de mon zèle, et obtenir l'estime de mes braves compagnons, auxquels j'ose dire que je ne peux prodiguer trop d'éloges. Ce sont eux qui en sont dignes, et le bonheur de les commander est pour moi une grande récompense des dangers que nous avons pu courir ensemble.

Daignez, Monsieur, recevoir avec bonté l'hommage de mes sentimens, comme celui de ma reconnoissance.

LOUIS-ANTOINE-HENRY DE BOURBON.

Sir Morton Eden to Mr. Wickham.

Vienna: Wednesday, Oct. 26th, 1796.

Dear Sir,—I was on Saturday last favoured with your interesting letter of the 9th inst. and its inclosures, and in return for your obliging congratulations on the great and glorious successes of the Austrian arms, I sincerely felicitate you on having operated the change of sentiment and conduct that has so happily taken place in the Governments of the Principal Cantons. In an interview that I had on Monday with the Austrian Minister I was on the point of executing your Commission, but was anticipated by His saying that He had received the Emperor's Command to express to me His Imperial Majesty's just sense of the service that you have rendered to the Common Cause by your able and zealous support

of Baron Degelman's representations, and to request of me to convey to you His Imperial Majesty's thanks. He added many obliging Compliments from himself. It is with real pleasure that I transmit to you these assurances from a Monarch whose firm and magnanimous Conduct so justly entitles him to a distinguished place in the page of future History. We understand that between 5 and 6,000 of the Enemy have escaped through Switzerland, but if it be true, as we are told, that they are gone to their respective homes, cursing the war and the Directory, their escape may have a good effect. Jourdan's army we consider as being entirely destroyed. Moreau we suppose to have effectuated the passage of the Rhine, though not without great loss—What Baptiste [Pichegru] required is done—Can He now do anything?

In Italy appearances are favourable, but much is still to do. The Austrian troops are sufficiently numerous, but the reinforcements consist chiefly of recruits that have never been in action. We are in daily expectation of hearing of their march forwards. The King of Naples promises much, but He has let slip the moment that would probably have been decisive of the fate of the war in Italy. I have but little reliance on effective succours from that Quarter.

His Prussian Majesty's connexion with his New friends is very intimate, but we do not think that a treaty of alliance between them has been concluded. M. de Lucchesini has communicated here an Act signed at Berlin on the 5th August by Count Haugwitz and M. de Calli, and settling the line of demarcation from the Source of the Fulda, by His Prussian Majesty's Dominions in Westphalia and round to the Elbe. Those States of the Empire which lie within this line are immediately to withdraw their Contingents and engage not to furnish any further assistance against France. The Margraviates of Anspach and Bayreuth were not comprised in the Line for the purpose of affording a passage to the enemy

into Bohemia. These kind intentions have happily been baffled by the Archduke's successes. I will only further add to this letter that the most perfect Concert and understanding prevail between this Court and Ours, and that every possible effort is making to recruit the different Armies and to supply them with every necessary.

Believe me to be ever, with great and unfeigned Regard, Dear Sir, Your most faithful, Humble Servant,

MORTON EDEN.

WM. WICKHAM, Esq.

Mr. Wickham to General Pichegru.

(Draft.) Berne, le 16 nov. 1796.

Furet [Demougé] m'a remis le Billet et la musique que Baptiste [Pichegru] avoit confié à Coco [Badouville]. Je pense comme Baptiste [Pichegru] au sujet du contenu du Billet, et ma confiance en lui est toujours le même, c'est-à-dire toujours sans Bornes. Par rapport à la musique, je ne peux que répéter ce que je lui ai déjà dit ou fait dire en tant de circonstances différentes. *Mes moyens* sont toujours à ses ordres ; je les tiens toujours prêts. C'est à lui seul à en indiquer l'emploi. Au surplus, je l'exhorte à avoir bon courage à travailler toujours, mais en même tems à ne pas trop se fier à ses ennemis. Ils sont fins, habiles, serrés, et au besoin audacieux. Le triomphe des méchans ne peut pas être éternelle, mais il peut être longue.

J'écris ce billet, *pour la première fois*, de ma propre main, sous les yeux de Furet [Demougé] même, et *cela pour cause*. Le dit Furet [Demougé] et Louis [Fauche Borel] m'ayant dit l'un et l'autre que Baptiste [Pichegru] se méfioit des intentions qu'on pouvoit avoir de favoriser soit les prétentions du rival du Grand Bourgeois [King Louis XVIII.] soit les projets infâmes des Jacobins et des Terroristes, je le crois de mon *devoir* de le détromper entièrement à ce sujet, de la manière la moins équivoque

et la plus solennelle. Je ne peux pas trop répéter à Baptiste que mes commettants et moi ont toujours eu, et auront j'espère à jamais, en horreur les *auteurs* et les *fauteurs* de pareils projets. *On ne les favorisera jamais*, et s'ils osoient s'approcher de nous, ce que je ne crois pas, B. [Pichegru] peut être assuré qu'eux, leurs offres, et leurs propositions seroient repoussés à l'instant même avec l'indignation et le mépris qu'ils doivent inspirer à tant de titres à tout homme, *soit public* soit particulier, qui possède encore le moindre sentiment de justice, d'honneur, d'amour de sa patrie ou de ses semblables.

J'ai de la peine cependant à pardonner à Baptiste [Pichegru] de s'être livré un instant à de pareils soupçons aussi injurieux pour nous que dangereux pour la chose publique, et qu'on pardonne à peine à ces infortunés dont les malheurs et les souffrances leur ont donné le droit de tout soupçonner et de tout dire. Mais un homme de sens et de talents qui a vu les choses de près, et que les évènements majeurs auroient dû instruire, comment ne voit-il pas qu'en se livrant à de telles pensées il est la dupe de ses ennemis, et qu'en le proclamant il se rend instrument aveugle de leur Machiavélisme accoutumé?

Du reste j'aime à croire que B. [Pichegru] n'a proféré cette idée que pour éprouver ceux à qui il parloit. Je le prierai d'être assuré de mon respect et de mon inviolable attachement.

Mr. Wickham to Sir Morton Eden.

(Draft.) Bern: 21st Nov. 96.

Dear Sir,—I have received your letter of the 4th November, and particularly thank you for the information contained in the cyphered part of it, which may materially assist me in forming my opinion upon some points on which it will be necessary for me immediately to write to Government.

I had hoped and promised to have written fully to you

upon the same subject before now, but I really have not had the time. You will naturally suppose the nature of the business here at this moment consists a great deal in matters of detail, and requires very often an exact and minute attention to trifles that prevent me from attending to more important matters as fully as I could wish.

As soon as I shall have written to Government upon the subject I will send you copies or extracts of my letters.

(*Cypher.*) In the mean time I should be particularly obliged to you if you could sound the Imperial Minister upon the question whether, 1st, a *moderate* augmentation of the Condé army would be seen without pain, and whether such an undertaking would be really *favoured* by the Court of Vienna or only *suffered*; 2nd, to what extent an augmentation might be allowed to go without being considered as *immoderate*; 3rd, whether, in case such an undertaking were either *favoured* or *suffered*, the Austrian Minister would really intimate his wishes to the Generals and officers on the staff in a way that they might be clearly understood and really abided by. (*Cypher ends.*)

From what I could collect whilst at Basle, it appeared to me most evident that Moreau's army would have been inevitably and intirely destroyed but for the dispute between Generals La Tour and Nauendorff. It appeared also most evident that the Prince of Condé, at the famous affair of the 2nd October, saved the Austrian army from total destruction. I most earnestly wish that the Court of Vienna could be brought to say something kind and friendly to the new King of Sardinia.

The negotiation at Paris has I daresay by this time terminated exactly as I had expected from the beginning. After the notes that have passed between Lord Malmesbury and Mr. La Croix, it seems to me impossible that his Lordship should remain much longer at Paris. I believe with you that *a certain Northern court* has not as yet"

entered into any direct alliance, but I am satisfyd that she is strongly pushed and tempted by her new friends, and that there is a good deal of *tampering* between them on that as well as on many other points.

P.S.—I thank you for your information respecting the Arch Duke. As His Royal Highness was gone to Offenburgh before my arrival at Basle, I did not think it right to follow him so far. For the news of the day I refer you to the inclosed, which I will thank you to have the goodness to forward.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Auckland.

Bern: 25th Nov. 96.

My Lord,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's very obliging letters of the 15th July, 12th Aug. and 4th Sept., together with two notes accompanying some pamphlets and newspapers for the Greffier, the whole of which reached me nearly at the same time, that is, not till some days after the communication with Francfort had been fairly open.

To form any idea of the pleasure that I received from their perusal, your Lordship must have been shut up like me for two months, receiving everything that reached me through the hands of the Enemy, a near Witness to their astonishing successes, and to all the calamities they were carrying with them, hearing their impudent Bulletins *cried about* every day, and receiving duplicates of some or one of them (and nothing else) in almost every letter that reached me from allmost every quarter. To crown the whole a panic terror had seized this Country against which the stoutest were not proof, and which was extremely fomented and encreased by the indiscreet fears of some, and the mischievous insinuation of others of our Countrymen, then resident here.

Under these circumstances I have infinite satisfaction in assuring your Lordship, that it is principally to the

statement contained in the speech of the 2nd May, and to the personal credit given to that statement, as coming from your Lordship, that I attribute the happy circumstance of the whole property of this State in England not being drawn at once out of the Funds in the most alarming moment of the crisis, when the change was heavy beyond example against us, and when the price of stocks was at the very lowest.

Having been a witness to the good that has been done here by the circulation of that work I have much pleasure in sending to your Lordship the enclosed Gazette, from which you will perceive that it probably begins to have the same effect at Paris. I still, however, return to what I have, I believe, before suggested to your Lordship, and what I cannot too often repeat, that a clear and distinct statement of the origin, nature, and effect of Mr. Pitt's sinking Fund, is at this moment our great *desideratum*, and that I am persuaded it will have the happiest effect if once freely circulated on the Continent. Had I had the necessary materials here, it should long since have been *done*. I take this opportunity of observing that whenever any thing of that kind *be done*, it answers much better that it should be sold than that it should be distributed gratis, and that it is allways useful that frequent and well chosen extracts from the work should be inserted in all the most popular Gazettes on the Continent; German, and Italian, as well as French. It is most extraordinary that even the name of the new sinking fund shoul as yet be but little known, and its nature still less understood upon the Continent. Your Lordship will hardly believe me when I say, that it is not so long since, that Mr. Neckar himself had not the smallest idea of it, and that I heard him myself harangue on the inutility of all sinking funds in England, as they were always seized and squandered away by the Ministry in time of war on the first exigency.

I am sorry that it is not in my power to send you an

uncut copy of the speech of the 2nd May, the Bookseller not having one remaining in that state

I cannot say how truly grateful I am to your Lordship for your kind attention in communicating to me from time to time your opinion on the state of the public mind and public credit at Home, nor of what satisfaction (I may say also of what service) it is to me to receive such statements from such a source. From Ministers, or any persons in the office, such things cannot be expected, and my own private friends are either too busy or too lazy to trouble me with many communications of that kind, and yet to enable me to labour with satisfaction and spirit here, it is *necessary* to be assured that all goes on well at home. It is to England alone that we can look up with hope and confidence, and your Lordship has no idea of the anxious moments that I sometimes pass, waiting for intelligence from that quarter, or of my disappointment when two, three, four and sometimes even five mails become successively due, whilst in the mean time we receive our only intelligence through the medium of French gazettes.

If my countrymen be yet *such* as I believe them to be, we have, be assured, nothing at all to fear. A little sooner or a little later this monstrous edifice must be pulled down to the ground. Its basis is already sapped by the strong arm of public opinion, and if you could contrive to calm the passions, and *steady* the imaginations of our unhappy neighbours, and give to certain descriptions of them the same degree of moderation and conciliatory spirit that has marked your Lordship's writings on the great question now before us, I think the *dénouement* would be infinitely nearer than is generally supposed.

(No. 100.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Bern: 27 Novr. 96.

My Lord,—(*Cypher.*) I am still unable to learn anything certain as to the destination of the expedition now preparing on the coasts. I continue to receive the same assurances from the two different persons whose opinions I have lately communicated. The one continues to maintain that a descent on the plan furnished by him is the *real object*, the other that a descent will probably be attempted, but that the real object is the Colonies.

If the mission of General Clarke to Vienna take place, it will be to me a decided proof either that the expedition is really destined for the Colonies, or that the descent is at least suspended.

The latter correspondant says that being perfectly sure of his fact, and yet *not being able to discover* that there are any preparations made at Brest for a very distant expedition, he is inclined to believe that it will sail either from the Mediterranean or the Texel.

I am assured, what I firmly believe, that the projects of the enemy in the Mediterranean and the Levant are again vast and dangerous, and that every thing will be put in practice to extend them to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulph. Their most active agent in all this business is Mr. Muredja, the Swedish Minister at Constantinople (whom your Lordship knows to be a pensioner of the French Republick); all their ministers and agents have special orders to consult that gentleman on every point, and (Mr. Smith will probably tell you) he is indefatigable in his endeavours to render them service. Unless the Empress can promise the removal of this man from his present situation, her new triumph at the Court of Stockholm will be but of little avail, as she will have left her most dangerous enemy behind her. This man is not only dangerous in consequence of the ability with which

he executes the *hostile* instructions that he receives from his Court, but he is from principle a decided enemy to Russia, and entirely devoted to the service and interests of France; he has, besides, an independant private fortune, and has all his private connections either in Turkey or in France, and is sure at all times of being received with open arms by the latter power, so that a mere removal of him from his place of Minister would be of no manner of service, unless he were sent for home, or removed to some honourable mission at a distance.

That Spain enters into all the views of aggrandizement of the French Republick in the Mediterranean and the Levant—at least into as much of them as it is thought prudent to reveal—there seems no manner of doubt.

There is no doubt also but that she has been promised that some of her old pretensions in Italy shall be revived in some shape or other. But that any treaty has been signed, or any secret *engagement* entered into, for putting an Infant on the Throne of France, as is the general opinion at Paris, I cannot bring myself to believe, though I have allmost the certainty that hints of that kind have been constantly thrown out by Tallien, and that his principal friends at the Court of Madrid, nominally Mr. Cabarus, and as I am assured also the Prince of Peace himself, had either entered or feigned to enter into the project.

The person, however, from whom I have hitherto received very correct information in everything that relates to Spain, assures me positively that, on the one hand, the Directory is really a party to all these manœuvres, on the other, that they have no more intention of really favouring an *Infant* of Spain than they have of restoring Louis XVIII.; their whole object being to deceive and amuse the Court of Spain, to commit her as deeply as possible, and to engage her irretrievably in the war with England, at the same time that they secure to

themselves a retreat in that country, in case of any new revolution at home. (*Cypher ends.*)

I am assured, from authority *that I cannot doubt*, that the Directory, though often put to great shifts for pecuniary supplies, and living (to use a trivial expression) from hand to mouth, is perfectly easy as to its expences for the ensuing year, and that, contrary to the expectation of its best friends, the government will be able to preserve *the appearance* of regularity and Justice, and avoid all *open* violation of the rights of private property.

The expences, if the war should continue, are estimated at fifteen hundred millions. This fact may be entirely relyd on. But the Committee of Finances, that the public might not be too much alarmed, was engaged to reduce the estimate to eleven hundred. The way in which it is proposed to provide for the 1100 has been made public. The Directory hopes to obtain the rest in part from the surplus of the *indirect impositions* with which it is intended to provide for the publick exigencies according to the calculation allready given. Those *indirect contributions* having been purposely rated very low, will, it is supposed, produce a very considerable sum above the estimate.

2nd. By voluntary contributions.

3rd. By supplementary lists to the forced loan, which will be directed entirely against the monied men, army agents, and contractors; who will be glad to make their peace by sacrificing a part of their fortune.

4th. By paying as they now do all their engagements in mandats and other papers of as little value.

(No. 102.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft. Cypher. Most Secret and Confidential.) Bern: 11 Dec. 1796.

My Lord,—In my several dispatches Nos. 66, 70, and 71, I informed your Lordship of the existence of three different clubs or committees at Paris, formed from

among the moderate and Royalist Parties in the Legislative assemblies, of which one had determined for the moment to give an active support to the Directory, the other had entered into communication with the agents of Louis the eighteenth at Paris, and the third was in correspondance with Mr. D'André, member of the Constitutional Assembly, now resident in Switzerland. I mentioned to your Lordship at the same time, something of the presumptuous Hopes entertained by the first of these committees, that it would be able to deceive and undo the Directory, and of my own persuasion that sooner or later its members would discover themselves to have been the Dupes of much abler men than themselves. It is now in my power to give your Lordship upon the same subject some further and more material information, which I have obtained as well from a more direct communication with some of the parties, as from a perusal of some of their confidential correspondance.

My information as to the persons who composed these different Committees was in many respects incorrect. The first, known by the name of the *Comité Directorial*, on account of the support that its members had determined to give for a time to the Directory, is composed of Messieurs Gilbert Desmolières, Dumas, Portalis, Simeon Duplantier, Dumolard, Cadrou, and another person whose name I cannot now recollect; Mr. Dupont de Nemours, though in habits of great intimacy with all of them, and entrusted with the direction of their favourite Gazette, the Historien, is however not admitted to their more secret conferences. This Committee allways meets at the House of Gilbert Desmolières.

The two last-mentioned Committees appear in fact to be one and the same. Its members are Messieurs Lemerer, Durand Maillane, Henri Larivière, Thibeaudeau, and a Mr. Ribufet (?), who has the direction of all the army contracts, but is a member of neither assembly. Mr. Durand Maillane carrys on their correspondance

with Mr. D'André, and Mr. Lemerer with the King's Agents.

All these Persons often meet at Clichy, together with several other of the Royalist and Moderate Parties, but the meeting at that place being really nothing more than a Club, and open to and attended by allmost all who profess generally the same way of thinking, no confidential communication ever takes place there, and Mr. Dumas's committee has in fact no very certain information either of the numbers, the opinions, or even of the existence of the other. I am inclined also to believe that the Directory itself has no good information upon that point, and that Mr. Lemerer's committee is confounded with the club of Clichy in general.

The Directory is not only acquainted with the existence of Mr. Dumas's committee, but has been in direct treaty with it *as a Body* for its support and assistance on several different occasions when matters of importance to Government were to be carried through one or both of the Assemblies. In the course of these communications, which have principally been carried on by Messieurs Carnot and Dumas, regular offers have been made, accepted, rejected, and modified by one party as well as the other, but the Committee affirm that every promise made, and every engagement entered into by the Directory has been as regularly either broken or eluded.

This Committee discovered about two months since, what nothing but the personal vanity and presumption of Mr. Dumas could have prevented them from learning long before, that they had been in every point the Dupes of the government, and that they had been aiding it in all its plans of finance, in all its military and political speculations, to no other end than the fixing more firmly the Directory in its usurpation, and destroying all the future hopes, power, and means of themselves and their own friends and party.

Among many others they alledge four specific objects of complaint.

First, that the Directory refused, contrary *to their express engagement*, to dismiss Mr. Merlin of Douai, and put Mr. Demousseau in his place.

Secondly, that they refused, in like manner contrary to express engagement, to dismiss a number of their commissaries in the different Departments whose misconduct was notorious, and who were proved to the Directory to be in direct communication with the different Jacobin societies in their respective Provinces.

Thirdly, that different messages had been sent by the Directory to the two Assemblies, inviting them to adopt measures of which the Committee disapproved, and of which they had declared their decided disapprobation to the Directory at conferences holden for the purpose of discussing those particular points.

Fourthly, that the Directory, instead of leaving the approaching elections free, *as they had promised to do*, were secretly endeavouring, by their commissioners and agents in the different Departments, to secure a majority of their own creatures; and that finding it neither possible nor indeed safe to *bring in* a sufficient number of Jacobins, they were endeavouring to form a coalition among the purchasers of national property, upon whose support they thought they could intirely rely *from the motive of common Interest.**

The Committee particularly complains that the Directory, with a view of carrying this point more easily, and making its effect more extensive, had hastened the sale of the confiscated estates, and brought such an immense quantity of that property into the market at once as had reduced its value to a mere trifle, made it accessible to all their own creatures and dependants, and rendered it allmost null considered as a national resource.

* *Note at the side.*—That this is the actual project of the Directory is confirmed to me from several quarters.

In consequence of this discovery of the Committee, and particularly with a view to this last grievance, they deputed three of their members, viz. Messieurs Cadrou, Dumolard, and Duplantier, to the Southern Departments, to which they imagined that the efforts of the government would be chiefly directed, with instructions to discover the plans and intrigues of the Directory, and to endeavour to defeat them if possible by their presence, their influence, and their exertions among their friends and partisans. In one word, they were charged to undo, if the thing was still practicable, all the mischief they themselves had caused by their own correspondance, their printed Gazettes, and the opinions they had been constantly giving to their partisans in those very departments, as to the necessity of supporting the Directory from the fear of greater evils.

It will probably not have escaped your Lordship that the absence of these gentlemen from the Assembly was noticed, and the nature and object of their mission very exactly explained in the Jacobin Gazettes, a very short time after their departure from Paris.

Mr. Duplantier, however, had another object in view which appears to have been kept more secret, the execution of which his habitual residence in the Department of the Ain on this frontier greatly facilitated. He was charged to go into Switzerland, and endeavour to engage all the members of the Constitutional party resident there to enter immediately each into their respective Department, to endeavour to procure *themselves* if possible, if not their friends, to be chosen at the approaching election, and then to form a common cause with their Committee the *primary* object of which should be an attack upon the Directory, the *ultimate* one, the restoration of a monarchy in the person of the present Sovereign. Mr. Duplantier first saw Mr. Duport and Mr. Theodore Lameth, both of whom he engaged to follow his advice without difficulty, and one if not both of them are now actually at

Dole. He next waited on Mr. D'André, for whom he had a special commission tending to persuade that gentleman to engage the friends with whom they supposed him to be in correspondance at Paris to unite with *their* Committee, and then to come himself to Paris, and to put himself at their head. Mr. D'André, after having declined to give any positive answer, and denying all knowledge of the existence of any thing like a club or committee among his friends at Paris, came over to Berne, communicated to me the whole of what had passed, and desired my advice and instructions on the occasion, as well in what respected himself personally, as in regard to his engagements, contracted in the beginning of the year at Verona, with which I have allready made your Lordship acquainted.

I did not hesitate to promise to Mr. D'André every possible support, and to advise him, provided he were persuaded that he ran no personal danger, to undertake the Journey to Paris immediately; his personal talents, as well as the engagement above alluded to, rendering him in my mind by far the most proper person that could be found to direct an undertaking of the nature of the one in question.

The Instructions that I ventured to give him were in every respect conformable to the principle of those which I originally received from your Lordship, and to the opinions I have of late so frequently and so uniformly expressed with respect to the necessity of mutual sacrifices and of an union of every party that sincerely wishes for the reestablishment of order and tranquillity in France and of Peace in Europe. It would be useless therefore for me to repeat them to your Lordship.

I have, however, given Mr. D'André the strongest caution against committing himself or his friends too easily with Persons who had conducted themselves so inconsiderately (to say nothing worse) as Mr. Dumas and his Committee appear to have done in their commu-

nications with the Directory, being myself by no means persuaded that Mr. Carnot, whenever he shall think it worth while, may not gain the greater part of them once again. I am sorry to add that I have reason to believe that the Directory considers itself certain of being able to secure a majority of the new election.

I must not omit mentioning to your Lordship on this occasion, extraordinary as the conduct of Mr. Duplantier may appear in some respects, that when he went to Paris last year he was a steady Royalist; that he has universally the reputation of being such; that he is still in correspondance with many of that description of persons; and that Mr. Preçy and Mr. Imbert would have relyd very much on his influence and exertions in the county of Bresse in case circumstances had permitted them to take up arms. I should add also, that during his present residence at Bourg, one of Mr. de Preçy's confidential friends went from hence to see him there and passed a fortnight in his house, on which occasion he held exactly the same language with respect to the general situation of affairs that he was instructed to hold to Mr. D'André.

Among many other things of less importance, I learnt from these gentlemen that nothing can be more secret than the Councils of the Directory, and that in all their communications they were never able to learn anything of the general views or particular plans of the government but exactly so much as was meant to be entrusted to them, as in the case of the projected descent in which Dumas was actually consulted; and that not only their own Committee, but also — *(Cypher ends)* the great majority of the Royalists and of the moderate party throughout France, are still persuaded that the British Ministry allways have supported, and still continue secretly to support, the Partizans of the Duke of Orleans, as well as the Jacobins and Terrorists, with the intention of maintaining the state of anarchy and disorder under which that unhappy country has so long laboured.

The manner in which this extravagant opinion is propagated, and the extent to which it is carryd, is at the same time one of the most extraordinary circumstances of the Revolution, and one of the most striking proofs of the uncommon ability and address of the Directory and their agents.

(No. 106.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft. Cypher.) Bern: 14th Decr. 1796.

My Lord,—In my dispatch No. 91, I had the honour of communicating to Your Lordship the particulars of a conversation that had then lately taken place between the person known by the name of Baptiste [Pichegru] and my agent at Strasburg. Your Lordship will there have remarked, that Baptiste [Pichegru] considered the manner in which General Moreau appeared to be effectuating his retreat as a circumstance which might again destroy, for a time at least, all hopes of realizing the plan, whatever it may be, upon which he had intended to have acted. What we have since seen has but too well justified his apprehensions, and necessarily puts a decided end to all his projects untill a new campaign shall offer us a better perspective. On receiving the above report, I immediately informed my agent that I should discontinue the small pecuniary supplies with which I had lately furnished that service, as no longer of any possible public utility, unless Baptiste [Pichegru] himself should inform me *directly* that he thought a continuation of them necessary, and unless he himself also particularly specified the amount, as well as the manner, in which he wished them to be applied.

In answer to this message, to my very great surprize, Baptiste [Pichegru], for the first time, sent me two short notes* in his own hand writing (one of them in cypher),

* These are probably the two notes mentioned by Montgaillard, p. 93. Mr. Wickham has written in the margin of that page in his copy of Montgaillard's work, 'P. ne m'a jamais demandé de l'argent.'

and ordered his old Adjutant, Mr. Badouville (of whom I have often had occasion to speak to your Lordship), to bring them to me himself to Basle, accompanied by my own agent.

The note in common writing was to say, that, though he thought that Things were brought nearer to a point than they had been, yet that, under the present circumstances, his taking any part was impossible. The note in cypher added, that he wished me not to discontinue entirely all pecuniary supplies, but that it was impossible for him to fix the precise sum that would be necessary.

Mr. Badouville was charged to enter with me more particularly into both those subjects.

Unfortunately, I had left Basle the day before his arrival, and his own situation as Colonel of a Regiment of Hussars, now in actual service on the Rhine, rendered his following me impossible. He therefore sent my own agent on here with a Letter, saying that he had communicated to that person the whole of his last Conversation with Baptiste [Pichegru], and that I might rely upon the exactness of the account he would give me of it. The following are nearly all the particulars that my agent communicated to me.

First. As to the continuation of a pecuniary supply, Baptiste [Pichegru] was of opinion that any distribution of money among the Troops, or any attempt to gain any particular persons, was, in the present moment, quite unnecessary, and might even do mischief, but he desired that two officers who had been originally about his person, whom he had afterwards placed advantageously under General Moreau, and to whom he had communicated the whole Affair from the beginning, might have an allowance continued, to enable them to appear and live as officers ought to do. He particularly requested at the same time, that some engagements that had been entered into last year for the purpose of saving my agent Fauche, might be strictly executed.

Secondly. He desired that my own agent might accompany him to Paris, and remain with him there to carry on his correspondance, as he was determined to commit nothing more to paper in his own hand writing, and as Mr. Badouville, who is in correspondance with the Austrian Generals, might supply his place to better purpose at Strasburg. He further desired, that either that Agent himself might have a Credit at Paris, or that he might have the Power of addressing himself to some confidential Person that had.

Thirdly. As to his opinion upon the general situation of Affairs, as they had not very materially changed since the last Communication I had from him in the summer, so he said he had nothing very materially new to say; he thought, however, notwithstanding that Moreau and his Army were still too full of courage and spirits, yet that the superiority of the Austrian Troops *when well commanded* was now pretty generally acknowledged by the Republicans; that the Communication of good offices that had taken place between the Republicans and the Army of Condé was a most fortunate Circumstance, and had produced a very happy effect, and that there were not wanting people in the Army who, to his knowledge, made the best use of it; that in general the publick opinion, both in the Army and in the interior of the Country, had materially improved since last year, and that he never had better hopes of the Troubles in his own Country being brought at last to a happy conclusion.

Fourthly. In answer to two different reproaches that I had directed to be made to him,—viz. one, that whilst he had the command of the Army he had never communicated with the Austrians in such a way that they might be assured of his disposition to consider their Cause as his own; *the other*, that he had never given them any opportunity of taking advantage of that disposition,—he desired me to observe, 1st, that it would have

been dangerous, as well as difficult, for him to have himself sought any communication *directly* with the Austrians, and that he had, besides, every reason to believe that the Prince of Condé had made them acquainted with everything that passed, as he had particularly advised that measure from the very beginning; that as for the Austrians themselves, they never addressed themselves to him till after the Armistice had been nearly if not actually concluded with General Jourdan.

Secondly. That he had favoured them to the utmost of his power on four different occasions—the first, in not passing the Rhine either so soon, or with so sufficient a force as he might have done; the second in composing the garrison of Manheim of 10,000 of the best and at the same time the most desperate Troops of the whole Army, under the orders of a man who was quite incapable of commanding them; the third and fourth, in twice committing his *whole* army, and more particularly once on the Pfinz, before Manheim, in a good position certainly, for with the Generals he had about him he could not have taken any other, but in a fair field of Battle, in such a way as no Republican General had ever done before or since, and so that if the Austrian Generals had had the spirit to have done the same, the *whole* might and probably would have been utterly destroyed.

They however, having chosen to attack him on only one point, it was not to be expected that he would suffer himself to be turned, or make such a clumsy retreat as would have destroyed his military reputation. *As it was*, he maintains that the Austrians, before the Battle of Manheim, might have followed him under the walls of Strasburg, in which case he believed that either the army would have disbanded or that he should have been entirely the master of it.

Lastly, Mr. Badouville was particularly desired to say that it was the general opinion at Paris, either that the

British Government or, if not the Government, at least some powerful party in England, favoured the cause of the Jacobins as well as that of the Duke of Orleans, and certainly furnished their partizans with money; and that he particularly wished I would set his mind at rest upon that point, and enable him to assure his friends that it was not so.

Being fully satisfied of the importance of doing away the bad impression which this opinion had caused in France, I wrote a note to Baptiste [Pichegru] in my own hand writing (to convince him that I was not afraid of committing myself on the subject) nearly in the following terms: — 'That having now learnt from his own agent that he really harboured such an idea, I felt it my duty to undeceive him in the most unequivocal manner. That both my employers and myself should ever have in horror the authors and supporters of the horrible faction to which he alluded; that we never had and never could favour or assist them, and that should they ever address themselves to us, they and their offers should be received with the contempt and the indignation they must necessarily inspire to every man, *public as well as private*, who had the smallest principle of justice, of honour, of love of his own country or of his fellow creatures still remaining.

'That for myself I felt it difficult to pardon such conduct in a man of his sense and experience; and that it was astonishing that he should not long since have perceived, that in harbouring such an injurious suspicion he was making himself the Dupe of the common enemy; and that in propagating it, he was rendering himself the unwilling instrument of their most dangerous and artful designs.

'On the question of pecuniary supplies, I assured him that his desires should be complied with in every point, and also that my agent should follow him to Paris, and should be furnished with the credit he required.'

This letter was conveyed to Baptiste [Pichegru] at his usual residence at Belvaux in Franche Compté by my agent alone (Mr. Badouville being obliged to rejoin his regiment from Basle), and I have received in answer the strongest assurances of satisfaction at its contents, and of the firm intention of Baptiste to serve the cause of the Allies, to use his own expression, *according as circumstances will permit.* (*Cypher ends.*)

General Pichegru still remains in Franche Compté, where he is visited by crowds of persons of every Description. His own friends say he has refused the repeated demands of the Directory to undertake his embassy to Sweden. His conversation is, I am told, Republican, but mixed with strong marks of disapprobation of the conduct of the Directory in the protection they accord to the Jacobins, in the arbitrary measures they adopt in the Departments, and in the folly and rashness of their military enterprizes.

The desertion to the interior of France is again become very considerable in the French armies. Letters from officers of this date now in garrison at Basle say that it has been so high as 400 in a day in the army before Huninguen.

(No. 108.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Extract from Draft.) Bern: 18 Decr. 96.

My Lord,— . . . . I formerly mentioned to your Lordship that the famous diamond known by the name of Pitt's diamond had been sent to Berlin. I now find that it was not then sold, but that, together with several others, it is still there in pledge for a considerable sum of money that the Republick has taken on a loan, of the exact amount of which I am not informed, but I have reason to believe that it is not very considerable. However that may be, I have reason to be assured that the Directory has been lately much pressed to pay the last 6 months'

Interest, and that they have hitherto put off the Lenders with very trifling excuses.

(*Cypher.*) Notwithstanding what I so lately marked to your Lordship respecting the near probability of an alliance between the Republick and the Court of Berlin, I have again positive information that the Directory has some new subject of dissatisfaction, and that their confidential persons exclaim again against the perfidy of that Court. My correspondant attributes this dissatisfaction to the disagreement of the Ministers amongst themselves, to the mediocrity of their talents, and to no one of them feeling himself bold enough to embrace so new and extensive a system of policy as that in which the Directory would engage them.

I am assured from the same quarter that the Court of Berlin maintains at this moment (in confidence with the Directory) some secret and very high and dangerous correspondance in Russia. This advice comes to me from a person well informed, who I know wishes well to his Majesty's government. When he communicated it to my agent he desired him to forward it to me immediately, and to desire that his Majesty's Ministers at the Courts of Berlin and Petersburgh would spare no pains to get more perfect information on the spot. That in the mean time he would spare none in Paris, but it was more than ever difficult to learn the details of such projects, they being in general known to Rewbell alone. I am assured from the same source, to which, from past experience, I am inclined to give much credit, that the plan of the Directory with respect to the Court of Vienna is this.

If possible to obtain a separate peace. *First*, by the offer of a compensation in Germany for the Low Countries, and for such sacrifices as *may be necessary* in Italy. *Secondly*, on the probability that these conditions will be rejected, by an offer to restore so much of the Low Countries as the Emperor shall finally insist on after every province and every town shall have been contended for

inch by inch. I am persuaded that the giving up these possessions has been determined on after much consideration, and that it will be effected in the manner and on the principle stated in my Nos. 43 and 48. It has been said in favour of this system that the Low Countries were only wanted for a temporary purpose, viz. that of plunder, and that that purpose being now answered, there was no longer the same interest in keeping them at the risk of the ruin of the Republick.

Whether all or any of the conquests in Italy shall be ceded to the Emperor in addition to the Low Countries, is said to be as yet undecided. Should these offers be rejected *on account of the engagements by which the Emperor is bound with England and Russia*, it is then intended to propose the same terms *as the Basis of a treaty* to which the other powers may accede, during the negotiation of which an armistice shall be granted on the Rhine and in Italy which from the nature of a maritime war cannot be extended to England. With respect to Spain, I firmly believe, on the one hand, that the Prince of Peace as well as the Queen are really flattered with the idea of an Infant becoming King of France, and that, on the other, the Directory, having thrown the government off its guard by this illusion, is doing its utmost to bring about a revolution in their own manner in that devoted country. I informed your Lordship long since that measures to that effect had been taken, and *I know* that hopes of their success have been lately thrown out, and expectations raised, should such an event take place, of the revolution being carried to full as great an extent there as in France.

The departure of General Clarke for Vienna contributes more than any thing else to make me believe that the expedition against Ireland is laid aside.

(No. 110.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Bern: 22 Decr. 96.

My Lord,—I have received *from the Comte de Grandpré* the following intelligence, which becomes more important as I am assured that Mr. Leger has accepted the mission proposed to him, and as Mr. De Fresne, the late Governor of Pondicherry (with whom, though in the Interior of France, I have the means of corresponding) gives me nearly the same information as to what he conceives the *probable* intentions of that gentleman, of whose talents and means he entertains the very highest opinion, but expresses much astonishment that he should have accepted any employment under the Republic, as he had been obliged to quit Pondicherry early in the Revolution on account of his attachment to the old Government.

The views and plans of Mr. Leger, late Intendant of Pondicherry, *which have been adopted*, are shortly these: 1st, to engage Tippoo Sultan to break his Treaty with the English and commence hostilities against the company. In consideration of which the French are to aid that Prince in recovering, and afterwards to guarantee to him, not only all that was taken from him by Earl Cornwallis, but also the whole country of the Nabob of Arcot, under the condition that the French alone are to be permitted to have any settlements from Bombay to Balassore, and from thence Southwards.

2nd. In conjunction with that Prince, to drive the English beyond Balassore and to confine them entirely to the Province of Bengal, after which event it is to be in the option of the French, according to circumstances, either to leave them peaceable Possessors of that Country, or to attack them there *with the assistance of the Marattahs.* Mr. Grandpré adds that he cannot find that they have any means whatever capable of effecting so vast a project.

The experience, however, we have had of that adventurous rashness by which their councils are allways directed, and of their indifference about the fate of their friends and allies *provided they can once effectually commit them*, leaves no room to doubt but that they will do everything in their power to engage Tippoo Sultan in a new war, whatever may be the consequences, without considering that the probable result of it would be the further aggrandizement of the British Power and influence in the East. I should add here that Mr. De Fresne assures me that, if *any European be capable of influencing the mind of Tippoo to such a degree*, it is undoubtedly Mr. Leger.

Mr. Grandpré further informs me that it is not the intention of the enemy to send out any avowed and regular force, but to encourage several enterprising and ambitious Partizans and adventurers to recruit here among the most desperate corps of their own army under the Hope of Plunder. These corps or skeletons of corps are to be sent out in small numbers at a time to Tippoo, who is not to declare himself untill he shall have received a sufficient number of Europeans. (*Cypher ends.*)

I have taken such measures as that I hope to be very accurately informed of all Mr. Leger's motions, and the Presidencies in India shall regularly receive the most exact information of everything that shall come to my knowledge upon so important a subject.

(No. 111.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Bern: 28 Dec^r. 96.

(*Cypher.*) My Lord,—After a conference between the Generals Froelich and Wolf and Mr. Badouville at Basle, the Archduke has sent to the latter to desire that he would *at all events* contrive to absent himself for a short time, and meet his Royal Highness at Offenburgh. Mr. Badouville has declined accepting the offer untill he shall have my opinion, as well as that of Baptiste [Pichegru] on

the expediency of the measure. For myself, though I think it extremely dangerous, and would certainly have given that opinion to the Archduke himself, had I had an opportunity of communicating with his Royal Highness, yet for obvious reasons I have not ventured to say so to Mr Badouville, who is now gone into Franche Compté to consult Baptiste [Pichegru] on that point, as well as to know whether, in case he should approve of the journey, he had anything new to communicate to the Archduke.

Mr. Badouville, in making me the above communication, forgot to state what was the nature of his conversation with the Austrian Generals. I think, however, I can collect that it related entirely to the operations before Kehl and Huninguen.

I have almost every day new proofs as well of the indiscretion of Mr. Montgalliard with respect to the correspondance with Baptiste [Pichegru], as of the extreme degree to which the confidence so imprudently placed in that gentleman by the French Princes has been carried.

I have learnt also several facts tending to strengthen the opinion I have long formed of the profound immorality and wickedness of that man, and of his having lately given information to the French Government as a means of making his peace with the Directory. I am now the less surprized at the Intelligence communicated by Mr. Drake (alluded to in my No. 91) as to the opinions circulated in the Italian Army with respect to Baptiste [Pichegru], as I find that Mr. Montgalliard has been intriguing with that army ever since the month of July last, from which epoch those reports date their origin.

This gentleman is now at Venice with Mr. D'Antraigues and the Abbé de Villefort. Their letters are occasionally shewn to me. It is not to be conceived what mischief they do, or of how very dangerous a tendency is the whole nature of their correspondance, as well in what respects its subject matter *as the sort of persons* to whom it is addressed. I have hitherto forborn to say anything

on the subject of the Abbé de Villefort, nor do I think it now worth while to fatigue your Lordship to no purpose by entering into many particulars concerning either his personal character, his avowed opinions with respect to the British Government, or his general conduct in this country. I will only observe that the agents of the French King appear highly culpable for having concealed, at the time they ventured to recommend him to your Lordship, many facts that they must necessarily have known on the two former of those Points. His opinion respecting his Majesty's Government he has not thought necessary to disguise even from me, and the immorality of his life and conversation was such (as Mr. Preçy may probably have informed your Lordship) that the Clergy in the Diocese of Lyons found it necessary to make a strong remonstrance against his presence there as matter of scandal to all well disposed persons, and extremely detrimental to the cause he meant to serve.

I furnished him at his own request with the means of returning to England in the month of July last, and meant then to have written to your Lordship on the whole subject, though not by him, but I found that, instead of going to London, he had set off immediately to join Mr. D'Antraigues at Venice.

A person whom I had instructed to pay due attention to the affair of Mr. de Grandpré, after having satisfyd me as to the reality of his appointment to the command of the projected expedition, writes to me as follows:— 'Je pense que l'affaire pourra bien être croisée, parceque toute cette machine est dans un débâcle affreux. Quant à Mr. Grandpré—lui-même, je lui ai trouvé toute la franchise, toute la rondeur, toute la délicatesse que j'aurais pu désirer, et rien qui m'offusquât sinon qu'il me paroissoit trop sûr *et de son affaire et de sa personne*, ce que j'attribue au caractère national.' It appears that Mr. Grandpré will only receive final instructions at Brest, and that he will not receive any part of his pay or ex-

traordinary appointments untill his arrival at that Port. I learn as well from that person as from Mr. Grandpré that the Clerks in the office of the Marine know little or rather nothing of the nature and object of the intended expedition.

Every thing, they say, is carried on at Brest, and concerted between General Hoche and the Directory, and the orders for victualling the fleet, *if any such exist to any extent*, are given directly either by the Directory or the General. It is the opinion in the office, that the disputes among the officers are irreconcileable, and also that Mr. Truguet will be displaced on his return to Paris.

I am still assured most positively, on the faith of new and more exact inquiries, (though my correspondant admits that the greater part of the fleet is probably not intended for a long voyage) that the main object of the Brest squadron is the West Indies, and also that the fleet destined to protect that expedition will escort it to the Latitude of the Canaries. My correspondant is aware of the extent of the armament preparing, and of the intention of Hoche to make a descent in Ireland, but he is persuaded that nothing of the kind will at last be put in execution, as the plan will always be counteracted by the Naval officers, who are decidedly against it. He is *certain*, he says, that a portion of the fleet is intended for the West Indies, and he is persuaded from many circumstances that that portion will be materially augmented when the expedition against Ireland shall be abandoned.

It is, I believe, the undoubted intention at this moment to establish a pretty formidable, but temporary, cruise on the coast of Africa—I believe somewhere between Madeira and the Canaries. My correspondent *inclines* to think that Richery's squadron may be destined to this expedition. (*Cypher ends.*)

The offers about to be made to the Court of Vienna

were, I believe, certainly such as I lately stated them to be. But this, like all their plans, is liable to be changed at every moment according as new circumstances may offer new hopes of success in their greater schemes; and I should think it more than probable that the death of her late Majesty the Empress of Russia may at least have caused those offers to be suspended or very materially modified.

Notwithstanding the present favourable appearance of affairs in Portugal, the intimation I lately gave your Lordship on the subject of the connections of the enemy at the Court of Lisbon are by no means to be despised. I am persuaded that my information on that point was good (*Cypher*) as well as what I stated to your Lordship in my No. 108, respecting the intrigues carrying on at the Court of Petersburgh. I am now informed that the Directory either has employed, or is about to employ in the conduct of that affair, a certain Abbé Girod, who was formerly attached to the Prince of Nassau, was afterwards in England, and is stated to me to be much connected with Mr. Le H——, the late French Minister in Sweden.

The communication lately made by the Directory to the Assembly on the deplorable situation of the Republick is, I firmly believe, by no means exaggerated. It cannot, however, be too often repeated that it must not be inferred from thence that the Directory will not be able to find resources for the ensuing campaign, unless, beyond my hopes, the new elections should prove so favourable as to enable the moderate Party to obtain and exercise an effective control over the operations of the Government.

My information on that head is, I know, by past experience, but too well founded; and this very message had no other object in view but that of facilitating and justifying some extraordinary measure, and of throwing the odium of all the increased calamities and misfortunes

of the nation upon the two Assemblies, should they refuse to concur in its execution.

The meeting of the Merchants and Bankers will, I believe, produce nothing effective, and their report (though I am not yet acquainted with the particulars) has, I believe, been highly unsatisfactory, inasmuch as the opinion of the whole Body was strongly expressed in favour of Peace, as the only means remaining of restoring public credit, without which there were no means of restoring the Finances.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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